

THE
ROMAN HISTORY,

FROM THE

Building of ROME

TO THE

Ruin of the COMMONWEALTH.

By N. HOOKE, Esq;

VOL. III.

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THE HISTORY OF THE
ARTS OF BRITAIN

1200 A.D.

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ARTS OF BRITAIN

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M O L Y R O I D A C Y

T O T H E

R I G H T H O N O U R A B L E

H U G H , E a r l o f M A R C H M O N T .

My Lord,

PERMIT me to lay hold of this fair occasion, publicly to congratulate your Lordship, upon that *true Glory, the consenting praise of the honest and the wise*, which you have so early acquired. ‘ When men have performed any *virtuous actions*, ‘ or such as sit easy upon their memories, it is a ‘ reasonable pleasure (says a philosophical * Writer, ‘ who speaks contemptuously enough of Renown ‘ after death) ‘ to have the testimony of the ‘ world added to that of their own consciences, ‘ that they have done well.’ My Lord, you have not only this pleasure, but another, no less reasonable, and more exquisite, attending a character like yours, The being able to do much good to others. To those whom you distinguish by particular marks of your good opinion you give reputation; and I have happily experienced, that reputation, so derived, is not meer air and fruitless. Through that warmth of good will which your Lordship, on all occasions, expresses for me, I have profited, greatly profited, by *your glory*. You, my Lord, can be no stranger to this truth; yet I trust, you will forgive me, if, to

* Mr. Wollaston.

D E D I C A T I O N.

draw still more advantage from your fame, I here take the liberty to tell your Lordship, *in print*, for the information of others, what you knew before: as a Player, when alone on the stage, speaks aloud to himself, that he may be heard by those who fill the Theatre. I would, by this dedication of my Book to your Lordship, publish, as far as by such means I can, that You, my Lord, are my Patron and my Friend; and that I am, with the greatest respect, esteem and gratitude,



My Lord,

Your Lordship's

Most faithful, and

Most Humble Servant,

N. HOOKE.

DISSERTATION

ON THE

CREDIBILITY of the HISTORY of the first 500 years of ROME.

THE famous *Turenne*, (as we learn from the history of his life) when he was about 12 years old, sent a challenge to an officer, who had affronted him, by saying that *Quintus Curtius*'s history of *Alexander the Great* was a mere romance. I do not wish, that our young gentlemen, who have begun to delight themselves in the Roman History, should carry their resentments so far against M. de *Beaufort*, author of a work, intitled, ‘*Dissertation sur l’Incertitude des cinq premiers siecles de l’Histoire Romaine*’^a: yet I think they may reasonably look upon him as an enemy, who seeks to deprive them of a considerable part of their pleasures; and that they ought to be upon their guard against him. And, for my own part, I cannot readily consent to have my grave remarks upon certain passages of the history reduced to the importance of those, by which some industrious chronologer should fix the precise year when *Noab*’s grand-daughter *Cesara* fled into *Ireland* to escape the deluge. For the sake therefore of us Romanists, I once purposed to have gone through the whole of M. de *B.*’s Dissertation, and to have attempted to shew the insufficiency of his citations and his reasonings for discrediting the Roman History of the first 500 years, as to the main and fundamentals of it: for much of the embroidery and flourishing may be given up without parting with the ground-

Ramsay’s
life of the
Viscount
de Turen-
ne.

Topog.
Hibern.
p. 135,
136. apud
M. de
Pouilli.

^a A Dissertation on the uncertainty of the history of the first five ages of Rome.

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work ^b. But the execution of that design would stretch this Discourse to too great a length: and I conceive, that to those who have perused M. L'Abbé Sallier's ^c Defence of the history against the attacks of M. de Pouilli, any further defence is unnecessary. However, as the discourses of that able champion of our cause have, I think, neither been printed apart from the

^b That the *Romans* had, with the neighbouring states, the successive wars which *Livy* has recorded; that these wars followed one another in the order given them by *Livy*, and had the final events which he has mentioned, may surely be admitted by a reader, not over credulous, and who at the same time will, in his own mind, naturally abate somewhat of the complete victories and numerous triumphs, with which *Livy* has adorned his history, in compliance with the vanity of his countrymen. For, that the *Roman* vanity has now and then prevailed to the misrepresentation of facts, is too manifest, from several passages in the Latine Historian, some regarding the earlier, some the later ages of *Rome*. The fortunate effect of the unsuccessful enterprize of *Mucius* against *Porsenna*'s life, and the marvellous exploit of *Camillus* against the *Gauls*, when, at the foot of the Capitol, they were selling a peace to the *Romans*, are remarkable instances of the power of this vanity. And that it had its influence in *Livy*'s relations of the war of *Hannibal*, and the *Spanish* war, is shewn in the second part of this History.

See *Memoires de Litterature, &c.*
Tom. 8.
edit.
Amsterd.
Pref. p.
vii.

^c It was the controversy [in 1722, 23, 24, 25] between these two very learned and very eloquent gentlemen, members of the Royal French Academy of Inscriptions and Belles Lettres, which gave occasion to M. de Beaufort's Dissertation sur l'Incertitude des cinq premiers siecles de l'histoire Romaine. Not content with the efforts made by M. de Pouilli, who, he thinks, has treated a little too superficially a matter which deserved to be examined to the bottom, he without neglecting M. de Pouilli's arguments, endeavours to supply his deficiencies, and to prove, even to Demonstration, the Uncertainty &c. [Je crois avoir démontré, d'une maniere très claire, l'incertitude qui regne sur le temps lequel a précédé, la prise de Rome par les Gaulois, et la destruction de ses monumens, qui en fut une suite naturelle. Il est vrai, que cela ne prouve rien à l'égard du siècle suivant, sur lequel j'ai cru pouvoir étendre cette incertitude, à cause de la confusion, qui regne encore par rapport à divers evenemens.] In 1738 M. de Beaufort gave the first edition of his Dissertation; an English translation of which was published in 1740. His second edition of it revised, corrected, and considerably augmented, bears date 1750. 'Tis to the pages of the latter the references are made.

N. B. M. de Beaufort gives up one argument, on which M. de Pouilli expatiates, drawn from the work called, *The Parallels of Plutarch*, a work of which M. Abbé Sallier has totally destroyed the credit.

other



other pieces in the *Memoires de Litterature*, nor translated into *English*, and therefore may not have fallen into the hands of many persons, who may have met with M. de B's Dissertation, which is translated, I shall just mention some particulars, in which I apprehend the chief strength of M. L'Abbé Sallier's arguments to be couch'd; and then make some brief remarks on M. de B's principal positions in his attempt to refute those arguments.

1. It is beyond all belief, that *Varro*^d, the most learned *Roman* of the most learned age of *Rome*, should employ his studies and his labours upon the antiquities of his country, in order to dispel the obscurity cast upon the history of the earliest ages, unless there were means of attaining to certainty, or a high degree of probability, with regard to many things that passed in those ages.

2. It is no less incredible, that *Cicero* should ^e design, and

^d Of *Varro* *Cicero* thus writes.

Nos in nostra urbe peregrinantes errantesque tanquam hospites, tui libri quasi domum deduxerunt, ut possemus aliquando qui, et ubi effemus agnoscere; tu ætatem patræ, tu descriptiones temporum, sedem locorum, tu sacrorum jurâ, tu domesticam, tu bellicam disciplinam, tu omnium divinarum humarumque rerum nomina, genera, officia, causas aperuisti. Acad. 1. c. 3.

^e *Cicero*, says Dr. Middleton, was meditating a general history of *Rome*, to which he was frequently urged by his friends, as the only man capable of adding that glory to his country, of excelling the Greeks in a species of writing, which, of all others, was at that time the least cultivated by the *Romans*. But he never found leisure to execute so great a task; yet has sketched out a plan of it, which, short as it is, seems to be the best, that can be formed, for the design of a perfect history.

He declares it to be the first and fundamental law of history, that it should neither dare to say any thing that was false, nor fear to say any thing that was true, nor give any just suspicion either of favour or disaffection: that in the relation of things, the writer should observe the order of time, and add also the description of places: That in all great and memorable transactions, he should first explain the councils, then the acts, lastly the events: that in the councils he should interpose his own judgment on the merit of them: in the acts should relate not only what was done, but how it was done: in the events, should shew, what share chance, or rashness, or prudence had in them: that in regard to persons, he should describe, not only their particular actions, but the lives and

M. L'Abbé
Sallier
1st and
3^d Disc.

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and *Livy* undertake^f a history of the earliest ages of *Rome*, if they had no authentic records, no solid materials for their ground work; and this in an age, of which *Cicero* says^g, that it was too knowing, too much enlightened to be imposed upon by fictions and persuaded to believe absurdities.

3. *Cicero* in six books which he wrote concerning the *commonwealth*, gave a particular and circumstantial^h account of the customs and maxims of antient *Rome*, à *primo urbis oriu*, its domestic and military discipline.

4. We have the express testimony of *Cicero* for the existence, in his time, of the PONTIFICAL ANNALS,

characters of all those, who bear an eminent part in the story. That he should illustrate the whole in a clear, easy, natural stile; flowing with a perpetual smoothness, and equability; free from the affectation of points and sentences, or the roughness of judicial pleadings. *De Orator.* 2. 15. *Middleton's Life of Cicero*, Vol. 2. p. 528.

^f *Res immensi operis, ut quæ supra septingentesimum annum repetatur, &c.* *Liv. Pref.*

^g *Ut jam doctis hominibus, ac temporibus ipsis eruditis ad fingendum vix quicquam esset loci. Antiquitas enim recipit fabulas, fidias etiam nonnunquam incondite; hæc etas autem jam exculta præsertim et erudita omne quod fieri non potest respuit.* *Frag. Lib. 3. de Repub.*

^h *Nec enim hic locus est ut de moribus, institutisque majorum, et disciplina ac temperatione civitatis loquamur: alii hæc locis accurate satis dicta sunt, maximèque in his sex libris quos de republica scripsimus.* *Lib. 4. Tusc. c. 4.*

ⁱ *Erat * enim historia nihil aliud nisi annalium confectione. Cujus rei memoriae publicæ retinendæ causa, ab initio rerum Romanarum usque ad Publum Mucium Pontificem Maximum res annes singulorum annorum literis mandabat P. Maximus, referebatque in album, et proponebat tabulam domi ut esset potestas populo cognoscendi, si qui etiam nunc annales maximi nominantur. Hanc similitudinem scribendi multi fecuti sunt, qui sine ullis ornamenti monumenta solum temporum, hominum, locorum, gestarumque rerum reliquerunt. Itaque qualis apud Græcos, Pherecydes, Hellanicus, Acuilaus fuit, aliquie permulti; talis noster Cato, et Pictor, et Piso, qui neque tenent, Lib. 1. c. quibus rebus ornatur oratio (modo enim huic ista sunt importata) et dum intelligatur, quid dicant, unam dicendi laudem putant esse, brevitatem.*

^{*Doubtless} *Abeat enim historia litteris nostris, ut et ipse intelligo, et ex te persæpe jejunius. Potes autem tu profecto satisfacere in ea, quippe cum sit opus, ut tibi See Tay- quidem videri solet, unum hoc oratorium maxime. Quamobrem aggredere, lor's Elem. quæsumus, et sume ad hanc rem tempus, quæ est a nostris hominibus adhuc of Civ. aut ignorata, aut relicta. Nam post annales pontificum maximorum, Law. p. quibus nihil potest esse * jucundius: si aut ad Fabium, aut ad eum, qui tibi*

which were begun almost as early as the birth of the state, and continued to the time of *P. Mucius*, the High Priest, who lived in the 7th century of *Rome*. *Varro*, in his books concerning the Latin tongue, gives us many fragments of these annals.

5. Since it was the custom in the latter times of the republic to record the *acts of the senate and of the magistrates*; it is probable that the same custom was observed in the former. And it seems unquestionable from a passage^k in *Suetonius* [Vit. *Vesp.* 8.] not only that the *Brut.*^{L. 12. E. 25. ad Cornif. L. 11. Ep. 25. ad acts of the senate, and of the people, in the earliest ages, used to be recorded; but that many of those records were preserved from the flames, when the *Gauls* burnt the city.}

6. *Dionysius* speaks of the *memorials*, ¹ *commentaries* or *tables* of the *censors* preserved in families which had been honoured with the censorship, *pieces* which he consulted, and in which he found, that a poll of the people had been taken *two years before the burning of Rome*, in the consulship of *Valerius* and *Manlius*.

7. *Censorinus*, in his book *de die natali*, insinuates, ^{c. 17.} that the *memorials* of the *duumvirs* and *decemvirs* were ancient monuments that used to be consulted, long after the first ages of *Rome*.

8. *Livy* frequently cites the *Linen books*; which *Libri Linseui* seem to have been of great use for discovering the succession of the consuls and other magistrates.

tibi semper in ore est, Catonem, aut ad Pisonem, aut ad Fannium, aut ad Vennonium venias: quanquam ex his aliis plus babet virium, tamen quid tam exile, quam isti omnes.

Unde autem facilius quam ex annalium monumentis aut res bellica, aut omnis reipublicæ disciplina cognoscitur? Unde ad agendum aut dicendum copia deponi major gravissimorum exemplorum, quasi incorruptorum testimoniorum potest? Frag. Cic. in Hortens.

^k Speaking of *Vespasian's* restoring the capitol which had been demolished in the *Vitellian* sedition. *Ipsa* [*Vespasianus*] *aerarum tabularum tria millia, quæ simul conflagraverant, restituenda suscepit, undique investigatis exemplaribus, instrumentum imperii pulcherrimum ac vetustissimum confecit; quo continebantur penè ab exordio urbis senatus consulta, plebiscita de societate, et fædere, ac privilegio cuicunque concessis.*

¹ Δηλοῦται δὲ εἰς ἄλλων τε ωλλῶν καὶ τῶν καλὸνμένων τιμητικῶν ὑπομημάτων, &c. D. Hal. p. 59. Edit. Oxon.

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9. It appears from the historians, that many *treaties* with foreign states were preserved from the flames which consumed the city.

10. *The laws of the twelve tables* were unquestionably preserved, and these would give a thorough insight into the constitution of the state.

Liv. Lib. 11. In *Livy*, *Macrobius* and *A. Gellius* we have the
 1. Macr. antient invariable *forms* that were used by the *Roman*
 Lib. 3. c. heralds, when employed to *demand satisfaction* for an
 9. Aul. injury done to the State; *declare war*; *invite the gods to*
 Gell. L. 16. c. 4. *forsake a city besieged*; and, before a battle, *load*
with curses the army of the enemy.

12. The *Rituals* and *Calendars* were of use to history. The very name of a festival is often a brief relation of the fact which gave occasion to its institution.

13. Antient *pillars*, *statues* and *inscriptions*^m immortalized the memory of several great men of the early times, and bore testimony to their exploits.

Therefore, though *Livy* complains of the scarcity of men of letters in the early times [*rare per ea tempora litteræ*] and of the loss of *a great part*, or the *greater part*ⁿ of the pontifical annals, and other historical monuments, both public and private, in the burning of *Rome* by the *Gauls*, yet there remained good memorials and original pieces sufficient for composing a credible history^o of the earliest ages of *Rome*.

14. *Tradition* alone was sufficient whereon to found a reasonable and full belief of many facts in the Roman story; such, for example, as the *shameful defeat* of the *Romans* near the *Caudine Forks*; and the seditions and *secessions* of the *Plebeians* on occasion of the cruelties ex-

^m *Suorum vero clypeos in sacro vel publico, privatim dicare primus instituit* (*ut reperio*) *Appius Claudius*, *qui consul cum Servilio fuit anno urbis 259. posuit enim in Bellonæ æde majores suos*; *placuitque in excelso spectari et titulos honorum legi*.—*Quales clypeos nemo non gaudens, faventes aspicit* *Pliny L. 35. c. 3.*

ⁿ *Quæ in commentariis pontificum, aliquique publicis, privatisque erant monumentis incensâ urbe pleraque interiere*. *L. 6. c. 1.*

^o *Quæ ab conditâ urbe ad captam eandem urbem Romani sub regibus pri- mium, consulibus deinde ac dictatoribus, decemvirisque ac tribunis consula- ribus gessere foris bella, domi seditiones, quinque libris exposui*. *L. 6. c. 1.*
ercised

ercised by the rich towards the poor. [This is a concession made by M. de *Pouilli*.]

15. The fables which are found interspersed in the writings of the Roman historians ought not to ruin the credit of the history of the first ages of *Rome*, as to the essentials of it; though the historians should seem to have adopted those fables for facts. *Livy*^b warns us not to be over credulous with regard to several old stories of the *marvellous* kind, and *Cicero* ridicules them.

16. And *Atticus*^c had successfully laboured to rectify the mistakes in some family-memoirs, concerning the succession of the magistrates, and the origins of families, L. 2. de Divin. & L. 1. de leg.

mistakes occasioned by ignorance or vanity; and he could have had no success in such an attempt, had he been destitute of all sure guides to the truth.

If any reader desires to see these, and several other particulars, relating to the same subject, learnedly and ingeniously discussed, I shall refer him to the discourses at large of M. L. *Abbé Sallier* in the *Memoirs de Litterature*.

Before I take notice of M. de *Beaufort*'s positions, I must frankly confess that I am not well qualified to dispute against his opinion, concerning the Roman History; because I cannot, by his Dissertation, discover with *certainty* what his opinion is.

I know not whether, in his judgment, we may reasonably *reject* the *whole*^d history of the first 500 years of *Rome* as groundless and fabulous.

Or

^b ————— *Omnis expers curæ, quæ scribentis animum, et si non flectere à vero, sollicitum tamen efficere possit. Quæ ante conditam, condendamque urbem, poeticis magis decora fabulis, quam incorruptis rerum gestarum monumentis traduntur, ea nec affirmare nec refellere in animo est.* Liv. in Præf.

Speaking of the *Curtian Lake*, and how it came to be so called. *Cura non deflet, si qua ad verum via inquirentem ferret; nunc fama rerum stan-dum est, ubi certam derogat vetustas fidem,* Liv. Lib. 7. c. 6.

^c *Laborem nobis Attici nostri levaravit labor; sic familiarum originem subtexuit, ut ex eo clarorum virorum propagines possimus cognoscere,* Cic. in Orat. et Corn. Nep. in Attic.

^d Attendu le peu de soin qu'on a eu de transmettre à la posterite la memoire des evenemens, dans le tems, qu'ils arrivoient, nous sommes fondés,

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Or should reject only *almost all*.

Or may stop when we have rejected *the greater part*.

Or, rejecting some passages of the history as utterly false, should *call in question, doubt of, suspect all the rest*: [le revoquer en question, en douter, le tenir pour suspect.]

This last, from a great number of passages in his Dissertation, one would imagine to be his real opinion. And yet now and then he seems to slide into *belief*, and even to *certainty*, without being aware of it. He has great faith in what *Polybius* relates of the *Romans* in the early times of the Republic; and admits, as indubitable, several facts, for which the other historians are his only vouchers. Thus, for example,

" It

fondés, en voiant une histoire suivie de quatre siecles, de rejeter LE TOUT, ou du moins la plus grande partie comme forgée à plaisir.

Ce n'est pas que je veuille *revoquer en doute* généralement tous les evenemens de ce siecle [le cinquième,] pour quelques traits fabuleux dont ils se trouvent accompagnés, ou parce qu'il y en a plusieurs qui font manifestement faux. Mon intention est seulement de faire voir, que divers faits des plus marqués, et des plus importans, se trouvant faux, et le fruit de la vain gloire des Romains, les autres doivent nous être suspects. J'en tire encore de nouveaux motifs de douter de l'*Histoire des siecles precedens*, laquelle à plus forte raison, doit paroître fabuleuse et forgée apres coup. p. 359.

Ces caractères de fausseté suffroient à bien des gens pour leur faire rejeter cette *Histoire*, sans plus d'examen; mais je ne veux pas me prévaloir de cet avantage. Ce n'est que sur l'autorité des ecrivains les plus celebres, et les plus accredités que je veux m'appuier pour *en douter*. Et afin qu'on ne m'accuse pas d'en douter trop legerement, je me retranche à ne trouver cette histoire obscure et incertaine, que parce qu'ils la trouvent telle eux-mêmes. p. 10.

^c De-la je conclus——que nous sommes fondés à tenir pour fort suspect TOUT ce qu'on nous raconte des quatre ou cinq premiers siecles de Rome.

La seconde partie sera destinée à l'examen de certain faits des plus marqués, et qui figurent le plus dans l'*Histoire Romaine*: l'incertitude ou la fausseté desquels, étant bien prouvée, donnera une nouvelle force aux raisons que l'on a de *revoquer en doute* TOUTE cette *Histoire*, — je me flatte, que ceux qui se dépouilleront de leurs préjugés conviendront qu'il n'y a rien de plus incertain que TOUT ce corps d'*Histoire des premiers siecles de Rome*. p. 11, 12.

Il faut absolument, qu'on en vienne à dire, que ces traités sont supposés, ce qu'on ne peut faire sans de fortes raisons (et je ne vois

pas

" It is certain^f that *Servius [Tullius]* augmented the number of the Tribes." Dissert. p. 299.

" Certain it is, that from this time *Porsenna* did not treat the *Romans* as enemies, but as old allies or as good subjects." P. 329.

And M. de *B*'s arguments for disbelieving some facts in the *Roman* story, or doubting of them, are frequently drawn from the certainty of others, particularly of the *Treaties*. See p. 334.

I cannot but take notice, that, with regard to the story of King *Brennus* the *Gaul*, M. de *B*. seems not to doubt of these facts. 1. That the *Gauls* totally routed the *Roman* army in the field. 2. That they presently after possessed themselves of *Rome*. 3. That they burnt the city. 4. That the old historical records and monuments were most of them consumed in the flames. 5. That the capitol was saved. 6. That several ancient monuments, being there deposited, were preserved with it. 7. That the *Gauls* sold a peace to the *Romans*, and departed without loss. Here are then, in the history of this one affair, seven important facts which M. de *B*. seems fully to believe. And what is it he objects to? Why, to *Livy*'s relation of *Camillus*'s wonderful arrival in the critical moment to save the *Romans* from the disgrace of living on the foot of a ransomed people; and his destroying the whole army of the *Gauls*. But this relation, romantic in the air of it, and discovered by *Polybius*'s account to be a mere fiction of Roman vanity, can never be thought a good reason for questioning the truth of every thing that *Livy* has related of the earliest ages of *Rome*; and much less for regarding the whole Roman History of the first 500 years, as

pas qu'on ait aucune pour douter de leur authenticité) ou que l'on convienne de bonne foi, que tout ce qu'on nous debite dans l'*Histoire Romaine* n'est qu'incertitude, et qu'on n'y peut compter sur rien.

P. 43.

^f Il est sur que *Servius* en augmenta le nombre [des tribus].

Ce qu'il y a de sur, c'est que, dès lors, *Porsena* n'en usa plus avec les Romains, comme avec des ennemis, et qu'au contraire il les traitta en anciens alliés ou en bons sujets.

fabulous

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fabulous or *uncertain*. For when M. de *B.* speaks of the *uncertainty* of the Roman History, I suppose he means, or ought to mean, ‘the uncertainty of the best and least exceptionable accounts of the Roman affairs, that can be collected from the several antient writers who have treated the subject.’

We shall presently see, that one of M. de *B.*’s reasons for his incredulity is, that the Roman Historians (the earliest of whom lived in the sixth century from the building of *Rome*) wanted means to know the truth. Yet he gives credit to *Polybius*’s relation of the wars between the *Romans* and *Gauls*, from the time of *Brennus*, to that of *Pyrrhus*; and if he thinks it reasonable to believe *Polybius* on this part of the Roman History, he must allow that there were means of coming at the truth of it; whether *Livy*, and the prior historians whom he followed, made use of them or not.

But whatever be the real opinion of M. de *B.* concerning the Roman History of the first 500 years, he has advanced (if I mistake him not) the following propositions.

Differ.
p 6.

I. “The *Romans* were an obscure people, confined, during four centuries, to a little corner of *Italy*; and the continual exercise of arms, and husbandry (the only sciences they professed) hindred them from having the thought of transmitting the memory of events to posterity.”

II. “AND, if they had thought of perpetuating the memory of what passed among them, they were universally so illiterate, that no body was capable of writing history, or transmitting the events to posterity by sure and exact memorials.” Personne n’etoit capable, &c.

“ III. THE

—l’empêcha de songer à transmettre à la postérité des evenemens, qui dans le fond, ne sont devenus interessans, que par le haut degré de gloire, auquel ses descendans se sont élevés par leurs conquêtes.

^h M. de *B.* cites a passage from *Livy*, (B. vii. c. 3.) to prove that even in the end of the 4th century, WRITING was very little in use. “Raræ per ea tempora litteræ, on faisoit peu d’usage de l’écriture dit Tite Live en parlant de la fin du quatrième siècle.” M. de *B.* adds, “Indeed

III. ‘THE PONTIFICAL ANNALS, or historical part
 of the pontifical books, and the other monuments
 ‘public

“Indeed they must have been very little solicitous in those times to
 “preserve the memory of events, since, instead of all other Annals,
 “they were content with driving a nail every year into the wall of the
 “temple of Jupiter Capitolinus; and this was the sole expedient they
 “could have for fixing the chronology. [c'étoit là toute la ressource
 “qu'on pouvoit avoir pour fixer la chronologie] as the same historian
 “informs us in the same place.”

He proceeds; “Had this been practised from the foundation of
 “Rome, it might have been of great use for settling the true Æra of
 “the city. But the practise could not commence before the temple
 “was dedicated, which was not till after the expulsion of Tarquin;
 “and it had suffer'd a long interruption. It was renewed in the end
 “of the fourth century of Rome, not because they found it mentioned in
 “any record or ritual, (for they made so little use of letters, that they
 “had neither books nor records) but on account of a tradition almost
 “forgotten, ex seniorum memoria repetitum.” [it was called to mind by
 “some old men, &c.]

As great use is made of the passage in *Livy*, referred to by M. de
 B. for proving the extremely illiterate state of the Romans, during
 many years after the commencement of the Republic, I shall here
 transcribe the passage at length. The historian is speaking of the
 year 392 (or, according to the Capitoline Marbles, 390) when *Rome*
 was grievously afflicted with the plague.

Cn. Genucio, L. Æmilio Mamercino secundum consulibus, quum
 piaculorum magis conquisitio animos quam corpora morbi afficerent,
 repetitum ex seniorum memoria dicitur, pestilentiam quondam clavo
 ab dictatore fixo sedatam. Ea religione adductus Senatus, dictatorem
 clavi figendi causa dici jussit. Dictus L. Manlius Imperiosus, L. Pi-
 narium Magistrum Equitum dixit. Lex vetusta est priscis litteris,
 verbisque scripta, ut qui Prætor Maximus sit; Idibus Septembribus * Crevier.
 clavum pangat. Fixus [most of the manuscripts have fixa *] fuit dextro
 lateri ædis Jovis optimi maximi, ea ex parte qua Minervæ templum
 est. Eum clavum, quia raræ per ea tempora litteræ erant, notam
 numeri annorum fuisse ferunt; eoque Minervæ Templo dicatam le-
 gem, quia Numerus Minervæ inventum sit. Volsiniis quoque clavos
 indices numeri annorum, fixos in templo Nortiæ Etruscæ Deæ, com-
 parere, diligens talium monumentorum auctor Cincius affirmat. M.
 Horatius CONSUL, EX LEGE Templum Jovis optimi maximi dedicavit,
 anno post reges exactos: à CONSULIBUS postea ad DICTATORES quia
 majus imperium erat, solenne clavi figendi translatum est. Intermissio
 deinde more, digna etiam per se visa est res, propter quam dictator
 crearetur. Liv. B. vii. 3.

NOW I conceive that M. de B. has, through inattention, made
 no less than four mistakes in his comment upon this passage.

FOR I. First of all, *Livy* does not speak of THE END OF THE
 FOURTH

On the Credibility of the HISTORY

'public and private,' which could have given some
 'certainty

FOURTH CENTURY, when he says, *some report that the Nail was to mark the number of years, because Letters were rare in THOSE DAYS, per ea tempora*; but of the time, *when the practice of driving a nail in the Wall of the Temple of Jupiter, COMMENCED*, in pursuance of a LAW directing that it should be done annually, *on THE IDES OF SEPTEMBER*, by the Chief Praetor, [i. e. by the Chief Magistrate. The CONSULS were, at first, styled PRATORS.] That this Practice commenced long before the end of the fourth Century is evident, from the instance then called to mind by the old men, of a Dictator's doing it, and from the words *intermissio deinde more*. And it seems highly probable from Livy's words, that the LAW was made, and the PRACTICE commenced in the first year of the Republic, and that HORATIUS, when he dedicated the Temple, struck the First nail into the wall: and that it was a part of the Ceremony, at the Dedication, and performed in conformity to the Law above-mentioned. "There is an old Law, " (says Livy) written in antique characters, and antique words, importing, that the Chief Praetor should, on the Ides of September, "drive the nail, clavum pangat. The nail [or the Law] was fixed "on the right side of the Temple of Jupiter, in that part where the "Fane of Minerva is." What follows is all Parenthesis, till he thus goes on: "The CONSUL Marcus Horatius, ACCORDING TO THE "LAW, dedicated the Temple of Jupiter, the year after the expulsion of the Kings: AFTERWARDS, the fixing the Nail was transferred "from the CONSULS to the DICTATORS, because these were Magistrates of greater power and dignity" [agreeably to the Spirit of the Law, expressed in these words, Qui Praetor Maximus sit.] Whoever attends to Livy's words must surely see, that, when he says, the CONSUL Horatius dedicated the Temple ex LEGE, he refers to the Law, where it was enjoined, that the Chief Magistrate should drive a Nail annually on the Ides of September; and means to tell us, that this CONSUL drove the first Nail, pursuant to that Law, when he dedicated the Temple; (which DEDICATION was on the Ides of September, as Plutarch informs us.) If Livy did not mean to say that HORATIUS drove the Nail when he dedicated the Temple, what connexion between the former and latter part of this period? "The CONSUL Horatius "dedicated the Temple the year after the Regisuge; AFTERWARDS, "the fixing the Nail was transferred from the CONSULS to the DICTATORS."

II. THERE is not one word in the passage referred to, importing that the Romans had no annals except nails. And the written law itself is a proof, that the nails were not used because no body could write, or because these nails were the only expedient they could have to fix the chronology. And, for the same reason, they, of whom Livy says ferunt, cannot be suppose to have meant, that the nails were used, because no body could mark the years by words or figures, but because the generality of people could not read what some could write; as was the case

certainty to history, were ALL,¹ destroyed by the flames which consumed the city, after the Gauls had taken it [in 363.]

How to reconcile this *third* assertion with the *second*, or with the *latter part of the first*, seems somewhat difficult; nor seems it very easy to reconcile it with the following enumeration of the antient monuments which M. de B. supposes to have escaped the flames:

‘ SOME LAWS OF THE KINGS.

‘ ALL the LAWS of the Twelve Tables, by which p. 13.
‘ might be known the constitution of the antient government. p. 32.

case in thete countries not many hundred years ago. And the *interruption* of the practice of *driving nails* [*intermissio deinde more*] if it proves any thing, proves only, that the common people were become less illiterate, and that the nails were not wanted to instruct them in chronology.

III. It appears from the passage referred to, that, in the end of the fourth Century, the Romans had a monument or record mentioning the custom of driving a nail, &c. They had a written law enjoining it; *lex vetus est priscis litteris verbisque scripta, ut qui Praetor Maximus sit, Idibus Septembribus clavum pangat*: In conformity to which Law the Act of fixing the nail had been transferred from the Consuls to the Dictators. And this shews that both the Law and the Practice were anterior to the Institution of Dictators.

IV. THE thing said to be remembered by the old men, was not the custom of driving a nail into the wall of the Temple, but a particular instance of the plague's being stopt by a Dictator's driving a nail, &c. *repetitum ex seniorum memoria dicitur, pestilentiam quondam clavo ab dictatore fixo sedatam.*

¹ C'est de ces ecrivains, que j'apprens, que tous les monumens publics, qui auroient pu donner quelque certitude à l'Histoire, perirent par le feu. lorsque les Gaulois eurent pris Rome. p. 10.

Il est sur que la partie historique des livres des Pontifes, ou leurs Annales perirent dans la destruction de Rome par les Gaulois. Tite Live est si exprés là dessus, qu'il nous ote tout sujet d'en douter,— lorsque se plaignant de la peine qu'il a eue parceque tous les memoires, conservez dans les Archives, qui étoient entre les mains des particuliers, ou qui faisoient partie des livres des Pontifes, avoient été enveloppés dans la ruine de la ville. Et quod etiam si que in commentariis Pontificum, aliquaque publicis privatisque erant monumentis, incensâ urbe PLERÆQUE interiere. p. 56.

N. B. In this place, Pleræque, with M. de B. imports *Tous*; in p. 5. 18. *Presque tout*; in p. 20, 27. *La plus part*; in p. 19. *Grande partie*.

46, 47. ‘ SOME of the PONTIFFS BOOKS, which discovered
 ‘ the origin of several religious customs or ceremonies.
 ‘ (Under the name of the *Pontiffs books*, M. de B. com-
 ‘ prehends all the books in general, which treated of
 ‘ the religious ceremonies and traditions of the *Romans*,
 ‘ as the books of the *Augurs* and *Haruspices*, the verses
 ‘ or hymns of the *Saiii*, the *Saturnian* verses, and a
 ‘ great number of books of that kind.)

103. ‘ SOME of the *books*^z which contain’d the *musters* and
 ‘ *polls* taken of the *Roman* citizens, *which books might be*
 ‘ *of use to history*.

42. ‘ A considerable number of the *Treaties* which *Rome* had
 ‘ made with the neighbouring states. Il est à presumer
 ‘ qu’ils sauverent un assez bon nombre de ces derniers
 ‘ [les traités] parce qu’ils étoient gardéz dans le temple
 ‘ de Jupiter au capitole, qui demeura à l’abri de la
 ‘ fureur des Gaulois. And treaties of peace are the most
 ‘ authentic materials for history. Les traités de paix
 ‘ sont les matériaux les plus authentiques pour l’histoire,
 ‘ et on ne peut former aucun doute raisonnable sur des
 ‘ faits appuyés de pareilles preuves.’

145. IV. ‘ THERE was, at *Rome*, no book, no writing
 70. ‘ prior to *Pyrrhus’s* coming into *Italy*; no piece that
 ‘ could be of use to history, anterior to the end of the
 ‘ fifth century.’

^z Quoique les anciens Historiens omettent quelques *lufres*, et quelque fois les noms des censeurs, ainsi que le nombre des citoyens, qui s’étoit trouvé dans chaque dénombrement, je serois assez porté à croire, sur ce qui nous reste de ces revues générales des citoyens de *Rome*, que c’étoit un des monumens le mieux conservé, et que les historiens avoient le moins négligé de consulter. Ce que Denis d’Halicarnasse en cite remonte jusqu’au premier cens sous *Servius Tullius*. On seroit un peu mieux fondé, si on nous alléguoit de pareilles pieces en faveur de l’histoire Romaine. Car, si ce que les historiens nous disent des differens cens, où dénombremens, qui se sont faits à *Rome*, est fondé sur le témoignage de ces monumens, qui se gardoient dans les Archives, on ne peut disconvenir, qu’ils n’aient échappé aux flammes, du moins en partie, et qu’ils n’aient été de quelque usage pour l’histoire. p. 102, 103.

* J’ai déjà prouvé que ces Annales des Pontifes n’existoient point : et je prouverai bientôt, qu’il n’y avoit aucune pièce qui pût servir à l’Histoire laquelle fut antérieure à la fin du cinquième siècle de *Rome*. p. 70.

How

How to make this agree with the foregoing enumeration of *pieces preserved from the flames*, I do not readily perceive.

V. ‘THE LATER historians of *Rome* did but copy^b
‘the *earlier* with regard to the times preceding the
‘earlier.’

6, 7.

This seems to be a hasty assertion; since both *Livy* and *Dionysius* speak so frequently of the disagreeing accounts given by the authors they cite, with regard to the times anterior to the first historians. And *Livy*, in his preface, says, that each new writer thinks *either to produce something more certain with regard to facts than his predecessors have done, or to excel them in language and style. Novi semper scriptores, aut in rebus certius aliquid allatueros se, aut scribendi arte rudem vetustatem superatueros credunt.*

VI. ‘THOSE records or monuments which escaped
‘the flames (when *Rome* was burnt by the *Gauls*)
‘were of little use for composing a history. And the
‘first historians did not rest upon such monuments, but
‘founded themselves WHOLLY upon traditions and vulgar
‘stories, as the most celebrated and most esteemed

p. 11.

^b On reconnoitra facilement que ceux qui ont écrit l’Histoire Romaine n’ont fait que se copier les uns les autres pour ce qui regardoit les tems antérieurs. p. 7.

Fabius Pictor et ceux qui le suivirent de près avoient ignoré, &c. On n’avoit fait depuis que les copier sans autre examen. p. 45.

Ils ont été plus de cinq siecles sans avoir d’Historiens—les premiers qu’ils ont eus ont fort mal réussi destitués comme ils l’étoient de monumens anciens et de memoires furs qui leur pussent servir de guides—les Historiens, qui depuis ont entrepris de fournir la même carriere, se sont contentés de s’appuier de l’autorité de leurs Predeceſſeurs et de les donner pour garans des faits qu’ils rapportoient—ils se sont peu mis en peine d’examiner à la rigueur la vérité des faits. p. 6.

N. B. Unless with regard to absurd fictions, it is hard to guess by what test the later historians, if there were no ancient monuments, no authentic memorials, could examine the truth of the facts related by the earlier historians.

' writers inform us, ^c who nevertheless took all their ac-
' counts from those *first* historians.

p. 142.

143, &

435.

151, 152.

' What we have of the *Roman history* [of the first
' 500 years] was taken out of *family-memoirs*. Desti-
' tute of all other monuments, it was to these pieces,
' that the historians, towards the middle of the sixth
' century, [i. e.] the first historians] were obliged to
' have recourse, and from no other sources could they have
' drawn what they related of those times which, as
' they ^d themselves confess, were cover'd with thick
' darkness, and of which there was no speaking with
' any certainty.^e

To explain, and, as much as possible, reconcile these two paragraphs, we shall have recourse to another passage in the Dissertation.

^c Je recherche ce qui a pu échaper à cet incendie——je trouve que ce qui enchaça fut de peu d'utilité pour la composition de l'*Histoire*. Ce sont eux memes [*les écrivains les plus célèbres et les plus accredités*] qui m'apprennent, que ce n'est point sur de pareils monumens, que *les premiers Historiens* se sont appuiés, et que *ceux qui les ont suivis* (en avouant, que ceux qui les avoient precedés dans cette carriere, ne s'étoient fondes que sur des traditions, et sur des bruits populaires, que d'ailleurs ils n'avoient aporté ni jugement, ni exactitude, dans la composition de leurs histoires, et dans ce qu'ils disoient, des premiers siecles de Rome) n'ont pas laissé de reconnoître que c'étoit d'eux qu'ils tiroient tout ce qu'ils en rapportoient [i. e. tout ce qu'ils rapportoient des premiers siecles de Rome] p. 10, 11. Les historiens, qui ont vecu dans des siecles plus polis, et où l'on n'ignoroit aucune des loix de l'*Histoire*, n'aitant point eu d'autres sources où puiser que ces mêmes histoires, qui n'étoient fondées que sur la tradition, il's n'ont pû donner plus de certitude à ce qu'ils rapportoient des premiers siecles de Rome. p. 204.

^d By *they themselves*, I presume M. de *B.* means the later historians; for they are the only writers he cites as complaining of darkness.

^e C'est des *Memoires des Familles*, qu'est tiré ce que nous avons de l'*Histoire Romaine*. p. 142.

Destitués de tous autres monumens, ce fut à ces pieces [*Memoires des Familles*] que les historiens, vers le milieu du sixieme siecle, furent obligez d'avoir recours. p. 435.

Dans quelle source ont-ils puisé ce qu'ils ont dit sur des tems, que selon eux-memes couvoient d'épaisses tenebres, et dont on ne pouvoient parler avec aucune certitude? Ce n'a pu être que dans ces *Traditions des Familles* puisqu'il n'y avoit point d'autre monument auquel ils pussent avoir recours. p. 152.

‘The most antient piece known at Rome in Cicero’s time^f, was the speech of *Appius Claudius, the blind*, pronounced in the senate to dissuade them from accepting the terms of peace proposed by *Pyrrhus* in 474. Indeed there were beside that, some *funeral orations*; but *tradition* must have supplied the rest; so that the truth of the history of the first five centuries had no other support but these two witnesses, *funeral orations* and *traditions*.’

‘Perhaps to these we add, some songs or hymns, composed in honour of the heroes and illustrious men,—pieces not proper to instruct us in the truth of facts.’

THE CASE then was this; there were no written family-traditions nor any other [historical] writings, aucun livre, aucun écrit, before the year 474. Between this time and the year 550 (when *Fabius Pictor* became an historian) *funeral orations* were written. And from

^f I am not aware that M. de B. has any support for this, but a mistake of his own (through inattention) in interpreting a passage of Cicero’s *Brutus* [c. 16.] *Nec verò habeo quenquam antiquorem* cuius quidem scripta proferenda putem, nisi *Appii Cæci oratio hæc ipsa de Pyrrho, et nonnullæ mortuorum laudationes, fortè delectant: et Hercule, hæc quidem extant.* Cicero is discoursing, not of authors in general, nor of historians, but of *Orators*, and the last he mentions, is *Cato* the Censor: and he adds, that ‘he is acquainted with none more antient, whose writings he thinks worth speaking of; unless the *oration* of *Appius Claudius* concerning *Pyrrhus*, and some *funeral orations* may happen to please. Of these there are indeed enough.’ Had Cicero been speaking of Roman historians, or authors in general, he certainly would not have said, that he knew none more antient than *Cato*, that were worth mentioning, because *Fabius* and *Cincius* and several other historians, much esteemed, were prior to *Cato*. Yet on the authority of this passage, M. de B. (page. 145.) writes thus, ‘On ne pourra pas douter de la vérité de ce que j’avance, dès que j’aurai fait voir, qu’on n’avoit à Rome aucun livre, aucun écrit, qui fut antérieur à la venue de *Pyrrhus* en Italie, evenement, qui ne se place que vers la fin du cinquième siècle de Rome. Pour des HISTORIENS, on sait qu’ils ne parurent que dans le siècle suivant. Ciceron, parlant de ce qu’on avoit de plus ancien de son temps, dit que Caton, qui étoit mort il n’y avoit pas plus d’un siècle, étoit considéré comme un Auteur fort ancien *eum nos per veterem habemus.* Certes ajoute t-il, je n’en connois point de plus ancien dont je puissé vous citer les écrits, à moins que l’on ne trouve du gout à la harangue d’*Appius Claudius* sur *Pyrrhus*, et à quelques oraisons funebres’.

these *written orations* and from *oral tradition*, the *first historians* compiled their works.

p. 150. But then we are aground again, by reason of an unlucky passage, cited by M. de B. from *Dionysius*, who tells us, that *Fabius* [whom all the following historians are said to have copied] compiled his history of the first 500 years from tradition, from *bear-say*, *wholly* from hear-say ; on voit que ce qu'il en disoit n'etoit appuié

p. 164. que sur ce qu'il en avoit oui dire : *εξ ὀνόματος*, D. H. Lib. 7. p. 475. *Fabius* then did not make use of the *funeral orations*, nor of any *written* family-traditions, (family-memoirs :) Neither were these, according to M. de B. formed upon *bear-say*. The matter of them was *invented* by the vanity of private men. And not only the matter of them was invented, but the greater

p. 154. number of the *pieces themselves* were *forges* ; & i. e. they were not cotemporary with the authors to whom they were ascribed, but forged after their time. And if *Fabius* took his historical accounts from *forged funeral orations*, these forgeries must have been *almost all* made in his own time, and *all* in the space of 76 years ; supposing it true, that there were no *writings* of earlier date than the year 474. And then we shall be at a loss to guess how it was possible to impose these forgeries upon *Fabius* for genuine pieces.

But is it not strange that M. de B. who, by admitting that the public monuments and private memorials of the *Romans* were burnt by the *Gauls*, admits that the *Romans* had both ability and disposition to write before that time, should yet suppose, that they had neither the one nor the other, for above 100 years after that time ?

.162. And there is another difficulty arising from another passage cited by M. de B. from *Dionysius* [Lib. 1. p. 59.] who there says, that the earliest *Roman* historians took all their accounts of the birth of *Romulus* and the build-

* L'on peut assurer sans temerité que l'*Histoire Romaine*, pour la plus grande partie, à été forgée sur ces *Traditions des Familles*, et sur des *oraisons funebres*, qui pour la plupart n'etoient que des *pieces supposées*, que des *fauffaires* avoient forgées pour favoriser les pretensions, que quelques familles formoient à une *genealogie illustre*.

ing

ing of *Rome*, from the antique narratives in the SACRED Books, *ἐν ἱεραῖς διήρτοις*.

And what makes these difficulties the greater is, that M. de *B.* is of opinion, we ^h ought to give full credit to *Dionysius*, in what he says concerning the works and merit of the historians who preceded him.

BUT, not to dwell any longer on the seeming repugnancies in the argumentation of our ingenious Critic against the credibility of the history of the five first centuries, let us now consider what *Livy* says concerning his own history of the times anterior to the burning of *Rome* by the *Gauls*.

' I have, in five books, set forth what, from the building of the city to it's being taken, was done by the *Romans*, first under the Kings, then under the Consuls, Dictators, Decemvirs, and Military Tribunes with consular power; the foreign wars and domestic seditions; matters very obscure, *by reason of their antiquity*, (like objects, that at a great distance, are hardly discerned.) For it is only by writings, that the transactions and events of remote times can be clearly and faithfully transmitted; and in those days there were few writers; and the greater part of the commentaries of the High Priests, and of the other records, publick and private, perished in the burning of *Rome*ⁱ. Henceforward, matters more clear and certain will be related; the civil affairs and

^h Denis d'Halicarnasse, ayant enterpris l'Histoire des cinq premiers siecles de Rome, doit etre consideré comme juge competent de ceux qui l'ont precedé dans la même carrière. p. 168. L'on ne risque rien en s'en rapportant à ce qu'il en dit. p. 163.

I cannot possibly be of M. de *B.*'s opinion in this particular. *Dionysius* seems, of all writers, to be the man who deserves the least credit when he speaks of the merit of other writers. For (Lib. 1. p. 5.) he says of *Polybius*, ' that he wrote little concerning the *Romans*, and that the little he did write was without any care or accuracy, and wholly founded upon idle reports.' Nor could even *Thucydides* please *Dionysius*: but, as to what he says by way of censure on *Thucydides*, Mr. *Hobbes* remarks, ' that there was never written so much absurdity in so few lines.'

ⁱ It seems pretty plain from what *Livy* here says of the destruction of public and private Monuments or Records, that he knew nothing of the *peu d'usage de l'écriture*, for which M. de *B.* contends.

‘ military acts of the *Romans*, after the rebuilding of
‘ their city ^k.’

Now what is the obvious sense of this passage?

‘ The foregoing part of my history, (says *Livy*) is
‘ full of obscurity and uncertainty; because the mat-
‘ ters, there treated of, are of too antient date to have
‘ been transmitted with *faithfulness* and *exactness* by *oral*
‘ *tradition*, and because the contemporary writers were
‘ few, and the greater part of their writings perished
‘ in the fire that consumed the city. But the transac-
‘ tions and events after that time, are things more clear
‘ and certain, *clariora & certiora*: How so? Because
‘ with respect to these, there are not the same causes
‘ of obscurity and uncertainty. The times not being
‘ so remote, the *traditions* concerning them are more
‘ to be depended on; contemporary writers were less
‘ rare; and there has not been alike destruction of
‘ their writings.’

This is surely the plain meaning of his words, and it ought to be observed to his credit, that his history of the earliest times is proportioned, for length, to the scarcity of materials he complains of; for notwithstanding his *circumstantial*, and, perhaps in his own opinion, fabulous account of the rape of the *Sabine* women, with the consequences of it; and notwithstanding the frequent display of his skill in adorning a story, as in his description of the combat between the *Horatii* and *Curiatii*, and in several other instances, his whole history of the seven kings, who are supposed to have reigned 244 years, hardly fills seventy pages in *Le Clerc*'s small edition; and, of these, twenty are taken

L. 6. ^k Quæ ab condita urbe Roma ad captam eandem urbem Romani
Cap. 1. sub regibus primum, consulibus deinde ac dictatoribus decemvirisque
ac tribunis consularibus gessere, foris bella, domi seditiones, quinque
libris exposui; res quam vetustate nimia obscuras, veluti quæ magno
ex intervallo loci vix cernuntur: tum quod et raræ per eadem tempora
litteræ fuere, una custodia fidelis memoriæ rerum gestarum: et, quod
etiam si quæ in commentariis pontificum, aliisque publicis privatisque
erant monumentis, incensa urbe pleræque interiere. Clariora deinceps
certioraque ab secunda origine, velut ab stirpibus lætius, feraci-
usque renatae urbis, gesta domi militiæque, exponentur.

up

up with the reigns of *Servius Tullius*, and his successor *Tarquin the Proud*. Now, the institutions of *Servius*, which were his most important acts, and were the plan, whereon, after the expulsion of *Tarquin*, the new government was established and maintained, cannot easily be called in question ; nor, I believe, will any body question the truth of the most material things, related of *Tarquin's* tyranny, which gave occasion to the revolt from him, and the abolition of kingly government. The obscurity and uncertainty therefore, of which *Livy* speaks, must chiefly regard the circumstances with which some facts are accompanied in his relations, and not the principal facts and events contained in the history of the early times.

Certainly M. de *B.* had not duly attended to the accounts given by the antients, of the regal state of *Rome*, p. 6. when he ventured to say, ‘ It is surprising to find a continued history of five centuries, in which there is scarce any void , any year, that is not distinguished by some considerable event :’ for very few of the 244 years of the kings are distinguished by any event whatsoever.

It may be further remarked, that *Livy's* history of the 119 years, from the expulsion of *Tarquin* to the burning of *Rome* by the *Gauls*, is above four times as long as his history of the 244 years of the kings ; and his history of those 119 years is no longer than his history of the 95 years that follow the rebuilding of *Rome*, and reach to the year 460, with which his tenth book ends. And the next ten books (which are lost) contain'd but the history of 73 years. Now the reason of these differences in the length of his accounts of the different periods is very obvious, and is contained in the passage above cited.

I proceed now to say something of the value of those materials, which the first *Roman* historians may reasonably be supposed to have had for composing their histories. Without entering into any discussion of the antiquity or contents of the *linen books*, the *books of the magistrates*, the *tables* and *memorials* of the *censors*, the *books*

books of the Decemvirs and Duumvirs, or the inscriptions on pillars, statues or shields, (from all which, it cannot be questioned but many things, useful to history, might be drawn) I shall confine myself to speak of the other sources of historical matter, that were open to the first historians.

I. THE ANNALS or Commentaries of the High Priests, called the *Great Annals*.

That it was the constant custom from the earliest times, for the High Priests to record in writing the events of each year, and that *antient Annals*, composed by the *High Priests*,¹ existed, either entire or in part in *Cicero's* time, is unquestionable from his express testimony.

And from the complaint which *Livy* makes of the loss of the *greater part* of the Pontifical Annals, anterior to the burning of *Rome* [*incensa urbe Pleræque*^m L.6. c. 1. *interiere*] it is evident that some *pieces* of those ANNALS were preserved from that fire. His words import this: and his chief ground for saying that the *greater part* perished, was doubtless the preservation of the *smaller*.

Rome was burnt by the *Gauls* about the year 363, i. e. about 119 years, after the commencement of the republic. The *Romans*, we are told, were very industrious in collecting what monuments or records had escaped the fire: and it is natural to suppose that endeavours were used to supply by *memory* (as far as memory could supply) the defects of what remained of the Pontifical Annals. ‘ Before the use of *letters* (says ‘ Sir Isaac Newton) the names and actions of men ‘ could scarce be remembered above 80 or 100 years ‘ after their deaths: and therefore I admit of no chro-

*Short
Chron.
P. 7.*

1. ————— *Ab initio rerum* ————— *Res omnes singulorum annorum manda-
bat litteris pontifex maximus* ————— *ii qui etiam nunc Annales Maximi-
vocantur, De orat. Lib. 2. c. 12. Servius ad Virg. Aeneid Lib. 1. v. 377.* and *Vopiscus in Tacito. cap. 1.* speak to the same effect, as M. d. B. observes.

^m *M. L'Abbe Sallier* considers *Livy's Pleræque* as a word of exaggeration, to magnify his own labour in compiling a general history of his country.

‘ nology

'nology of things done in *Europe* above 80 years before *Cadmus* brought letters into *Europe*.' It seems here to be admitted by this great man, that the names and actions of men, and even the chronology of things done 80 years back, might be preserved by *memory*, and without written records. The defects of the *Great Annals* might therefore, with certainty enough, be supplied, by the help of *memory alone*, as to the principal events during the far greater part of the time, between the beginning of the Republic and the burning of *Rome*. And with regard not only to that time but to the earlier times, is it to be supposed, that those persons, who had read the Annals before they were in part destroyed, remembered nothing of what they had read ?

These Annals, thus repaired, would doubtless be very brief and very imperfect, but not useless to history. The great events and the order of them would there be found. And as to the Annals, written after the burning of *Rome* (for the practice was continued) we read of no destruction happening to these either in whole or in part. It must be granted however, that even these, through some accident or neglect, were not entire and perfect in the days of *Livy* or of the prior historians. If there had been no chasms, no interruptions in them, how could the historians have been so much at a loss, as we find they sometimes were, concerning the succession of the magistrates ?

But granting the Pontifical Annals, mentioned by *Cicero*, to have been very imperfect, and even supposing, that his words, *ab initio rerum*, regard the time when the practice of writing Annals began, and not the *Era* whence the relations, contained in those which he had read, commenced ; yet (as I said before) certain it is from his testimony, that *antient Records*, called *the Annals of the High Priests*, or *the Great Annals*, did exist in his time : and therefore the silence of *Livy* and *Dionysius*, if they are silent, (as M. de B. imagines) concerning these Annals, will not prove what M. de B. would infer from it, the non-existence of them in their

their time. If they did not *then* exist, they must have been lost in the few years between the time when *Cicero* wrote, and the time when *Livy* and *Dionysius* composed their histories; and of this there is no where any hint. *Livy* would doubtless have complained of such a loss, had it really happened, since he complains of the earlier loss suffered by the burning of *Rome*. And for these several considerations, it is reasonable to believe, that the *old Annals*, of which *Livy* frequently speaks, and the *τεπαι Διάτροι*, mentioned by *Dionysius* as historical monuments, were the *Great Annals* described by *Cicero*: and I think it may be reasonably asked, How could *Cicero* well know (and he speaks with confidence) that the custom of writing Annals commenced *ab initio rerum*, but from the actual existence, in his time, of fragments of Annals, written in the earliest times; or from their being cited by the first historians as existing in their time?

To PROVE the non-existence of any Annals, or parts of Annals written before the burning of *Rome*, M. de B. makes great use of the authority of one **CLODIUS** cited by *Plutarch*, and represents this *Clodius* as speaking thus: ‘ ALL the ANTIET MONUMENTS ‘ *were burnt when the Gauls sacked Rome, and those* ‘ *which the Romans now have are forgeries.*’

In Numa.
Dissert.
p. 20.

M. de B. goes on: ‘ And *Plutarch* himself, or who- ‘ ever was the author of the treatise OF THE FORTUNE ‘ OF THE ROMANS * after speaking of some marvellous ‘ events of those early times,—adds, To what purpose ‘ should we dwell upon times which have nothing clear, ‘ nothing certain, since, as *Livy* assures us, the Roman ‘ history was corrupted, and its monuments destroyed?’

* De For-
tuna Ro-
manorum.
p. 21.

Then immediately, (taking for granted, that *Plutarch* was the author of that treatise) he adds, ‘ What ‘ *Plutarch* says, upon the testimonies of *Clodius* and ‘ *Livy*, of the destruction of those monuments, gets an ‘ additional force in the mouth of so grave an author ‘ as he. For since he does not contradict them, he ‘ supports

' supports what they say by his suffrage. The testimony of these authors is very express, &c.

Again, *Livy*, *Clodius* and *Plutarch* depose that the monuments, by which the truth of the Roman History might have been ascertained, and which alone could give it the requisite certainty, were destroyed in the sacking of *Rome*.^{p. 26.}

And again, ' It is certain, that the historical part of the books of the Pontiffs or their ANNALS,ⁿ if they ever existed, perished in the destruction of *Rome* by the Gauls. *Livy* is so express upon this, that he leaves us no room to doubt of it.' — For he says, that ALL the memorials (kept in the Archives) that were in private bands, or that made part of the books of the Pontiffs, were involved in the ruin of the city.' But where does *Livy* say this? Why, [in B. 6. c. 1.] where he tells us, that a great part or the greater part of what was contained in the High Priests commentaries, and in other public and private monuments, perished in the burning of *Rome*: *Et quod etiam si quæ in commentariis Pontificum, aliisque publicis privatisque erant monumentis incensâ urbe pleræque interiere.*

NOW as to *CLODIUS*, *Plutarch* writes thus: ' Though the pedigrees of *Numa*'s family from its beginning to

ⁿ If they ever existed. Had *Livy* used these words in this place, he would have spoken like a certain gentleman, who, in giving a bad character of a person deceased, after many severe accusations, went on thus, *And he was a very cruel father to most of his children—if he had any.*

That *Livy* did not intend to express a doubt whether any Pontifical Annals existed before the burning of *Rome*, is pretty evident from a passage (in his 4th book c. 3.) cited by M. de B.

The historian is writing of the year 310, and he puts these words into the mouth of a Tribune, ' If we are not admitted to the *Fasti*, nor to the COMMENTARIES of the High Priests, are we therefore ignorant of those things which are known even by all strangers? That the Consuls succeeded in the place of the kings, and have no rights or prerogatives which the kings had not before?' Si non ad Fastos, non ad COMMENTARIOS PONTIFICUM admittimur: ne ea quidem scimus, quæ omnes perigrini etiam sciunt: Consules in locum Regum successisse: nec aut juris, aut majestatis quicquam habere, quod non in Regibus ante fuerit?

this,

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' this day, be set forth in very nice order, there is
 ' much dispute concerning the time when he lived.
 ' One *Clodius*, in a work entitled *ἱστορίας χρόνων*, asserts that
 ' the antient writings of that sort [*τὰς αἰχαῖας ΕΚΕΙΝΑΣ*
 ' *ἀναγενθάς*] were lost, when the *Gauls* destroyed *Rome*,
 ' and that those which now appear were framed by
 ' flatterers to please the vanity of some private fami-
 ' lies, who would needs be thought descended from the
 ' most illustrious origins, to which they had in truth no
 ' relation.' We see, that *Clodius* speaks only of genea-
 logical tables, and not of any other historical monu-
 ments. Had he asserted that ALL the antient monu-
 ments or records were lost, he would have asserted
 what was not true, by the concession of M. de *B.*
 who allows, that many treaties of peace, the laws of
 the twelve tables, and several other pieces of antiquity,
 escaped the flames.

M. L'Abbé *Sallier* thinks, that *Plutarch* was not the author of the treatise *de Fortuna Romanorum*; and indeed, if he were, he must, how grave soever, have been a very idle man, and condemned by himself in the above cited passage from that treatise, to spend his time in writing the lives of *Romulus*, *Numa*, *Poplicola* and *Camillus*, without any materials, but what he believed to be forgeries and romance.

But can it be imagined, that either *be* or *Livy* or *Dionysius* believed nothing of what they have written of the first ages of *Rome*, or that they looked upon all as *uncertain*? Though *Livy*, in some instances doubts, yet he often says, *it is evident, it is certain, constat, certum est*; and, in his preface, he warns us, with regard to what he is going to write, to distinguish between the stories adorned with fiction, and the traditions supported by authentic monuments.

And it was very singular, and not a little marvellous, if, when *Rome* was burnt by the *Gauls*, the fire did so piously distinguish between sacred writings and profane. It spared that part of the Pontiffs Books which regarded public worship, and likewise the treaties of peace, and the laws of the twelve tables, treaties

ties and laws being *religiones*^{*}, religious matters, deemed so on account of the religious ceremonies performed at their making ; but it destroyed entirely the *historical part* of the Pontifical Books, their *Annals* ; it spared no writing that was wholly prophane, nothing historical, if not somehow under the protection of religion.

* *Livy*, L. 6. c. 1.

II. THE FIRST Roman Historians had, among the materials for their works, not only some parts of the High Priests Annals, written before the burning of *Rome*, but some parts of OTHER public historical monuments or memorials, preserved from that fire. *Quæ in Commentariis Pontificum ALIIS que publicis monumenis erant PLERÆQUE interiere* : the greater part, not all, perished.

What those OTHER public monuments were, I will not pretend to say. Perhaps they were the *linen books*, the *books of the magistrates*, the *memorials or tables* of the *Censors*, and some other antient pieces referred to by the historians.

M. de B. observes, that *Livy*, who cites the *linen books* pretty often, from *Licinius Macer*, during the space of about ten years, does not cite them for any thing after that time, or before it. Now supposing this to be a proof that the *linen books*, which *Licinius* had consulted, contained nothing but what related to those ten years ; yet, as those years were prior to the burning of *Rome*, we may reasonably believe, that the books in question were part of an old public record, a fragment preserved from that fire. And we may reasonably think the same of those parts of the *books of the magistrates*, and of the *Censors books*, which are cited in attestation of matters anterior to the destruction of *Rome* by the *Gaul's*. The very imperfection of these pieces carries with it some proof of their antiquity, and of the mischief they had suffered.

98.

III. ORIGINAL Records of many treaties which the *Romans* had made with the neighbouring nations, before the burning of the city. And these must have been of excellent use to the first historians, both for facts

facts and dates in their accounts of the early times. And as to the treaties, after the rebuilding of *Rome*, there is no question of their preservation.

IV. THE ACTS of the *Senate* and of the *Comitia*, and the LAWS of the *Twelve Tables*, which fully laying open the constitution of the state, the customs and manners of the *Romans*, the rights of the people, and the powers of the magistrates, were a sure guide to the historians in many particulars of their accounts.

V. WHATEVER could be ascertained by antient annals or records, preserved in the other cities of *Italy*, that were fallen under the power of the *Romans*, when *Fabius* and his successors undertook to write history. Why should we suppose, that these were totally neglected by the first historians? That the neighbouring nations had books and records is evident from *Liv.* L. 10. c. 38, where we find, that, in the year 459 of *Rome*, the *Samnites* had ^o recourse to their *linen books* for direction in forming that legion which they called *legio linteata*.

That treaty with *Porsenna*, (mentioned by *Pliny*) of which M. de *B.* takes advantage to discredit the *Roman History*, was doubtless found at *Clusium*, or some other city of *Hetruria*, not at *Rome*.

Livy, in citing the prior historians, does not always tell us from whence they took their matter, yet often enough to make us know, that they cited authorities for what they delivered. And it is evident that they had recourse to the archives of the conquered cities. From the passage in *Livy*, (L. 7. c. 3.) before referred to, we learn that *Cincius* having examined into the anti-

^o M. L'Abbé *Sallier*, in his first discourse, makes this observation; and he adds, Les nations Voisines pouvoient donc offrir des monumens aux recherches des historiens. On pourroit rapporter bien d'autres preuves, que les peuples Voisins des Romains n'étoient pas sans monumens & sans histoires. *Varron*, cité par *Censorin et Festus*, en plusieurs endroits, fournoiroit de bons témoignage pour ce que je dis ici.

tiquities of *Volsinii*, a town in *Hetruria*, had found it to have been formerly a custom there to mark the number of the years by nails fixed in a temple, dedicated to *Nortia*, an *Hetruscan Goddess*; and that *Cincius* was a diligent enquirer into such antiquities, *diligens talium monumentorum auctor Cincius*.

VI. FAMILY-MEMORIALS, and FUNERAL-ORATIONS.

M. de B. cites ^{p. 104. & seq.} the authorities of *Cicero* and *Pliny* to prove, that it was the general custom at *Rome* for each noble family to preserve *memorials* recording the services which the members of it had done the state in the discharge of those offices, with which they had been intrusted. ‘ If these *memorials*, says M. de B. had been faithfully written, they would have been of infinite use to history. Should we admit that all the other monuments were lost, we must likewise admit, that the loss might have been supplied by these *memorials*. They were so many histories of the lives of particular men, and contained the principal affairs of the state, in the conduct of which those men had had a share. But unhappily, in the composition of these histories, much less regard was had to truth than to heightening the lustre of families. There were so many falsifications, the truth of facts was so frequently corrupted in these *memorials*, that no use could be made of them without great precaution.’

To PROVE the unfaithfulness of the *Family-memorials*, M. de B. insists chiefly on a passage in *Cicero*, and another in *Livy*, charging some *Funeral-orations* with containing false facts, invented to gratify the vanity of private families. From which it would seem that he considers the *Family-memorials* as consisting wholly of *Funeral-orations*. Yet, as he ranges certain *records of the Censors*, (called by *Dionysius τιμητικὰ ὑπομνήματα*) among the *Family-memorials*, and is inclined to think that the ^{p. 105.} *linen-books* ought to be placed there too, he manifestly

^p Cic. in Brut. c. 16. Plin. L. 35. c. 2.

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admits, that *funeral-orations* were not the *whole* of the *Family-memorials*.

NOW if the practice of writing *Family-memorials* began early, and these pieces were preserved, and transmitted from generation to generation, they must have been of excellent use to the first *Roman* historians: For how much soever those pieces might abound in panegyrical exaggeration, and false colourings, they would furnish good evidence of the truth of those *facts*, in which they agreed, and with which the several writers of those pieces were contemporary.

But as it does not appear, at what time the custom of writing *Family-memorials* began, I shall here leave this matter, and consider what is said of *Funeral-orations*.

DIONYSIUS, speaking of the *Funeral-oration* which *Poplicola* pronounced on his deceased colleague *Brutus*, tells us, it is uncertain whether *Poplicola* introduced this custom among the *Romans*, or found it already established by the kings. Be that as it will, there is no doubt of its being the constant practice from the beginning of the Republic, to honour the memory of great men by *Funeral-panegyrics*. And, as these were premeditated speeches, and as the glory of the orator was no less concerned in the composition, than the glory of the deceased, it is highly reasonable to believe that the orator wrote down what he purposed to say, and by revising and correcting his speech, put it into the best form he could, before he delivered it. I say it is natural to suppose, that this method was for the most part, if not universally, observed by the speakers of *Funeral-orations*. Nor can any thing be more probable, than that the families, concerned in these orations, would be very desirous to preserve them.

And indeed there seems to be sufficient ground to conjecture, that from these *Funeral Orations* were taken, into the History of the earliest times of the Republic, many particulars, not to be learnt from Tradition, or the High Priests Annals, or any other public Memorials. But then, for an authentic account of what passed among the *Romans*, I would ask, What better materials could

could an Historian have to work upon, than a series of such Orations ? For though in a Funeral Panegyric, the orator may well enough be supposed to over-rate the private virtues of the deceased , disguise or refine the motives of his actions, ascribe to his remote ancestors exploits which they had not performed, nay, give him noble ancestors from whom he was not really descended ; yet, as to the high offices which the person himself had filled, and the public acts he had done in those offices, whether civil or military, we can hardly imagine the Orator would attempt to impose upon an audience, who, having been eye-witnesses of the truth, were not capable of being deceived : For the sphere of action, in which the *Romans* moved, during more than 200 years after the erection of the commonwealth, was so very narrow, that nothing considerable, of a public concern, could pass either in peace or in war; but what must be known to almost every individual of the State. The *Roman* citizens were all soldiers, all went to the war in their turns, and they could not, therefore, be imposed upon with regard to the success of the enterprizes formed by their Generals : And the same soldier-citizens were parties in all the civil commotions and struggles, and had a share in establishing those useful laws and regulations, which their magistrates had the merit of contriving and proposing. So that a series of *Funeral Orations* on the great men of *Rome*, would contain most authentic Memorials of all the principal transactions and events both at home and abroad. It was the business of the Historian, who employed these materials for his work, to separate the *solid* from the *light* and *unsure* ; and certainly no task could be more easy.

It does not seem probable, that, during the *Regal State*, Funeral Panegyrics were in use, unless we may suppose that this honour was done to the Kings upon their demise, who, while *Rome* was governed by Kings, had the glory of all victories in war, and all prudent institutions in peace. But certain it is, that the practice prevailed from the very commencement of the Republic. And though much the greater number of these

Funeral Orations were unquestionably lost, when *Fabius*, about 300 years after the expulsion of *Tarquin*, undertook a general History of *Rome*, yet, that many of them were preserved, and especially of those posterior to the rebuilding of the City, there seems no reason to doubt. What could *Livy* mean by the *Privata Monuments*, of which, he says, the greater part was destroyed by the *Gauls*, but these Funeral Orations and other Family Memorials? For he speaks of them as Pieces that would have been useful towards a general and clear History of those times. And indeed we cannot imagine, that private families, in the earliest times of the Republic, were chargeable with that vanity, which ^q *Cicero* and *Livy* complain of, as the source of many inventions in Funeral Panegyrics of the later ages. Till some families could with *Truth* boast of their antiquity, and the long glories of a line of ancestors from whom they were descended, there was no temptation, no opportunity for vain men *falsely* to claim that kind of nobility, and invent pedigrees to do themselves honour. And should we suppose, that at the renovation of the State, upon the departure of the *Gauls*, (*i. e.* about 119 years after the birth of the Commonwealth) the loss of many monuments public and private, might give both temptation and opportunity for fiction in some degree, yet this could reach to nothing very considerable: and it is hardly credible that the Orator at a Funeral would, to raise the glory of the deceased and his family, hazard invented facts, which derogated from the

^q Nec verò habeo quemquam antiquorem [Catone Censore] cuius quidem scripta proferenda putem, nisi quem Appii Cæci Oratio hæc ipsa de Pyrrho, et nonnullæ *Mortuorum Laudationes* forte delectant: et Hercules, hæc quidem extant. Ipsæ enim familiæ sua quasi ornamenti, et monumenta servabant, et ad usum, si quis ejusdem generis occidisset, et ad memoriam laudum domesticarum, et ad illustrandam nobilitatem suam. Quamquam his laudationibus Historia rerum nostrarum est facta mendorior. Multa enim scripta sunt in eis, quæ facta non sunt, falsi triumphi, plures Consulatus, genera etiam falsa, et ad Plebem Transitiones, cùm homines humiliores in alienum ejusdem nominis infunderentur genus: ut si ego mē à M. Tullio esse dicerem, qui patricius cum Servio Sulpicio Consule, anno decimo post Reges exactos fuit. Cic. in Brut. c. 16.

glory

glory of other families, and could be contradicted by the memory of persons living. And when in later times (the brevity and imperfection of the Pontifical Annals and the other public monuments, and the loss of many private ones, through the extinction or decay of families, giving large scope to inventive vanity) Consulships and Triumphs were falsely ascribed, in Funeral Orations, to the remote ancestors of those whose obsequies were then solemnized ; still the accounts given in those Orations, of what they themselves had performed in the high offices they had filled, would be materials which an Historian might confidently and safely employ.

Livy's complaint sufficiently proves, that he thought the first Historians had made use of Funeral Orations in compiling their Histories, and that some of those writers had very injudiciously adopted what they found delivered in such Orations, concerning the remote ancestors of the persons, in whose honour they were spoken. But neither he nor *Cicero* charges those Orations, with containing false accounts of facts contemporary with the Orators, nor do they speak of those pieces as *forges*. I am not aware of any the least ground M. de B. has for thinking, that the Funeral Orations of which *Livy* and *Cicero* complain, were *pieces supposées que des faussaires avoient forgées*.

It is in writing of the year 432 of the City (*i. e.* the 188. of the Republic) that *Livy* is at a loss to know, whether the Dictator *Cornelius*, or the Consuls of the year, conducted the war against the *Samnites* and had a Triumph for the success. The Authors he consulted, differed on this point, all agreeing however in *Cornelius* being then Dictator : they had therefore some unquestionable authority for this particular. Their differences, in relation to the persons who obtained the Victory and Triumph, he imputes to the differing accounts in Funeral Orations and Inscriptions on Images, made long after the time, and by which he supposes the disagreeing Historians to have been respectively guided. ‘ It is ‘ my opinion, says he, that the truth of history has been ‘ corrupted by Funeral Orations, and lying Inscriptions

‘ on Images, each family, by plausible fictions, assuming to itself the honour of great exploits. Hence, (that is, from this arrogant vanity) it has doubtless happened, that the actions of particular men are confounded (those of one man ascribed to another) and the *Public monuments* are likewise in confusion (disagree, contradict one another.) Nor is there any contemporary writer (contemporary with the Dictator and Consuls of the year 432) extant, by whose authority the truth of the matter in question can be sufficiently ascertained.’

What *Livy* means by *Public Monuments* in this place, I will not pretend to say; probably they were the Inscriptions on Statues, *erected in the later times*, in temples and other public places, which Inscriptions, contradicting one another, had occasioned a disagreement among the Historians, who employed them in their own compositions. That he does not speak of the *High Priests Annals*, as confounded or made inconsistent, is evident from Cicero’s account of those Pieces. The High Priests business was not to record the transactions that passed two or three hundred years before, but the transactions of the present, or immediately preceding year. No Funeral Orations nor Inscriptions on Images, made in after times, could confound those Annals. Contradict them they might, but not make them inconsistent with themselves.

The same may besaid of any other monuments, contemporary with the facts recorded in them; no posterior Orations nor Inscriptions could throw them into confusion.

It must indeed be admitted, upon the Credit of *Livy*’s words, that, in his time, no authentic record of any sort, contemporary with the Magistrates he is writing of, was extant, *by which the particular point in*

¹ Vitiata memoriam funebris laudibus reor, falsisque imaginum titulis, dum familia ad se quæque famam rerum gestarum, honorumque fallente mendacio trahunt. Inde certè et singulorum gesta, et publica monumenta rerum confusa. Nec quisquam æqualis temporibus illis scriptor exstat, quo satis certo auctore stetur. Lib. 8. c. 40.

‘ question

question could be cleared up : For otherwise the differences among the prior Historians would not have perplexed him. But he does not say, that *Rome* had no writers so early as the year 432, or that no writing of so early date was extant in his time. His words rather import the contrary, That there were writers in those days, and that some of their writings were extant, but none whereby the matter in doubt could with sufficient certainty be determined. *Nec quisquam æqualis temporibus illis scriptor extat, quo satis certo auctore stetur.*

DEMONSTRATION, or satisfactory proof is not aimed at, by any thing, or by all that is said above, in favour of the Roman History of the five first centuries ; but only probability. The sum is this. It seems from many passages in *Cicero*, *Livy* and other antient writers, that the first Roman Historians had a great variety of antient and genuine pieces for the foundation of their Histories ; *The High Priests Annals : The Acts of the Senate, and of the Comitia ; Records of the succession of the Magistrates ; The Censors Books ; Treaties of Peace and Alliance ; Family Memorials and Funeral Orations.*

Of no one sort of these pieces was there an uninterrupted series, but only parts and fragments. The whole stock of materials was insufficient for a continued thread of History ; and accordingly, the History is broken and imperfect ; there are many chasms in it ; some things are delivered as uncertain, some as fabulous ; and many things in it are fabulous or uncertain, which are not delivered as such. *Fabius Pittor* and his nearest followers adopted traditional stories which pleased the national vanity, and of which those Historians had no desire to destroy the belief, even when they could have done it by the means of authentic monuments ; and in many instances they were destitute of those means. The *Circumstantial Accounts* of the exploits of particular men, I conjecture to have been taken from Family Memorials and Funeral Orations ; because I cannot conceive from what other source the

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Historians could have them. For the *Great Annals*, according to the description of them by *Cicero*, must have been too brief, to descend often to Circumstances of Actions ; and *Tradition* (as M. de *Pouilly* observes) never informs us of Circumstances any more than of dates. When fiction or uncertainty is apparent in the accounts given us of the heroic deeds of this or that great man, I apprehend, that those accounts were taken from Family Memorials and Funeral Orations, of low date, when, the power of the *Romans* growing considerable, and their vanity keeping pace with it, Genealogies became a matter of great moment to private Families.

BUT as to the most memorable of the *National Affairs*, the civil contests and the important changes produced by those contests in the constitution of the government, the foreign wars in which the *Romans* engaged, and the final success of their struggles with each of the neighbouring states, the truth of these events might be assured by Tradition alone ; and the very dates of most of them would be ascertained by the **Laws** and the **TREATIES**, that were carefully preserved ; the laws consequent to the commotions and the treaties consequent to the wars. And we may well presume that the memory of much more than these principal events was transmitted by the High Priests *Annals* and the other public Monuments, contemporary with the facts they recorded. Family Memorials and Funeral Orations, composed in the earliest times of the Republic, would be excellent materials for an Historian ; and even those of later date, where truth was mingled with fiction, would be good authority with regard not only to contemporary facts, but to facts much earlier than those Pieces, if many of those Pieces agreed in the same accounts.

M. de *B.* begins the second part of his Dissertation with these words. ‘ I have given the reasons which make me call in question the History of the first five centuries of *Rome*. They are founded on the want of contemporary Monuments and Historians. So that the first Historians which *Rome* produced, could have nothing

nothing whereon to ground their relations but *Tradition*, which is apt to corrupt very much the truth of facts.' ^a

Now, granting that *the very short account* of the 244 years of the Kings, contained in *Livy's first Book*, was chiefly taken from *Tradition*, yet surely it is quite incredible, that such a variety of matter, so many particulars (with that degree of order which they have) as fill the *nine* preserved Books of *Livy* that follow the *first*, and filled *seven*^b Books more that are lost, could all be collected from Tradition alone. Tradition is not so copious and methodical. The earlier Historians, therefore, from whom *Livy* drew the matter of his History of *Rome*, from the Expulsion of *Tarquin* to the end of the 5th Century, must have had written Records and Memorials of some sort to work upon; and from these they must have taken *the greater part* of what they related: unless we will suppose that their Histories were romances of their own invention, which is not very probable; there being no indication whatsoever of those writers being great wits. It is probable, that, after *Fabius Pictor* and some others had composed General Histories of their Country, most of the private Memorials, which had served them, in many particulars, for guides and vouchers, were neglected and lost; as was the fate of *Fabius*, and all the Historians prior to *Livy*, after he had published a better written and more entertaining History, comprehending the substance of all that they had collected.

M. de B. in the second part of his Dissertation, produces from the *Roman* story, several facts, which he calls *Principal Events*, and which, from the disagreement among the Antients, in their accounts of them, he considers as wholly uncertain; and from the uncer-

^a J'ai rapporté les raisons qui me font revoquer en doute l'*Histoire des cinq premiers Siecles de Rome*. Elles sont fondées sur la disette de Monumens, et d'Historiens contemporains: de sorte que les premiers Historiens ne purent fonder leurs relations, que sur la Tradition, sujette à alterer beaucoup la vérité des faits. p 205.

^b *Livy's 17th Book ended with the year 495.*

tainty of these *Principal Events*, he infers the uncertainty of all the rest. I shall not enter into a particular consideration of the facts referred to ; because first of all, some of them are spoken of by the Antients as uncertain ; and nobody pretends to certainty where they disclaim it. In the next place, because I conceive that very few of the facts mentioned have a title to be called *Principal Events* ; and lastly, because, if disagreement in some things, among Historians who write of the same People and times, be a sufficient ground for refusing credit to every thing they relate, there is no History which may not with good reason be utterly rejected ; and I am not concerned in the defence of History in general.

BUT, in the first part of the Dissertation, there is one particular, which being strenuously insisted upon by the ingenious author, and seeming very much to his purpose of discrediting the accounts, given us by *Livy* and *Dionysius*, of the early times of the Republic, ought not to be passed over unconsidered : I mean THE TREATY which *Polybius* says, was concluded between the Romans and Carthaginians in the first year after the expulsion of Tarquin ; *Lucius Junius Brutus*, and *Marcus Horatius* being Consuls. The Reader may find this piece in the 7th Chap. of B. 3. of this History. If the treaty be genuine, and there be no mistake in the date which *Polybius* assigns to it, it stands in opposition to many things related by the two other Historians.

I. IT APPEARS by this treaty (says M. de B.) ‘ That
 Dissert. p. 35. ‘ *Brutus* and *Horatius* were colleagues in the consulship ;
 ‘ which, according to *Livy* and *Dionysius*, and all the
 ‘ *Roman Fasti*, they were not :’ and he adds, ‘ that
 ‘ every thing the historians tell us of the events of this
 ‘ year, being partly founded on the names of the Con-
 ‘ suls, nothing of the whole is, in his opinion, much
 ‘ worthy of credit.’^c

^c Je crois qu'il faut avouer de bonne foi, que tout ce que les Historiens nous disent des evenemens de cette année, étant en partie fondé sur les noms de consuls, est peu digne de creance.

He observes, ‘that Mr. *Dodwell*, (de cyclis Rom. Diff. x. p. 104.) and *Rycquius* (de capitol. Rom. c. 11.) chuse rather to accuse *Polybius* of falsifying this treaty, than admit the uncertainty which it throws upon antient history : and that *Perizonius* † has endeavoured to reconcile *Polybius* with the *Roman Fasti*, by conjecturing, That *Polybius* found only the name of *Horatius* in the original of the treaty, and added, of his own head, the name of *Brutus*, the better to denote the true date of this piece ; and, as the name of *Horatius* alone had been put on the temple of the capital, so that name alone had been put to this treaty. This conjecture [says M. de B.] I would let pass, if it removed the other difficulties raised by the piece in question, and reconciled it with the accounts given by the other Historians : yet I think *Polybius* too well versed in the Roman History, to have given *Horatius* a colleague, who never was his colleague ; and too exact and scrupulous to have added any thing of his own to an original piece.’

THAT it is not probable, *Polybius* would falsify a Treaty, add any thing of his own to an Original Piece, I readily grant : and that *Perizonius*’s conjecture, if admitted, would leave the main difficulties in their full force. But I should be curious no know, what *Roman History* that was, which M. de B. supposes *Polybius* so well versed in, and in which he supposes him to have found, that *Brutus* and *Horatius* were colleagues in the consulship. If, in the days of *Polybius*, there were authentic annals existing, which recorded the transactions of the earliest times of the Republic, M. de B.’s main position in his Dissertation is overthrown. If he supposes that *Polybius*’s sole authority for joining *Brutus* and *Horatius* in the consulship (contrary to the report of the older historians and annalists, whom *Livy* and *Dionysius* are said to have copied) was the piece in question, I would ask, how it appears that the names of *Brutus* and *Horatius* were certainly at the head or tail of that antient monument ? It is plain they were not in the body

body of it. When *Livy* and *Dionysius* contradict *Polybius* upon any particular historical fact, I believe there are very few readers who will not be inclined to side with the last, provided there be no reason not to do so, but barely his being contradicted upon *that fact*, by those two historians. But this is not the present case. The fact reported by *him* is highly improbable ; and it is inconsistent with a series of not improbable facts, reported by *them* ; facts, in regard to which we cannot conceive any temptation they had to *invent, conceal, or disguise* : and, in what *Polybius* himself says, there seems to be good ground for suspecting that he was deceived in relation to the piece in question. He introduces his translation of it with these words : ‘ The first treaty

L. 3. c. 22 ‘ between the *Romans* and *Carthaginians* was made in
 ‘ the consulship of *Lucius Junius Brutus*, and *Marcus*
 ‘ *Horatius* the first Consuls after the *Refuge*, by whom
 ‘ also was consecrated the temple of *Jupiter Capitolinus*,
 ‘ 28 years before the passing of *Xerxes* into *Greece*.
 ‘ Below, you will find the words of the treaty, inter-
 ‘ preted in the best manner I was able to do it. For the
 ‘ antient Latin is so different from that now in use, that
 ‘ the most skilful are frequently at a loss, even after close
 ‘ application, to explain it.’—And (in c. 26.) after giving us two subsequent treaties, he says, ‘ It is no won-
 ‘ der that *Philinus* knew nothing of these [all the 3]
 ‘ treaties, (though engraven on brass, and preserved in
 ‘ the temple of *Jupiter*, under the custody of the *Æ-
 ‘ diles*) for even in my time, the oldest men, both *Ro-
 ‘ mans* and *Carthaginians*, those who were thought the
 ‘ best acquainted with public affairs, were ignorant of
 ‘ these treaties.’

NOW, granting that some Consuls names were *really* found at the beginning or end of the old record in question, yet no body will suppose, that the Consuls were *there described* in the manner *Polybius* describes them. The *description* is all his own. And (by the way) when he says, that the temple of *Jupiter Capitolinus* was consecrated by *Brutus* and *Horatius* ; Who can prefer his authority, *in this particular*, to that of

Livy,

Livy, or of the most antient Latin historians whom doubtless *Livy* followed herein ; and to the very inscription itself on the temple, where *Horatius* was named as the only consecrator ? What motive can we imagine the Roman Historians to have had for denying *Brutus* a share in that honour, if he had any title to it ? Be- L. 2. c. 8. sides, it seems pretty evident from many passages in L. 4. c. 29. *Livy*, that it was not the custom, in the dedication of L. 9. c. 46. any temple, for more than one person to perform that ceremony.

FURTHER ; not only the *description* of the Consuls, but their very *NAMES*, as *Polybius gives them*, cannot well be supposed to have been annexed to this record, *Lucius Junius* with his surname *Brutus*, and *Marcus Horatius* without his surname *Pulvillus*. If the names were *entire* and *legible*, we must believe that the historian has either omitted or added something. And supposing, that to this record were found both *entire* and *legible*, the names of some Consuls ; yet why is it so difficult to believe, that *Polybius* may have been deceived, concerning those names, by the persons to whom he applied himself, for assistance in his attempt to explain a record in old Latin ? For it is not to be supposed that he, a stranger, would undertake, without assistance, to translate a piece so difficult to be translated, even by the most skilful of the natives. He may have given us a false account of the date of this treaty without being guilty of forgery.

AND why may we not suppose, that time had effaced some parts of the Consuls names, and that the defects were supply'd by conjecture ? The Roman vanity might have a share too in the conjecture ; it might prompt the assistants of our historian to fill up ^b the chasms in such a manner

^b Suppose the treaty in question to have been made so late as 304, the first year after the Decemvirate, when *Lucius Valerius Potitus* and *Marcus Horatius Barbatus* were Consuls. The matter of the treaty will, in this case, suit better with the times, according to the accounts of them by *Livy* and *Dionysius*. (For *Ardea* was then in alliance with *Rome*, and *Antium* was a *Roman colony*.) Imagine the names of the

a manner as to form an evidence, that the Roman state was considerable enough, in the first year of the Republic, to have a treaty with the *Carthaginians*.

But perhaps there is some reason to doubt, whether any date, or Consuls names were *really* found at the beginning or end of this old record. For it is remarkable, that *Polybius*, who gives us, at large, two subsequent treaties engraven, like the first, on brass, and kept with it under the custody of the *Ædiles*, neither mentions *the names of the Consuls* under whose administration they were made, nor assigns any *certain date* to either of them. Of the former of the two he says only, that it was made *after the first*; and of the latter he says only, that it was made *about the time of Pyrrhus's coming into Italy*: and for *this* it does not appear, that he had any voucher, but the matter of the treaty itself, where *Pyrrbus* is mentioned. If he had found dates and consuls names to these brazen records, it is wonderful that so exact an historian should omit them; and especially when he is employing these records as evidence against *Pbilinus*'s accounts, and the evidence has no real weight for want of those dates. Seeing then there is so much reason to believe that the records of the two later treaties wanted dates, we may well suspect that the oldest had the like defect; and that the date given to it was by meer conjecture.

Dissert. p.
37.

L. I. c. 20.

II. M. DE B's second discovery, in this important piece of antiquity, is, ' That so early as the first year of the Republic, the *Romans* practised navigation and ' *pyracy*; of which things (he adds) there is little said ' in their history, which represents their *marine*; till the ' first Punic war, as consisting only of some merchant ' ships, and as not brought to any perfection but on ' occasion of that war, as *Polybius himself* remarks.

the Consuls to have been partly effaced; and that there remained of them, (supposing the cognomens to have been originally inserted) only *Lucius—ius—sus*, *Marcus Horatius*. Who will not see, that the Roman vanity of those, whom *Polybius* employed for his decyphering, might tempt them to supply the chasritis with *Jan—Bru*? But I am inclined to think that the piece in question was of much later date than the year 304.

I MUST

I MUST here confess, that I cannot discern, in the treaty, one word importing, that the *Romans*, at the time of its being concluded, practised *pyracy*, or had any *ships of war*. Perhaps M. de *B.* collects this *pyracy* from *Polybius's comment* on the treaty, who says, ‘That the *Carthaginians* would not suffer the *Romans* to sail to the south of the Fair Promontory with long ships, *μαρτιλίς ναῦς*;’ which are commonly understood to be *ships of war*. But his comment here does not well accord with what he himself asserts, when he writes of the *first Punic war*: For he there tells us, ‘ That L. 1.c. 20. the *Romans*, to that time, had never thought of the sea—and were so far from having *deck'd ships*, that they had not so much as *one long ship*, or even a *Lemibus*.’ In this particular the historian is undoubtedly mistaken: and I mention it, not only to shew its repugnance to his comment on the treaty in question, but to shew likewise that *Polybius* is not always to be followed with a blind deference; and that we ought, in reading him, to observe the rule which he recommends to those who read the historian *Fabius*, ‘ not to regard so much the great name of the person who writes, as the matter he delivers,’ and to consider whether this be probable, have the appearance of truth, and be consistent with what is unquestionably true ^b.

BUT

^b *Polybius* (L. 3. c. 26.) quarrels with *Philinus*, not for being ignorant of the three treaties before mentioned, as he supposes he was, but for asserting things contrary to the tenor of them. Now it does not appear, from any proof *Polybius* gives, either that *Philinus* was ignorant of these treaties, or that he asserted any thing contrary to them. *Philinus* affirmed (in speaking of the grounds of the first Punic war) that in some treaty between the *Romans* and *Carthaginians*, it had been covenanted, that the former should not invade any part of *Sicily*, nor the latter any part of *Italy*. But this assertion does not contradict what is contained in the other treaties. To shew a contradiction *Polybius* should have given us the dates of all the three treaties he has mentioned, and likewise the date, which *Philinus* assigned to the treaty mentioned by him; and this *Polybius* has not done. The treaty, to which *Philinus* referred, might have been made after the time of *Pyrrhus's* coming into *Italy*: And *Philinus* might know there

BUT further, this treaty, according to M. de B. informs us,

Dissert. p.
37.

* Lib. 2.
in fine.
† Lib. ix.
P. 615.

§ D. Hal.
Lib. 4. p.
277.
Livy. Lib.
1. c. 57.

III. THAT so early as the first year of the Republic,
 ‘ The Romans were masters of all the sea-coast as far as
 ‘ to Taracina, and even of the cities of Antium and
 ‘ Ardea ; a point wherein it manifestly stands in oppo-
 ‘ sition to *Livy* * and *Dionysius* †. For these authors
 ‘ tell us, that Antium was the capital of the Volsci, and
 ‘ that the Romans did not take it till 40 years after, in
 ‘ the Consulship of T. Quinctius and Q. Servilius. The
 ‘ city of Ardea §, according to the same historians, was
 ‘ besieged by Tarquin the Proud at the time when the
 ‘ Roman people shook off the yoke of his domination.
 ‘ The Ardeates, after that, having the same interests
 ‘ with the Romans, made a fifteen years truce with
 ‘ them. After which time Ardea continued in alli-
 ‘ ance with Rome to the year 310, when on account

there was such a treaty, though *Polybius* could find no record of it ; which is the second bad reason he gives for denying the fact. What *Philinus* reported is so far from being manifestly false, that it is highly probable. For if the Romans before they had subdued all *Latium*, or had even alliances with all the *Latine* states, thought it necessary to bind the *Carthaginians* by treaty not to attempt conquests in any part of *Latium*, it was natural, that when they came to have the same sort of interest in protecting all *Italy* from the *Carthaginians*, which they had before in protecting *Latium* only, they should exclude the *Carthaginians* from every part of *Italy* ; and doubtless in that case the *Carthaginians* would exclude the *Romans* for the like reasons, from every part of *Sicily*.

[N. B. In p. 18. of the second Volume of this History, where the question, *Whether the first war, undertaken by the Romans against the Carthaginians was justifiable*, is discussed, the reasoning is partly founded on the supposition, that the report of *Polybius* is true ; and that no treaty had been concluded between the two states, whereby the *Romans* were barred from meddling in the affairs of *Sicily*.]

It is sometimes urged against the authority of *Livy* and *Dionysius*, with regard to certain important facts related by them, that *Polybius* is silent concerning those facts, tho' he writ of the same times and on the same subject which they treat. But I shall here observe, once for all, That this his silence will never alone be a sufficient reason for rejecting the accounts of the other historians. For *Polybius*, though he speaks three times of the taking of *Rome* by the *Gauls*, does not once mention their *burning* it ; and yet this is an important fact, of which I believe no body questions the truth.

‘ of some particular discontents, they confederated with
‘ the *Volsci* ; but in the following year the old alliance
‘ was renewed.

‘ This city therefore (adds M. de B.) was, accord-
‘ ing to those historians, *independent*, and *only in alliance*
‘ with the *Romans* ; whereas the *treaty*, given at large
‘ by Polybius, imports, that this city, and likewise
‘ Antium, Laurentum, Circeii, Tarracina were *SUBJECT*
‘ to them ; and *expressly distinguishes these cities from the*
‘ *cities IN ALLIANCE with Rome*. Hence it appears
‘ that the two historians give us a false notion of the
‘ *Roman* state in the beginning of the republic ; for
‘ they represent its domination as extending little fur-
‘ ther than the proper territory of *Rome* ; whereas
‘ by this treaty we see, that it extended over several
‘ cities, and over all the sea-coast as far as *Tarracina*.^a

WHENEVER THIS treaty was made (supposing it genuine) it is evident, that the main purpose of the *Romans* in it, was to exclude the *Carthaginians* from *all Latium*, not only those parts of it that were *subject* to the *Romans*, or in alliance with them, but those like-
wise with which they had neither of those connexions. And it is not, I think, clear from the words of the treaty, that *all* the towns therein mentioned were *in absolute subjection* to the *Romans*. It speaks to this effect, ‘ Let the *Carthaginians* do no hurt to the
‘ *Ardeates*, *Antiates*, *Laurentini*, *Circeienses*, *Tarraci-*
‘ *nenses*, or any other of the *Latines*, if they be *ιππηκοοι*,
‘ nay, if any of them be not *ιππηκοοι*, let not the *Cartha-*
‘ *ginians* meddle with their towns. If they take any
‘ town of the *Latines* [whether they be *ιππηκοοι* or not
‘ *ιππηκοοι*] let them restore it unhurt to the *Romans*.’ Here is no distinction made of towns *subject* and towns
in alliance, but of the *Latines* who were *ιππηκοοι*, and the

^a ΚΑΡΧΗΔΟΝΙΟΙ ΔΕ ΜΗ ΑΔΙΚΕΙΤΩΣΑΝ ΔΗΜΟΝ ΑΡΔΕΑΤΩΝ,
ΑΝΤΙΑΤΩΝ, ΛΑΥΡΕΝΤΙΩΝ, ΚΙΡΚΑΙΑ ΤΩΝ, ΤΑΡΡΑΚΗΤΙΩΝ,
ΜΠΑ’ ΆΛΛΟΝ ΜΗΔΕΝΑ ΛΑΤΙΝΩΝ, ΟΣΟΙ ΑΝ ΥΠΗΚΟΟΙ. ΕΑΝ
ΔΕ ΤΙΝΕΣ ΜΗ ΩΣΙΝ ΥΠΗΚΟΟΙ, ΤΩΝ ΠΟΔΕΩΝ ΑΙΙΕΧΕΤΩΣΑΝ.
ΑΝ ΔΕ ΛΑΒΩΣΙ, ΡΩΣΙ, ΡΩΜΑΙΟΙΣ ΑΠΟΔΙΔΟΤΩΣΑΝ ΑΚΕΡΑΙΟΝ.
Polyb. Lib. 3. c. 22.

On the Credibility of the HISTORY

Latines who were *not iuniores*. What the force of the ' word *iuniores* is, does not fully appear; whether it means *subject* in the strict sense, or only *dependent allies*. I say *dependent allies*; for these towns might be *in alliance* with the *Romans* and yet *not independent* on them; such being the case of almost all the states of *Italy* at the commencement of the first Punic war. And what the true import was of the old obsolete Latin word, which *Polybius* has rendered *iuniores*, who can tell? One would suspect that neither *Polybius* nor his assistants did very well understand the piece they undertook to explain. For it is a very strange covenant, *That in case the Carthaginians seized any town of the Latines, not subject to the Romans, they should restore it to the Romans.*

Lib. 4. c.
7.

Further; If this Brazen Monument had, for its date, the names of *Brutus* and *Horatius* (Consuls in the first year of the Republic) and if the words of the treaty import, that the *Ardeates* were *subject* to *Rome*, and *distinguish* them from *ALLIES*, it is contradicted by an *Original Authentic Record*, which *Livy* mentions of a *Treaty of Alliance and Friendship*, made with the *Ardeates* in the Consulships of *L. Sempronius Atratinus*, and *L. Papirius Mugilanus* (year of *Rome* 309 or 311:) which treaty was a *Renewal of an Alliance* that had long subsisted between the two States^a.

Again;

^a The *Ardeates*, on occasion of a dispute between them and their neighbours the *Aricini*, about a tract of land, were insulted by a decree of the *Roman* people, to whom the cause had been referred; who, instead of adjudging the land to either of the claimants took it to themselves. Hereupon the *Ardeates* broke alliance with the *Romans*, and soon after, by Ambassadors complained at *Rome* of the injury which had been done them; but complained in such terms, as shewed they were willing to renew alliance and friendship with the *Roman* state, provided restitution were made of the land in question. The Senate gave them a soft answer; and the next year the alliance was renewed by treaty; the record of which treaty *Licinius Macer* had read. *T. Quinctius Barbatus interrex consules crevit, L. Papirium Mugilanum, L. Sempronium Atratinum. His consulibus cum Ardeatis foedus renovatum est. Idque Monimenti est, Consules eos illo anno fuisse qui neque in Annalibus Priscis, neque in Libris Magistratum inveniuntur, Credo, quod Tribuni Militum initio anni fuerunt, eo perinde*

Again, it is hardly to be imagined, that the *Romans* had subdued the maritime towns of old *Latium*, as far as to *Tarracina*, in the remotest extremity of it, without having reduced the intermediate inland towns, and in short, the whole or almost the whole country : Yet this subjection of the *Latine Nation* to *Rome* in the first year of the Republic, is incompatible with an Original Brazen Monument existing in *Livy's* time, and recording the *Treaty of Alliance* made with the *Latines* in the second Consulship of *Cassius*, (year of R. 260, or 261.)

Lib. 2. c.

33.

And, as to *Antium*, the Capital of the *Volsci*, though *Livy* reports, that it was taken (in 284) forty years after the commencement of the Republic, yet, by the sequel ^b of his story, it would seem, that the *Antiates* were

perinde ac si totum annum in imperio fuerint, suffectis his Consulibus, prætermissa nomina Consulum horum. Licinius Macer auctor est, et in FOEDERE ARDEATINO et in Linteis Libris ad Monetae inventa.

^b The *Latine* Historian relates, that when after the taking of *Antium* in 285. by *T. Quinctius*, the Senate had decreed to place a Colony there, the persons appointed to settle the Colony could prevail with but few of the *Roman* Citizens to go thither, so that they were forced to admit of *Volsci* to compleat the necessary number ; and he further tells us, that a multitude of the old inhabitants returning soon after to the City, these alienated the minds of the Colony from the *Romans*, and its fidelity could no longer be depended upon. *Livy* c. 23. seems not to have known the exact time, when the *Antiates* shook off all dependance upon the Republic ; But he represents them in the year 345 at the head of a Confederacy against *Rome*. In 377, he makes them surrender their town and territory to the *Romans*. Nevertheless, in 407, we find them acting as an independent people ; they had re-built *Satricum*, and sent a Colony thither : And they by deputies solicited the *Latines* to take arms against the *Romans*. And in 413 the *Antiates* make incursions on the lands of *Ostia*, *Ardea* and *Solonium* ; and the *Romans* gain no honour in the war against them. But in 415 they are totally subdued, together with the *Latines*, and a new Colony is sent to *Antium*. The *Antiates* are allowed to enrol themselves in the Colony ; but they are forbid the sea, and deprived of their *Long Ships*, some of which the *Romans* burn, carrying the *Beaks* of them to *Rome*, where the *Suggebum* or Pulpit, in the Forum, being adorned with them, acquires thence the name of *Rostra*. With the rest of the ships, the *Romans* augment their own navy.

L. 3. c. 1

c. 4.

L. 4. c.

56.

L. 6. c.

33.

L. 8. c.

12.

L. 8. c.

13, 14.

Supposing the *first* treaty with *Carthage* to have been made in 244, and the *third* in the time of *Pyrrhus*, there will have been, according to *Polybius*, 231 years between the *first* and the *third*.

not really subdued, nor reduced to a state of absolute
 Liv. L. 8. subjection till the year 415, when the *Latines* also, or
 c. 13, 14. at least the much greater part of them, were brought
 into the like subjection. And even then *Antium* was
 made a *Roman* Colony into which the Natives were ad-
 mitted.

It would seem therefore, that the treaty, given by
Polybius, as made with *Cartilage* in 244, was not made
 till after the year 415, the matter of it perfectly
 agreeing with the state of things after this year, and not
 before it.

* Oros. L. 3. c. 7. *Livy* speaks of a * treaty of alliance and friendship
 calls this
Primum
 illud iustum
 cum
Carth.
 Fœdus.
 L. 9. c.
 43.

with the *Carthaginians* in the Consulship of *Valerius Cor-*
vus, and *Popilius Lænas*, year of *Rome* (according to
 the *Fuſt Cap.*) 405; and his words seem to import that
 this was the *firſt* treaty concluded between the two Re-
 publics. *Cum Carthaginensibus Legatis Romæ fœdus*
iustum, quum amicitiam ac societatem petentes veniſſent.

Liv. L. 7. c. 27. He speaks of no other till he comes
 to the year 447, when he says a *Third Treaty* was made
 with *Cartilage*; *Cum Carthaginensibus eodem anno*
fœdus Tertio renovatum eſt. L. 9. c. 43. So that it would
 seem from hence, and from the matter of that treaty,
 which *Polybius* calls the *firſt*, that it was really the *se-
 cond*, and made between the years 405 and 447, and
 after the reduction of *Latium* in 415. According to
 the Epitome of *Livy*, the treaty concluded in the

* Y. of R. 475. time of * *Pyrrhus*, which is *Polybius's third* treaty, was
 Epit. L. 13. the *fourth* treaty made with the *Carthaginians*. *Iterum*
adversus Pyrrhum dubio eventu pugnatum est. Cum
Carthaginensibus quarto fœdus renovatum eſt.

GRANTING then, that, by the words of this old
 brazen record, the towns, there mentioned, were ab-
 solutely SUBJECT to the *Romans*; what is the conclu-
 sion we should naturally draw from it? Not that *Livy*
 and *Dionysius* have given us a false account of the *Roman*
 state in the first year of the Republic, but that the
 PIECE in question was not genuine, or that the names
 of Brutus and Horatius were not annexed to it. For,

What could tempt *Livy*, a *Roman*, or *Dionysius*, an
 extravagant

extravagant flatterer of the *Romans*, *wilfully* to disguise the extent of the *Roman* domination at the commencement of the Republic? I say *wilfully to disguise*: For is it possible to believe that either the *Romans* or the *Latines* were ignorant of the time when the latter became *Subjects* of the former? And M. de B. seems not to have duly reflected, when he says^c, ‘It is sufficiently apparent, that *Livy* and *Dionysius* knew nothing of the treaty mentioned by *Polybius*.’ They could not but meet with this piece in *Polybius*’s work, which they appear to be very well acquainted with, and of which *Livy* makes great use in compiling his own. And is it not evident therefore, from their shewing no regard to what *Polybius* says of his old brazen monument, either that they looked upon it as not authentic, or knew that he had been deceived concerning the date of it? It is remarkable, that *Livy*, who informs us, that some authors differing from the rest, make *Horatius* the immediate successor of *Brutus*, has not thought it worth while to observe, that *Polybius* makes them *collegues* in the consulship.

L. 2. c. 8.

Add to this the great improbability, that, during the unsettled and precarious state of things at *Rome*, in the first year after the expulsion of *Tarquin*, the *Carthaginians* should enter into any treaty with the *Romans*; and the yet greater improbability, that they should conclude a treaty with them in terms, which suppose them in a settled state, and in a condition to maintain the stipulations therein expressed.

Perhaps we should have found the matter cleared up, and *Polybius*’s mistake animadverted upon by *Livy* or *Dionysius*, if those parts of their histories, which treated of the first war with the *Carthaginians*, had been preserved.

I shall close these Observations with the words of M. de *Pouilly*, in the beginning of his *Nouveaux Essais de Critique sur la fidélité de l’Histoire*.

^c Il paroît même assez, qu’ils n’en ont eu nulle connoissance, Dissert. p. 34. Si Tite *Live* avoit eu connoissance de cette pièce, &c. S’il avoit consulté ce monument, &c. p. 39.

On the Credibility of the HISTORY, &c.

‘ It very seldom happens, that we avoid one faulty extreme without running into another, its contrary :
‘ This maxim, true in morality, is true in criticism.
‘ Are men afraid of giving credit to fables ? They sometimes refuse it to the most certain facts ; they look upon History as a compound of Truths and Fictions, so intimately united, that it is impossible to separate them.—Had the Historian no part in the transactions he relates ? They suspect him of being ill informed.—Had he a part in those transactions ? They accuse him of prejudice and prepossession.—On the other hand there are those, who, fearing lest they should happen to reject true History, give credit to all the fables which have borrowed its Name—Let us avoid these opposite extravagances : Let us confess, that, in History, *falshood* is mingled with *truth* ; but that there are marks by which they may be distinguished. Love of the *Marvellous*, Interest, Vanity, Spirit of Party, are so many fountains ever open, from whence fiction spreads itself in ample waves over the Annals of all nations.—When we are reduced to seek the truth of a fact in Historians biased by passions, if they are of different parties and interests, let us bring their narrations together ; and from this collation, we shall strike out the truth, if I may so speak, in spite of them : I say farther, that those who are of one and the same party, will commonly deserve some credit in facts of such public notoriety, that they durst not disguise them ; or in which they were too little interested to have sufficient temptation to undertake it.’

T H E
R O M A N H I S T O R Y.
T H I R D B O O K continued.

C H A P. XXV.

§ I. *The Tarentines endeavour privately to stir up both old and new enemies against Rome. The Gauls, called Senones, give the Roman army a terrible overthrow. Curius Dentatus revenges this defeat.* §. II. *The next year the Romans vanquished in battle the Senones, the Boii, and the Hetrurians. The Samnites revolt. The year following, almost all Italy rises in arms against the Republic. Fabricius defeats the confederate forces of the Lucanians, Bruttians, and Samnites.* §. III. *The Tarentines, fall in a hostile manner upon a Roman fleet, which chances to come into their port. The Romans send to demand satisfaction. The Tarentines insult the Ambassadors, and then turn their thoughts to an alliance with Pyrrhus King of Epirus.* [A short account of this Prince, and the state of his affairs at this time.] §. IV. *The Senate and people of Rome decree a war against the Tarentines. An army marches directly for Tarentum. The mad and ridiculous behaviour of the Citizens on its approach. They resolve to invite Pyrrhus to their assistance.* §. V. *Pyrrhus accepts the invitation, and sends before him to Tarentum the famous Cyneas his prime minister.*

§. I. **R**O M E was now not only in perfect tranquillity at home, but in a flourishing condition with respect to her affairs abroad. The *Latines*, *Sabines*, *Hernici*, *Aequi*, *Marfi*, and *Campanians* were all brought into subjection to her. The *Volsci* were no more a people

ple. The terror of the *Roman* arms reached to *Apulia*, and kept it in awe. Apart of *Lucania* on one hand, and on the other *Umbria* and *Picenum*, quite up to the frontiers of the *Senones*, were all either obedient to the *Romans*, or awed by *Roman Colonies* near them. On the other side of the *Tiber* one part of *Hetruria* was subdued, and that which was more distant observed the truce which had been granted it. *Samnium*, in all appearance, was quieted; and the *Gauls*, both *Senones* and *Boii*, lived in peace with the Republic, always ready however to fight for those who would employ them. Such was the State of *Rome*, when *C. Claudius Canina*

Y. of R. and *M. Aemilius Lepidus* entered upon the *Consulship*.
468.
Bef. J. C. Nothing memorable happened during their administration;
284. and the *Fasces* were transmitted to *C. Servilius*
167 Consulship. *Tucca* and *L. Cæcilius Metellus*. In their year the *Tarentines* (formerly a Colony of austere *Spartans*, but
Y. of R. now sunk into idleness and vice) growing jealous of the
469. prosperity of the *Romans*, and fearing an interruption
283. in their pleasures, as much as the loss of their liberty,
168 Consulship. employed all their *Grecian* subtlety to stir up both old
Zonaras, and new enemies against the Republic; and this without appearing to be concerned.
B. 8.

Polyb. B. 2.
c. 19.
Appian.
apud.
Fulv.
Urbinum.
Liv. Epit.
12.
Orof. B. 3.
c. 22.

Upon the news of this terrible defeat, *Curius Dentatus* (probably *Prætor* at this time) was dispatched from *Rome*, at the head of some new levies to supply the *Consul's*

At the same time the *Senones* prepared to besiege *Aretium*, a City of *Hetruria*, about forty leagues from *Rome*, not far from the river *Arno*, and which was in truce with the Republic. The *Romans*, at the request of the *Aretini*, raised an army to defend them; but before any act of hostility, they sent a deputation to the *Senones*, to persuade them to desist from their design. These proud *Gauls*, instead of listening to the mediation of the *Romans*, killed the Ambassadors, and then immediately brought their troops before *Aretium*.

The *Consul Cæcilius* hastened to the relief of the place, and came to an engagement with the enemy, in which he himself was killed, with seven *Legionary Tribunes*, many of the nobles, and thirteen thousand private men.

Consul's place. But this able and experienced Commander, instead of attacking the army of the *Gau's* Dion. apud flushed with success, or of attempting to succour *Arc- Fulv. Urſi- tium*, marched along the confines of *Hetruria*, and entered the enemy's country, where he took ample vengeance for the murder of the *Roman Ambassadors*. With fire and sword he laid waste and destroyed all before him, so that in a little time he reduced it to a vast desert, in which there scarce remained any appearances of its having been cultivated or inhabited; all the men that were found were put to the sword, and the women and children carried into slavery.

§. II. IN the mean time, and in the beginning of Y. of R. the administration of *P. Cornelius Dolabella* and *Cn. Domi- 470. Bef. J. C.*
tius, the Republic began to feel the effects of the secret negotiations of the *Tarentines*. The *Boii*, *He- 282. 169 Con-*
trurians, and *Samnites* all declared against her at once, fulship.
and she had already the army of the *Senones* before *Are- Appian.*
tium to deal with. These *Gauls*, to revenge the deval- apud
tation made in their country, left the siege of that *Fulv. Urſi-*
Town, and were advancing strait to *Rome*, when *Domini- num.*
tus met them in *Hetruria*, and gave them a total over- Polyb. B. 2.
throw with great slaughter. After this, *Cornelius* came c. 20.
to a pitched battle with the united *Hetrurians* and *Boii*; the troops of the former were almost all slain, and those of the latter, who escaped, being vanquished a second time, sued for peace. As for the *Senones*, they were so utterly destroyed, that there scarce remained any footsteps of them in *Italy*.

In the following *Consulship* of *C. Fabricius* and *Q. Æmilius Papus*, almost all *Italy*, through the secret in- 471. Bef. J. C.
trigues of the *Tarentines*, rose up in arms against the *Robbers*, as the *Romans* were then called. On one side 281. 170 Con-
the remains of the *Hetrurians* and *Boii*, on the other the *Lucanians* and *Bruttians*, in conjunction with the *Samnites*, all conspired together for the destruction of Plin. B.
the imperious Republic. It fell to *Æmilius* to carry on 34. c. 6.
the war in *Hetruria*, and to *Fabricius* to command in Ammian.
Lucania. The latter marched to the relief of *Thurium*, Mar. B.
a city on the Gulph of *Tarentum*, and besieged by the Lucanians, 24. c. 15.

Val. Max. *Lucanians, Bruttiens, and Samnites.* He defeated this confederate army, but found it a difficult enterprize to force their camp. The means by which he succeeded in it, and which had something of the air of a miracle, was probably a stratagem of his own contriving. Whilst he seemed to be in suspense what measures to take, a young man full of strength and vigour, wearing feathers in his helmet, appeared on a sudden in the midst of the Legions, exhorted them to decline no danger for the honour of their country, and then seizing a ladder, advanced to the rampart through a shower of darts, planted his ladder against it, and mounted the wall. This bold action intimidated the confederates, and inspired the *Romans* with such intrepidity, that they soon made themselves masters of the camp. Twenty five thousand of the enemy, with their General *Statilius*, were slain. After the victory the *Consul* ordered the young man who had first mounted the rampart to be sought for, in order to reward him; and because he was not to be found, the *Romans* presently imagined, that it was the God *Mars* himself, and returned him solemn thanks for his assistance, by public *Supplications*.

Flor. B. 1. §. III. AS for the *Tarentines*, the real authors of this war, they had not yet openly declared against *Rome*.
c. 18.
Oros. B. 4. An accident at length made them throw off the mask.
c. 1. *Valerius* one of the *Maritime Duumvirs*, or Admirals of the *Roman* fleet, happened to come with ten ships to the mouth of their port, while they were celebrating their Games in the Theatre, which looked towards the harbour. The sudden appearance of the *Roman* ships interrupted their diversions; the *Tarentines* imagining that the *Romans* were come with hostile intentions, they all with one consent ran down to the port, fell upon the fleet with the fury of mad men, sunk one ship, and took four, the other five escaping. All the prisoners fit to bear arms were put to the sword, and the rest sold to the best bidder. Upon the news of this unexpected insult, the Republic sent a deputation to *Tarentum* to demand satisfaction. *Posthumius Megellus*, who had been thrice *Consul*, was at the head of the Embassy.

D. Hal.
in Legat.

He

He was admitted to an audience in the Theatre, where Y. of R. he harangued the assembly in *Greek*. The *Tarentines*, heated with wine, instead of listening to his discourse with that seriousness which the importance of the matter required, burst into loud laughter, or hissed him, whenever he hesitated, was incorrect in his expression, or even pronounced a word with a foreign accent; but when he began to speak of *Reparation of Wrongs*, they flew into rage, called him *Barbarian*, and, in a manner, drove him out of the assembly. Nor was this all: As he was walking off with an air of gravity and dignity, a buffoon named *Pbilonides* coming up to him, urined upon his robe; a new source of immoderate laughter to the mad and drunken multitude; some of them even clapped their hands for extreme joy at the outrageous insolence. *Posthumius* turning about to the assembly, only shewed them the skirt of his garment so defiled; but when he found that this had no effect but to encrease the loudness of their contumelious mirth, ‘Laugh on, TARENTINES, laugh on now while you may. The time is coming, when you will weep; yes, TARENTINES, you will long weep. It is not a little blood that must wash and purify this garment.’ Having thus spoken, he strait withdrew, left the city, and embarked for *Rome*.

When the *Tarentines* came to themselves and began to reflect on the enormity of their conduct, never to be forgiven, and at the same time on the inability of their neighbours in *Italy* to defend them, they concluded it absolutely necessary to look for succours from beyond sea; and they cast their eyes on *Pyrrhus*, King of *Epirus*, who for personal bravery and martial skill, was renowned above all the *Grecian Commanders* of that time.

This Prince was descended from *Achilles* by his son *Neoptolemus* (*or Pyrrhus*) who conquered *Epirus*, reigned there himself, and left the throne to his posterity. Being yet an infant at the breast, when his father was dethroned by his subjects, he was conveyed through variety of dangers into *Illyricum*, where *Glaucus* the King of that country took care of him, and educated him

of Pyrrhus, p. 383. & seq.

Y. of R. him with his own children. When *Pyrrhus* had attained
 471. 12 years of age, *Glaucus* at the head of a great
 Ref. J. C. army entered *Epirus*, and placed him on the throne of
 281. his ancestors; but when he was 17 years old, the *Epi-*
 170 Consulship. *rois* rebelling again, drove him from his kingdom and
 forced him to seek refuge in the dominions of *Demetrius*, the husband of his sister *Deidamia*. *Demetrius* was
 then master of *Greece* and a great part of *Asia*. *Pyrrhus*
 served under him in his wars against *Ptolemy* King of
Ægypt, and gained great applause by his courage and
 conduct at the famous battle of *Ipsus* in *Pbrygia*, where
 so many Kings were present; and when a peace was
 made between *Demetrius* and *Ptolemy*, *Pyrrhus* was sent
 to *Ægypt* as one of the hostages to secure the perfor-
 mance of the Treaty. Here he behaved himself with
 so much prudence and address as to gain universal es-
 teem and admiration; and he made his court so suc-
 cessfully to *Berenice* the favourite Queen, that she gave
 him in marriage *Antigone*, her daughter by a former
 husband. Having by this alliance engaged *Ptolemy* to
 assist him with money and troops, he recovered his
 own Kingdom; after which he made himself master of
Macedon; but being dispossessed of it again by *Lysimachus*, retired into *Epirus*, and was at this time in peace
 with all the neighbouring States. However as he na-
 turally loved action, and the bustle and hurry of war,
 the ambassadors whom the *Tarentines* sent to him (per-
 haps only to try his pulse and observe the state of his
 affairs) found him in a disposition to hearken to any
 proposal, which would furnish him with employment
 worthy of his ambition.

Appian.

§. IV. THE *Tarentines* to amuse the *Romans* till it
 could be known what might be expected from *Pyrrhus*,
 besieged *Thurium*, defended by a *Roman* Garrison, and
 took it. This news came to *Rome* soon after the re-
 turn of *Posthumius*, and the other ambassadors who had
 been so ill treated at *Tarentum*. The Republic had
 just raised *L. Æmilius Barbula* and *Q. Marcius Philippus*,
 to the *Consulate*. These Magistrates having assembled
 the Conscript Fathers, represented to them on one hand
 the

the shameful indignity offered to their ambassadors, which required vengeance ; and, on the other, the danger of engaging in a new war, when the Republic had already so many enemies to contend with : for the *Hetrurians* and *Samnites* were still in arms, and the *Lucanians* and *Bruttians* grown more confident, since the taking of *Thurium*. To the necessity of chastising the *Tarentines*, the Hostilities they had committed against the Republic, and the insult they had offered to *Postumius*, whose robe was produced in the assembly, left no room for deliberation upon that point ; the only question was concerning the proper time ; and this the Fathers debated from Sun-rising to Sun-set for several days together, being divided in opinion. Some were for deferring the war with the *Tarentines*, till the intermediate Provinces should be subdued ; others for beginning it immediately. The question being put to the vote, the latter opinion prevail'd by a majority of voices ; and the Senate's Decree was confirmed by the people. *Zon. B. 8.*

Hereupon, *Æmilius*, who had intended to make the campaign in *Samnium*, received orders to lay aside that Expedition, and march directly to *Tarentum*.

The approach of the *Romans* made the *Tarentines* carry on their deliberations with a little more seriousness than formerly ; and when the *Consul* sent once again to demand satisfaction, before he began Hostilities, the oldest and richest declared for peace : but the populace who had little to lose, insisted upon a war ; and what put an end to the debate was a speech of one of the common citizens, who renewed the proposal of bringing *Pyrrhus* into *Italy*, a motion highly applauded by the multitude. The wiser part of the citizens finding themselves overborn by numbers came no more to the assemblies. Only, the day that a public Decree was to pass for inviting *Pyrrhus* to *Tarentum*, and when the people were all placed in the Theatre, one *Meton*, a sober worthy citizen, with a withered garland on his head, and a flambeau in his hand, (as was the manner of drunken debauchees,) and accompanied by a woman playing on a flute, came dancing into the midst of the assembly. *Diod. in Eclog. Plut. Life of Pyrrhus, p. 390.*

Y. of R. assembly. This silly sight was sufficient to divert the *Tarentines* from their most important deliberations.
472. They made a Ring, and called out to *Meton* to sing,
Bef. J. C. and to the woman to play ; but when, expecting to be
280. entertained with a song, they were all silent, *Meton* as-
171 Con- suming an air of great seriousness, ‘ You do well, *Tar- rentines*, not to hinder those from diverting themselves
fulship. ‘ who are disposed to mirth ; and if you are wise you
‘ will yourselves make advantage of the present liberty
‘ you enjoy to do the same. When *Pyrrhus* comes, you
‘ must change your way of life ; your mirth and joy
‘ will be at an end.’ These words made an impression
upon the multitude, and a murmur went about, that
he had spoken well : but those who had some reason to
fear that they should be delivered up to the *Romans* in
case of an accommodation, being enraged at what he
had said, reviled the assembly for suffering themselves
to be so mocked and affronted, and crowding together,
they thrust *Meton* out of the Theatre. After this the
Decree was passed, and ambassadors were sent into *Epi- rus*, not only from the *Tarentines*, but from all the *Italick Greeks*, with magnificent presents for the King, and
with instructions to say, that they only wanted a gene-
ral of fame and experience ; that as for troops, they
could themselves furnish a numerous army, 20000
horse, and 350000 foot, *Lucanians*, *Mezzapians*, *Sam- nites*, and *Tarentines*.

Oros. B. 4. As soon as the news came to the *Roman* camp, that a
c. 1. deputation to *Pyrrhus* was decreed, *Æmilius* straight
Zon. B. 8. began Hostilities, burnt and destroy’d all before him,
and forced the *Tarentines* in the field to take refuge
within their walls. However not to drive them to de-
spair, and to induce them to lay aside the design of re-
ceiving *Pyrrhus*, he used some moderation, and sent
back the prisoners he had taken. These highly extoll’d
the generosity of the Consul : insomuch, that many of
the inhabitants were brought over to the *Roman* party ;
and they all in general began to repent of their rejecting
a peace, and sending for *Pyrrhus*. This was evident
by

by their chusing *Agis*, a friend of the *Romans*, to be Y. of R.
their General, and the Governor of the City.

§. V. IN the mean while the *Tarentine* ambassadors,
pursuant to the powers they had received, made an ab-
solute treaty with the King of *Epirus*. He was very
ready to accept the invitation into *Italy*, his head being
turned with the exploits of *Alexander the Great* in the
East, which he thought to imitate by mighty conquests
in the West.

There was then at the court of *Epirus*, a *Thessalian*, *Plut.* Life
named *Cyneas*, a man of sound understanding, and of *Pyrrhus*,
who had been a Disciple of *Demosthenes*. He was P. 391.
thought to approach nearer than any other orator of
this time to the vehement and forcible eloquence of
that great master. *Pyrrhus* usually employed him, as
his ambassador to those cities with whom he had any
affair to transact, and the able minister succeeded so
well in these negotiations, that the King was wont to
say, ‘He had made more conquests by the tongue of
‘*Cyneas* than by his own sword.’ And for this reason
he not only held him in the highest esteem, but loaded
him with honours, making him his chief minister and
favourite

Cyneas perceiving that *Pyrrhus* was eagerly bent to
pass into *Italy*, and finding him one day at leisure, and
in a humour for free conversation, thus began; ‘The
‘ROMANS, SIR, are reported to be great warriors,
‘and to rule over many brave and warlike nations.
‘Should God grant us, nevertheless, to vanquish them,
‘what use shall we make of our victory?’— ‘The
‘thing speaks of itself, answered *Pyrrhus*; the *Romans*
‘once conquered, there is no city, *Barbarian* or *Greek*
‘in *Italy*, that will dare to resist us. We shall be im-
‘mediately masters of that whole country; whose ex-
‘tent, wealth, and power, no body is better apprized
‘of than yourself.’— *Cyneas*, (after a short silence,)
‘And when we have conquered *Italy*, What are we to
‘do next?’— *Pyrrhus*, (not yet perceiving his drift)
‘Next? Why, there is *Sicily* just by. She opens her
‘arms to receive us, a rich and populous Island, and
‘easily

Y. of R. ‘easily subdued ; for since the death of *Agatbocles*, the
 472. cities are all in confusion and anarchy.—‘ What
 Ref. J. C. you say, replied *Cyneas*, seems very probable indeed,
 280. ‘But is the conquest of *Sicily* to put an end to our
 171. Con- expeditions ?’—‘ No certainly, cried the King ; these
 fulship. successes will be only preludes to greater enterprises,
 ‘Who, in such a case, could forbear passing into
 ‘*Africk*, and to *Cartbage*? It is but a step thither.
 ‘And when we have subdued these, what think you ?
 ‘Will any of those enemies, who now give us uneasi-
 ness, have once the boldness to withstand our arms ?
 ‘We shall then easily recover *Macedon*, and not only
 ‘so, but in a little time be masters of all *Greece*.’—
 ‘Very true, said *Cyneas*, Nothing can be clearer : But
 ‘when we have compleated all these Conquests, What
 ‘shall we do then ?’—*Pyrrhus* smiling, ‘ Do then ?
 ‘Why, then we’ll live at our ease, my Good Friend,
 ‘and drink, and feast, and spend our days in agreeable
 ‘conversation.’—‘ Ah, Sir, replied the *Philosopher*,
 ‘What hinders you from immediately possessing that
 ‘happiness, which you propose to purchase at the ex-
 ‘pence of so much danger ?’ *

Theſe

* Monsieur Pascal, in his discourse of the Misery of Man, has a much admired reflection on this advice of CYNEAS to PYRRHUS.

THERE is nothing more capable of letting us into the knowledge of human misery, than an enquiry after the real cause of that perpetual hurry and confusion, in which we pass our lives.

The soul is ſent into the body, to be the ſojourner of a few days. She knows that this is but a ſtop, till ſhe may embark for eternity ; and that a ſmall ſpace is allowed her to prepare for the voyage. The main part of this ſpace is ravished from her by the necessities of na- ture ; and but a ſlender pittance left to her own diſpoſal : And yet this moment which remains, does ſo strangely oppreſs and perplex her, that ſhe only ſtudies how to loſe it : ſhe feels an intolerable burthen, in being obliged to live with herſelf, and think of herſelf ; and therefore, her principal care is to forget herſelf, and to let this ſhort and precious moment paſs away without refection, by amuſing herſelf with things which prevent her notice of its ſpeed.

This is the ground of all the tumultuary buſineſs, of all the trifling diſverſions amongſt men ; in which our general aim is to make the time paſſ off our hands without feeling it, or rather without feeling ouरſelves ; and, by getting rid of this ſmall portion of life, to avoid that

These words rather vex'd the King, than diverted Y. of R.
him from his design; for he could not part with the
pleasing hopes he had entertained.

472.
Bef. J. C.
280.
To 171 Con-
fulship.

that inward disgust and bitterness, which we should not fail to meet with, if we found leisure to descend into our own breasts. For 'tis undeniably certain, that the soul of man is here incapable of rest and satisfaction. And this obliges her to expand herself every way, and to seek how she may lose the thoughts of her own proper being in a settled application to the things about her. Her very happiness consists in this forgetfulness: and to make her exquisitely miserable, nothing more is required but the engaging her to look into herself, and to dwell at home.

WE charge Persons from their very infancy with the care of their own fortunes and honours, and no less of the estates and dignities belonging to their kindred and friends. We burthen them with the study of languages, of exercises, and of arts. We enter them in busines, and persuade them that they can never be truly blessed, unless by their industry and caution they in some measure secure the interest and glory of themselves, their families, and their dependents; and that unavoidable unhappiness is entailed upon the failure of any one particular in this kind. Thus we teach them to wear out their strength, and to rob themselves of their rest. A strange method (you'll say) of making them happy. What could be done with more effect towards the insuring them in misery? Would you know what? Why, only to release them from these cares, and to take off these burthens. For then their eyes and their thoughts must be turned inward, and that is the only hardship which they esteem insupportable. Hence if they gain any relaxation from their labours, we find them eager to throw it away upon some sport or diversion, which takes up their whole activity, and pleasantly robs them of themselves.

'Tis for this reason, that when I have set myself to consider the various agitations of human life, the toil and danger, to which we expose ourselves in the court, in the camp, in the pursuits of ambition, which give birth to so much passion and contention, to so many desperate and fatal adventures, I have often said that the universal cause of men's misfortunes, was their not being able to live quietly in a chamber. A person who has enough for the uses of this world, did he know the art of dwelling with himself, would never quit that repose and security for a voyage or a siege; nor would take so much pains to hazard his life, had he no other aim than barely to live.

But, upon stricter examination I found, that this aversion to home, this roving and restless disposition proceeded from a cause, no less powerful and universal; from the native unhappiness of our frail and mortal state, which is incapable of all comfort, if we have nothing to divert our thoughts and to call us out of ourselves.

Y. of R. To conceal his design of making himself master of
 472. Tarentum, as well as of the rest of Italy, heartfully in-
 Ref. J. C. serted
 280.

171 Con-
fuslship.

I speak of those alone who survey their own nature, without the views of faith and religion. 'Tis indeed one of the miracles of Christianity, that by reconciling man to God, it restores him to his own good opinion; that it makes him able to bear the sight of himself; and in some cases, renders solitude and silence more agreeable, than all the intercourse and action of mankind. Nor is it by fixing man in his own person, that it produceth these wonderful effects; 'tis by carrying him to God, and by supporting him under the sense of his miseries, with the hopes of an assured and compleat deliverance in a better life.

But for those who do not act above the principles of meer nature, 'tis impossible they should without falling into an incurable chagrine and discontent undergo the lingering torment of leisure. Man who loves nothing but his own person, hates nothing so much as to be confined to his own conversation. He seeks nothing but himself, and yet flies and avoids nothing more than himself; because when he is obliged to look within, he does not see himself such as he could wish; discovering only a hidden store of inevitable miseries, and a mighty void of all real and solid good, which 'tis beyond his ability to replenish.

Let a man chuse his own condition, let him embellish it with all the goods and all the satisfactions he can possess or desire; yet, if in the midst of this glory and pride he is without busines, and without diversion, and has time to contemplate on his fortunes, his spirits must unavoidably sink beneath the languishing felicity. He will of necessity torment himself with the prospect of what's to come; and he that boasted to have brought home all the ingredients of happiness, must again be sent abroad, or condemned to domestick misery.

IS *Majest*y itself so truly great, and sufficient, as to support those whom it adorns and encircles, under the bare thought of their own grandeur? Is it necessary that this thought should be here likewise diverted, as in the common herd of men? A vulgar person will be abundantly happy, if it may ease himself of his secret troubles, by applying all his care to excel in the perfection of dancing. But dare we say this of a king? Or, will he be more charm'd with so vain and petty amusements, than with the contemplation of his royal dignity and estate? What nobler, what more sublime object than himself, to engage and to satisfy his spirit? Might it not seem an envious lessening of his content, to interrupt his princely thought, with the care of measuring his steps by an air of musick, or of exactly ordering a *ball*, instead of leaving him to survey the glories of his throne, and to rejoice in the excellence of his power? Let us presume to make the experiment: Let us suppose a prince in solitude, without any entertainment or sense, any engagement of mind, any relief or conversation; and we shall find that a prince with his eyes upon

ferred a clause in the treaty with his allies, ‘That when Y. of R.
‘ he had delivered them from their dangers, he should ^{472.}
‘ not ^{Bef. J. C.} ^{280.}

171 Con-

upon himself, is a man full of miseries, and who feels them with as fulship.
quick and piercing a resentment as the lowest among his slaves. And *Zonaras*,
therefore, it has been a standing maxim, to banish these intruding *B. 8. Plut.*
and importunate reflections from court, and to keep about the *Royal Life of*
Person those who shall constantly purvey for the amusement of their *Pyrrhus*.
master, by laying a train of diversions to succeed after business,
and by watching his hours of leisure, to pour in immediately a fresh
supply of mirth and sport, that no vacancy may be left in life, that is,
the court abounds with men, who have a wonderful activity in taking
care that *His Majesty* shall not be alone, well-knowing that solitude is
but another name for misery, and that the supreme pitch of worldly
greatness is too nice and weak, to bear the examination of a thought.

— WHENCE comes it to pass, that men are transported to such a
degree with gaming, hunting, or other diversions, which seem to
have taken an absolute possession of their souls? not because there is
any real and intrinsick good to be obtained by these pursuits; not be-
cause they imagine that true happiness is to be found in the money
which they win at play, or in the beast which they run down in the
chase: for should you present them beforehand with both these, to
save their trouble, they would be unanimous in rejecting the propo-
sal. 'Tis not the gentle and easy part which they are fond of, such
as may give them leisure and space for thought; but 'tis the heat and
the hurry, which divert them from the mortification of thinking.

— A MAN, that by gaming every day for some little stake, pa-
seth away his life without uneasiness or melancholy, would yet be
rendered unhappy, should you give him every morning the sum
which he could possibly win all day, upon condition to forbear. It
will be said, perhaps, that 'tis the amusement of the play which he
seeks, and not the gain. Yet if he plays for nothing, his gaiety is
over, and the spleen recovers full possession. Bare amusement, there-
fore, is not what he proposeth; a languishing amusement without
heat or passion, would but dispirit and fatigue him: he must be al-
lowed to raise and chaff himself, by proposing a happiness in the gain-
ing of that which he would despise, if given him not to venture, and
by creating a fictitious object, which shall excite and employ his de-
sire, his anger, his hope, and his fear.

— WE have seen the utmost that human invention can do, in pro-
jecting for human happiness. Those who content themselves barely
with demonstrating the vanity and littleness of common diversions,
are indeed acquainted with one part of our miseries; for a consid-
erable part it is, to be thus capable of taking pleasure in things so base
and insignificant. But they apprehend not the cause and principle
which renders these miseries even necessary to us, so long as we re-
main uncured of that inward and natural infirmity of not being able
to bear the sight of our own condition. The hare which men buy in

Y. of R. 'not be hindred from returning to *Epirus*. And to
 472. secure their fidelity, he detained some of their am-
 Bef. J. C. bassadors

280.

171 Con-
fuslship.

the market cannot screen them from this view ; but the field and the chase afford an approved relief. And therefore when we reproach them with their low and ignoble aim, and observe to them how little satisfaction there is in that which they follow with so much contention and ardour, did they answer upon mature judgment, they would acknowledge the equity of our censure, and would ingenuously declare, that they proposed nothing in these pursuits but the bare violence of the motion, such as might keep them strangers to the secrets of their soul ; and that therefore they made choice of objects, which, how worthless soever in reality, were yet of an engaging and attractive nature, and able to engross the activity of all their powers. And the reason why they don't answer in this manner, is the want of this acquaintance with their own bosom. A gentleman believes with all sincerity that there's somewhat great and noble in Hunting, and will be sure to tell you, that 'tis a Royal Sport. You may hear the like defence and encomium of any other exercise or employment, which men affect or pursue. They imagine that there must needs be somewhat real and solid in the objects themselves. They are persuaded, that could they but gain such a point, they should then repose themselves with content and pleasure ; and are under an insensibility of the insatiable nature of this desire. They believe themselves to be heartily engaged in the attainment of rest, while they are indeed employed in nothing else but the search of continual and successive drudgery.

Men have a secret instinct, prompting them to seek employment or recreation ; which proceeds from no other cause but the sense of their inward pain, and never-ceasing torment. They have another secret instinct, a relique of their primitive nature, which assures them, that the sum of their happiness consists in ease and repose. And upon these two opposite instincts they form one confused design, lurking in the recesses of their soul, which engages them to prosecute the latter by the intervention of the former, and constantly to persuade themselves, that the satisfaction they have hitherto wanted will infallibly attend them, if by surmounting certain difficulties, which they now look in the face, they may open a safe passage to peace and tranquillity.

Thus our life runs out. We seek rest, by encountering such particular impediments, which if we are able to remove, the consequence is, that the rest which we have obtained becomes itself a grievance. For we are ruminating every moment either on the miseries we feel, or on those we fear. And even when we seem on all sides to be placed under shelter, the affections, which are so naturally rooted in us, fail not to regret their lost dominion, and to diffuse their melancholic poison through the soul.

AND therefore when *Cneas*, so gravely admonished *Pyrrhus* who proposed

bassadors under pretence of wanting their assistance. Af- Y. of R.
ter these precautions, he sent away *Cyneas* with three
thousand men to *Tarentum*. This eloquent minister
soon found means to depose *Agis* from the government,
and to get possession of the Citadel.

^{472.}
^{Bef. J. C.}
^{280.}
^{171 Con-}
^{fulship.}
^{Zonaras.}
^{B. 8.}

In the mean time *Aemilius*, the *Roman Consul*, finding
that there was no possibility of attempting any thing
with success against *Tarentum* this campaign, resolved to
march his army into winter quarters in *Apulia*. Being
obliged to pass thro' certain defiles, straitened by the
sea on one side and high hills on the other, he was there
attacked by the *Epirni* and *Tarentines* from great num-
bers of barks fraught with *Balisteæ* (Engines for throw-
ing stones of a vast weight) and from the hills which
they had covered with archers and slingers; neverthe-
less by placing, between him and the enemy, his *Tar-*
rentine prisoners, whom they were unwilling to hurt,
he preserved his Legions from suffering any considera-
ble loss. Having quartered his troops, he himself repair-
ed to *Rome*, where his colleague *Marcus* had a *Triumph*
for some conquests he had made in *Hetruria*.

^{Fest. Ca-}
^{pit.}

proposed to enjoy himself with his friends after he should have con-
quered a good part of the world, that he would do much better to
anticipate his own happiness, by taking immediate possession of this ease
and quiet, without pursuing it through so much fatigue: The coun-
sel he gave was indeed full of difficulty, and scarce more rational than
the project of that young ambitious Prince. Both the one and the
other opinion supposed that which is false, that a man can rest satis-
fied with himself and his present possessions, without filling up the
void space in his heart with imaginary expectations. *Pyrrhus* must
inevitably have been unhappy, either without or with the conquest of
the world; and perhaps that soft and peaceful life which his minister
advised him to embrace was less capable of giving him satisfaction,
than the heat and tumult of so many expeditions, and so many battles,
which he was then forming and fighting in his mind. See *Pensees de*
Pascal c. 26. as translated by Mr. Basil Kennet.

CHAP. XXVI.

§. I. Pyrrhus (whose character is given) being arrived at
Tarentum takes measures to turn the Tarentines from

the pursuit of Pleasures, to which they are entirely addicted. The villainous behaviour of a Legion of Campanian Soldiers, which had been sent by the Roman Republic to garrison Rhegium at the request of the inhabitants. §. II. Pyrrhus sends a letter to the Consul Lævinus, requiring him to submit the quarrel between Rome and Tarentum to his arbitration. Lævinus, in answer, returns a defiance. The Romans force Pyrrhus to a battle. §. III. The king tho' victorious declines a second battle with Lævinus, and returns to Tarentum. §. IV. His conversation with Fabricius, sent from Rome to treat with him concerning the ransom of Prisoners. The King sends Cyneas to Rome with proposals of Peace. The Senate moved chiefly by a warm speech of Appius Claudius (now blind) unanimously refuse to enter into any treaty of Peace with the King while he continues in Italy.

Y. of R. §. I. **T**HE Consuls for the new year were *P. Valerius 473. Lævinus and Tib. Coruncanius*, the latter not *a Roman by birth, but raised to the Consulate purely 279. 172. Con-* for his merit. He was of *Cumerium, one of the Roman fulship. Municipia in Latium.* It fell to him by lot to carry on *Tab. Claud. the war in Hetruria, and to his Colleague to conduct Cæsar.* that against the *Tarentines. Æmilius was continued in apud Lug- the command of his own troops in quality of Procon- dunenses. sul, and was ordered to march against the Salentines Orof. B. 4. (in Iapygia,) who had declared for the Tarentines. The C. I. present exigence of affairs obliged the Romans to enlist the *Proletarii.* These (as has been formerly observed) were the meanest of the People, and esteemed not capable of doing the State any service, except that of peopling the city; hitherto they had never been suffered to bear arms: A wise part of *Roman Policy,* to make it an ignominy to be excluded from serving their country in war.*

Justin. B. 18. c. 1. Zon. B. 8. Plut. Life of Pyrrhus, 392. **P**yrrhus was now arrived at *Tarentum*, having narrowly escaped shipwreck. The *Tarentines*, soon after the arrival of *Cyneas*, had sent to the King a great number of Galleys, flat-bottom Vessels, and other Transports,

ports, whereon to embark his forces; and he had sailed Y. of R. from *Epirus* with 20 Elephants, 3000 Horse, 20 00 ^{473:} Bef. J. C. heavy armed Foot, 200 Archers, and 500 Slingers. ^{279.} When he was got out to sea, the wind rising suddenly ¹⁷² Con- at North, and blowing hard, he was driven out of his fulship. course. Nevertheless, by the great skill and diligence of the pilots and seamen, the King's ship bore with the land, and kept the *Italian* coast; but the rest of the fleet could not get up; some of the ships were driven into the *Libyan* and *Sicilian* seas; others, not being able to double the Cape of *Iapygia*, and a very boisterous sea throwing them in the night upon a rocky shore, they all suffered great damage. The Admiral, by her strength and bulk, resisted the violence of the weather, but the wind coming about, and blowing directly in her teeth from the shore, and the vessel keeping up her head against it, she was in danger of opening at every shock she sustained from the huge billows that broke over her. On the other hand to be driven off again to sea in a raging tempest, and when the wind was continually shifting about, seemed the greatest of all evils. In this extremity, the vessel not being far from land, *Pyrrhus* without hesitation threw himself into the sea. His friends and guards instantly followed him, striving with emulation to assist and save him, which the darkness of the night and the impetuosity of the waves, that were repelled with a roaring noise from the shore, made extremely difficult. However, by day-break the wind being then quite laid, he got ashore, much fatigued and weakened in body, but with undaunted courage, and a strength of mind superior to the most adverse fortune. The *Messapians*, upon whose coast the King was cast, hastened to give him all the assistance in their power; and they also went out to meet and succour some of his vessels which were not far off, and in which were found a few Horse, two Elephants, and about 2000 Foot. *Pyrrhus* having drawn these together, marched with them directly towards *Taren-tum*. *Cyneas*, upon the news of the King's approach, led out his troops to meet him, and conducted him

Y. of R. into the city, where he was received with the acclamations of the People.

^{473.}
Bef. J. C.

^{279.}

¹⁷² Con-
fuship.

Plut. in
Pyrrb. p.

^{387.}

PYRRHUS (as we learn from *Plutarch*) had in his countenance a Majesty that was rather terrible than august. In a day of battle he was thought to resemble *Alexander* in look, agility, impetuosity, and strength of arm. His consummate knowledge in the art of war appeared even from the books he wrote upon that subject. *Antigonus* being ask'd, *Who was the greatest Captain (of that time) answer'd, Pyrrhus, if he lives to be old*: But *Hannibal* afterwards, speaking of great Commanders in general, gave *Pyrrhus* the first * place in the whole list. War was indeed his only study, and the only science he thought worthy of a Prince. Nevertheless he had a great share of humanity in his natural temper, was affable and familiar to his friends, not easily provoked to anger, and the most ardent of all men living to requite obligations. For which reason when *Eropus* died, who had done him important services, he could not bear it with any moderation: 'Not because his friend had paid the indispensable tribute to nature, (to die, *be said*, was common to all) but because he himself, by delays, had lost the opportunity of requiting the kindnesses he had received from him: For, as *PLUTARCH adds*, tho' money debts may be discharged by payment to the heirs of the creditor when he is dead, a debt of kindness can never be satisfied but by a return of kindness to the friend himself; and, if he dies unrequited, it will always be a pungent grief to the person obliged, if he have a good and honest heart.

His chief faults were boundless ambition, and a strange inconstancy in the pursuit of its objects. Fond of a new enterprize, he was always ready to quit it, how successfully soever begun, the moment that a newer presented itself to his imagination. Whatever, *says PLUTARCH*, he acquired by his exploits, he lost by his

In *Pyrrb.*
p. 400.

* *Plutarch*, in his life of *Flaminus*, makes *Hannibal* give *Alexander* the first place, and *Pyrrhus* the second.

vain

vain hopes ; his impatience to pursue what he had not yet attained, would not let him secure what he had already won ; which made *Antigonus* compare him to a man at Dice, who has admirable fortune, but plays ill.

473.

Bef. J. C.

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172 Con-

fuslion.

Plut. in

Pyrrh. p.

392.

While *Pyrrhus* was waiting for the arrival of his scatter'd forces, he observed the dispositions of the *Tarentines*, and was surprized to see how their minds were entirely bent to pleasures, in which they thought to indulge themselves as usual, while he and his *Epirots* were to fight in their defence. To remedy this mischief, which must otherwise naturally end in the ruin of themselves and their defenders, he, as soon as his troops had joined him, shut up the public gardens and walks, where the inhabitants used to meet to talk of news and politics ; he forbade public feasting, plays, and masquerades, and incorporated the best bodied men of the people in his *Pbalanxes*. The effeminate *Tarentines* groan'd under these wholesome regulations, in the execution of which the King was very rigorous. They found they had got a Master instead of an Ally ; many of them, rather than endure such strict discipline withdrew from the city, while others expressed their discontent by secret murmurs and loud complaints. *Pyrrhus* had his spies in the city, who insinuated themselves into all companies, and brought him an account of the discourses of the malecontents. One day some young *Val. Max.*
debauchees, heated with wine, gave their tongues an *B. 5. c. 1.* unbounded liberty in talking against the King's measures. *Pyrrhus* being informed of it, order'd them to be brought before him : ‘ Is it true,’ said he, ‘ that you have utter'd against me those outrageous things you are accused of ? ’ ‘ It is very true,’ answered one of them ; ‘ and we should have said more, if our wine had not fail'd us.’ *Pyrrhus* smiled and dismissed them.

But (if we may believe *Zonaras*) he was not so moderate with regard to some of the Citizens, whose intrigues he suspected and feared ; he caused the most factious of them to be dispatched by private assassinations. To get rid of one *Aristarchus*, a great Orator,
Zonaras,
B. 8.
and

Y. of R. and much in credit with the People, he commission'd
^{473.}
 Bef. J. C. him to go to his son in *Epirus*, on some business which
^{279.}
 172 Consulship. he pretended to be of great importance. *Aristarchus*
*Dion. apud Fulv.
 Urfinum.* saw through the artifice ; and, the master of the vessel
 in which he was to sail being at his devotion, instead of
 going to *Greece*, he steered to a port of *Italy*, and went
 thence to *Rome*. What advice he gave the *Romans* is
 uncertain : But *Fabricius* was dispatched away to visit
 the *Colonies* and allies of the Republic. Nor was the
 precaution unnecessary at a time when a Prince, so il-
 lustrious for his exploits in the East, undertook to
 deliver the *Italians* from the domination of the Republic.

An extraordinary event, which had happened a little
 before, had also given the *Romans* much uneasiness,
 and brought a great discredit on them in their *Colonies*
 and among their *Allies*. While *Pyrrhus* was coming to
Tarentum, and the *Carthaginians* infested all the coasts
 of the *Ionian* sea, the inhabitants of *Rhegium*, situated
 in the southern extremity of *Italy*, near *Sicily*, applied
 to the Republic for a *Roman* Garrison to defend them
^{Polyb. B. I.}
^{c. 7.}
^{Liv. Epit}
^{II.} from an Invasion. A *Legion* was raised in *Campania* for
 that purpose, and sent to them under the command of
 one *Decius Jubellus*. These soldiers, who had been used
 to a laborious life, began soon to envy the inhabitants
 the pleasures and ease in which they lived, and it was
 not long before they formed and executed a scheme to
 make those advantages their own. They forged letters
 from the *Rhegians* to *Pyrrhus*, importing an offer to put
 the place into his hands ; and under this pretext they
 massacred all the chief men of the place at a banquet,
 and then fell upon the rest, whom they either put to
 the sword, or drove out of the city. As for the wo-
 men, they obliged them to marry the murderers of their
 fathers and husbands. This news was brought to *Rome*
 at a time when the circumstances of the Republic would
 not allow the *Romans* to take vengeance on the perfidi-
 ous *Legion*.

*Plut. in Pyrrb.
 P. 392.*

§. II. *PYRRHUS* hearing at *Tarentum* that the
Consul Lævinius was come with an army into *Lucania*,
 a province in alliance with the *Tarentines*, and was com-
 mitting

mitting hostilities there, thought it shameful to con- Y. of R.
tinue longer shut up within walls; and though he 473:
had not received any reinforcements from the *Samnites* Bef. J. C.
and *Messapians*, or other allies of the *Tarentines*, he took 279.
the field. But first he wrote the following letter to 172 Con-
Lævinus. ‘PYRRHUS to LÆVINUS Health. I am in- fulship.
Zon. B.

‘ formed that you command an army which is to make 8.
‘ war against the *Tarentines*. Disband it without delay,
‘ and then come and expose your pretensions before
‘ me. When I have heard both parties, I will give
‘ judgment, and I know how to make my sentence be
‘ obey'd.’ To this *Lævinus* answer'd: ‘ Know, Pyr-
‘ rhus, that we neither admit you for a Judge, nor fear
‘ you as an Enemy. Does it become you to assume
‘ the character of a Judge over us, you who have
‘ yourself injured us by landing in *Italy* without our
‘ consent? We will have no Arbitrator but *Mars*, the
‘ author of our race, and the protector of our arms.’

The King, who expected no other kind of answer, march'd his army without delay into the plain between the cities of *Pandosia* and *Heraclea*; and understanding that the *Romans* were encamped not far from him on the other side the *Siris*, (a river which waters the country then called *Lucania*, and which empties itself into the Gulph of *Tarentum*) he rode up to the banks of it to take a view of their camp. When he had considered it well, its form and situation, with the manner in which the *Romans* posted their advanced guards, and p. 393. had observed some other parts of their discipline, he was much surprised, and turning to one of his friends who stood near him, *Megacles*, said he, *this ORDER of the Barbarians is not Barbarian. What they are able to do in fight we shall see hereafter.* And being now a little more anxious about the success of the war than before, he resolved to wait within his camp for the arrival of his confederates; and he posted some troops on the banks of the river to hinder the *Romans* from passing it. *Lævinus* nevertheless, knowing of what consequence it was to come to an engagement with the *Epirot* before he could receive the reinforcements he expected,

*Plut. Life
of Pyrrhus
p. 393.*

Y. of R. expected, and having exhorted his troops not to be
 473. intimidated by the reputation of *Pyrrhus*, or by his E-
 Ref. J. C. lephants (animals which they had never yet seen) made
 279. his Infantry ford the stream in the very face of the ene-
 172 Con- my's advanced guard, while his Cavalry passed the ri-
 fulship. ver in different places, and wherever they could ; so
 that the *Epirots* fearing to be surrounded, retired in all
 haste to their main body. *Pyrrhus* upon the first notice
 of this motion, which much surprised him, directing
 the Officers of his Infantry to range their troops in
 battalia, and keep them ready to march upon the first
 signal ; he himself with the Horse, amounting to about
 3000, advanced with all diligence to charge the *Romans*, before their whole army could recover firm foot-
 ing, and get into order. But the *Roman* Cavalry being
 already formed, received him as men well exercised in
 sustaining furious attacks. The beauty and lustre of
 the King's arms made him very conspicuous, and his
 actions presently convinced all who observed him, that
 his reputation did not exceed his merit ; for in this
 fight, neither did his courage transport him beyond the
 duties of a careful General, nor his attention to direct
 others, hinder him from displaying his personal Va-
 lour.

Plut. ibid. During the heat of the combat, *Leonatus* a *Macedonian*, observing that an *Italian* horseman had singled out the King, whose every motion he watched and followed, gave *Pyrrhus* notice of it, advising him to beware of that *Barbarian*, who, he said, seemed to have formed some great design. *PYRRHUS* answered ; ‘ No man, *LEONATUS*, can avoid his Destiny ; be assured, however, that neither that *Italian*, nor any other, shall have much satisfaction from an Encounter with me this day.’ He had scarce ended these words, when the *Italian* quickning his horse, and making directly at the King, aimed a furious stroke at him with his lance, but wounded only his horse ; *Leonatus*, at the same time, wounded that of the *Italian*, and both horses fell to the ground with their riders. *Pyrrhus* was instantly surrounded by a troop of his friends,

who

who carried him off, having slain the *Italian*, who fought Y. of R.
with great bravery.

This adventure taught *Pyrrhus* to be more cautious. 473.
Seeing his Cavalry shrink, he ordered his Infantry to 279. Con-
advance; but before he put himself at their head to re- fulship.
new the charge, he gave his mantle and arms to *Mega-
cles*, in exchange for his. The battle was obstinately
fought on both sides, and the victory continued a long
time doubtful. The King's changing his arms (tho'
prudently done for the safety of his person) had like to
have lost him the day. For *MEGACLES* being mistaken
for the *KING*, was attacked by great numbers of the
enemy, and at last wounded and unhors'd by a *Roman*
Knight, who pulling away his helmet and mantle, rode
full speed with them to *Lævinus*, crying out, that he
had slain *Pyrrhus*. These spoils being carried as in
triumph through all the ranks, filled the *Roman* army
with inexpressible joy, so that the air rung with shouts
of victory; while the *Grecian* troops were struck with
consternation and dismay.

The King no sooner perceived the ill effect of this *Plut.*
mistake, but with all diligence he flew along the Lines P. 394
bare-headed, stretching out his hands to his soldiers,
and by his voice confirming the evidence of their eyes.
The combat was then renewed, and *Pyrrhus* bringing
his elephants into the wings, quickly obtained the vic-
tory. For the *Roman* Battalions seeing their Cavalry
put to rout by these huge animals, whose unusual
form, noises, and smell, terrified the horses, and find-
ing themselves both charged in flank, and overborne by
the force and bulk of those strange beasts, gave way to
necessity, and saved themselves as well as they could
by hasty flight; nor did they stop to defend their camp,
but ran quite beyond it, leaving both that and the ho-
nour of the day entirely to *Pyrrhus*.

Dionysius writes, that near 15000 *Romans* were slain Dion.apud
in this battle, and that *Pyrrhus* lost 13000 of his men. Plutarch.
But other authors lessen the loss on both sides. The
King treated the prisoners, amounting to about 1800,
with

Y. of R. with all possible humanity, and esteemed them the
 473. more for refusing to enlist themselves in his service.

Bef. J. C. The fame of this victory was soon spread over all

279. 172 Con- Italy, much to the reputation of *Pyrrhus*; for it was a
 fulship. rare thing, that a *Roman Consul*, with a select army,

should lose in pitch'd battle, not only the field, but the camp itself. And this honour was the more bravely won by the *Epirot*, as he had none of his *Italian Allies* to assist him, except the unwarlike *Tarentines*. Neither

Plut. in Pyrrb. p. could he well dissemble his content in having the glory of this action so peculiarly his own. His satisfaction

394. Zon. B. 8. was visible in his face, even while he was severely reprimanding the *Lucanians* and *Sannites* (who joined him soon after the battle) for their tardiness. To at-

attach them the more firmly to him, he gave them a share of the booty.

§. III. BUT now the King of *Epirus*, with his victorious army, broke like a torrent into the countries in alliance with the Republic, and many cities surrendering to him, he advanced within 30 miles of *Rome*^b. *Zonaras* relates, that the King being disappointed in his designs upon *Capua* and *Naples*, thought to march into *Hetruria*, join the enemies of the *Roman Republic* in that country, and thence go and besiege *Rome*; but that hearing there was an alliance just concluded between the *Hetrurians* and *Romans*, and that the Consul *Coruncanius*, who by a successful campaign had effected that alliance, was advancing against him, he proceeded no further in his march. It appears indeed, by the *Capitoline Marbles* that *Tib. Coruncanius* had a Triumph for his victories this year over the *Volsinenses* and *Volcentes* in *Hetruria*. And it is not improbable that these victories compleated the reduction of that country. Be that as it will, it is certain that *Pyrrhus* returned to *Tarentum*.

^b *Florus*, Book I. c. 18. in his poetic strain tells us, that *Pyrrhus* from a hill near *Præneste* took a view of *Rome*, and filled the eyes of the trembling inhabitants with smoke and dust at twenty miles distance, à vicefimo lapide oculos trepidæ civitatis fumo ac pulvere implevit.

The *Romans* notwithstanding the great loss they had sustained, were not so dejected, as to have any thought of asking peace from the victor ; nor, tho' *Fabritius* said publickly, ‘ that the *Epirots* had not vanquished the *Romans*, but that *Pyrrhus* had vanquished *Lævius*,’ did they recall the unfortunate Consul : their whole attention was to recruit his army, and enable him to try a second engagement. *Pyrrhus*, in his return to *Tarentum*, found him in *Campania*, with a more numerous army than that which he had vanquished on the Banks of the *Siris* ; and hereupon he is said to have cried out, ‘ I see plainly I was born under the Star of *Florus*, ‘ *Hercules*, I have to do with a *Hydra* whose Heads are no sooner lopp'd off, but new ones spring up from its blood.’ The Consul offered him battle ; *Pyrrhus*, unwilling to refuse it, drew up his army, and commanded the conductors of his elephants to force them to make their strange and dreadful noises, in order to frighten the *Roman* Legions ; but these noises were answered by so universal and terrible a shout from the *Romans*, that the King who found his soldiers dismay'd, thought fit to decline the engagement, pretending that the Omens were not favourable ; and the Consul not forcing him to fight, he pursued his march to *Tarentum*.

§. IV. WHILE *Pyrrhus* continued quiet in this city, he had time to reflect on the bravery, conduct, and strength of the *Romans*. He consider'd that they were better able to endure many such losses as they had suffered, than he many such victories as he had won. And he concluded therefore, that the only means to save his reputation, was an honourable peace. He was full of these reflections, when to his inexpressible joy he heard that an embassy ^a was coming to him from the

^a Authors are not agreed concerning the time of this embassy, whether it was after *Cyneas* had been at *Rome* or before. *Plutarch* (whom Mr. *Rollin* follows) makes it posterior to *Cyneas*'s journey thither ; and *Dyonisius* seems to do the same. But, if we consider the haughty manner in which *Cyneas* was dismissed by the State, with an absolute refusal,

Y. of R. the Senate ; he pleased himself with the imagination,
 473. that it was to ask that peace, which he himself so much
 Bef. J. C. desired. But when the three *Roman Ambassadors*,
 279. 172 Con- *Cornelius Dolabella*, *Fabri- cius*, and *Aemilius Papus*, after
 fulship. a splendid reception, were admitted to an audience,
 D. Hal. in they proposed nothing more than ‘ a release of the *Ro-*
 Legat. ‘ *man Prisoners*, either by way of exchange, or for
 such a ransom per head, as should be agreed upon.’
 Pyrrbus, after a moment’s silence, answered, ‘ That he
 would consider of the matter, and let them know
 Zon. B. 8. ‘ his resolution.’ Accordingly he assembled his Council ; and there *Cyneas*, who knew his master’s inclination, proposed that an embassy should be immediately sent to *Rome* to negotiate a peace, of which one of the conditions should be the release of the *Roman Prisoners* without ransom. The rest of the Council declared themselves of the same opinion, and the King gave the *Romans* an answer conformable to it.

Pyrrbus after this desired a private conference with *Fabri- cius*, who, he had heard, was the man most esteemed for his virtue, of any in the Republic, a brave and able warrior, and very poor. The King taking him apart, told him, ‘ He had been informed
 ‘ of his distinguished merit, and of his poverty so un-

refusal, of entering into any treaty with the King while he continued in *Italy*, at least it is very unlikely that *Fabri- cius*, after such a refusal, should apply himself to *Pyrrbus* in the manner *Dionysius* represents, preaching about the inconstancy of fortune, and as if he was asking a favour. He is made to speak more like an ambassador from a people who sued for peace, than from the proud *Roman Senate*, who rejected it even upon reasonable terms. *Hannibal*, indeed, before the battle of *Zama*, talks much to *Scipio* of the mutability of fortune, and the vicissitudes of war ; but this was in order to dispose him to grant peace to the *Carthaginians*, whom he had reduced to extremity.

Neither can I see what there was unbecoming in *Fabri- cius*’s proposal, even upon the supposition that the *Romans* had rejected a peace offered. A release of prisoners by way of ransom or exchange, is what surely without any indecency may be proposed to an enemy, notwithstanding that a peace has been refused to that enemy upon his terms. Yet *Dionysius* makes *Pyrrbus* reprove the ambassadors as guilty herein of an unworthy proceeding.—Σχέτλιον τι περίγμα ποιεῖ, &c.
 —D. Hal. in Legat. p. 711. Dr. Hud. edit.

See D.
 Hal. in
 Legat.

suitable

‘ suitable to it ; that he thought a Prince could never Y. of R.
 ‘ employ his wealth and power to a nobler purpose, 473.
 ‘ than that of raising the fortune of an indigent great Bef. J. C.
 ‘ man ; and that for this reason he had resolved to be- 279.
 ‘ stow such riches upon him, as should put him, at 172 Con-
 ‘ least, upon an equality with the most opulent nobles fulship.
 ‘ of Rome.’ The King added ; ‘ nor yet imagine, F.A.-
 ‘ BRICIUS, that my intention is to ask any thing, in
 ‘ return, that can be inconsistent with the regard you
 ‘ owe your country. I demand nothing but your aid
 ‘ in negotiating the peace which I am desirous to con-
 ‘ clude with the *Roman Senate*. You know very well,
 ‘ that I cannot with honour abandon the *Tarentines*,
 ‘ and the other *Greeks* who are settled in this part of
 ‘ *Italy*, before I have secured to them a peace with
 ‘ *Rome* upon equitable terms. Some pressing affairs call
 ‘ me back into my own country, and this makes me
 ‘ the more solicitous to finish our war by an amicable
 ‘ treaty. If my being a KING ^b renders me suspected
 ‘ by

^b The Greek Historians seldom lose any occasion of letting us *Plut.* in know their unfavourable opinion of Kings. *Plutarch*, speaking of *Pyrrh.* this very *Pyrrhus*, says, *KINGS have no reason to complain when inferior men change sides, and violate faith for private advantage, seeing, in this, they do but imitate them who are the great masters in perfidy and treachery; and whose maxim is*, that no man pursues his own interests with much prudence, as he who has no regard to justice.

And *Polybius* (L. ii p. 202.) reproves the folly of *Phylarchus*, an historian, who in giving an account of the miserable end of *Aristomachus*, King of *Argos*, whom (as he pretends) the *Achaians* had put to death by torture, endeavours to heighten the glory of the sufferer, and excite the greater indignation against his persecutors, by saying, *That Aristomachus was not only an ABSOLUTE PRINCE, but descended from ancestors, who had been ABSOLUTE PRINCES.* What more bitter accusation (says *Polybius*) could any one easily have brought against him? What charge heavier with crime could he have loaded him with? For surely this name of ABSOLUTE PRINCE expresses the very height of impiety ; it imports all the kinds of injustice and wickedness, that can be committed by man. Καίπερ συγγεφίνις βαλόμενος αὐξεῖν αὐτῷ τὴν δόξαν καὶ παρεπόσασθαι τὸς ἀκέντας εἰς τὸ μᾶλλον ἀντῷ συναγαγακτεῖν ἐφ' οἷς ἐπαθεῖ ἢ μόνον αὐτῷ φησὶ γεγονέναι τυράννον ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐκ τυράννων πεφυκέναι ταῦτης δὲ μέντῳ κατηγορίαις η πικροτέραις ὃδ' ἀντεῖν ἔαδιος δύναντ' ἄδεις. αὐτὸν γὰρ τέ-

Y. of R. by the Senate, because other Princes have made no
 473. scruple to violate the faith of treaties, be you yourself
 Bef. J. C. my security. When the peace is made, come and
 279. assist me with your counsels ; I will undertake no-
 172. Con- thing without your advice ; you shall be my chief
 sulship. minister, my lieutenant in the field, nay, a sharer with
 ' me in all that I possess. I have need of an honest
 ' man, and a faithful friend, and you have need of a
 ' generous Prince, a Prince, whose munificence may
 ' enable you to make your virtues, and your talents
 ' for great affairs more conspicuous, and more useful :
 ' Let us therefore mutually contribute to each other's
 ' happiness.'

FABRICIUS answered in words to this effect :

' You have indeed, been rightly informed concerning my poverty. My whole estate consists in a house of but mean appearance, and a little spot of ground, from which, by my own labour, I draw my support. But if, by any means, you have been persuaded to think, that this poverty makes me less considered in my Country, or in any degree unhappy, you are extremely deceived, I have no reason to complain of Fortune. She supplies me with all that nature requires, and, if I am without superfluities, I am also free from the desire of them. With these, I confess,

νομα περιέχει τὴν ἀστεβίστην ἥμφασιν, καὶ πατεῖς περιείληψε τὰς εἰς αὐθεώποις αδικίας καὶ παρανομίας.

The reader observes, that the word which, in this passage of Polybius, has been translated ABSOLUTE PRINCE, is *τόπαν* [TYRANT] an appellation frequently used by the antiets to signify only A prince with absolute and perpetual power ; in which sense it is used by Phylarchus on the present occasion. We cannot possibly suppose him so very unskilled in the Pathetic, as to endeavour at exciting either indignation or pity for the sufferings of Aristomachus, by telling us, that he not only was a TYRANT himself, but descended from ancestors, who had been as great TYRANTS as he.

Cornelius Nepos, speaking of Miltiades has these words. — Chersonesi omnes illos quos habitarat annos, perpetuam obtinuerat dominacionem, tyrannus que fuerat appellatus, sed justus. Non erat enim vi consequitus, sed suorum voluntate, eamque potestatem bonitate retinuerat. Omnes autem et habentur, et dicuntur tyranni, qui potestate sunt perpetua in ea civitate, quæ libertate usa est.

‘ I should

‘ I should be more able to succour the necessitous, the
 ‘ only advantage for which the wealthy are to be envi-
 ‘ ed : but as small as my possessions are, I can still
 ‘ contribute *something* to the support of the state, and the
 ‘ assistance of my friends. With regard to HONOURS,
 ‘ my Country places me, poor as I am, upon a level
 ‘ with the richest : for *Rome* knows no qualifications
 ‘ for great employments but virtue and ability. She
 ‘ appoints me to officiate in the most august ceremonies
 ‘ of religion ; she intrusts me with the command of
 ‘ her armies ; she confides to my care the most impor-
 ‘ tant negotiations : my poverty does not lessen the
 ‘ weight and influence of my Counsels in the *Senate* ;
 ‘ the *Roman People* honour me for that very poverty
 ‘ which you consider as a disgrace ; they know the
 ‘ many opportunities I have had, in war, to enrich
 ‘ myself without incurring censure ; they are convinced
 ‘ of my disinterested zeal for *their* prosperity ; and, if
 ‘ I have any thing to complain of in the return they
 ‘ make me, it is only the excess of their applause. What
 ‘ value then can I set upon your gold and silver ? What
 ‘ King can add any thing to *my* fortune ? Always atten-
 ‘ tive to discharge the duties incumbent on me, I have
 ‘ A MIND FREE FROM SELF-REPROACH, and I have an
 ‘ HONEST FAME.’

The King perceiving by this answer that *Fabricius* Plut. in Pyrrb. absolutely refused his offers, pressed him no farther. The next day, knowing that he had never seen an ele- p. 395.
 phant, and being desirous to try whether he could surprise and discompose him, he commanded the largest he had of those animals to be armed, and led to the place where he intended to converse with the ambassador. The beast was to stand concealed behind some hangings till a sign should be made for his appearance. The King’s order being punctually executed, the signal was given, the hangings were suddenly drawn aside, and the enormous animal, stretching out his trunk over the head of the *Roman*, made a most terrifying noise. *Fabricius* betrayed not the least emotion, but turning towards *Pyrrhus*, said with a smile, ‘ Neither

Y. of R. ' your *Gold* yesterday, nor your *Great Beast* to day have
 473. ' made any impression upon me.'

Bef. J. C. While they were sitting at table in the evening, dis-

279. 172 Con- coursing of various subjects, but especially of *Greece*,

fulship. and the philosophers of that country, CYNEAS hap-

Plut. ibid. pened to mention EPICURUS; and he began to relate

the principles of the *Epicurean* doctrine: ' That the
 ' DIVINITY, far removed from love and hatred, com-
 ' passion and anger, and wholly regardless of human-
 ' kind, lived through all ages, without action, and
 ' without providence, totally absorbed in an uninterr-
 ' rupted flow of delights. That PLEASURE was also
 ' the SOVEREIGN GOOD of MAN; and that, for this
 ' reason, all public employments, all solicitude for the
 ' public weal should be carefully shunn'd by the wise,
 ' as inconsistent with a life of happiness.' — *Cyneas*

was going on, when with a loud voice, ' O HERCULES,'
 cried FABRICIUS, ' May PYRRHUS and the TAREN-
 ' TINES be heartily of this SECT, while they are at
 ' war with us!' The King greatly admiring the wisdom
 and virtue of the *Roman*, became more desirous than

ever to conclude an alliance with his Republic. He

Plut. ibid. therefore, once more, took him apart, and warmly
 p. 396. pressed him to employ his endeavours for a speedy ac-
 commodation, earnestly requesting of him at the same
 time, that, as soon as the peace should be made, he
 would come and live at his court, where he promised
 him the first place among all his friends and captains.

Fabricius answer'd in a kind of whisper, ' You don't
 ' consider, SIR, your own interest in what you pro-
 ' pose; for if those who now honour and admire *you*,
 ' come once to have experience of *me*, they will chuse
 ' rather to have *me* for their King than *you*.' *Pyrrhus*
 was not in the least offended with this answer, but to
 his friends highly commended the exalted soul of the
Roman; upon whose single parole he also suffered the *

prisoners

* The Senate (according to *Plutarch*) careful of *Fabricius's* honour
 and their own, commanded every prisoner upon pain of death to re-
 turn to *Pyrrhus*, as soon as the festival should be over.

With

prisoners to go to *Rome* to celebrate the festival of the Y. of R. ^{473.}
Saturnalia.

And now *Pyrrhus* having resolved to send *Cyneas* to ^{473.}
negotiate a peace with the *Roman* Senate, instructed ^{279.} _{172 Con-}
him, if we may believe *Plutarch*, to ask nothing of the _{fulship.}
Romans but their † friendship, and a sufficient security
for the *Tarentines*. Upon which conditions he offer'd ^{p. 394.}
to cease all hostilities, releate the captives, and assist
the Republic in the conquest of *Italy*.

Together with these instructions, *Pyrrhus* furnished
his ambassador with magnificent presents for those per-
sons whose assistance would be necessary to compass
what he desired ; nor did he forget rare and precious
toys for the *Roman* Ladies, by whose means he hoped
to smooth the rugged spirit of their husbands in his fa-
vour. Some authors report, that *Cyneas* found both
men and women so steady and uncorrupt, that not one
of either sex would receive any of his presents : but
Zonaras affirms, that many even of the Senators were ^{Juſt. Plut.}
gained by the liberality of *Pyrrhus*. Be that as it will, & *Flor.*
it is certain, that after *Cyneas* had had his audience in
the Senate, several of the *Conscript Fathers* discover'd
a strong inclination to accept the peace proposed, af-
signing for reasons, the battle they had already lost,
the hazard they were in of losing another (*Pyrrhus's*

With respect to this affair there is a great diversity in the accounts
of *Plutarch*, *Justin*, *Florus*, and *Zonaras*. Some say, the prisoners
were absolutely released, and that the Senate, to punish them as cow-
ards, would not suffer them to serve again in the field, but sent
them to garrison Towns.

† Other writers make his demands to be more extensive, and
say, that he required, in favour of all the *Greek* cities in *Italy*, the †
enjoyment of their laws and liberty ; and further, that the Republic
should restore to the *Sannites*, *Lucanians*, and *Bruttians*, whatever
she had conquer'd from them. These demands, if they were made,
may well account for the warm indignation which *Appius Claudius the*
Blind expressed, as we shall presently find, at the Senate's listening to
Pyrrhus's minister. But then it will be difficult to reconcile them with
the offer which *Pyrrhus* at the same time made the *Romans*, to assist
them in the conquest of *Italy*. The *Jesuits*, aware of this inconveni-
ence, have made *Cyneas* speak only of the West of *Italy*.

† *Appian. apud Fulv. Ursin.*

Y. of R. strength being now greatly augmented by the junction
 473. of his *Italian* allies) and the fatal consequences that
 Bef. J. C. might attend a second overthrow. A rumour of this
 279. disposition in the Senate being spread through the city,
 172. Con- came to the ears of *Appius Claudius*. He had for some
 fulship. time, on account of his great age and the loss of his
 Plut. in sight, retired from all public business, + and confined
 Pyrrb. p. himself wholly to his family. Upon hearing the report
 394. of what pass'd in the Senate, he caused himself to be
 carried in the arms of his domestics to the door of the
 Senate-house. There his sons and his sons in-law met
 him, and led him into the assembly, which was hush'd
 into a profound silence the moment he appear'd. The
 venerable old man was hardly enter'd, when he thus
 began.

‘ Hitherto, *Romans*, I have borne the loss of my
 ‘ sight with weariness and impatience ; but my great
 ‘ affliction now is, that I am only *blind*, and that I am
 ‘ not *deaf* too ; that I am able to hear of those shame-
 ‘ ful resolutions you are taking, and of that infamous
 ‘ Treaty which is to extinguish the glory of the *Roman*
 ‘ name. What then is become of all those brave dis-
 ‘ courses, those lofty, sounding words, with which you
 ‘ are wont to make all places ring, *That if Alexander*
 ‘ *had come into Italy when we were young, and our Fathers*
 ‘ *in the vigour of their age ; that if the Great Alexander*
 ‘ *had dared to contend in arms with Us, he would not*
 ‘ *be now stiled THE INVINCIBLE, but by his death or*
 ‘ *flight have added new lustre to the Roman Glory ? An*
 ‘ *idle tale ! vain and empty boasting ! Heroes indeed !*
 * People
 of Epirus
 ‘ *you that are afraid of the Chaonians* and Molossians,*
 ‘ *ever the prey of the Macedonians ! you, that are*
 ‘ *trembling at the name of Pyrrhus, an assiduous hum-
 ‘ ble courtier of one of Alexander’s life-guards ! a va-
 ‘ gabond in Italy, come hither not so much to succour*
 ‘ *the Italic Greeks, as to seek a shelter from his enemies*

+ This *Appius Claudius* had been *Quæstor* in the Y. of R. 435 ;
Curule Aedile in 438 ; and, a second time, in 440 ; *Censor* in 441.
Consul in 446 ; *Prætor* in 448 : *Consul*, a second time, in 457 ; *Præ-
 tor*, a second time, in 458 ; *Diclator* in 461, (according to Pighius.)
 ‘ at

‘ at home ! And yet this mighty man, this *Pyrrbus*, it Y. of R.
 ‘ seems, is to conquer *Italy*; he is to *subdue all Italy* to 473.
 ‘ *Us* with those very forces that were not able to pre- Bef. J. C.
 ‘ *serve to Him a small portion of Macedonia* ! No, Ro- 279.
 ‘ mans, suffer not his arrogance to escape unpunished ; 172 Con-
 ‘ if you condescend to treat with him, your glory is at
 ‘ an end ; *Pyrrbus* will himself despise you ; his allies
 ‘ will insult you as a nation easy to be terrify’d ; and
 ‘ one dishonourable peace will involve you in a hundred
 ‘ wars.’

Appius by these and some other words to the like *Plut. ibid.* effect, so awaken’d the *Roman* spirit in the Senators, p. 395. that without further debate they unanimously passed a decree, instantly to dismiss the Ambassador with this answer, ‘ That the *Romans* would enter into no Treaty with King *Pyrrbus* so long as he continued in *Italy* ; but with all their strength would pursue the war against him, tho’ he should vanquish a thousand *Lævinus’s*.

Cyneas left *Rome* the same day, and return’d to *Tarentum*. ’Tis said, that when *Pyrrbus* ask’d him his opinion of the *Roman* City and Senate, he answer’d, that *ROME was a TEMPLE, and the SENATE an ASSEMBLY OF KINGS*. His account of what he had observed, greatly increased the King’s admiration of the *Romans* ; but finding that there were no hopes of peace, *Flor. B. I.* he made all possible preparations for the next cam- c. 18. paign.

CHAP. XXVII.

§. I. *The Romans came to a second battle with King Pyrrhus. Pyrrhus retires to Tarentum, and the Consuls into winter-quarters.* §. II. *The Carthaginians send a fleet to the assistance of the Romans against Pyrrhus. The Senate refuse the assistance offer’d.* §. III. *The Romans and Epirots having again taken the field, the Consuls give the king notice of the treachery of his Physician, who had offer’d to poison him for a reward. Pyrrhus once more sends Cyneas to*

Rome with proposals of peace, but to no effect. §. IV.
Pyrrhus passes with his army into SICILY.

Y. of R. §. I. **I**N the mean time the Republic chose new
 Consuls, *P. Sulpicius Saverrio* and *P. Decius
 Mus*, (whose father and grand-father were both famous
 for their *Devotements*.) The two Generals joined their
 armies, and march'd together into *Apulia*, where they
 found *Pyrrhus* encamped near a little town called *Asculum*,
 and where they entrench'd themselves in a plain
 at the foot of the *Apennines*. This plain was divided
 by a large deep stream, which likewise separated the
 two camps. For some time the *Romans* and *Epirots*
 seem'd to stand in awe of each other. The latter had
 entertain'd the foolish belief, that the *Decii* transmitted
 from father to son some unaccountable art of Necro-
 mancy, by which they secured the victory to their
 side, whenever they lost their lives in a battle. *Pyrrhus*
 endeavour'd to destroy this dangerous prepossession
 among his soldiers; and not only so, but he sent a
 message to *Decius*, ‘ That if he attempted to *devote*
 himself, he would find the *Epirots* upon their guard,
 who would take him alive, and make him suffer the
 most cruel kind of death after the battle.’ To this
 message the *Consuls* returned the following answer:
 ‘ PYRRHUS is not formidable enough to reduce us to
 Devotements. To shew how little we fear him, we
 offer him his choice: let him pass the river unmole-
 sted, or suffer us to do so, and we shall then see
 which of us has the more need of extraordinary me-
 thods to gain the victory.’ *Pyrrhus* chose to let the
Romans pass the river. The Historians are not agreed
 concerning the circumstances of the battle of *Asculum*,
 nor the success of it, and some make two battles of it.
 The *Romans* had prepared, against the Elephants,
 armed Chariots filled with soldiers, who were to throw
 fire-brands and other combustible matter against those
 huge beasts and the Towers on their backs. It is cer-
 tain that *Pyrrhus* was dangerously wounded in the ac-
 tion, and that the *Consul Decius* lost his life; but
 whether

Ibid.

whether in fighting, or by a voluntary Devotement in imitation of his father and grand-father, as Cicero ^{Cic. in Tusc. B. 1.} thinks, is not known. Fifteen thousand men, including the loss on both sides, were left dead upon the field. Pyrrhus after the battle, making a march unperceived by the Romans, retired to Tarentum; whereupon the Consul Sulpicius led his troops into winter-quarters in Apulia.

§. II. AND now the Republic placed at the helm of her Government two men of the most distinguish'd merit, C. Fabricius * and Q. Æmilius || Papus. The Carthaginians at this time sent Mago with a fleet of 120 sail to assist the Romans against Pyrrhus, who, they heard, would make a descent upon Sicily, after he had forced the Roman Republic into a peace; for the Syrians had invited him thither to protect them against the tyranny of the Carthaginians, who not long before had invaded their country. Mago coming to Rome, told the Senate, That the Carthaginians, full of concern to see the Romans attack'd by King Pyrrhus, had sent a fleet to their assistance, that in a war with a foreign Power they might have foreign aid. The Fathers returned a compliment of thanks for the kind offer, but would by no means accept it. However, they entered into a new treaty with the Carthaginians, in which it was stipulated, that the Romans should furnish Troops to assist the Carthaginian Republic, in case Pyrrhus attacked it; and that the Carthaginians should assist the Romans, when desired, with their fleet. After this, Mago, sail'd to Tarentum, where he had a conference with the King of Epirus. Finding that his intention was to pass very soon into Sicily, he, in order to prevent it, sailed with his fleet into the Streights between that Island and Italy, under pretence of besieging Rhegium. This obliged Pyrrhus to continue at Tarentum, and carry on the war for some time longer against the Romans.

§. III. WHEN the spring was sufficiently advanced, the Consuls marched their troops into the territory of Tarentum, and Pyrrhus came and encamped within sight of them; but the high opinion he had of Fabricius made

^{c. 37.}
^{Zon. B. 8.}

^{475.}
^{Bef. J. C.}

^{277.}
^{Con-}

^{174.}
^{fulship.}

^{* A 2d}

^{time.}

^{|| A 2d}

^{time.}

^{Justin. B.}

^{8. c. 2.}

^{Polyb. B. 3.}

^{c. 25.}

^{Liv. Epit.}

^{13.}

^{Juſt. B.}

^{18. c. 2.}

^{Diod. in Eclog.}

^{B. 22.}

Y. of R. made him avoid a battle. While the two armies
 475. were watching of each other, *Fabricius* § received a
 Bef. J. C. letter from *Nicias*, the King's principal Physician,
 277. offering to take off his master by poison, and so
 174. Con- end the war without farther hazard to the *Romans*,
 fulship. provided he might have a reward proportionable
Zonaras, to the greatness of his service. *Fabricius* detesting
 B. 8. the villainy of the Physician, and finding his Colleague
Plut. Life of *Pyrrhus*, p. 396. of the same sentiment, they immediately dispatched the
 following letter to the King. ‘C. FABRICIUS and
 ‘Q. ÆMILIUS, Consuls, to King PYRRHUS, Health.
 ‘You have made an unhappy choice both of your
 ‘friends and your enemies. When you have read
 ‘the letter sent us by one of your own people,
 ‘you will see that you make war with good and honest
 ‘men, while you trust and promote villains. We give
 ‘you this notice of your danger, not for your sake,
 ‘nor to make our court to you, but to avoid the ca-
 ‘lumny which might be brought upon us by your
 ‘death, as if, for want of strength or courage to over-
 ‘come you, we had recourse to treachery.’ *Pyrrhus*
 upon receipt of this letter, is said to have cry’d out,
 Entrop. B. ‘This is that *Fabricius*, whom it is harder to turn a-
 2. c. 14. ‘side from the ways of justice and honour, than to
 ‘divert the sun from its course;’ and in acknowledg-
 ment of the benefit, he immediately set all the *Roman*
 prisoners free without ransom. *Rome* was however too
 generous to accept a present from an enemy, much
 less a reward for not consenting to an execrable deed.
 In return therefore she released an equal number of
Samnite and *Tarentine* prisoners. But though *Pyrrhus*,
Plut. in Pyrrb. p. 396. more ardent than ever for a peace, dispatch’d *Cyneas*
 once more to *Rome*, to try the force of his eloquence
 and presents, this able minister had no better success
 than before; the Senators were steady in their resolu-

§ This story is differently related by the Historians, as to the cir-
cumstances, but they all agree in the substance.

tion to enter into no treaty with the King, till he had withdrawn his troops out of Italy.

§. IV. IT has been already said, that the *Syracusans* had invited *Pyrrhus* into their island to assist them against the *Carthaginians*. The King laid hold of this pretext to quit the war against the *Romans*, in which he had now but little hopes of success, having in the last action lost his best Troops and his bravest Commanders. Besides, the *Sicilian* expedition was a new enterprize, and therefore very agreeable to the natural inconstancy of his spirit. But just at this time he received intelligence, that *Ptolemy Ceranus*, King of *Macedon*, was dead, and that the *Macedonians* wanted a King to guard them against an inundation of *Barbarians*. This news kept him some time in suspense, and he pleasantly complained of Fortune for loading him with too many favours at once. *Macedon* had formerly been in his possession, and he wished to be master of it again; but as *Sicily* would open him a passage into *Africa*, and conduct him to a more ample harvest of glory, he determined at length for that expedition. In consequence of this resolution, he sent his faithful *Cyneas* before him to treat with the cities there, and give them assurances of his speedy arrival. Not long after, leaving in *Tarentum*, under the command of *Milo*, a strong garrison, sufficient to keep the much discontented inhabitants in subjection, he set sail from thence with thirty thousand foot and two thousand five hundred horse, on board a fleet of two hundred ships. His departure proved fatal to the enemies of *Rome*. *Fabricius* fell upon the united *Bruttians*, *Lucanians*, *Tarentines*, and *Samnites*, defeated them, drove them out of the field, and laid waste their countries.

^{475.}
Bef. J. C.

^{277.}

^{174 Con-}

^{Plut. P.}

^{397.}

Zon. B. 8.

C H A P. XXVIII.

§. I. *The state of Sicily at the time of Pyrrhus's arrival there. He makes rapid and extensive conquests in the island.* §. II. *The Romans suffer a shameful defeat from the Samnites.* III. *But, the next year, carrying*

ing

ing on the war with success against the Samnites, Lucanians, and Bruttiens, these nations send to intreat Pyrrhus to return to their assistance. His fleet, in its return to Italy, is attacked by the Carthaginian fleet. After his landing suffers a considerable loss of men. He plunders the Temple of Proserpine. §. IV. The Romans under the conduct of Curius Dentatus totally defeat the forces of Pyrrhus. §. V. Who leaving a strong garrison in Tarentum, embarks for Epirus.

Diog. Sic. §. I. **W**HEN Pyrrhus arrived in Sicily, this island in Eclog. l. 21. was almost wholly possessed by foreigners of three different nations, *Italians*, *Carthaginians*, and *Greeks*, who had settled there at different times. *Messina*, *Lilybæum*, and *Syracuse*, were the capitals of the three dominions there established. The *Mamertines*, from *Mamertum* in *Campania*, had possess'd themselves of the first (much in the same manner as the perfidious *Legion*, who followed their example) got possession of Polyb. B. 1. *Rhegium*; the *Carthaginians* were masters of the second; c. 7. and the third was governed by two tyrants, whom common interest had united after a civil war, to call in the King of *Epirus* to assist them against the growing power of the formidable *African Republic*.

Justin. B. 23. c. 3. **P**yrrhus soon after his arrival deprived the *Carthaginians* of all their conquests in *Sicily*, except *Lilybæum*. He also attacked the *Mamertines*, and having defeated them in a pitched battle, reduced them to their city of *Messina* only; after which he counted so much on the reduction of the whole Island, that he caused one of his younger sons (whom he had by a daughter of King *Agathocles*) to be styled King of *Sicily*, purposing to make the other King of *Italy*, which he now also looked upon as a certain conquest.

Y. of R. 476. **S**. II. IN the mean time the *Centuries* at *Rome* proceeded to the choice of new *Consuls*. *Fabri-
cii* presided in the *Comitia*, and the respect he had acquired by his virtue was such, that it made him master of the Elections. Every body therefore was astonished to see him vote and influence the assembly in favour of *Cornelius Ruffinus*

Ruffinus, a man extremely covetous and self-interested. *Y. of R.*
Fabricius hated him thoroughly, yet promoted his elec- ^{476.}
tion, because of the dangerous situation of affairs, and *Bef. J. C.*
because he knew him to be a much abler soldier than ^{276.}
any of his competitors. And these reasons were im- ^{175 Con-}
plied in the short answer he made to *Ruffinus*'s compli- *Cic. de*
ment of thanks ; ‘ I deserve no thanks,’ said he, ‘ for *Orat. B.*
‘ chusing rather to be plundered than sold.’ *The Col.* ^{2. c. 66.}
league given to *Ruffinus* *, was *C. Junius* † *Brutus*, * *A 2d*
and they both turned their forces against *Samnium*. *The time.*
Samnites being too weak to sustain the attacks of two † *A 2d*
Consular armies, fled to their mountains, and there in- *time.*
trenched themselves so strongly, that it was no easy
matter to force them. *The Romans* nevertheless at- *Zon. B. 8.*
tempted it, and were punished for their rashness ; ma-
ny of them were killed, and a great number taken
prisoners and loaded with irons. *The Consuls* at length
ashamed of their enterprize, threw the blame on each
other, and separated ; *Brutus* continued in *Samnium*,
while *Ruffinus* entered the territory of the *Lucanians* and
Bruttians. These nations continued steady in their ad-
herence to *Pyrrhus* and the *Tarentines*. *Ruffinus* there-
fore not only laid their country waste with fire and
sword, but formed a design upon *Croton*, a consider-
able City belonging to the *Bruttians*, and situated on
the borders of the *Ionian* sea, at a little distance from
Cape *Lacinium*. He found this place too well defen-
ded to be carried by force ; for *Milo* having notice of
his design, had sent a reinforcement of *Epirots* to the
garrison, under the command of one *Nichomachus*.
However, the *Consul* took it by stratagem. Having *Frontin.*
been repulsed by the besieged, who made a sally, he *Strat. B.*
exaggerated the loss he had sustained in the action, ^{3. c. 6.}
and employed two pretended deserters to publish, one, *Zonaras.*
that he was going to retire into the country of the *B. 8.*
Locrenses, the other, that he was actually gone, and
had marched off in a precipitate manner. *Nichoma-
chus*, deceived by these reports and by the *Consul's*
decamping, hastened with his troops to relieve *Locris*,
which he imagined the *Romans* intended to besiege.

Ruffinus

Ruffinus took the advantage of his absence, returned with all expedition, and, by the help of a fog, got into the place almost before the inhabitants, who were in perfect security, discovered him ; and not only so, but he defeated *Nichomachus* also in the field, who when he found himself cheated, would have led back his detachment to *Tarentum*. *Locris* likewise soon after surrendered to the *Romans*, the inhabitants having first massacred the Governor and Garrison that *Pyrrhus* had left in it. [The *Capitoline Marbles* ascribe all these exploits to the *Consul Brutus*.]

Appian.
apud
Vales.

Y. of R. §. III. IN the following *Consulship* of *Q. Fabius**
477. *Gurges* and *C. Genucius*, *Rome* was afflicted with a strange
Bef. J. C. sort of Plague, which chiefly affected women with child
275. and breeding cattle. To put an end to this calamity,
176 Consulship. an unfortunate *Vestal* was buried alive ; and *Ruffinus* was
* A 2d created *Dictator*, to drive a nail into the wall of *Jupiter*'s Temple. In the mean time the sickness did not
time. hinder the *Romans* from continuing the war. *Fabius*
Orof. B. 4. by repeated victories reduced the *Samnites*, *Lucanians*,
Euseb. & and *Bruttians* so low, that they could no longer keep the
Pausan. B. 4. field without *Pyrrhus* ; and they therefore sent Ambas-
sadors to him to intreat him to return, and put himself
again at their head.

Justin. The face of *Pyrrhus*'s affairs in *Sicily* was now much
B. 23. c. 3. changed. At his first arrival he gained the hearts of
Plut. Life of *Pyrrhus* p. 398. the *Sicilians*, by his insinuating affable behaviour ; but
D. Hal. in excerptis. afterwards elated with success, his mild govern-
a Valesio. ment changed into an absolute tyranny. He treated
cruelly those very men who had been chiefly instru-
mental to his good fortune. He excluded the natives from
the Magistracies, bestowing them on his Guards and
Courtiers, whose extortions and injustices were so
grievous, that at length the cities entered into leagues,
some with the *Carthaginians*, and others with the *Mam-
mertines*, to expel him the island. The *African Republic* had also sent a powerful army into *Sicily* to recover
B. 23. c. 3. her former conquests. This being the situation of the
King's affairs when the Ambassadors arrived, he was
not a little pleased to have so honourable a pretence to
leave

leave a country, where he was no longer safe. At his departure he is reported to have turned his eyes back upon the island, and to have said to those who were near him, ‘ What a noble field are we leaving for the *Plut. Life Cartbaginians and Romans* to fight in ! ’ In his passage of *Pyrb.* the *Carthaginian* fleet attacked him, sunk seventy of his ^{P. 398.} vessels, and dispersed all the rest of his two hundred ^{Appian. in excerptis} sail, except twelve ships, with which he escaped to ^{a Valesio.} *Italy*. He landed near *Rbegium*; and when he had there *Plut. Life* collected the scattered remains of his forces, which had ^{of Pyrb.} been driven on different parts of the coast, he marched ^{P. 399.} towards *Tarentum*.

The *Mamertines*, upon the first report of his intended departure from *Sicily*, had detached 10,000 men to *Rbegium*, to molest him after his landing; and these lying in ambush in woods and behind rocks, attacked the rear guard of his army unexpectedly, and made great slaughter. *Pyrrhus*, on this occasion, signally displayed his heroic bravery and surprising strength. In the beginning of the action he received a wound in the head, which obliged him to retire out of the battle; but returning to it again, he is said with one stroke of his sabre to have cleft a *Marmertine* to the waist, who defied him to single combat. This action so astonished the ^{Zonaras,} enemy, that they ceased the fight, and the King con- ^{B. 8.} tinued his march towards *Tarentum*. It was necessary for him to pass through the territory of the *Locrenses*, who had a little before massacred the garrison he had left in *Locris*. He not only exercised all sorts of cruelties on this people, but plundered the Temple of *Proserpine*, ^{Dio. apud Valesum.} to supply the wants of his army. The great treasure which he found there, he put on board his fleet to be carried to *Tarentum* by sea, but the ships were all dashed against rocks by a tempest, and the mariners lost. The *Val. Max.* historians relate, that *Pyrrhus* now repented of his sacri- ^{B. 1. c. 1.} lege; and as the sea had thrown the greatest part of the treasure upon the shore, he caused it to be gathered up and replaced in the Temple with great reverence; and not only so, but he put to death all those who had coun- ^{Appian.} sellled him to rob the Temple. ^{apud Valesum.}

His

His army, when he arrived at *Tarentum*, consisted only of about twenty thousand foot and three thousand horse.

Y. of R.

478.

Bef. J. C.

274.

177 Consulship.

Val. Max.

B. 6. c. 3.

Florus,

Epit. 14.

Plut. in

Pyrrb.

P. 399.

Frontin.

B. 2. c. 1.

Plut.

Life of

Pyrbus,

P. 399.

§. IV. BEFORE *Pyrrhus* was in a condition to renew the war, *Rome* changed her *Consuls*; and the famous *Curius Dentatus* was now raised (a second time) to that dignity, with *L. Cornelius Lentulus*. Their first business was to raise two armies, which might be sufficient to make head against the King of *Epirus* with his numerous allies. But when *Curius* would have begun to form the *Legions*, he found that the *Roman* youth, from some unaccountable caprice, or perhaps because their spirits were depressed by the late contagious distemper, refused to enlist themselves. Upon this he assembled the *Tribes* and put all their names into an urn. The first drawn was the *Pollian Tribe*; and the man of this *Tribe*, whose name came first up, being an audacious young fellow, and refusing to list, *Curius* ordered his effects to be sold, and, upon his appealing to the *Tribunes*, he sold the man too, saying, ‘The Commonwealth stood in no ‘need of such members as refused obedience.’ The fellow’s cause being too bad, the *Tribunes* did not think it for their honour to assist him; and from this time if any *Roman* refused to list himself in a regular muster, when commanded, it became a custom to make a slave of him.

So wholesome an instance of severity had its due effect; and two considerable armies were raised without further opposition. *Lentulus* led one into *Lucania*, while *Curius* entered *Samnium* with the other. *Pyrrhus*, to make head against both, was obliged to divide his forces, which were now become very considerable; and esteeming *Curius* the more formidable of the two *Roman* Generals, he marched himself against him with the choice of his *Epirots* and of his Elephants. And tho’ the *Consul* had posted himself very advantageously near *Beneventum*, in a place full of hollow ways, rocks, and woods, where the Grecian *Phalanx* could not act with all its strength; yet *Pyrrhus*, who found it necessary by some new exploit to confirm his allies, who were much discontented

discontented with him, made all possible haste to attack Y. of R.
 the *Romans* in their camp. He marched by night in ^{478.}
 hopes to surprize them; but passing through certain ^{Bef. J. C.}
 woods his lights failed him, and he lost his way; and at ^{274.} Con-
 the break of day his approach was discovered by the fulship.
Romans as he came down the hills that bordered the
Taurasian fields. *Curius* sallied out of his camp, with a
 detachment of his *Legionaries*, and fell upon the King's
 van-guard with such fury, that he put them to flight,
 killed a great number of them, and took some *Elephants*.
 This success encouraged *Curius* to descend into the
 plain, and try a pitched battle with the enemy. One
 of his wings had the advantage in the beginning of the
 battle, but the other was overborne by the *Elephants*,
 and driven back to the intrenchments; but then the
Consul sending for a body of troops which he had left to
 guard his camp, these so plied the huge beasts with
 lighted torches, that they ran back upon the *Epirots*, *Oros* B. 4.
 bearing down and breaking all their ranks, so that the ^{c. 2.}
Romans obtained a compleat victory. The King is said *Eutrop.*
 to have lost in this action 23000 men. His army, ac-
 cording to *Orosius*, had consisted of 80000 Foot and
 6000 Horse.

Pyrrhus's camp being also taken, proved afterwards
 of great service to the *Romans*; for they not only admi-
 red the form of it, but made it their model for the fu-
 ture. Hitherto a large enclosure within a rampart and
 a ditch had served them for a camp, in which their tents *Frontin.*
 were pitched in a disorderly manner; but now they got B. 4. c. 1.
 great light into the art of encamping, which by gradual
 improvements they at length carried to the highest per-
 fection.

§ V. THE King of *Epirus*, who after his defeat had
 retired to *Tarentum* with a small body of Horse, resolved
 to leave *Italy* as soon as possible; but he concealed his
 design, and endeavoured to keep up the spirits of his
 allies by giving them hopes of succour from *Greece*.
 In reality he sent letters thither to several courts, de- *Justin,*
 manding men and money; but for want of favourable *B. 25. c. 3.*
 answers, forged such as might please those he would *Polynæus*
 deceive. *Stratag.* B. 8.

Y. of R. deceive. When he could no longer conceal his resolution of going, the method he took to save his honour, at least for some time, was to pretend to be on a sudden transported with anger against his friends for their disfavour. ^{478.} ^{Bef. J. C.} ^{274.} ¹⁷⁷ Con- transported with anger against his friends for their disfavour. latorines in sending him the succours he required. Then, said he, *I must go myself and fetch them.* He left a strong garrison in *Tarentum* under the command of *Milo*; and, to engage him to be faithful, one author tells us, that he made him at his departure a very extraordinary present, a seat covered with the skin of the wretch *Nicias*, that Physician who had offered *Fabricius* to poison the King his master. After these disguises and precautions he returned into *Epirus* with only 8000 Foot and 500 Horse.

*Plut. in
Pyrrh.
P. 400.*

C H A P. XXIX.

§ I. *The triumph of Curius for his victory. His disinterestedness.* § II. *He is continued for another year in the Consulate. He forces the Samnites and Lucanians to retire for refuge to their mountains. The next year, the Consul Claudius defeats them in a pitched battle.* § III. *Ptolemy Philadelphus sends an Embassy to Rome, to ask an alliance with the Republic. The Romans send Ambassadors into Ægypt.* § IV. *Certain advise comes that Pyrrhus is dead.* [The manner of his death is related,] *The SAMNITES, in despair, put all to the hazard of a battle, are defeated, and thereby totally subdued, after a war which had lasted 72 years. The BRUTTIANS and LUCANIANS submit soon after; and Tarentum is surrendered into the hands of the Romans; after which the Carthaginians, whose fleet lay before Tarentum, sailed away from the coast.* § V. *The Romans punish the perfidious Campanian Legion.* § VI. *Silver Money is coined at Rome for the first time.* § VII. *Picenum is entirely subdued, and the SABINES are made entirely Roman, by being admitted to the right of suffrage in the Roman Comitia.* § VIII. *A war is commenced with the Salentines; which nation, together with the Sarcinates in Umbria, being entirely subdued, Rome remains*

remains mistress of all the Countries in ITALY from the remotest part of Hetruria to the Ionian Sea, and from the Tyrrhenian Sea to the Adriatic. § IX. The Republic is courted by foreign States. A law is passed to prevent insults on Ambassadors. The Romans regulate their Finances.

§ I. **A**ND now the Triumphal Procession of *Curius*, Y. of R.
478.
Bef. J. C.
274.
177 Con-
fulship.
Florus, B. 1
c. 18. for his victory over *Pyrrhus*, drew all the attention of the People at *Rome*. The Romans had never before seen so much magnificence, such quantities of rich spoil; Vessels of Gold, Purple Carpets, Statues, Pictures, and, in short, all the fineries of the Greek Cities. *Rome*, says *Florus*, could hardly contain her victory. And what raised the admiration of the People more than all, were the Elephants, those huge animals, with Towers on their backs. The Senate, to reward the victor, empowered him to appropriate to himself fifty acres of the Conquered Lands; but he declined this favour, having firmly resolved never to possess above seven acres, an Estate which he thought sufficient for the support of any honest man. Plin. B. 18.
c. 3
Val. Max.
B. 4. c. 3.

The Triumph of *Curius* was followed by that of his Collegue *Lentulus*, who made a successful campaign in *Lucania*, and taken *Caudium* from the *Samnites*.

This happy Consulship ended with a *Census* and *Lustrum*. The austere *Fabrius*, and his old Collegue in the Consulship, *Æmilius Papus*, being *Censors* this year, they made a new list of Senators, and excluded all those of the former list who led dissolute lives; nay, *Cornelius Rutilus*, who had been *Consul* and *Dictator*, was struck out of the roll, only for having ten pounds weight of Silver Plate for his table. The number of *Roman Citizens* fit to bear arms appeared to be 271,224. Plut. Life
of Sylla.
Val. Max.
B. 2. c. 9.

§ II. THE Romans being under the apprehension that *Pyrrhus* might soon appear again in *Italy*, continued *Curius* in the Consulate for the next year, giving him for a Collegue *Cornelius Merenda*. In the mean time the *Tarentines*, who had hated *Pyrrhus* ever since his first coming among them, began now to despise him. Y. of R.
479.
Bef. J. C.
273.
178 Con-
fulship.
Zonaras,
B. 8. Placing

ing one *Nicon* at their head, they forced *Milo* and his Troops to retire into the Citadel, and confine themselves there. The belief that by these divisions *Tarentum* would ruin herself, and be forced in the end to surrender to the *Romans*, was what probably made *Curius* neglect to besiege it. He turned his forces against the *Samnites* and *Lucanians*, who not being able to keep the field, retired to their mountains. But in the following *Consulship* of *C. Fabius Dorso* and *C. Cladius * Canina*, being encouraged, doubtless, by the emissaries from *Epirus*, who promised them that *Pyrrhus* (after the conquest of *Macedon*, which he had undertaken since his return home) would hasten to their assistance, they came down again into the plains to defend their Towns, and preserve their harvests. *Claudius* defeated them in a pitched battle, and preserved the same ascendant over them, which his predecessors had gained.

§ III. THE reputation of the *Romans* being now spread into foreign countries by the successful war they had sustained for six years against *Pyrrhus*, *Ptolemy Philadelphus*, King of *Ægypt*, sent an Embassy to *Rome* to ask the friendship of the Republic, an honour which gave the *Romans* no small pleasure. Not to be outdone in civility they sent away to *Ægypt* four ambassadors, chosen with the utmost circumspection by a Senate studious to preserve their reputation abroad entire. *Fabius Gurges* was at the head of the Embassy, and with him were joined three *Curule Aediles*, two of them brothers of the *Fabian* family, and the third *Q. Ogulnius*. Their reception was magnificent, and *Ptolemy* at a splendid entertainment presented each of them with a Crown of Gold, which they received, because they were unwilling to disoblige him by a refusal; but they went the next morning and placed them on the heads of the King's Statues, that were erected in the public parts of the city. The rich presents which the King offered them at their audience of leave they also accepted; but at their return to *Rome*, and before they went to the Senate, they deposited all these presents in the public Treasury, desiring no reward but Glory for the services they did their country:

Y. of R.

480.

Bef. J. C.

272.

179 *Con-*

fulship.

* A 2d

time.

Fast. Capit.

Eutrop.

B. 2. p. 15.

Zonaras,

B. 8.

Liv. Epit.

14.

Dion. in.

excerpt.

Val. Max.

B. 4. c. 3.

country : However, the Senate and People ordered the *Quæstors* to restore to the Ambassadors what had been given them for their own use.

§ IV. WHETHER the *Romans* believed or not, Y. of R.
that *Pyrrhus* when he had conquered *Macedon*, would
once more return into *Italy*, they took care to chuse such
Consuls for the next year as should be able to cope with ^{481.}
him if he came. Their choice fell upon *L. Papirius* fulship.
^{Bef. J. C.} ^{271.} ^{180 Con-}

Cursor and *Sp. Carvilius*, who both of them had been raised to that eminent station before, and had signalized themselves in it. These Generals, with two Consular armies, were already entered into the Territory of the *Samnites*, when an account came that *Pyrrhus* was dead. This inconstant Prince, when he had almost totally subdued *Macedon*, left that enterprize to undertake the protection and restoration of *Cleonymus* King of *Sparta*, *Plut.* Life who had been driven from his capital by the intrigues of *Pyrrh.* of his wife, and the ambition of his nephew. Such was P. 404,
the *Epirot's* pretence ; but his real design was to make ^{405.}
himself master of all *Peloponnesus*, by taking advantage *Justin,*
B. 25, c. 4. of the divisions which had sprung up there. He marched into *Laconia*, and invested *Lacedæmon*, but soon after quitted that undertaking likewise to get possession of *Argos*, whither he was invited by one of the two factions into which that city was split. There he fell by the hand of a woman. The faction that favoured him having in the night admitted him into the Town by one of the gates, and the other faction having opened another gate to a body of *Macedonians* and *Spartans*, a bloody battle was fought, in which *Pyrrhus* receiving a slight wound from a young *Argian*, would have revenged it by his death : But the mother of the young man, affrighted at her son's danger, which she beheld from the top of a house, took up a great tile, and with both her hands threw it at the King ; who receiving the blow in the nape of his neck, of which it bruised the *Vertebræ*, fell senseless to the ground ; and then *Zopyrus*, a *Macedonian*, who was the only person in the throng that knew him, severed his head from his body.

Y. of R. The news of *Pyrrhus's* death threw the *Sannites* into
 despair; they now looked upon their liberty as gone,
 and, like men in such a situation, put all to the hazard
 of a single battle. *Florus* says, that the *Sannites* were so
 totally conquered, and the ruins of their Cities so ruined,
 that *Samnium* might in vain be sought for in *Samnium*.
 And thus ended this bloody war, which had lasted se-
 venty two years, and had procured the *Roman* Generals
 thirty-one Triumphs. The *Bruttians* and *Lucanians* soon
 after submitted to the same yoke. *Tarentum* remained
 unpunished, and thither therefore the *Consuls* marched
 and invested it. *Milo* still possessed the Citadel. The
Tarentines (as it is reasonably thought) had implored the
 assistance of the *Carthaginians*; for these lay with a fleet
 before the Town, and pretended to have no design but
 against *Milo* and his *Epirots*. *Papirius* being desirous to
 prevent the *Carthaginians* from getting any footing in
 Italy, signified privately to *Milo*, that if he would surren-
 der up the Citadel to him, he and his garrison should not
 only have their lives spared, but be transported safe with
 their effects to *Epirus*. *Milo* readily listened to this
 offer, and even did more than he was asked. He under-
 took to put the City likewise into the *Consuls* hands.
 Having assembled the *Tarentines*, he persuaded them to
 depute him to the *Consul*, promising to negociate matters
 so well for them, that they should lose neither their lives
 nor their estates; and he made good his word. The *Romans*
 being soon after admitted into the Town, did no
 violence to the inhabitants. As for the *Carthaginians*,
 when they found themselves disappointed, they retired
 with their fleet, leaving the *Romans* in a well-grounded
 suspicion, that they had intended to seize a place which
 by right of Conquest belonged to *Rome*; and though
 their manner of proceeding did not cause an open rupture,
 it produced a coldness at least between the two
 Republics.

Faf. Capit. § V. ALL the old enemies of *Rome*, the *Sabines*,
Volsci, *Campanians*, and *Hetrurians* being subdued, and
 these, with the other nations newly conquered, being
 now

now become parts of one and the same State of which *Rome* was the capital, the Republic was at leisure to wipe off the dishonour thrown upon her by the perfidious *Campanian Legion*, formerly sent to *Rbegium*. As c. 7. *Polyb. B. 1.*
 soon therefore as *Quintilius Claudius* and *L. Genucius Clep-* Y. of R.
sina were entered upon the *Consulship*, the latter was ^{482.} *Bef. J. C.*
 ordered to lead an army to that City and besiege it. ^{270.}
 The usurpers, to make a better defence, not only called ¹⁸¹ Con-
 to their assistance the *Mamertines* (who were themselves fulship.
 originally *Campanians*, and had acted the same part at *Messana*, after the death of King *Agaibocles*, which the other had done at *Rbegium*) but opened an *Asylum* for ^{Zon. B. 8.}
 all the *Banditti* of the country. Their obstinacy being increased by this additional strength, the siege proved a long one, and provisions failing in the camp of the *Romans*, *Genucius* was obliged to have recourse to *Hiero*, King of *Syracuse*, a generous Prince, whose name will be often mentioned in the course of this history. *Hiero* furnished the *Consul* not only with the corn he wanted, but with a reinforcement of some *Sicilian Troops*; and by the help of these succours the *Romans* took the town. Of about 400 men, of which the guilty *Legion* had at first consisted, there remained now but 300 alive. These, though *Campanians* by birth, having the privileges of ^{c. 7.} *Val. Max.*
^{B. 2. c. 7.}
Roman Citizenship, were sent prisoners to *Rome* to be there tried. The Senate condemned them all to be first beaten with rods, and then beheaded; and notwithstanding that one of the *Tribunes* made an opposition to this sentence, pretending that it belonged to the People alone to pronounce upon *Roman Citizens* in capital cases, the decree was executed, and they were put to death by fifty at a time in the *Forum Romanum*. By this execution the *Republic* cleared herself from the suspicion of having ^{Polyb. B. 1.} c. 7.
 had any part in the treachery of the *Campanian Legion*. Those of the old inhabitants, who had escaped the cruelty of the usurpers, were re-instated in the possession of their lands, liberties and laws

§ VI. DURING the following administration of the *Consuls C. Genucius* and *Cn. Cornelius*, the former obtained a victory over the *Sarcinates*, a people of *Umbria*, ^{483.} *Bef. J. C.*
^{269.}

who were for the most part *Gauls*. This year was remarkable for nothing more, except the severity of the

Fast. Capit. winter. The snow lay forty days upon the ground in
Zon. & D. the *Forum of Rome*, and was of a prodigious depth.
Aug. B. 3. The succeeding *Consuls*, *Q. Ogulnius Gallus* and *C. Fabius Pictor*, were ordered to undertake the reduction of
de Civ. the *Picentes* and *Salentines* (the only nation in the East
Dei. of Italy not yet subject to the Republic) but they were
Y. of R. of a sudden called elsewhere, to extinguish a flame which
484. a very small spark had kindled. One *Lollius*, by birth
Bef. J. C. a *Samnite*, had been delivered to the *Ronans* by his
268. countrymen, as a hostage for their fidelity. This man
183 Consulship. had escaped from *Rome*, joined a company of rebels,
Eutrop. seized a strong place in *Samnium*, and was committing
B. 2. c. 16. robberies in all the country; he had drawn also the
Zon. B. 8. *Caricini*, who were either a people of *Samnium*, or in alliance with them, into his measures, making their City
 the magazine of his booty. The *Consuls* were therefore dispatched to lay siege to that place; and by the help of some deserters, who introduced the *Roman*
 Troops secretly into it, they made an easy conquest. The *Consuls* had no Triumph for their success in this war, because it was deemed a civil war; nevertheless, they signalized their victory by more lasting monuments.

To this time the *Romans* had never used any money in commerce, except pieces of Brass stamped with the figure of a Bull, a Ram, and a Boar; they had been too poor to coin Silver Money. But now after the conquest of *Samnium*, and the surrendry of *Tarentum*, the riches of the State being increased, and a great quantity of bars of silver (of no use to the Republic in that form) having been found among the treasures taken from *Lollius*, the *Consuls* thought it adviseable to coin the silver, and introduce it into commerce. The place appointed for the Mint was the Temple of *Juno Moneta*, from whence comes the word *Money*. The new species, instead of being stamped with the figures of animals, was made to represent the exploits of the *Roman Heroes*, by ingenious hieroglyphics; but so ænigmatically, that the invention of our antiquaries is often put to the rack to explain

Suidas under the word *Moneta*.

plain them. Some of these pieces of silver money, being worth ten *Asses of brass*, were called *Denarii*, and marked with the numeral letter X; and others worth but five *Asses*, were called *Quinarii*, and were marked with the letter V. The *Sestertii*, which were worth but two *Asses* and a half, were distinguished by the letters HS or LLS *.

§ VII. THE next year the new *Consuls*, *P. Sempronius Sopbus* and *Appius Claudius Caecus* (son of the famous blind *Appius*, and the heir of his artfulness) entered *Picenum* jointly; but new commotions in *Umbria* obliged the latter soon after to march thither. He laid siege to *Camerinum*, a town situated near the *Apennines* that separated *Umbria* from *Picenum*; and when he had taken it, treated the inhabitants barbarously: he sold them for slaves, contrary to his agreement with them, put the purchase-money into the public treasury, and seized their lands. The Republic, however, would not authorise so wicked a fraud. The Senate ordered the unhappy wretches to be sought out, granted them the privilege of *Roman Citizens*, assigned them a quarter upon Mount *Aventine* for an habitation, and allotted each of them as much land as he had lost in *Umbria*.

In the mean time *Sempronius Sopbus* pursued the war against the *Picentes*. Just as he was going to engage with the enemy in a pitched battle, a sudden earthquake greatly terrified his soldiers, and damped their ardour for fighting; but he telling them, "That the earth shook only for fear of changing its masters," and then vowing a Temple to the Goddess *Tellus*, they quickly recovered their courage, and fell upon the *Picentes* with their usual intrepidity. The battle must have been exceedingly bloody; for though the *Consul* gained the victory, he lost the greater part of his troops in the action. *Asculum*, the capital of *Picenum*, soon after surrendered, and the whole nation gave themselves to the *Romans*; an important increase of the dominion of the Republic, because this country alone was able to supply her armies with 360,000 soldiers.

To

Y. of R.
484.
Bef. J. C.
268.
183. *Con-*
sulship
Varr. de-
ling. Lat.
B. 4.

**Duo & Se-*
mis tertius.
Y. of R.
485.
Bef. J. C.
267.
184. *Con-*
sulship
Eutrop. B.
2. c. 16.
Val. Max.
B. 6. c. 5.

Frontin.
Strat. B. 1.
c. 12.
Flor. B. 1.
c. 19.
Orof. B. 4.
c. 4.
Plin. B. 3.
c. 13.

Y. of R.

485.

Bef. J. C.

267.

184 Con-

sulship.

Vel. Pat.

B. I. c. 14.

To keep the newly-conquered nations in awe, the *Romans* at this time settled *Colonies* at *Ariminum* in the country of the *Picente*, and at *Beneventum* in that of the *Samnites*; and at this time also the *Sabines*, whose right of Citizenship at *Rome* had hitherto extended only to the privilege of being incorporated in the *Legions*, instead of barely serving as auxiliaries, were admitted to the right of suffrage in the City, and thereby became entirely *Roman*.

Y. of R.

486.

Bef. J. C.

266.

185 Con-

sulship.

Flor. B. I.

c. 20.

Fast. Capit.

§ VIII. THE *Salentines*, whose chief Cities were *Hydruntum*, *Aletium* and *Brundusium*, were now almost the only people in the eastern extremity of *Italy*, that remained unsubdued to the *Romans*. It was easy for the ambitious Republic to invent pretences to rob her neighbours of their liberty. The next year's *Consuls*, *L. Julius Libo* and *M. Attilius Regulus*, took *Brundusium*; but as the brave *Salentines* disputed their country inch by inch, the two Generals were obliged to leave their conquests to be finished by their successors. These were *Numerius Fabius* and *D. Junius Pera*, who, having first subdued the *Sarcinates* in *Umbria*, totally reduced the *Salentin's* (though they had brought the *Messapians* or *Iapygians* into their quarrel.) The reduction of two nations in one campaign procured each *Consul* two Triumphs, a thing unheard of before in the Republic.

Rome was now become mistress of all the different nations of *Italy*, from the farthest part of *Hetruria* to the *Ionian Sea*, and from the *Tuscan Sea* cross the *Apennines* to the *Adriatic*. But these nations had not all the same privileges, nor were upon the same footing in point of subjection. Some were so entirely subject to *Rome*, as to have no laws but what they received from thence; others retained their old customs and forms of government. Some were tributary, others barely allies, who were bound to furnish the *Roman* army with troops, and maintain them at their own expence. Some had the privileges of *Roman Citizenship*, and their soldiers were incorporated in the *Legions*, others had likewise a right of suffrage in the elections made by the *Centuries* in the

Campus

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Campus Martius. These different degrees of honour, privileges and liberty, were founded in the different terms granted by the conquerors in their treaties with the vanquished ; and these honours and privileges were afterwards increased, according to the fidelity of the several cities and nations, and the services they did the Republic.

Y. of R.

487.

Bef. J. C.

265.

186 Con-

fulship.

§ IX. AFTER the great increase of power and dominion which the *Romans* acquired by their victories over *Pyrrhus* and his *Italian* allies, free Cities and whole Nations beyond the seas began to follow the example of the King of *Egypt*, and court the friendship of the Republic. *Apollonia*, situated over-against *Brundusium*, was the first city of *Macedon* that sent Ambassadors to desire her protection. These Ambassadors were receiv- *Liv. Epit.*
ed with honour by the Senate ; but afterwards, upon *15.*
some occasion not known, were insulted by *Fabrius* and *Val. Max.*
Apronius, young *Romans* of great distinction, and at this *B. 6. c. 6.*
time *Aediles*. So grievous a breach of the law of nations required satisfaction ; nor did the Republic refuse it. The young men were condemned to be delivered up into the hands of the Ambassadors, in order to be transported to *Apollonia*, and there punished at the pleasure of the People. This was shewing the *Apolloniates* all the regard possible ; and they, in their turn, shewed a prudent respect for the *Roman* Senate ; *Fabrius* and *Apronius* were hospitably received, and then sent back to *Rome*. And this memorable event gave rise to a law (which subsisted ever after) “ That if any Citizen, of *Dig. Pa-*
“ what quality soever, insulted an Ambassador, he should *rag. de*
“ be delivered up to the injured nation.” *Legat.*

And now the great affair of the Republic under the administration of the *Consuls* *Q. Fabius* * *Gurges* and *L. Mamilius Vitulus*, was to regulate her Revenues. These revenues arose from the tributes each province was to pay ; from the rents of certain arable and pasture lands, which the Republic reserved as her demesnes, whenever she divided any conquered lands among the Citizens ; from the tenth of the produce of all lands dependent, on

Y. of R.

488.

Bef. J. C.

264.

187 Con-

fulship.

* A 3d

time.

Y. of R.

488.

Bef. J. C.

264.

187 Con-

fuslship.

Cic. de

Orat. pro

Sext. &

contra

Rullum.

Sueton.

on her; and lastly from the imposts upon all merchandise imported into her dominions. It has been already observed, that four Officers, with the title of *Quæstors*, had the charge of receiving and disbursing the Public Moneys. *Valerius Pop'ica'a*, soon after the birth of the Republic, desiring to ease himself of the care of the Finances, had appointed two: To these *Sempronius Atratinus*, in the year 333, being then *Military Tribune with Consular Authority*, had added two more, whose peculiar business was to attend the *Consuls* in their expeditions, keep the military chest, pay the troops, and sell the spoils and prisoners taken from the enemy. The *Quæstors* neither of the one nor of the other institution had any of the great badges of distinction annexed to their offices. They had neither *Curule Chairs*, nor *Lictors*, nor *Apparitors*; nor could they refuse to appear before the *Prætor*, upon a summons from even the meanest of the Citizens. The only privileges they had were those of assembling the *Comitia* at *Rome*, and speaking to them from the *Rostra*, and haranguing the soldiers in the field.

The four *Quæstors* had been found to be hardly sufficient to go through the business belonging to them even before the late conquests; but now it was absolutely necessary to augment the number of these officers; and four new ones were therefore created, with the title of *Provincial Quæstors*, to take charge of the four^a provinces into which the Republic had divided her conquests.

The

^a The seat or chief office of the first province was at *Offia*, a maritime city near *Rome*. This *Quæstorship* reached, in all probability, from the head of the *Tiber* and the river *Arnus*, to the mouth of the *Liris*; and comprehended *Hetruria*, *Latium*, *Sabinia*, *Umbria*, and, in short, all the coasts of the *Tuscan sea*, and all the lands between that sea and the *Apennines*. The seat of the second province was at *Cale*, in the delightful country of *Campania*; and it reached from the *Liris* to the *Gulph of Tarentum*. This province contained *Campania*, *Samnum*, *Lucania*, the country of the *Brutii*, and *Oenotria*; and within it were many rich maritime cities. The third province reached from the *Apennines* to the shore of the *Adriatic sea*, and was called the

The usual fortune of *Rome* during any interval of Y. of R. tranquillity, did not fail to attend her at this time. A ^{488.} most dreadful Plague raged both in the City and in the ^{Bef. J. C.} Country. The *Sybilline* books, according to custom, ^{264.} were hereupon consulted ; and it was there found, that ^{187 Con-} some secret crimes had drawn down the wrath of ^{Orofus,} Heaven upon the Republic. A vestal, named *Caparonia*, ^{B. 4. c. 5.} proving the unhappy victim, was sacrificed to the pre-
possession of the People. Being convicted of inconti-
nency before the Tribunal of the *Pontifices*, they con-
demned her to be buried alive ; and though to avoid so
cruel a death she strangled herself, the same ceremonies
of

the "Gallic Quæstorship." It contained the countries formerly conquered by the *Gauls*, especially the *Senones*, from the river *Rubicon* to the *Æsis*. But notwithstanding its name, it contained also *Picenum*, the country of the *Frentani*, and all the other countries as far as *Apulia*. And lastly, the fourth *Quætorship*, of which we have not so distinct an account as of the other three, could only comprehend *Ajulia*, *Calabria*, and the territories of the *Salentines*, *Messapians*, and *Tarentines*. A fine province, if we consider the great number of its sea-ports, into which merchandizes were imported from *Greece*, *Asia* and *Africa*. For these four provinces *Rome* created four new *Quætors*; and it was then settled, that all the eight *Quætors* should for the future be chosen in *Comitia by Tribes*. After the elections, which were renewed every year, the eight *Quætors* drew lots, in the presence of the People, to decide which should have the *Roman*, which the *Military*, and which the *Provincial Quætorships*. The four *Provincial* ones were mostly desired by the ambitious, before *Rome* had extended her conquests beyond *Italy*; but when she had brought the East and West into subjection to her, and great kingdoms were become so many provinces under her domination, the four *Italian* provinces were but little coveted by the *Quætors*, who were multiplied in proportion, as the Republic enlarged her conquests. The *Proconsul* and *Proprætors*, that is to say, the Governors of those remote provinces, had each his *Quætor*, or superintendant of the *Finances*, for his Government; and these Governments being large and rich, and far out of the Senate's sight, the *Quætors* were fond of going thither, where they could raise more money, and were more honoured and respected ; for here they wore the *Prætexta*, and were attended by *Lictors*, as appears from *Cic.* 3d *Orat. contra Verr.* For all these reasons, when the *Quætors* drew lots for their provinces, the man to whom any of the *Italian* ones fell became the jest of the people. *He goes to the waters*, said they ; meaning, that he was going to enjoy his repose near *Rome*, much as those *Romans* did, who went to *Baiae* or *Puteoli* for the waters. *C. & R.*

Y. of R. of interment were performed upon the dead body, as if
488. she had been living.

Bef. J. C. Notwithstanding the havock made by the plague, the
264. number of Citizens fit to bear arms appeared, by a
187 Con- *Census* taken this year, to be 292,224. Doubtless the
sulship. *Sabines*, to whom the right of suffrage had been lately
Liv. Epit. granted, must have been reckoned in this enumeration.
16 Eutrop.
B. 2. c. 18.
Val. Max.
B. 4. c. 1.
Plut. Life
of Corio-
lanus. *C. Marcius Rutilus*, one of the *Censors*, had, on account
 of his extraordinary merit, been elected, contrary to
 custom and his own earnest remonstrances, a second
 time to this office ; and hence probably he acquired the
 surname of *Censorinus*, which was perpetuated in his
 family. *Plutarch* tells us, that to put a stop to so dan-
 gerous a practice, *Marcius* got a law passed, forbidding
 any person to hold the *Censorship* a second time.

The present *Consuls* were still at *Rome*, wholly em-
 ployed in civil affairs, when on a sudden a war sprung
 up in the very bowels of the Republic. *Volsinii*, a
 considerable City of *Hetruria*, had been by Treaty
 allowed to enjoy her own laws and form of govern-
 ment ; but the *Volsinenses* had since fallen into sloth
 and luxury, neglected their laws, despised the public
 offices, and suffered their Freed-men to usurp them.
Zonaras, These Freed-men by degrees had made themselves ty-
B. 8. rants in the little Republic ; and it was their whole bu-
Flor. B. 1. siness to mortify their old masters. They not only with
c. 21. all licentiousness invaded their wives, but passed a law,
Author that no virgin-daughter of a man free-born, should be
de Viris married to a husband of the like condition, till she had
Illustr. submitted to the passion of a freed-man. And to all
c. 36. these insolences they added Banishments and Proscrip-
Val. Max. tions of the most worthy Citizens. The *Volsinenses* not
B. 9. c. 1. being able to help themselves, sent Deputies privately to
 implore the protection of the Senate of *Rome*. But tho'
 the negotiation was thought to be carried on with per-
 fect secrecy, the Freed-men got notice of it, and put
 the Deputies to death at their return ; and when *Fabius*
Gurges, who undertook with a small army of voluntiers
 to chastise them, came near their City, he found them
 upon their guard ; nay, the Freed-men ventured to face
 him

him in the field, and gave him battle. The *Consul* Y. of R. put them to the rout ; but as he was entering the Town ^{488.} with the run-aways, he received a mortal wound from ^{Bef. J. C.} an unknown hand, and then the *Romans* were repulsed. ^{264.} After this *Decius Mus*, who had been Lieutenant to ^{187 Con-} *Fabius*, besieged the place in form ; and in the year following it surrendered to the *Consul Fulvius Flaccus*. The Freed-men, who had usurped the magistracies, and acted the whole scene of villany, were all put to death ; the City was razed, and the Inhabitants transplanted to another.

These last particulars are here mentioned a little before their time, that they may not hereafter interrupt the relation of more important matters ; the causes and commencement of the FIRST PUNIC or CARTHAGINIAN WAR.



THE

THE
ROMAN HISTORY.
FOURTH BOOK.

From the Beginning of the FIRST PUNIC WAR
in the Year of *Rome* 489, to the End of the
SECOND in 552.

INTRODUCTION.

IN the close of the preceding Book of this History, we left the *Romans* complete conquerors, and quiet possessors of all *antient Italy*, that is, of all the country between the *Adriatic* and the *Mediterranean* from the remotest border of *Hetruria* to the *Ionian* sea. The far greater part of this Dominion, though their state [by the usual reckonings] was now 488 years old, had been of late acquisition: For whatever advantage they might have over their neighbours, in the admirable construction of their ^a *legion*, the discipline of war, or any other respects, they could make but little progress in conquest, during the space of above four centuries from the building of their city. *Rome*, while under the government of Kings, was in the weakness of infancy; and if, with *Florus*, we consider her as advanced to sprightly youth (the second stage of life) when she became

^a *Vegetius* thinks that the form of the legion was not the product of meer human reason, but that the *Romans* were led to it by a kind of instinct from Heaven: *Non tantum humano confilio, sed etiam divinitatis instinctu, legiones a Romanis arbitror constitutas.* *De re milit.* l. 2. c. 21.

became a Republick, yet her natural strength was impaired, and her growth long check'd, by the disease of civil discord, a mischief wholly proceeding from the want of that *essential* of a free state, a just equality among its members.

By the revolution which expelled *Tarquin the Proud*, the Commons of *Rome* were delivered from a Tyrant, but not from Tyranny. A short suspension there was indeed of the weight of oppression : This was owing to the honest zeal of that excellent Patriot, *Valerius Poplicola*, and to the temporizing lenity and moderation of the Senate, while their fears of *Tarquin's* return were alive and strong. In so perilous a season, the indulgent Fathers had the goodness to decree, *That the poorer sort, Livy, B. by only educating their children, paid sufficient tribute to 2. c. 9. the State, and ought not to be loaded with any other tax.* But it was not long before the Plebeians felt themselves in the chains of servitude ; *Livy* makes the death of *Tarquin*, which happened in the fourteenth year after his banishment, to be the precise period when they began ^b to be oppressed by the Nobles. The Commons then became sensible, that, by dethroning their King, they had only cast off the domination of one Tyrant to become slaves to many, an Assembly of Tyrants, whose yoke was no less heavy and insupportable. The *Vale- rian* * law, to permit appeals from the sentence of the Magistrates to *the People assembled*, was not suffi- * Passed in the ent to protect the Plebeians from injustice and cruelty. Y. of R. They found it necessary to provide themselves living Protectors against the Tyranny of the Great, and therefore extorted from the Senate a consent to the establish- 244. Y. of R. ment of the *Tribunitian* Power. Another rampart against the overflowings of ambition they raised to themselves by instituting the *Comitia Tributa*, and by Y. of R. the practice of bringing into judgment, before thole 622.

^b *Insignis hic annus est nuncio Tarquinii mortis.—Eo nuncio erec- ti patres, erecta plebes. Sed patribus nimis luxuriosa ea fuit lætitia : plebi, cui ad eam diem summa ope inservitum erat, injuriæ à primo- ribus fieri cœpere.* B. 2. ch. 21.

INTRODUCTION. Book IV.

Y. of R. assemblies, the most exalted of the Nobles, upon accusations of treason against the People. By the publication of the laws of the *Twelve Tables* some check was given to the abuse of that prerogative, which the Patricians tenaciously kept, of being the sole judges in civil causes : And we find, that on several other occasions, the Commons, urged by oppression to fury, exerted their natural strength in such a manner, as seemed to proclaim them the sovereign masters in *Rome*. But those acts of power were only transient flashes, the lightnings of a civil tempest : and, notwithstanding all the advances hitherto made towards liberty and equality, the Patricians were the permanent, established Lords of the Commonwealth : all the great Offices, Civil, Military, and Sacerdotal, were confined to their body ; the public treasure at their disposal : They heaped-up riches to themselves ; and, while the People, through extreme indigence, fell under a necessity of contracting debts to the Patrician usurers, the laws gave the creditors power to be cruel to their insolvent debtors : And See B. 3. c. 4. §. 1. the consequence of all this was, that multitudes of the Plebeians, slavishly dependent by reason of their poverty, durst not concur with the more free, in using even the undisputed rights of the commons. Hence the few instances of Plebeians chosen to the *Military Tribuneship*, even after they were legally qualified for that station.

Y. of R. The Commonwealth of *Rome* was never truly a free state, till after the publication of the *Licinian Laws*, 386. those laws which, *in their consequences*, made Merit alone the ordinary scale whereby to ascend to the highest offices, and which by admitting the Plebeians to a reasonable share of what was purchased with their blood, delivered them from that servile subjection to the wealthy nobles in which their indigence had so long detained them.

From this period, the *Roman* people, when they made laws, or elected Magistrates for the execution of them, were, generally speaking, free from all undue influence ; not over-awed, as before, by the rich and the great,

great, nor constrained by any force, but that of reason and natural justice, in the most absolute subjection to which is the most perfect freedom. No citizen, who had shewed superior talents and virtue, stood excluded, on account of the low degree of his birth, from the dignities of the state : The emulation among the individuals was to surpass each other in *deserving* honours.

Indeed the haughty Patricians, as, when vanquished by the Plebeians, they had given ground with an angry reluctance, and retired fighting, so they afterwards, from time to time, shewed a strong disposition to renew the war, in order to regain their unrighteous sovereignty : but their efforts were faint and ineffectual ; and at length acquiescing in what they could not undo, there ensued domestic peace and union, and an established liberty.

Union at home gave new strength to the state ; and liberty seems to have inspired the people with a more elevated courage, a more unwearied fortitude, than they had hitherto shewn, in their wars abroad. By a series of victories, they, in the space of about 70 years (reckoning from the battle against the *Latines* in 413) enlarged their narrow dominion, of a few leagues about the city, to the utmost extent of *Italy*. And, though destitute of naval strength and naval skill, their next enterprize, as we shall presently find, will be against a rival republic beyond the continent ; a republic that with greater riches, and more ample territories than theirs, had possession of the absolute dominion of the sea. The boldness of the undertaking, and the amazing constancy with which they supported it, in spite of the most terrible adversities, are not to be parallel'd in the history of any other nation : But the *Roman* legions were, at this time, legions of free citizens, whose predominant passion was glory, and who placed the highest glory in facing every danger, and surmounting every difficulty, to preserve their *Liberty*, and extend their Empire.

C H A P. I.

The occasion and commencement of the first Punic or Carthaginian war.

* See B. 3.
c. 28. §. 3.

THE prophetic * exclamation of King *Pyrrhus*, as he sailed from *Sicily*, is now going to be accomplished, and that island to be the theatre of a bloody war between *Rome* and *Carthage*. The *Epirot*, when he beheld these powerful and ambitious Republics making swift advances in conquest, and by every step approaching nearer to each other, could have no difficulty to foresee that they would soon become enemies, and, as he might with reason believe that the *Romans* would finish the reduction of *Italy*, before the *Carthaginians* could totally subdue *Sicily*, the conjecture was natural, that this country would be the seat of the war between them. He himself had gone thither, on the invitation of the people of *Syracuse*, to guard them against the *Carthaginian* encroachments; and he was, doubtless, persuaded, that, in a short time, they would find themselves under a necessity of suing to the *Romans* for the like succour. The occasion however of the first rupture, between *Rome* and *Carthage*, was not any distress of the *Syracusians*; it was an event singular and unexpected; and as it has left ground for a dispute, whether the *First Punic* or *Carthaginian War* was justly undertaken by the *Romans*, it may be proper, for the reader's satisfaction, to state the case as fully as possible; and, in order thereto, we must recall some passa-

* See B. 3. ges of the former * part of this History.

c. 26. §. 1. & ch. 29. A considerable body of soldiers, *Campanians* by birth, and called *Mamertines*, had been mercenaries to §. 5. Strab. 1. 6. *Agathocles* King of *Syracuse*; upon whose death, finding themselves no longer welcome there, they marched p. 268. Polyb. 1. away with all their effects to *Messina*. Admitted here, 1. c. 7. Diod. Sic. and kindly entertained as friends, they treacherously in Eclog. 866. massacred one part of the citizens, expelled the rest, and

and seized, for their own use, upon the lands, houses, and even wives of those unfortunate men.

Some time after this, when *Pyrrhus* was just landed in *Italy*, the inhabitants of *Rhegium*, that their city might neither fall into the hands of the *Epirot*, nor become a prey to the *Carthaginians*, who were masters of the sea, and whose fleets appeared frequently off the coast, requested of the *Roman* Senate to furnish them with a garrison. A Legion of 4000 *Romans*, raised in *Campania*, was, under the command of *Decius Jubellius*, appointed to that service. At first, they demeaned themselves suitably to the intention of those who employed them: but, at length tempted by the wealth of the place, emboldened by the example of the *Mamertines*, and strengthened by their aid, they acted the same perfidious and cruel part towards the *Rhegians*, which the other had acted towards the people of *Mesina*.

As these cities are parted only by that narrow sea (now called the *Faro*) which separates *Italy* from *Sicily*, it was easy for the two bands of robbers mutually to assist each other in the defence of their usurpations; for which purpose they entered into a strict confederacy.

The *Romans*, though they found their honour greatly stained by the outrageous wickedness of the garrison, with which they had furnished their good allies, were then too much engaged in affairs more urgent, to take immediate revenge on the offenders: Nor in truth did they turn their thoughts that way till four years after *Pyrrhus* had left *Italy*, and the old enemies of *Rome* were all subdued. Then they marched an army to *Rhegium*, and besieged it; in which enterprize *Hiero* of *Syracuse* lent his aid. The traitors hopeless of pardon, defended themselves with an obstinate resolution; yet the town was at length carried by assault: All those who escaped the sword of the assailants, being led in chains to *Rome*, were, by a decree of the senate, first beaten with rods, and then beheaded: And the *Rhegians* were restored to their former liberty and estates.

About six years after this execution of justice, the fame of which had sounded honourably through all quarters of *Italy*, came messengers to *Rome* from the *Mamertines* in *Sicily*, imploring help against the *Syracusians*, under whose power they were ready to fall, and who, they fear'd, would inflict on them the like punishment for the like crimes : a most impudent request from the thieves of *Messina*, to ask protection of the very judges who had condemned to death their fellow-thieves of *Rhegium* ! Nevertheless, from a view of their present situation, we shall perhaps be induced to conclude, that the *Mamertines* took this step in consequence of sober reflection, and were not without a reasonable hope of assistance from *Rome*.

Polyb. I.
1. c. 8.
and 9.

These usurpers of *Messina*, so long as they could get succours from their friends at *Rhegium*, had not only lived fearless of any danger, but had often been aggressors on their neighbours the *Carthaginians* and *Syracusians*, putting many towns and villages under contribution. The posture of their affairs received a mighty change by the destruction of their *Italian* allies : of whose wonted aid being deprived, they were overthrown in battle by the *Syracusians* under the conduct of *Hiero* ^c, *Prætor* of that state, and their army almost totally

^c *Hiero*, on his return to *Syracuse*, was elected King. He was the son of *Hierocles*, and by him descended from *Gelo*, who had formerly reigned in *Syracuse*; but his mother was a slave. He distinguished himself early from those of his own years by his expertness in military exercises, and his courage in battle. He gained the esteem of *Pyrrhus*, and was honoured with several rewards from his hand. Extremely handsome, of great bodily strength, smooth and engaging in his address, equitable in business, and gentle in command, he seem'd to want nothing kingly but a kingdom. *Pulchritudo ei corporis insignis, vires quoque in homine admirabiles fuere; in alloquio blandus, in negotio justus, in imperio moderatus; prorsus ut nihil ei regium deesse, praeter regnum videretur.* *Justin.* B. 23. chap. 4.

He was chosen *Prætor* by the soldiers on occasion of a quarrel between them and the citizens: nevertheless, the latter, on account of the great gentleness and humanity with which he proceeded on his first accession to power, confirm'd him in that office. He aspired however to something yet higher, as was easily discerned by the quick-sighted, from the very begining of his administration. For

Hiero

Polyb. I.
e. c. 8.

totally cut off. Humbled and reduced by so terrible a blow, they thought themselves no longer in a condition to defend *Messina*, and, being divided in opinion about what measures to take, one party had recourse to the *Carthaginians*, made a league with them, and put the citadel into their hands; the other sent ambassadors, ^{Polyb. I.} c. 10. with an offer of the city, to the *Romans*, whose protection they implored, and with whom they pleaded the relation between them, as men of the same country and original.

The *Romans*, having so severely punished the treachery and cruelty of their own citizens, were very sensible how much their honour might suffer, should they protect villains notoriously guilty of the same crimes: and, when, on the other hand, they considered that the ^{c. 11.} *Carthaginians* had not only subdued a very long

Hiero knowing that the citizens, whenever the troops with their leaders went into the field, were apt to fall into factions and seditions, and that *Leptines*, a man in high repute for his probity, had the greatest sway with the people, he made an alliance with him, by taking his Daughter to wife, proposing by this means to secure to himself the fidelity of the *Syracusians* at home, during his expeditions with the army abroad. As to the soldiery, the veteran mercenaries having lost their discipline, and being on all occasions prompt to mutiny, and to raise new commotions, he took the following method to get rid of them. Under colour of a design to extirpate the usurpers of *Messina*, he marched his forces that way, and, when he came up with the enemy, so ordered his battle, as to keep the *Syracusians* both horse and foot from engaging, while he exposed the mercenaries to the entire shock of the *Mamertines*. The mercenaries were all cut off; and while the enemy were busied in the slaughter, he withdrew his own people in safety to *Syracuse*. After this having formed an army to his own mind, he marched once more against the *Mamertines*, and gave them that total overthrow which is mentioned in the text.

Mr. *Rollin*, who is a Divine, cannot approve this method which *Hiero* took to rid himself of the foreign mercenaries, though he grants, that he had no other way to secure himself from them. Chevalier *Folard*, who is a soldier, seems to applaud *Hiero* for the action, and says, that it ought to have served for a lesson to the *Roman Emperors*, how to guard themselves against the *Prætorian Cohorts*, when they became licentious.

^d In the following account of the rise and progress of the *Carthaginian* power, great use is made of Mr. *Rollin's* collections in his *Hist. Ancienne*.

long and rich tract of country in *Africa*, and some part of *Spain*, but were masters of *Sardinia* and the adjacent isles

Justin. B. 18. ch. 4. THE CARTHAGINIANs were originally a colony from *Tyre* (in 5, 6. *Pbaenicia*, a country on the east coast of the *Mediterranean*) the most renowned city in the world for commerce, and which had long before sent into *Africa* a colony, that built *Utica*. The foundation of *App. de Bell. Pun.* *Carthage* is ascribed to *Elissa*, a *Tyrian* Princess, better known by the p. 1. name of *Dido*. Her great grandfather *Ithobal* King of *Tyre*, is thought *Strab. B.* to be the same with *Ethbaal* the father of *Jezebel*, wife of *Abab*. 17. p. *Dido* married her near relation *Acerbas* (called otherwise *Sicbarbas* and 832. *Sichaeus*) a man immensely rich. Her brother *Pygmalion*, King of *Vell. Pat-* *Tyre*, put *Acerbas* to death, that he might seize his great riches: but *terc. B. 1.* the disappointed the cruel avarice of the tyrant, by conveying them ch. 6. secretly out of his dominions. She put to sea with a considerable number of friends and dependants, and, after stopping a while at *Joseph. Ap.* *Cyprus*, pursued her voyage, and at length landed on the *African* B. 1. coast, between *Utica* and *Tunis*. Here she is said to have bought of the natives a piece of ground, as much as she could compass with an ox's hide (cut into thongs) and on this spot to have built *Byrsa*, afterwards the citadel of *Carthage*. Many of the *Africans* in the neighbourhood, invited by the prospect of gain, repaired to these strangers to traffick with them, and, in a short time, took up their habitation among them; so that the whole had now something of the appearance of a petty State.

Dido, soon after, by encouragement not only from the people of *Utica* (who look'd upon the *Tyrians* as their countrymen) but from the *Africans* also, built a city adjoining to *Byrsa*, and called it *Carthada*, a name that in the *Pbaenician* tongue signifies *New City*. The *Romans* called it *Carthago*, the *Greeks* *Carchedon*. It was to pay an annual tribute to the *Africans* for the ground on which it stood.

[It is impossible to fix the time of the foundation of *Carthage*, chronologers both antient and modern, differing widely on the subject. *Appian* and others place it before the fall of *Troy*; others many years later.

Solinus reckons 737 years from the first year of *Carthage* to its total destruction, which if placed in the 607th of *Rome*, *Carthage*, according to him, was built before *Rome* 130 years.

According to Sir *Isaac Newton*, *Carthage* was founded by *Dido* 883 years before the beginning of the Christian *Aera*. This Computation will fall in with that of *Solinus*, as to the age of *Carthage*, but not as to the juniority of *Rome*; which Sir *Isaac* supposes to be younger than her rival by 256 years.]

The new City grew in a short time into a flourishing condition; *Iarbas*, a neighbouring Prince, demanded *Dido* in marriage, threatening the *Carthaginians* with war in case of refusal. *Dido*, to avoid this marriage, without drawing a calamity upon her people, put an end

iles on the coast of *Italy*, and had even extended their dominion far in *Sicily*, these things gave them very uneasy

end to her own life with a poniard. She was afterwards worshipped as a Goddess, so long as *Carthage* subsisted.

THE FIRST WAR * waged by the *Carthaginians* in *Africa* seems to have been on account of the annual tribute they had bound themselves to pay to the *Africans* for the ground on which their city stood. In this war their arms prospered under the conduct of one *Malbus*.

But *Mago* who succeeded *Malbus*, is considered, by *Justin*, as the first builder of the *Carthaginian* empire, because it was he that introduc'd an exact discipline among the troops. After his death, his two sons *Azribal* and *Hamilcar* had the command of the army. These brothers left each three sons, who shared among them the chief authority in *Carthage*. They made war against the *Moors* and *Numidians* with success, and obliged the *Africans* to relinquish all claim to the tribute, which they had demanded sword in hand.

[Six commanders out of one and the same family, and who governed all affairs both at home and abroad, seemed dangerous to a free State. It was a jealousy of the exorbitant power of this family of *Mago*, which induced the *Carthaginians* to elect an hundred judges out of the Senators, to whom the Generals were to give an account of their conduct after their return from the war.]

When the *Carthaginians* had made considerable conquests in *Africa*, there arose a † war between them and the people of *Cyrene* (a powerful city, standing to the East of the greater *Syrtis*) concerning the limits of their respective jurisdictions. After many bloody conflicts by land and sea, it was agreed (as the story is told) that two men should set out from each of the two cities at the same instant, and that the place of their meeting should be the boundary to the two States. The men from *Carthage* (who were brothers of the name of *Philænus*) either made more expedition than those from *Cyrene*, or, as *Valerius Maximus* relates, began their course before the appointed time. Be that as it will, the *Cyrenians* complained of deceit, and refused to stand to the agreement, unless the two brothers (in proof of their innocence) would consent to be buried alive in the place of meeting. The *Philæni*, readily acquiescing in the proposal, were buried quick in that spot; and the *Carthaginians* erected there two altars to their memory. The place from that time was called *The Altars of the Philæni* [*Aræ Philænorum*] and was ever after the eastern boundary of the *Carthaginian* Empire, which in time comprehended the whole extent of the northern coast of *Africa*, from those Altars to the *Pillars of Hercules*.

History does not inform us at what times the *Carthaginians* first carried their arms into *SICILY*, *SARDINIA*, or *SPAIN*.

SPAIN

* *Justin*, B. 18. ch. 7. B. 19. c. 1.

† *Sallust*, de Bell. Jugurth. *Val. Maxim.* B. 5. c. 6.

easy apprehensions. For they plainly foresaw, that unless they interposed to prevent it, *Messina* would soon fall

SPAIN had sufficient allurements to draw the *Carthaginians* thither. It abounded with mines of gold and silver, enchanting baits to their avarice, and it was peopled by a martial race of men, who (if once reduced to be subjects of *Carthage*) would furnish her with brave troops for the conquest of other nations, and free her, in part, from the necessity of employing foreign mercenaries in her wars. For the genius of the *Carthaginians* being more turned to commerce than war, they had constantly recourse (at least in the latter ages of their state) to the dangerous expedient of hiring strangers to fight their battles.

* The occasion of the first descent made by the *Carthaginians* on *Spain*, was, to defend the inhabitants of *Gades*, (a colony from *Tyre*, and more antient than those of *Carthage* and *Utica*) against the *Spaniards*.

Encouraged by success in this enterprize, they became aggressors and made conquests in *Spain*. It is plain however, by what *Polybius* and *Livy* tell us of the wars of *Amilcar*, *Barcas*, *Aesdrubal*, and *Hannibal*, that, till the times of these Generals, (that is, till after the end of the first *Punic War*) the *Carthaginians* did not penetrate far into that country.

[Some account of *Spain* will be given in a more proper place, when the Romans carry their arms thither.]

Diod. Sic. L. 5. Sicily, the largest island in the *Mediterranean*, was antiently called *Trinacria* and *Triquetra*, on account of its triangular form.

^a *Passaro.* ^b *Capo di Faro.* The eastern side, which faces the *Ionian* or *Grecian* sea, extends from Cape ^a *Pachinum* to ^b *Pelorus*. The chief cities on this coast were *Syracuse*, *Tauromenium*, and *Messina*.

On the northerner coast, looking towards *Italy*, and reaching from Cape *Pelorus* to Cape *Lilybæum*, the most noted cities were *Mylae*, *Hymera*, *Panormus*, *Eryx*, *Drepanum*, *Lilybæum*.

The south west side, opposite to *Africa*, extends from Cape *Lilybæum* to *Pachynum*. Its principal cities were *Selinus*, *Agrigentum*, *Gebla* and *Camarina*. The passage from *Lilybæum* to the promontory of *Mercury* in *Africa* is about 187 miles.

Diod. Sic. B. 11. p. 1, 2. ABOUT the year Ant Chr. 480. the *Carthaginians*, in consequence of a league made with *Xerxes* King of *Perisia*, raised an army of more than 300,000 men, and equipped a fleet of 200 ships of war, and 3000 transports, in order to attack and expel all the *Greeks* who were settled in *Sicily* and *Italy*, while *Xerxes* himself was to invade *Greece*.

This mighty army, which landed at *Panormus*, and under the command of a general named *Hamilcar*, laying siege to *Hymera*, was, before that place, totally routed and destroyed by *Gelo* governor of *Syracuse*; and this on the very day of the famous action of *Thermopylae*,

when

* *Juſtin.* B. 44. ch. 5. Diod. B. 5. p. 300.

fall into the hands of those formidable neighbours ; who would then be able speedily to invade Syracuse, and all the

when Leonidas fell with his 300 Spartans in defending that pass against the numberless forces of Xerxes.

AFTER the memorable defeat of the Athenians at Syracuse, the people of Segesta (a city not far from Eryx) who had declared in favour of the Athenians against the Syracusians, fearing the resentment of the latter, and being attacked by the inhabitants of Selinus, implored the aid of the Carthaginian Republic, under whose protection they put themselves and their city. The Carthaginians allure^d by the prospect of possessing a place, very convenient for them, promised succour to the people of Segesta.

B. J. C.
413.
Diad. Sic.
B. 13. P.
169.

The conduct of this war was given to Hannibal, grandson to Hamilcar, who had been killed before Hymera. At the head of a great army, he besieged Selinus, and took it by assault. He treated cruelly all whom he found in the place, but suffered those, who had fled, to return and possess the city, paying a tribute to the Carthaginians. He afterwards took Hymera by assault, and, to revenge the death of his grandfather, not only razed the city, but caused 3000 prisoners to be murthered on the very spot where Hamilcar had been slain.

Hannibal, after these expeditions, returned to Carthage ; but his successes having rekindled the ambition of the Carthaginians to get possession of all Sicily, they, with this view, 3 years after his return, appointed him a second time to be their General, and allotted him an army of 120,000 (some say 300,000) men. On his pleading his great age, to excuse himself from commanding in this enterprize, they gave him for his Lieutenant Imilco, son of Hanno, of the same family.

The Syracusians and their allies prepared themselves to give the enemy a warm reception.

Hannibal opened the campaign with the siege of Agrigentum. Imagining that it was impregnable except on one side, he employed his whole force on that one side. He threw up banks and terrasses as high as the walls, and made use of the rubbish and ruins of the tombs which he had found standing round the city, and which he had demolished for that purpose. The plague soon after infecting the army, swept away a great number of the soldiers, and the General himself. The Carthaginians interpreted this disaster as a punishment inflicted by the Gods for the injuries done to the dead, whose ghosts they fancied they saw stalking before them in the night. They forbore therefore to demolish any more tombs, and endeavoured to appease the Gods : a child was sacrificed to Saturn, and many victims thrown into the sea in honour of Neptune.

The besieged after eight months were so pressed by famine, that they resolved to abandon the place in the night. Men, women, and children, all but the aged and sick, retired to Gela, the nearest city to them.

Imilco entered Agrigentum, and massacred all who were found in it.

The

the other parts of the island, not yet in their obedience. They considered likewise, that the *Carthaginians*, when once

The plunder of the place was immensely rich. It had contained 200,000 inhabitants, and had never before been besieged, nor consequently plundered. An infinite number of pictures, vases, and statues of an exquisite taste were found in it, and among other curiosities the famous Bull of *Phalaris*, which was sent to *Carthage*.

Imilco having quartered his troops during the winter in *Agrigentum*, and totally ruined it, laid siege to *Gela* in the beginning of the spring. He took this place notwithstanding the succours brought to it by *Dionysius* the Tyrant, who had seized the government of *Syracuse*. A treaty, which the *Carthaginians* afterwards made with *Dionysius*, put an end to the war. The conditions of this treaty were, that *Carthage* should remain mistress of her ancient colonies, and of the territories of the *Sicanians*; that the people of *Selinus*, *Agrigentum*, and *Hymera* should be subject to her; that those of *Gela* and *Comarina* should inhabit their own dismantled cities, but be tributary to *Carthage*; that the *Leontines*, *Messenians*, and all the other *Sicilians* should enjoy their own laws and liberties, except the *Syracusans*, who were to continue subject to *Dionysius*.

These articles being ratified, the *Carthaginians* returned home, having lost one half of their army by the plague, which raging afterwards in *Africa*, multitudes perished both of the people of *Carthage*, and of their confederates.

Dionysius had concluded the late peace with the *Carthaginians* in no other view, but to get time to establish his new authority, and make the necessary preparations for a vigorous war against them. These things being accomplished, he called the *Syracusans* together, and represented to them the dangerous ambition of *Carthage*, which, he said, aimed at nothing less than the subduing of all *Sicily*, an enterprise which only the havock made in *Africa* by the plague did at present suspend; and he exhorted them to seize the favourable opportunity they had of being the aggressors.

The tyrant was no less odious than his tyranny to the people of *Syracuse*; nevertheless, the implacable hatred they bore to the *Carthaginians* made them receive his harangue with applause. *Dionysius* hereupon, without any previous complaint of treaties violated, or so much as a declaration of war, gave up to the fury of the populace the persons and possessions of the *Carthaginian* merchants, who in great numbers were then residing in *Syracuse*, and were there trading securely on the faith of treaties. These unhappy men were not only plundered of all their effects, but made to undergo the utmost ignominy and cruelties that could be devised, under pretence of retaliation for what the *Carthaginians* had formerly done to the people of *Sicily*: and this example of perfidy and inhumanity was followed in many parts of the island. The Tyrant, after this strange beginning of hostilities, sent deputies to *Carthage*, to demand the restoration of all

the

once in possession of *Messina*, might make use of it almost as a bridge to pass into *Italy*, the conquest of which

the *Sicilian* cities to their laws and liberties; and to declare that, in case of refusal, all the *Carthaginians* found in those cities should be treated as enemies.

Dionysius opened the campaign with the siege of *Motya*, the chief magazine of the *Carthaginians* in *Sicily*; and, notwithstanding all that *Imilco* could do to succour it, carried the place by assault. He put all the inhabitants to the sword, except those who took refuge in the temples; he plundered the town, and then leaving a strong garrison in it under a trusty governor, returned to *Syracuse*.

The following year *Imilco* came back to *Sicily* with a most formidable army. He landed at *Panormus*, recovered *Motya* by force of arms, and took several other cities. Animated by these successes, he marched his forces towards *Syracuse* with intention to besiege it, ordering his fleet under the conduct of *Mago* to sail thither. *Dion. Sic.* B. 14. *Justin*, B. 19.c. 2 & 3. *Mago*, 3. *Dionysius*, with two hundred ships of war, that were adorned with the enemy's spoils, was quickly seen entering the great port as in triumph, and followed by 500 barks: The *Carthaginian* land-forces consisting, according to some authors, of 300,000 foot and 3,000 horse, appeared at the same time on the other side of the city, and both together threw the *Syracusans* into the utmost consternation. *Imilco* for thirty days successively employed his troops in laying waste the neighbouring country: He afterwards possessed himself of the suburb called *Acradina*, and pillaged the temples of *Ceres* and *Proserpine*, beating down the tombs that stood round the city, to fortify his camp with the materials. But now when master of almost all the cities in the island, he expected to complete the conquest of it by the speedy reduction of *Syracuse*, a dreadful plague, which with incredible swiftness and destruction spread itself among his troops, put an end at once to all his pleasing hopes, and made the splendor of his anticipated triumph vanish in a moment.

Dionysius did not neglect so favourable an opportunity to attack the enemy. The *Carthaginian* ships were almost all either taken or burnt. The land-forces made but a feeble resistance; but night coming on, *Imilco*, during that short suspension of hostilities, sent to *Dionysius* for permission to carry back to *Carthage* the small remainder of his troops, offering him 300 talents, which was all the money he had left. This permission could not be obtained but for the *Carthaginians* only, with whom he stole away in the night leaving the *Africans* to the discretion of the enemy. However, to shew that what he had done was purely to preserve those few of his countrymen whom the plague had spared, and not from a cowardly care of his own life, he on his arrival at *Carthage* retired immediately to his house, shut the doors against the citizens, and even his own children, and killed himself.

A misfortune far greater than what the *Carthaginians* had just suffered in *Sicily* now threatened them at home: for the *Africans* resenting

which had been long their ambition. All this was well weighed by the *Romans*; and yet, as *Polybius* reports, the

ing highly that their countrymen had been left behind in that island, to be slaughtered by the *Syracusians*, flew to arms in the utmost fury, seized upon *Tunis*, and, their numbers increasing to more than 200,000 men, marched directly to invest *Carthage*. Happily for the Republic, this numerous army had no leader, no discipline, no provisions, no engines of war. Disputes and jealousies quickly broke the lawless rabble into factions, and famine soon after entirely dispersed it.

Carthage, not yet despairing of the entire conquest of *Sicily*, made a new effort with that view. A General named *Mago* had the conduct of the enterprize. He lost 15,000 men, and his own life in a battle against *Dionysius*; and those of the *Carthaginian* army, who escaped the slaughter, were constrained to sue for peace. *Dionysius* insisted on their evacuating *Sicily*, and defraying all the expences of the war.

The *Carthaginians* pretended to accept the peace on these terms; but representing that it was not in their power to deliver up the cities they possessed in *Sicily* without the express orders of their Republic, they obtained a truce, which was to last till the return of an express sent to *Carthage*. During this interval they chose the son of *Mago* to be their General. This new commander, tho' very young, yet by his great ability and conduct so improved the short time he had to manage, that at the return of the express he was in a condition to take the field, and give the enemy battle. He gained a victory over the *Syracusians*, so considerable, as to produce an honourable peace for the *Carthaginians*. By the conditions of the treaty, they not only kept all their possessions, but acquired some additional places, and had also a thousand talents from *Dionysius*.

Diod. Sic. After the death of this the elder *Dionysius*, and in the time of the younger (his son and successor) *Carthage* took part in the troubles wherein *Syracuse* was involved, endeavouring to make advantage of them for establishing there her own domination. *Timoleon* from *Cos*

Plut. in Timol. rescued the *Syracusians* from this danger, and reduced the *Carthaginians* to sue for peace, which was settled on the following terms: *about the Y. ant.* The river *Halycus* (or *Lycus*) near *Argirgentum* was to be the boundary of the *Carthaginian* territory in *Sicily*; all natives of the cities subject to the *Carthaginians* were to be allowed to withdraw, if they pleased, to *Syracuse* with their effects; and lastly, the *Carthaginians* were not to assist, or to have any correspondence with the several tyrants who at this time pretended to the lordship of that city.

Justin. B. 21. c. 4. It was probably about the same time that *Hanno*, one of the most considerable citizens of *Carthage*, formed the design (but without success) of making himself Tyrant of his country, by poisoning the whole Senate at a banquet. His stratagem being discovered, he was put to death by torture; and his children, and all his relations, were at the same time cut off without mercy, tho' they had no share in his guilt. Some

the *Conscript Fathers* could not be brought to determine for succouring *Messina*; because they judged, that the benefit

Some years after this, the *Carthaginians* were terribly alarmed for their possessions in *Sicily*, by the growing power of the formidable *About the Agathocles*. This man, who is said to have been the son of a potter, Y. ant. owed the wonderful rise of his fortune in a great measure to the Chr. 317. beauty of his person, his distinguished courage, and his enterprising *Justin*. B. genius; but chiefly to his consummate wickedness, the arts of trea- 22. chery, and the practice of the most unbounded cruelties. He was *Dio. Sic.* now absolute lord of *Syracuse*. Not content with this elevation, he B. 19. c. 1. aspired to be King of all *Sicily*, and had made so swift a progress in *Polyb.* subduing the island, that *Carthage* was obliged, in self defence, to B. 15. p. dispatch a very numerous army thither, to put a stop to his conquests. *Hamilcar* commanded it; he gave the Tyrant a total overthrow near 1003. the *Hymera*, pursued him even to *Syracuse*, and closely besieged him in that capital of his dominion.

The cruelties of *Agathocles* had made him universally detested by the *Sicilians*; he was now therefore deserted by all his allies, and he knew at the same time that his own forces were too weak to preserve the place. In these distressful circumstances he formed an enterprise worthy of the most accomplished Hero; *To make a descent upon Africa, invade the dominion of his victorious enemies, and transfer the war to the very seat of their empire*. His great foresight and judgment to discern that this design was practicable, and also the courage and prudence he displayed in the execution of it, are much admired by the historians, but cannot be enlarged upon here. Let it suffice to mention, that leaving under the command of his brother *Antander* a sufficient number of his troops to defend the city for some time, he put to sea with the remainder, without letting any body know his design, or what course he intended to steer: But, before his departure, to encourage the *Syracusians* to behave themselves with constancy during his absence, he assured them, that the siege would be but of short duration, and that he had found an infallible way to victory.

The forces which *Agathocles* took with him in this expedition amounted to about 14,000 men. Having landed these troops safely in *Africa*, he immediately called them together, opened to them his design, with the motives of it, and made them understand, that the only way to deliver their own country from its present distress was to carry the war into that of their enemies. He represented to them, that the citizens of *Carthage* were a luxurious and effeminate people, utterly unable to cope with the *Syracusians*, inured to the toils of war; that the unexampled boldness of his enterprize would alone disconcert and terrify them; that they were wholly unprepared to repel an enemy at their gates; that the *Africans*, always hating the *Carthaginians*, would infallibly join him upon the first notice of his landing; and, in a word, he promised them the whole wealth of *Carthage* as the certain reward of their courage in the present expedition. The soldiers received his harangue with applause and acclamations, and fancied

benefit which they should draw from it, would not be greater than the reproach they should suffer for so inconsistent

fancied themselves already in possession of that rich city. Taking advantage of their present sanguine temper, and the high hopes he had inspired them with, he then persuaded them to burn all their ships in honour to *Ceres* and *Proserpine*, pretending, that in the passage to *Africa* he had secretly made a vow so to do, if those deities would grant him a prosperous voyage. When by thus destroying his fleet he had brought his soldiers under a necessity of placing all their confidence in their courage, he led them on to action.

Two considerable cities he successively attacked, and carried by assault in a short time; the latter was *Tunis*, not many miles from *Carthage*. The *Carthaginians*, terribly alarmed at the swift progress of this unexpected invader, hastily armed their citizens, to the number of above 40,000, and sent them out under the command of *Hanno* and *Bomilcar*, men who had been long at variance about family-interests. A pitched battle quickly ensued; *Hanno* was slain in it, the *Carthaginians* routed, and their camp taken. It is said, that *Bomilcar* might have restored the battle after the death of *Hanno*, if for private reasons of self interest he had not chose rather to quit the field to *Agathocles*. After this victory many fortify'd places surrendered to the conqueror; and great numbers of the *Africans* revolted to him.

Dio. Sic.

B. 17.

Q. Curt.

B. 4.

Diod. Sic.

B. 20.

It was at this time that an embassy came to *Carthage* from the *Tyrians*, to implore succour against *Alexander* the Great, who besieged their city; a request which the *Carthaginians*, how willing soever, could by no means comply with in the present melancholy situation of their affairs.

The unhappy condition, to which the *Carthaginians* were reduced, they ascribed to the anger of the Gods, provoked at some neglect of duty. It had been a custom from the very infancy of *Carthage*, and was become a part of their religion, to send annually to *Tyre* (the mother-city) the tenth, or what was so called, of the public revenue, as an offering to *Hercules*, the patron and protector of both *Tyre* and *Carthage*. But from the time that this revenue grew considerable, the whole tenth was not fairly remitted: Remorse seized the *Carthaginians*; and, to expiate their guilt, they now sent to *Tyre* presents of a prodigious value.

Another custom had prevailed at *Carthage* of a most barbarous and bloody superstition, that of sacrificing great numbers of children to *Saturn*. Anciently those children were chosen out of the best families; of late the children of slaves and beggars had been substituted in the room of the nobly born, a fraudulent impiety, for the expiation of which, two hundred children of the first rank were now thrown into the fire, an offering to the God: And, as *Diodorus Siculus* reports, three hundred of the citizens voluntarily sacrificed themselves on this occasion to pacify the same Deity.

After

consistent a conduct. But the people having been greatly impoverished by the late wars, and it being represented to them by those who were to command the army, in case of an expedition into *Sicily*, how profitable

After these expiations expresses were dispatched to *Hamilcar* in *Sicily*, with the news of what misfortunes had befallen the Republic in *Africa*, and to urge him to send speedy succours to *Carthage*. *Hamilcar* commanded the deputies not once to mention the victory of *Agathocles*, but on the contrary to report, that his forces had been all cut off, and his whole fleet taken by the *Carthaginians*. The Senate of *Carthage* had sent to *Hamilcar* by the messengers all the beaks of *Agathocles*'s ships which had been burnt, that by shewing them he might the more easily gain credit to this report. The stratagem had like to have proved successful. *Hamilcar* summoned the besieged to surrender, and shewed the beaks. The ruin of *Agathocles* being generally believed in *Syracuse*, the majority of the citizens, and *Antander* himself, were disposed to capitulate. But *Eurymnon*, an *Aetolian*, whom *Agathocles* had left behind him to counsel his brother, by much persuasion prevailed with them to hold out till they had certain intelligence of the truth. A galley of thirty oars arrived soon after in the port, and brought the news of *Agathocles*'s victory, which at once restored life and resolution to the inhabitants. *Hamilcar* made a last effort to carry the city by assault, but without success. He then raised the siege, and sent 5000 men to the relief of his distressed country. Returning afterwards in hopes to surprize the city in the night, his design was discovered, his army defeated, and he himself taken prisoner. The *Syracusans* cut off his head, and sent it into *Africa*, a welcome present to *Agathocles*.

The confusion, into which all these disasters threw the *Carthaginians*, encouraged *Bomilcar* their General, to attempt the execution of a design he had long harboured in his breast; it was to make himself monarch of the *Carthaginian* state. He had gain'd over some of the citizens to his interest, and had secured a body of the foreign mercenaries to assist him. The conspiracy nevertheless proved abortive; he was overpowered, and being made prisoner, was crucified for his rebellion.

While *Bomilcar* was pursuing his wicked design against the liberties of his country, *Agathocles* was busy in a treachery of another kind. He had won over to his cause *Ophellas*, King of *Cyrene*, by pretending that he would leave him the empire of *Africa*, and that he had no view in his present expedition, but to draw the *Carthaginians* out of *Sicily*. *Ophellas* brought a considerable army to the assistance of the *Syracusans*. *Agathocles*, to get the absolute command of these troops, slew their leader by surprize, after which by fair words and large promises he engaged the *Cyrenians* to follow him.

His affairs being now in a flourishing condition, he thought it proper to leave them a while under the conduct of his son *Archagathus*,

able it would be, not only to the public in general, but to each man in particular, they passed a decree in favour

and return into *Sicily*, to take some care of his interests at home. His renown and the report of his victories flew before him. On the news of his arrival in *Sicily* many towns revolted to him; but it was not long before ill news recall'd him into *Africa*. His absence had entirely changed the face of things in that country, and all his arts and endeavours proved ineffectual to restore them to their former condition. His army had been defeated, his strong holds had surrendered to the enemy, and his troops were mutinous for want of pay. He attacked the *Carthaginians* after his landing, but was repulsed and routed, he lost 3000 men in the action. After this defeat and another disaster, by which he lost 4000 of his men, the *Africans* of his army all deserted him. Not thinking himself therefore in a condition to maintain the war any longer, he resolved to leave *Africa*; and not having ships sufficient to transport his troops into *Sicily*, he would have stole away with only a few of his friends, and his younger son *Heracles*; for he feared lest his elder son *Archagathus*, being a daring man, and having been too familiar with his step-mother, would attempt something against his life. *Archagathus* discovered his design, caused him to be arrested and put in chains. A sudden panic soon after seized the army, believing that the enemy was just ready to fall upon them. The guard, who had the King in custody, being in the same consternation with the rest, and in their fright coming out with their prisoner bound, the soldiers were so moved at this sight, that they all cried out, *Unloose him, let him go*. *Agathocles* was no sooner freed from his chains, but, consulting only his own safety, he got on board a small vessel, and set sail for *Sicily*, leaving his two sons to the fury of the enraged soldiers, who slew them both upon the first discovery of his departure. The *Syracusan* troops, tho' thus forsaken by their leader, made an honourable treaty for themselves with the *Carthaginians*, with whom also *Agathocles*, after his return into *Sicily*, concluded a peace upon equal terms, notwithstanding his late disasters and disgrace.

After the death of *Agathocles*, and when *Syracuse* was again involved in civil war, the *Carthaginians* renewed their attempt once more to subdue the whole island of *Sicily*. They possessed themselves of many cities belonging to the *Syracusans*, and invested *Syracuse* itself. This common danger obliged the contending parties in the city to unite, and call in King *Pyrrhus* to their aid. *Pyrrhus* (as was mentioned in another part of this history) by repeated victories over the *Carthaginians*, deprived them in a short time of all their possessions in *Sicily*, except the city of *Lilybaeum* only. By his own misconduct he afterwards lost all the fruit of his successes, being abandoned by his *Sicilian* allies, and obliged to quit the island to preserve himself and his *Epirots* from total destruction. The *Carthaginians*, who before his departure had brought a mighty army into *Sicily*, not only recover'd

vour of the enterprize ; and *Appius Claudius*, ^b one of Y. of R. the Consuls, was ordered to conduct an army into *Sicily* ⁴⁸⁹.
to the relief of *Messina*. ^{Bef. J. C. 263.}

Appius, ^b His col-
league was

recover'd all their ancient possessions, but endeavour'd to enlarge *Fulv. Flaccus.*
their dominion by new conquests. *Hiero* being chosen to the government of *Syracuse*, opposed the progress of their arms, till the affair of *Messina* uniting the two powers in one enterprize, drew the *Romans* into *Sicily*, and gave commencement to the first PUNIC WAR.

The Form of the CARTHAGINIAN GOVERNMENT.

The government of *Carthage*, like that of *Rome*, was composed of three different authorities, which balanced each other ; the authority of the two supreme magistrates, call'd *Suffetes* (from the Phœnician word *Sopherim*, which signifies *Judges*) that of the Senate, and that of the Assembly of the People : To these was afterwards added the *Council of the Hundred*.

The SUFFETES.

The *Suffetes* were annual magistrates, and their authority much the same with that of the Consuls at *Rome*. By the ancient writers they are frequently styled Kings, Dictators, Consuls. History does not inform us of the manner of their election. Their office was to convene the Senate, to preside there, propose the matters for débat, and collect the voices. They also sat as chief Justices in private causes of importance : Nor was their authority confin'd to civil affairs, they sometimes commanded the armies.

The SENATE.

The number of which the Senate of *Carthage* consisted is not known ; it must certainly have been very considerable, seeing an hundred persons were selected from it to form a separate council. In the Senate all public affairs were debated, the letters from Generals read, the complaints from the Provinces heard, Ambassadors admitted to audience, Peace and War determined. When the Senators were unanimous, there lay no appeal from their decision ; but whenever they were divided in opinion, the affair devolved to the People ; a regulation which seems well contriv'd to prevent divisions, and a factious opposition to reasonable counsels ; for it was not to be supposed, that any member of an assembly, which had the prerogative of judging decisively in affairs, would willingly suffer them to be carried before another tribunal.

The PEOPLE.

It appears from *Aristot. Elogium* on the Government of *Carthage*, *Aristot. B.* that, so low as to his time, the People spontaneously left the chief administration of public affairs to the Senate. *And Polybius* remarks, *2. de Rep. c. 11.* that, while the Senate govern'd, the *Carthaginians* were successful in all their enterprizes. But at length riches and extensive conquests made the people insolent ; and then forgetting that they owed their

Appius, to learn the posture of the enemy and the true state of things in that place, is reported ^b to have ventur'd

prosperity to the wise conduct of that venerable body, they not only interfered in the government of the State, but arrogated to themselves almost the whole power. From that period the public affairs were transacted wholly by cabals and factions; and *Polybius* assigns this as one of the chief causes of their ruin.

The TRIBUNAL of the HUNDRED.

R of Car- This Council was composed of 104 persons, tho' for brevity sake
thage 487. they are called *the Hundred*, and was instituted to be a check upon the *Carthaginian* Generals, who had used before to exercise an absolute and uncontrollable power when at the head of armies in the field; they now became accountable to these judges for their actions, on their return from the campaign.

Of these 104 judges, five had a particular jurisdiction superior to that of the rest, and were like the Council of *Ten* in the *Venetian* Senate. A vacancy in their body could be filled by none but themselves. They had also the power of choosing those who composed the Council of *The Hundred*.

^b *Primū ad explorandos hostes fretum piscatoria navi trajecit [Appius Claudius Caudex] & cum duce Carthaginensium egit, ut praesidium arce deduceret. Rhegium regressus, &c. Aurel. Viā. ch. 37.*

That the Consul in person went over privately to *Messina*, seems to be supported by the words of *Polybius*, who speaks of the *Mamertines* sending for *Appius*, and surrendering their city to him, as of a transaction previous to the passage of the *Roman* army to *Messina*. But, according to this author, they had either by art or force rid themselves of the *Carthaginian* officer, before they call'd over *Appius*. *Polyb. I. 1. c. 11.*

If we may believe *Zonaras*, the person who went over privately to *Messina* to learn the state of affairs in that city, was not *Appius Claudius* the Consul, but one *Claudius* a Legionary Tribune, whom the Consul dispatched on that commission.

Zonaras differs in some particulars from *Polybius* concerning the origin of the first *Punic War*, and has many circumstances which are not mentioned by any writer but himself. He tells us, that the two Republics were mutually jealous of each other; each thought its own safety depended on subduing its rival. This was the true cause of the war. Thus far he agrees with other writers. But he adds, that the *Romans* assign'd, for their motive to the war, some assistance which the *Carthaginians* had formerly given the *Tarentines* against *Rome*. The *Carthaginians* on the other hand alledged as their ground of quarrel, that the *Romans* had made a friendship with *Hiero* when he was at war with *Carthage*.

As to the affair of *Messina*, his relation is, in substance, as follows. The *Mamertines*, being besieged by King *Hiero*, ask succour from the

ventur'd over thither in a fisher-boat, and to have so happily conducted himself there, as by some means to make

the *Romans*. The *Romans* knowing that, if this request should be refus'd, they would give themselves to the *Carthaginians*, who might then be able to pass into *Italy*, readily promise to send the succour desired. This promise however not being speedily perform'd, and the *Mamertines* being straitly pressed by the enemy, they apply for aid to the *Carthaginians*, who thereupon make peace with *Hiero*, both for themselves and for the *Mamertines*, as the most effectual means to hinder the *Romans* from coming into *Sicily*; and under a leader named *Hanno* they take upon them the guard of the city and of the straits. In the mean while *Claudius*, a Legionary Tribune, whom the Consul had sent before him with a few ships, comes to *Rhegium*; but finding that the enemy has a much stronger fleet at sea, and therefore not daring to attempt the passage with his ships, he steals over privately in a small boat to *Messina*, and has a conference with the *Mamertines*; but through the opposition of the *Carthaginians* is obliged to return without effecting any thing. Afterwards, when he hears that the *Mamertines* are in some commotion (for tho' they would not consent to be subject to *Rome*, they were weary of the *Carthaginians*,) he goes over again, and promises that the *Romans*, if admitted into the place, shall return home as soon as they have restored *Messina* to a state of security. He then bids the *Carthaginians* quit the place, or give a good reason for staying. The *Mamertines* are silent through fear; the *Carthaginians* make him no answer, because they hold the city by force, and despise him. *The silence of both, cries Claudius, shews that the Carthaginians act unjustly, and that the Mamertines desire liberty; for if these carea for the Carthaginians, they would promise to stand by them.* The *Mamertines* applaud his words. He then returns to *Rhegium*, and endeavours to pass from thence to *Messina* with his fleet. In this attempt he loses some of his ships by stormy weather, others are taken by the *Carthaginians*, so that he is forced to return once more to *Rhegium*. The *Carthaginian* Admiral coming on the coast of *Italy* offers to restore the ships he had taken, but at the same time declares, that the Straights belong to the *Carthaginians*, and that he will not suffer the *Romans* even to wash their hands in them. *Claudius* hearing this, rejects the offer with indignation, repairs his fleet, and seizing a favourable opportunity, passes safely with his troops to *Messina*. *Hanno* was now retired into the citadel; he had quitted the city thro' a distrust of the inhabitants. *Claudius* persuades the *Mamertines* to invite *Hanno* to an amicable conference. The *Carthaginian*, tho' with great reluctance, comes to the assembly, left the *Mamertines*, who already complained of his injustices, should begin hostilities against him. After much altercation between him and *Claudius*, he is seized by a *Roman* officer, and carried to prison, the *Mamertines* approving of the action. Thus *Hanno* is reduced to the necessity of entirely abandoning *Messina*. The ¹⁴ *Carth*

make the *Carthaginian* officer and his soldiers evacuate the citadel; after which the Consul return'd to *Italy* to prepare for the embarkation of his troops.

Carthaginians punish him for his ill conduct, and send a herald to signify to the *Romans* to quit *Messina* and all *Sicily* by a certain day; which demand not being complied with, they in the first fury of their resentment murder all the *Italian* mercenaries in their service; and then, assisted by King *Hiero*, lay siege to *Messina*.

Such is the account given us by *Zonaras*, of what pass'd in relation to *Messina* before the Consul went thither. But I do not find the least mention of the voyages or management of the Tribune *Claudius* in any other author. Only that the *Romans* sent some troops to *Messina*, as *Zonaras* relates, before *Appius* went thither with the main army, is supported by a fragment of *Diodorus Siculus*, who speaks of an agreement between *Hiero* and the *Carthaginians* to make war upon the *Romans*, unless they would immediately withdraw all their forces out of *Sicily*; and this is previous to the arrival of the Consul with the Legions.

C H A P. II. First, second, and third Years of the War.

The Consul Appius Claudius Caudex transports an army into Sicily to the relief of Messina, besieged by the Carthaginians and Syracusians. He forces them to raise the siege. His successors make peace and an alliance with Hiero, King of Syracuse. The next year's Consuls, assisted by Hiero, take Agrigentum from the Carthaginians.

Polyb. B.
I. c. II.

THE people of *Carthage*, upon the news of their officer's having quitted the citadel of *Messina*, were so highly offended, that they condemn'd him to be crucified, as both a traitor and a coward. They order'd at the same time a fleet and a land-army to besiege the place. *Hiero*, the new King of *Syracuse*, having now a fair prospect of exterminating the usurpers of *Messina*, enter'd into a league with the *Carthaginians*, and join'd his forces to theirs: so that the *Martines* were entirely closed up within their city, the *Carthaginians* lying with a navy at sea, and with an army

my on one side of the place, while the *Syracusians* lay before it on the other.

In this their great danger came *Appius Claudius* the Roman Consul to *Rhegium* with an army appointed for their relief: but how to pass from thence to *Messina* was a difficulty that seemed insurmountable. Not that he wanted transports; for he had borrowed from the *Tarentines*, *Neapolitans*, and other neighbours, a sufficient number of *triremes* and boats of fifty oars, wherein to waft over his men: but the *Carthaginian* fleet was in the way, and was by much superior in strength to that of the Consul. He was obliged therefore to have recourse to stratagem. He pretended to give the enterprize entirely over as a thing impracticable, and, the better to deceive the enemy, steered his course towards *Rome*. This motion made the *Carthaginians* watch the *Straights* less narrowly; and then the Consul tacking about on a sudden, and being favoured by a dark night, passed to *Messina* without opposition^a.

Frontin. de
Strat. B. 1.
ch. 4.

His

^a *Polybius* (from whom this account of the origin of the first *Punic* War is chiefly taken) tho' he does not directly charge the *Romans* with injustice in their beginning this war, yet declares (L. 1. c. 10.) that it would be difficult to justify them. Sir *Walter Raleigh* is clearly of opinion, that the *Romans* in this enterprize were unjust. His words are these.

" Now in this place I hold it seasonable to consider of those grounds where upon the *Romans* entred into this [the first *Punic*] war; not how profitable they were, nor how agreeable to rules of honesty (for questionless the enterprize was much to their benefit, tho' as much to their shame) but how allowable in strict terms of lawfulness, whereupon they built all their allegations in maintenance thereof. That the *Mamertines* did yield themselves, and all that they had into the *Romans* hands (as the *Campanes*, distressed by the *Samnites*, had done) I cannot find; neither can I find how the messengers of those folk, whereof one part had already admitted the *Carthaginians*, could be enabled to make any such surrendry in the public name of all. If therefore the *Mamertines*, by no lawful surrendry of themselves and their possessions, were become subject to *Rome*, by what better title could the *Romans* afflict the *Mamertines* against their most ancient friends the *Carthaginians*, than they might have aided the *Campanes* against the *Samnites*, without the same condition?

His arrival, however, did not discourage the besiegers; for they far exceeded him in number of men, and

" which was (as they themselves confessed) by none at all. But let
 " it be supposed, that some point serving to clear this doubt is lost in
 " all histories, doubtless it is, that no company of pirates, thieves, out-
 " laws, murderers, or such other malefactors, can by any good success of
 " their villainy, obtain the privilege of civil societies, to make league or
 " truce, yea to require fair war, but are by all means, as most perni-
 " cious vermine, to be rooted out of the world. I will not take upon
 " me to maintain that opinion of some Civilians, that a Prince is not
 " bound to hold his faith with one of these; it were a position of ill
 " consequence. This I hold that no one Prince or State can give protection
 " to such as these, as long as any other is using the sword of vengeance a-
 " gainst them, without becoming accessory to their crimes. Wherefore we
 " may esteem this action of the Romans so far from being justifiable by
 " any pretence of confederacy made with them, as that contrariwise,
 " by admitting this nest of murderers and thieves into their protec-
 " tion, they justly deserved to be warred upon themselves by the
 " people of Sicily, yea altho' Messina had been taken, and the Mamertines
 " all slain, ere any news of the confederacy had been brought
 " unto the besiegers."

To this reasoning of our learned countryman I take leave to answer:

WHETHER the messengers, who went to Rome from Messina from one part only of the Mamertines, could be enabled to treat in the name of all, or whether the Mamertines made such an absolute surrendry of their possessions to the Romans, as the people of Capua had formerly done, seems not material to the present purpose. Neither the Romans nor the Carthaginians could acquire any right to Messina in virtue of any such surrendry, whether made by a part or by the whole body of the Mamertines, these having themselves no right to the town, if they are to be consider'd as a nest of pirates, murderers, and outlaws, which is the light in which Sir Walter considers them.

In the next place, tho' it be granted, that no one Prince or State can give protection to pirates, thieves, and murderers, as long as any other is using the sword of vengeance against them, without becoming accessory to their crimes; I say, tho' this be granted, it will not affect the present question. For that the Romans did not grant their protection to the Mamertines, in the circumstance above described, is evident from what our author himself relates. He tells us that the Carthaginians (and they were the principals in the present war, Hiero was only an auxiliary) upon the news of their officer's being driven out of the citadel of Messina, sent a fleet and an army to besiege the place, as a town that had rebelled, having once been theirs. These preparations were to punish rebellious subjects, not to punish the Mamertines as pirates and murderers, nor for the injuries they had done to the lawful proprietors of Messina. It would indeed have been

and the whole island was ready to relieve them in their wants; and they were strong enough at sea to hinder any

been shameless in the *Carthaginians* to pretend the latter, after they had made a league with the usurpers, treated them as a civil society, and consented to protect them against King *Hiero*.

From the whole then it would seem, that our author has not assign'd sufficient reasons for passing so rigorous a sentence of condemnation against the *Romans*.

CHEVALIER FOLARD, who in his Comment upon *Polybius* entirely differs in opinion from Sir *Walter*, makes very short work with the present question. B. 1. ch. 1. §. 3.

A necessary war (says he) is always just. A war without which the rights and liberties of a people must be greatly endanger'd, is a necessary war: This was the case of the *Romans* at the present juncture; and he cannot therefore believe, that the Senate of *Rome* were really so scrupulous as *Polybius* represents them to be, about accepting the offer made them by the *Mamertines*.

Nay the Chevalier declares, that not only the consideration of a present danger to our liberties, but even the prospect of a distant one, an allowable motive to begin a precautionary war; and that the too great power of any Prince will justify the neighbouring powers in making war upon him; because Liberty is a thing, which by both divine and human laws we are allowed to have so tender a concern for, that the apprehension of being deprived of it justifies whatever we do for its preservation.

As I shall not contend with the force of this argument, so neither can I think it necessary to have recourse to it to justify the *Romans* in the present war.

If the *Mamertines* are to be considered as a civil society, the *Romans* acted nothing contrary to justice in making an alliance with them, or in succouring them when in that alliance. *Rome* (if we may believe *Polybius*) had made no treaty with the *Carthaginians*, or with *Hiero*, whereby she was bound not to concern herself in the affairs of *Sicily*. Polyb. B. 3. c. 26.

If the *Mamertines* are not to be consider'd as a civil society, but as a gang of robbers and pirates, *Messina* would then belong to the first civil society that should get possession of it; and the *Romans* having acquired the right of first possession, the *Carthaginians* must be consider'd as the aggressors; for I presume, that the latter cannot be deem'd to have acquired the right of first possession even of the citadel, by the bare admission of their officer with a few men into it, since they did not enter the citadel as taking possession of it for themselves, but to guard it for the usurpers against King *Hiero*.

As to the conduct of the *Romans* in protecting the *Mamertines*, who had been guilty of the same crimes for which the Senate had punished the *Campanian Legion*, it must undoubtedly at first, as *Polybius* observes, have a strange appearance; but certainly, when by sparing the

Polyb. B. I. c. II. any supplies from getting into the town. All this *Appius* well understood; and therefore apprehending both danger and dishonour in the enterprize, he dispatch'd ambassadors to the *Carthaginians* and *Hiero*, to treat of an accommodation, and obtain peace for the *Mamertines*. The answer ^b from King *Hiero* was, that the *Mamertines* for their cruelty and wickedness in getting the possession of *Messina*, and for diverse other barbarities committed in *Sicily*, were most justly besieged; and that it did not become the *Romans*, so famed for their justice and faithfulness, to protect such bloody villains, who had contemptuously broken all the ties of faith and truth among men; that if the *Romans* began a war in defence of such wicked invaders, it would be evident to all the world, that *succour to the distressed* was but a pretence to cloke their covetousness, when in truth their aim was to gain *Sicily*.

Polyb. B. I. c. II. The Consul finding his negotiation fruitless, and that he was under a necessity of fighting, took at length the bold resolution to sally out into the field, and make the enemy know, that his coming to *Messina* was to drive them from the town, and not to be by them besieged within it.

In executing this determination it was very advantageous for him, that the confederate armies lay encamped in such a manner, as not to be well able to assist one another in distress. *Appius* sallied out first against *Hiero*, and drawing up the Legions in order, presented him Sir W. Ra- battle. This brave Prince (says a learned writer, well leigh. skill'd in military affairs) must certainly have wanted good advice on the present occasion; otherwise he would not have hazarded all his power against an enemy, of whom he had made no trial, when it had been easy for the most notorious offenders a national good is to be obtained, much greater than could accrue from punishing such offenders, there is no doubt but the arm of vengeance may wisely and lawfully be stay'd. And this appears plainly to have been the motive on which the *Romans* acted in the case now before us, even according to *Polybius's* relation of the matter.

^b According to *Diodorus Siculus*, the Consul's embassy was sent from *Rhegium* before he pass'd the *Straights*.

him,

him, and as much as was requisite, to defend his own camp. With great readiness and gallantry he accepted the challenge, and met the enemy ; but after a long and bloody conflict, the *Syracusians* were defeated, and driven to save themselves within their intrenchments. The *Romans* return'd triumphantly with the spoils of the dead into *Messina*.

The King, by this disaster, learnt a point of wisdom very useful both to him and his kingdom during the remainder of his life. Had *Messina* been taken by the *Carthaginians*, *Syracuse* itself must have sought help from *Rome* against those friends whom it now so diligently assisted. *Hiero* had (in respect of those two mighty States) but a small stock, which it behoved him to manage frugally ; such another loss would have almost ruin'd him. He therefore quietly broke up his *Polyb. B. 1.* camp in the night, and retired home ; intending to c. 11. leave those to try the fortune of the war, who had hopes to be gainers by the event of it^c.

Appius receiving intelligence of the King's retreat, c. 12. and finding the courage of his men greatly raised by their success in the late action, resolved to attack the *Carthaginians* without loss of time. Having caus'd the soldiers to take their repast at a very early hour, he fallied out by break of day, surprized the enemy, and routed them with great slaughter ; those who escaped flying for refuge to the neighbouring towns. The *Romans* after this action made inroads upon the country as far as to the territory of the *Syracusians*, and at length set down before *Syracuse*. It does not appear, however, that the Consul made any progress in the siege : re-

^c *Diod. Siculus* writes, that when the Consul landed at *Messina*, *Hiero*, suspecting that the *Carthaginians* had made way for him, fled himself to *Syracuse*.

Florus says, that *Hiero* confess'd he was conquer'd before he saw the enemy.

Zonaras, B. 8. makes *Appius* to land with his forces, not at *Messina*, but some place near it, and to attack the *Syracusians* before he enter'd that town.

mitting the conduct of this enterprize to his successors, he returned to *Rome*^d.

Polyb. B. 1. c. 16. §. II. THE *Romans* being animated by the victories of *Appius* to pursue the war with more than ordinary

^d According to *Eutropius*, B. 2. and *Silius Italicus*, B. 6. *Appius Claudius* had a triumph for his victories; but the *Capitoline Marbles* say nothing of it

He acquired his surname of *Caudex*, if we may believe *Seneca*, (*de Brev. Vit.*) from his having transported the *Roman* army from *Italy* to *Sicily* in small boats, which the antients call'd *Caudices*.

Mr. *Vertot*, perhaps on no other authority, says, that this General was the first who by the means of some Rafts transported troops into *Sicily*, which got him the surname of *Caudex*, as having found the art of fastening planks together, so as to make transports of them.

Chevalier *Folard* rallies the Abbot on this passage of his history, and wants to know his voucher. Doubtless the Chevalier had good reason to dispute the fact. It would have been madness for the Consul to have attempted to waft an army cross those straits on such transports; neither had he any occasion to have recourse to that dangerous expedient, all the ships in the ports of *Italy* being at his disposal; and *Polybius* expressly tells us, that *Appius* embark'd his men on vessels of fifty oars, and on *triремes* borrow'd of the *Tarentines*, *Locrians*, &c. This relation of *Polybius* is decisive also against *Seneca*.

The Chevalier will have it, that *Appius*'s surname of *Caudex* was on account of a dull, stupid air, the word *Codex* signifying a block-head.

Father *Catrou*, in the large *Roman History*, speaking of *Appius*'s surname, keeps clear of Mr. *Vertot*'s Rafts and *Seneca*'s little Boats; but then he wants a reason for *Claudius*'s surname of *Caudex*. He says, that when *Appius* undertook to cross the *Straights* with his fleet, he went himself on board a sorry galley, hastily and clumsily built (une mauvaise galere tumultuairement construite & sans art.) This enterprize happily executed, the *Romans* thought it so fine an exploit, that they gave the Consul the surname of *Caudex*, which word, adds the Father, signified then un mauvais batteau fait de planches mal arrangées & précipitamment réunies.

But what reason in the world can be imagined why *Appius* should make choice of such a transport, wherein to convey his own person to *Sicily*, when he might have chosen the best *Triremis* in the fleet? I cannot find, that the Reverend Father has any authority for this fact.

If *Appius* did really acquire the surname in question, from the bad built and fashion of any vessel in which he cross'd the *Straights*, I should conjecture it was from that fisher-boat (which might be a *Caudex*) wherein, as *Aurelius Victor* reports, he courageously ventured over to *Messina*, to learn the state of things there before he transported his army thither.

vigour,

vigour, it was decreed, that the Consuls for the new Y. of R. year, *Manius Valerius* and *Manius Otacilius*, should both go into *Sicily*, and should take with them four Legions, each consisting of 4000 foot and 300 horse. Upon the arrival of these forces in *Sicily*, most of the fulship. towns and castles, that had submitted to the *Carthaginians* and *Syracusians*, gave themselves up to the *Romans*; insomuch that the King of *Syracuse* found it high time for him to endeavour after a peace with an enemy so formidable, and that came now to besiege him in his capital. He perceived, says *Polybius*, that the designs and hopes of the *Romans* were better founded than those of the *Carthaginians*, and in conclusion therefore sent ambassadors to the Consuls to treat of peace and an alliance with *Rome*. *Valerius* and *Otacilius* readily embraced the overture, and the more readily, on account of the difficulties they were under with regard to their convoys. The *Roman* troops had the last year been driven to great straits, and there was good reason to apprehend lest the *Carthaginians*, who were masters of the sea, should be able totally to debar them of all supplies of provision. The Consuls nevertheless made the King purchase the alliance which he sought, with an hundred talents of silver.

Diodorus Siculus reports, that *Hannibal* the *Carthaginian* General was by this time come with a fleet to *Xiphonia* (not far from *Syracuse*) to the assistance of the King, but that hearing of what was done, he instantly retired.

Hiero

We find by the *Capitoline Marbles*, that a Dictator was created this year at *Rome* to drive the Nail, probably on account of some prodigies, or to stop the plague; from the same Marbles we learn also, that *Valerius* at his return to *Rome* was decreed a triumph, and that he acquired the surname of *Messala*; which * *Seneca* and † *Macrobius* tell us was given him for the conquest of *Messina*, (then call'd *Messana*.) It is hard to reconcile this with *Polybius*'s account, unless we suppose that the enemy got possession of that place after the return of *Appius Claudius* into *Italy*. The *Jesuits* believe rather, that *Valerius* perform'd some notable exploit in the defence of *Messina*, while *Otacilius* was other ways employ'd, and that this occasioned the distinction

* *De Brev. Vit.*
† *Saturn.*
B. I.

Hiero after this treaty continued ever a firm and useful friend to the *Romans*; and being a Prince who not only made the prosperity of his subjects his chief aim, but always pursued that aim by measures honest and noble, he enjoy'd a long and happy reign, dear to his people, belov'd of his allies, and universally esteem'd by all the *Greek* nations.

§. III. THE treaty with the *Syracusan* King being ratify'd by an ordinance of the *Roman* People, it was now thought adviseable to abate of the number of troops in the service, and to send into *Sicily* under the command of the new Consuls (*L. Posthumius Megellus* and *Q. Mamilius Vitulus*) only two Legions; which, through *Hiero's* friendship, they trusted, would live in plenty of all things necessary.

As for the people of *Carthage*, when they learnt that *Hiero* of a friend was become an enemy, and when they consider'd that the *Romans* were now superior to them in strength, they turn'd their thoughts to provide a force that might be sufficient to preserve those acquisitions which they still possess'd in the island. To this end they hired a great number of troops in *Gaul* and in *Liguria*, but principally in *Spain*; and having resolved to make *Agrigentum* + (a strong place, distant about eighteen furlongs from the sea, on the south coast of *Sicily*,) the rendezvous of their armies, and their chief magazine, they transported the mercenaries to that city.

+ Called also *Agrag-*
gas, now
Gergentii.

The Consuls *Posthumius* and *Mamilius* were now arrived in *Sicily* with the Legions, and having got intelligence of the designs of the *Carthaginians*, and of the preparations they were making in *Agrigentum*, came to

stinction with which he was afterwards honour'd above his colleague. *Pliny* authorizes this conjecture, when he tells us (B. 35. cb. 4.) that *Valerius* brought with him from *Sicily* a picture representing the battle wherein he had vanquish'd *Hiero* and the *Carthaginians* before *Messina*. He fixed it up in the old palace of King *Tullus Hostilius*, where the Senate used to assemble. The same author reports also (B. 7. cb. ult.) that *Valerius* brought with him from *Sicily* another novelty, an horizontal sun-dial, and that he placed it on a pedestal in the *Comitium* near the *Roftra*.

a reso-

a resolution to march directly with their forces towards Y. of R. that place, and invest it. They pitch'd their camp ^{491.} _{Bef. J. C.} about a mile from the town, and totally block'd it up. ²⁶¹

It happening to be the time of harvest, the *Roman* ¹⁹⁰ Con-soldiers, who foresaw that the siege would be a long ^{fulship.} one, dispers'd themselves abroad to forage; and this they did in so unguarded a manner, that it tempted the besieged one day to sally out upon them. The *Carthaginians* not only fell upon the reapers in the fields, but made a furious attack upon the *Roman* ad-vanced guards, not without hopes to force the very camp. And here (says *Polybius*) the *Romans*, as on many other occasions, owed their preservation to that discipline in which they excell'd all nations; for being accustom'd to see those punish'd with death who de-serted their post, or fled in battle, they diligently ral-lied, and bravely sustain'd the shock of the enemy, tho' superior in number. And tho' many of the *Romans* fell, the loss was much greater on the enemy's side, who being at length surrounded when they had almost forced the *Roman* entrenchment, were with great slaughter driven back to their works. After this action the *Romans* became more wary in their foraging, and the *Carthaginians* less forward to make sallies. The Consuls however, the better to secure themselves, cut a deep trench between the walls of the city and their camp, and another on the side towards the coun-try, to prevent any surprize that way; which double fortification also hindered the besieged from receiving any supplies whatsoever. At the same time provisions and all necessaries were brought to the besiegers by their *Sicilian* allies to *Erbus*; and from that town, which lay not far from their camp, their convoys pass'd without impediment.

Affairs continued five months in this posture, neither party gaining upon the other any considerable advan-tage, their engagements being for the most part only in flight skirmishes. The besiegers received daily rein-forcements from the *Sicilians*, and, in all, amounted to above 100,000 men. In the mean time the city being ^{Diod. Sic.} _{in Eclog. p. 875.} ^{Polyb. B. 1.} _{c. 18.} stuffed

Y. of R. stuffed with a garrison of 50,000 soldiers began to be
 491. much straitned for provisions, *Hannibal*, who command-
 Bef. J. C. ed there in chief, dispatched frequent advices to *Car-
 261. tagine*, representing the extremities to which they were
 190 Con- fulship. reduced, and demanding speedy succour. The *Car-
 taginians* therefore embarking on board their fleet
 what soldiers and elephants they could readily muster,
 sent them into *Sicily* to *Hanno*, their other General in
 that country. *Hanno* having assembled all his forces
 at *Heraclea*, a maritime town a little to the west of
Agrigentum, march'd directly to *Erbesus*, where he had
 a secret correspondence, and which was put into his
 hands by treachery. By this loss the *Romans* not only
 were deprived of their wonted supplies, but became
 themselves almost as closely besieged by *Hanno*, as *Agri-
 gentum* was by their troops; and they must unavoidably
 have quitted their enterprize, if King *Hiero* had not re-
 liev'd them in their distress. He found means to con-
 vey provisions to their camp, tho' not in great quantity,
 nor sufficient to prevent those distempers among the sol-
 diers, which are the usual consequences of scarcity.

Polyb. B. I. c. 19. *Hanno* having intelligence of the bad condition of the
Roman army, that the soldiers were enfeebled by want,
 and their number diminish'd by diseases, believ'd he
 might now be able to cope with them. He march'd
 with fifty elephants, and all the rest of his forces from
Heraclea (whither he had return'd after the affair of
Erbesus) sending his *Numidian* horse before, with or-
 ders to approach to the enemy's camp, and endeavour
 to draw the *Roman* cavalry to a battle, in which they
 were to retreat till they join'd the main body. The
Numidians punctually perform'd their instructions. They
 march'd up to the entrenchment of the enemy, and
 being attack'd by the *Roman* horse, retired before them
 till they join'd *Hanno* with the army, which almost en-
 compassing the *Romans*, slew many of them, and drove
 the rest back to their camp. After this exploit the
Carthaginian made no other attempt for two months,
 but lay strongly encamp'd on an eminence about ten
 furlongs

furlongs from the *Romans*, waiting for some opportunity to fight with advantage. Y. of R.

In the mean time *Agrigentum* was reduced to the utmost extremity by famine. *Hannibal* gave notice to ^{491.} ^{Bef. J. C.} ^{261.} *Con-*

Hanno, as well by signals from the town, as by frequent expresses, that the garrison were no longer able to sustain the wants they labour'd under, and that many of the soldiers were compelled by hunger to desert. This brought *Hanno* to resolve upon a decisive action, to which the *Romans* were no less disposed, on account of their inconvenient situation. The two armies therefore drawing out, came to an engagement on the ground between their camps. The success was long doubtful ; but *Hanno*'s elephants being at length disorder'd by his own van-guard, which the *Romans* had broke and put to flight, those unruly beasts threw his whole army into confusion. The *Carthaginians* suffer'd a great slaughter ; some few got into *Heraclea*, but the *Romans* took most of the elephants, and all the enemy's baggage.

And now *Hannibal* turn'd all his thoughts to make his escape from *Agrigentum*, which he despair'd of holding any longer ; and perceiving that the *Romans* after their victory, wearied with labour, and grown secure by their good fortune, kept negligent watch, he rush'd out of the place at midnight with all his foreign troops, and filling the *Roman* trenches with faggots, pass'd over their works unhurt and unperceiv'd. The *Romans* saw not their error till the morning, when they contented themselves with a short pursuit, and presently return'd to take possession of the town ; which they enter'd without resistance, unmercifully despoiling the inhabitants both of their riches and of their liberty.

C H A P. III. The fourth and fifth Years of the War.

The Romans, to accomplish their designs upon Sicily, find it necessary to provide themselves with a naval force. They build a considerable fleet, and by the help of a new-invented engine for grappling and boarding the enemy's ships,

ships, gain a memorable victory over the Carthaginians at sea near Milæ, (now Milazzo.)

*Polyb. B.
I. c. 20.*

*Y. of R.
492.
Bef. J. C.
260.
191 Con-
sulship.*

GREAT joy there was at *Rome* on the news of the taking of *Agrigentum*, and every body's courage and hopes were raised. They now thought it not enough to have rescued *Messina*, and enriched themselves by the war; they proposed nothing less than the entire expulsion of the *Carthaginians* out of *Sicily*; nay, and this was to be done the very next year by *L. Valerius* and *T. Otacilius*, their newly elected Consuls. However, they soon became sensible, that the task was too difficult to be accomplish'd in so short a time. For tho' a great number of the inland towns of *Sicily* had, after the reduction of *Agrigentum*, readily submitted to the *Romans*, who were evidently superior to their enemies by land; yet many places situate on the coast, had revolted from them through fear of the *Carthaginian* strength by sea. And indeed this advantage on the side of *Carthage* made the success of the war still doubtful; which being well consider'd by the *Romans*, as also that the coast of *Italy* lay exposed to the depredations of the *Carthaginians*, who made frequent descents upon it, whilst *Africa* felt none of the calamities of war, they at length resolved to apply themselves diligently to maritime affairs, and even, at their first essay, to make provision of such a fleet, as should be able to contend with the naval power of *Carthage*.

Polybius, in speaking on this subject, cannot forbear to expres his admiration of the magnanimity of the *Romans*, so void of fear in enterprizes of the greatest hazard and moment; and it is in truth an astonishing instance of the resolute bravery of this people, that being hitherto extremely ignorant in all the arts relating to navigation, they should now at once determine upon a naval battle with the *Carthaginians*, who had held uncontested, from time immemorial, the dominion of the sea.

The same author tells us, that the *Romans* were not
at

at this time masters^f of one single galley, no not even of a bark, and were so little skill'd in ship-building, that if fortune had not favour'd them, it would have been almost impossible for them to put their design in execution. A *Carthaginian* galley cruizing on the coast of *Italy*, and venturing too near the shore, happen'd to be stranded; the *Romans* seized her before the crew could get her off, and, by the model of this galley, their first fleet, which consisted of 100^g *quinqueremes* and 20 *triremes*, was built.

While these vessels were upon the stocks, the men c. 21. 3 appointed to be the rowers were taught the use of the oar in the following manner. Seats were raised on the sea-shore in the same fashion and order as they were to be in the galleys, and the mariners being placed thereon, an officer who stood in the midst of them instructed them, by signs with his hand, how at once

^f Doubtless *Polybius* goes too far, when he affirms that the *Romans* had no ships before the first *Punic* war; the ancient treaties between *Rome* and *Carthage*, which he himself presents us with, evince the contrary; nay, it appears by the former part of this history, that they had ten *ships of war* at the time of the rupture with the *Tarentines*. And as to what he says of the loss the *Romans* would have been at to build a fleet, if they had not seized a *Carthaginian* vessel, which chanced to be stranded, his meaning, to be consistent with himself, must be, either that without this accident they would have had no good model whereby to build any ship of war, or would have had no model at all of a *quinqueremis*. For he tells us in the very same part of his history, that some of the vessels in which they transported their troops the first time to *Messina* were *triremes* (and these were ships of war) borrow'd from their neighbours the *Tarentines*, &c.

^g Of the ancient ships of war the most considerable were the *naves longæ* (long ships, or galleys) so named from their form, which was the most convenient to wield round or cut their way; whereas the ships of burden were generally built rounder and more hollow, that they might be more easy to load, and might hold the more goods. The most remarkable of the *naves longæ* were the *triremis*, the *quadriremis*, and the *quinqueremis*, exceeding one another by one bank of oars, which banks were raised sloping one above another. Some indeed fancy a different original of these names, as that in the *triremis*, for example, either there were three banks one after the other on a level, or that three rowers tugg'd all together at one oar; but this is contrary not only to the authority of the classicks, but to the figures of the *triremes* still appearing in ancient monuments. *Kennet's Antiq. part 2. b. 4. ch. 20.*

and all together to dip their oars, and in like manner to recover them out of the water. They afterwards spent some time in practising upon the water what they had been learning at land, adventuring first along the coast of Italy.

Y. of R. Before the finishing ^b of this naval armament, the
 493. Consular *Fasces* were transferred to *Cn. Cornelius Afina*
 Bef. J. C. and *C. Duilius*. It fell to *Cornelius* to be the *Roman*
 259. 192 Con- Admiral. Leaving orders with the pilots to make the
 fulship. best of their way to the *Straights* so soon as all the new
 vessels should be equipped, he with only 17 of them
 repaired to *Messina*, to give directions for the reception
 and security of the main fleet. He had not been long
 there, when, deceived by some false intelligence, he
 thought he had a fair occasion of surprizing *Lipara*¹.
 Thither he went with his squadron, and drew up un-
 der the walls of the town. *Hannibal*, who commanded
 at sea for the *Carthaginians*, and was now at *Panormus*,
 having notice of this design, immediately dispatch'd a-
 way 20 galleys under the command of one *Boodes* a
 Senator, who arriving in the night, block'd up *Corne-
 Polyb. B. I. lius* in the harbour. As soon as day appear'd, the
 ch. 21. Roman mariners, in their first fright, to save themselves,
 got with all diligence ashore. The Consul in this di-
 stress seeing no remedy, yielded himself prisoner; and
 the *Carthaginians* possessing themselves of the 17 vessels,
 and the principal *Roman* officers, made the best of their
 way back to *Hannibal*.

Such is *Polybius's* account of this affair: but accord-
 ing to *Livy's* Epitome, B. 17. *Cornelius* was made pri-
 soner by treachery, being decoy'd from his ship by the
 pretence of a parley, to which the *Carthaginian* com-
 mander invited him in order to a peace.

Not long after this adventure of *Cornelius*, *Hannibal*
 himself was very near falling into a like disaster by an

^b According to *Florus*, B. 2. and *Orosius*, B. 4. ch. 7. the *Romans* were but sixty days in building and equipping their fleet, reckoning from the time that the necessary timber was prepared.

¹ A town in a small island of the same name, not far from *Sicily*, to the north.

equal indiscretion. For having received advice that the Y. of R. Roman fleet was at sea, and coasting along Italy, he would needs be himself a witness of the number and posture of the enemy ; and to that end went in search of them with only fifty of his galleys. The Romans fulship. ^{493.} Bef. J. C. ^{259.} Con-

happen'd to be nearer than he was aware of, and just as he doubled a promontory on the Italian coast, surprized him with their whole fleet in order of battle. In this encounter he lost the greater part of his squadron, and escaped narrowly himself, when every body despaired of his safety.

The Romans continued their course towards Messina, pursuant to the instructions they had formerly received from Cornelius, of whose defeat and captivity having got advice, they imediately sent the news of it to Duilius (who then had the command of the land-forces in the island) and while they waited the coming of the Consul, they prepared for a new engagement with the enemy, whose fleet they heard was not far off. And considering that their own ships were heavy and slow, not having been built with great art, they turn'd their thoughts to contrive some new invention which might compensate for this disadvantage ; and then was devised that famous machine which they afterwards call'd the

* Corvus.

* The
Crow.

The learned cannot agree concerning the exact form of this engine. Polybius's description of it has not been found sufficient to make it clearly understood. It appears to have been a kind of draw-bridge, so framed on the prow of the vessels, that being let fall upon an enemy's ship, it served both to grapple her and to render the boarding her more easy.

Duilius, upon the first notice of what had happen'd to his colleague, remitting the conduct of the land-army to his Tribunes, hasten'd to the fleet ; wherē hearing, on his arrival, that the enemy were cruizing on the coast near Mylae, which was not far from Messina, he made the best of his way with all his galleys to en- ^{Polyb. B. I.} c. 23. counter them. Their fleet consisted of 130 ships,

Y. of R. and was commanded by the same *Hannibal* who had
 493. escaped with his army by night from *Agrigentum*.
 Bef. J. C. His own vessel was a *sptiremis*, or galley of seven
 259. banks of oars, belonging formerly to *Pyrrhus* King of
 192 Con- fulship. *Epirus.*

The *Carthaginians* greatly rejoiced when they descried the *Romans*, whom they held in such extreme contempt, that they advanced with their prows directly upon them, careless of any order of battle, and dreaming of nothing but certain victory. But when they drew near, they became much astonished at the sight of the engines before mentioned, having never seen the like before, and not being able to conjecture the design of them. However they staid not long in suspense, nor did the novelty of what they beheld lessen their presumption. The headmost of their vessels made a furious attack upon the *Romans*, who grappling with them by means of their engines, enter'd them at once, fighting upon deck hand to hand with their enemies, as upon firm ground. And now neither the lightness of the *Carthaginian* galleys, nor the skill of their mariners, availed any thing; all was carried by the advantage of weapon and superiority of valour, and both these were on the side of the *Romans*. The *Carthaginians* lost in this first encounter thirty of their vessels, of which *Hannibal's* galley was one, he himself escaping in a small boat, when he was by all given for lost. At length the rest of the fleet came up; but having perceived the terrible effect of the new engines in the defeat of their first squadron, they used all their endeavours to avoid them, nimbly rowing round the *Roman* galleys, to find an opportunity of attacking them with safety; but when they observ'd, that which way soever they approach'd, those machines were travers'd and oppoted to them, they were at length compell'd to yield the honour of the day to the *Romans*, retiring with the loss of fifty more of their ships.

Val. Max. *Hannibal* with the remainder of his fleet stood away
 B. 7. c. 3. for *Africk*, but fearing lest crucifixion should be his
 in Extern. fate, he sent before him one of his friends, a man well
 chosen

chosen for the commission, who being introduced into Y. of R. the Senate, Your Admiral, said he, *desires to know your opinion; whether, in case the Romans appear at sea with a numerous fleet, he should give them battle?* Doubtless be Con-^{493:}
ought to fight, they all cried out unanimously. The fulship.
messenger then added, He has fought, and is vanquish'd.
And thus Hannibal escaped the danger that hung over him; for they were no longer free to condemn an action which they had already approved.

As for Duilius, the courage of whose men was great-^{Polyb. B.}
ly raised by their late surprising victory, he landed his forces on the island, and marched to the relief of *Segesta*, which the enemy at that time closely besieged. He not only forced them to raise the siege of this place, but took from them *Macella* by assault. After these exploits leaving the land-army behind him, he returned to *Rome*, to receive the recompence due to his valour and conduct. A victory at sea so unexpected, so complete, and so important, made all former victories at land to be in a manner forgot. The conqueror, beside the usual honour of the *Triumph*, which was decreed him, was suffered to assume a new one of his own invention. During the rest of his life, whenever he had supped abroad in the city, he caused himself to be attended home with flambeaux and music. Medals ^{Cic. in Cat.} were struck by the *Romans* to perpetuate the memory of ^{maj.} *Florus*, his exploit; and to the same end they erected in the B. 2. *Forum a + Rostral Pillar* of white marble. This pillar + Colum-^{na Rostra-} was in the last century accidentally dug up out of the ^{ta.} ground, in that part of *Rome* which was formerly the *Roman Forum*. There are yet the figures of six *Rostra*, or *Prows* of *Roman* galleys sticking to it, and a long, but imperfect inscription on the pedestal.

C H A P. IV. The sixth, seventh, and eighth Years of the War.

The Romans invade Corsica and Sardinia with success, reduce some places in Sicily, and come to an engagement at sea with the Carthaginians near Tyndaris.

Y. of R. **T**H E Consuls for the following year were *L. Cornelius Scipio* and *C. Aquilius Florus*. While the former employed himself on the coast in getting the fleet ready for new enterprizes, the latter was detained at Rome on occasion of a conspiracy then on foot to plunder and burn the city. Four thousand *Samnites* being appointed, contrary to their inclination, to serve as rowers in the galleys, had united with three thousand discontented slaves in this design; but a certain commander of auxiliaries, whom they had chosen to be their leader, and who seem'd at first to go heartily into their measures, had no sooner learnt their whole secret, than he discover'd it to the Senate, who took effectual care to avert the mischief and punish the offenders.

Before this domestic disturbance was quite over, *Cornelius* weighed anchor and put to sea. Ambitious of signalizing himself by some exploit yet unattempted, he made a descent first upon *Corsica*, and then upon *Sardinia*, and in a short time made considerable progress in the conquest of those islands, the possession of which was of great importance to the *Romans*, who now aspired to the empire of the seas.

*Polyb. B.
1. c. 24.*

Aquilius went late into *Sicily*. The affairs of the *Romans* had suffer'd much in that island since the departure of *Duilius*. For a dispute had arisen between the *Roman* and *Sicilian* troops about the post of honour; which dispute was carried so far as to produce a separation. *Hamilcar* (the *Carthaginian* General by land) who was then at *Panormus*, having intelligence of this division, surprized the *Sicilians* as they were about to encamp between *Paropus* and *Thermas*, and slew four thousand of them. He had also taken *Enna* and *Camina*, and had fortified *Drepanum*.

Aquilius staid in the island all the winter in quality of Pro-Consul, and by his able conduct brought affairs into a better posture.

In the mean time his colleague held the *Comitia* for the new elections, where *A. Atilius Calatinus* and *C. Sulpicius*

Sulpicius Paterculus were chosen Consuls. The command of the land army fell to the former, the fleet to the latter. Soon after the arrival of *Calatinus* in Sicily, ^{495.} *Misistratum*, which the Proconsul *Aquilius* had reduced ^{257.} ^{194.} to the last extremity, surrendered to him. From thence he march'd towards *Camarina*; but in his way, not taking sufficient precaution, he brought his army into a valley, where he was shut in, and surrounded by the *Carthaginians* under the command of *Hamilcar*. In this desperate situation *Calpurnius* ^{Zon. B. 8.} ^{Orfias,} ^{Florus.} ^{Aurel.} ^{Vitior.} ^{c. 39.} ^{Liv. Epit.} ^{B. 17.} ^{Livy, B.} ^{22. c. 6a.} *Flamma*, a legionary Tribune, undertook, with the Consul's consent, an action of bravery much extolled by the historians. With three hundred chosen men, he, to make a diversion, seized an eminence, where he knew the *Carthaginians* would soon attack him, and from whence he could have little hope to escape. He promised himself, that by this motion he should give the enemy so much employment, that they would not be able to obstruct the Consul's march. The stratagem succeeded. The *Carthaginians*, in their attempt to dislodge him, met with so obstinate a resistance, that they were forced to bring almost the whole body of their army to the charge; and in the mean time the Consul with his legions got safely through the pass with little opposition. Of the three hundred *Romans*, *Calpurnius* was the only person that escaped: He was found miserably wounded, but still breathing, under a heap of dead bodies, and his wounds being carefully dressed, he recovered. A *Crown of Gramen* was the reward of his exploit.

Calatinus after this escape continued his march towards *Camarina*, and by the help of engines, sent him by King *Hiero*, made himself master of it. *Enna* betray'd her garrison, and open'd her gates to him. He took *Sittanum* by assault; and then many other towns surrender'd without standing a siege, and, among the rest *Erbesus* in the country of the *Agrigentines*. Flush'd with this success he undertook the siege of *Lipara*, expecting for the future to meet with no resistance where-

^a He is called by some writers *Cæditius*, by others *Laberius*.

V. of R. ever he appear'd : But *Hamilcar* having got notice of
 his design, had stolen with some troops into the place ;
Bef. J. C. and when the *Romans*, who saw none but citizens upon
 the ramparts, confidently began to scale the walls, they
194 Con- were on a sudden surprized by a sally of the *Carthaginians*, and shamefully repulsed with considerable loss.
 fulship. And thus *Calatinus* finish'd his campaign, which, by
 the mixture of good and bad success, gain'd him but
 little honour.

Zon. B. 8. As for the other Consul, *Sulpicius*, he had conducted the fleet like an able commander. He had not only assisted his colleague in the reduction of the maritime towns of *Sicily*, but had much advanced the conquest of *Sardinia* and *Corsica*. However, this did not satisfy his passion for glory ; he burnt with a desire of distinguishing himself by a naval victory : And because no *Carthaginian* fleet appeared at sea, he spread a report, that he intended to go and burn the ships of the *African* Republic in their harbours. This news alarm'd the *Carthaginians*, and they trusted *Hamnilcar* once more with the command of a considerable fleet. He found *Sulpicius* with his, not far from the coast of *Africa*. But when both sides were preparing for an engagement, a storm separated them, and drove the ships of both fleets into the ports of *Sardinia*. After this, *Sulpicius* surprized the *Carthaginian* admiral in a harbour of that island, and took many of his galleys ; which misfortune begetting a mutiny in the remainder of his fleet, the mariners seized on his person, and crucified him.

Polyb. B. The year following, when *C. Attilius Regulus* and
 1. c. 24. *Cn. Cornelius Blasio* were Consuls, the former being with
496. the fleet at *Tyndaris*, descri'd the *Carthaginian* fleet
Bef. J. C. 256. standing along the coast in a confused and careless manner,
195 Con- whereupon he hastened with a squadron of ten
 fulship. gallies to give them chace, directing at the same time the rest of his ships to follow him. The *Carthaginians* observing that the detached squadron was advanced a good distance from the enemies main fleet, tacked about on a sudden, and surrounding the ten ships, quickly funk them all, except the admiral galley, which

which escaped only by her lightness, and the force of *V.* of *R.*
her oars. But the rest of the *Roman* fleet coming up ^{496.}
soon after in order of battle, amply revenged this dif- ^{Bef. J. C.}
grace; for the *Carthaginians* were forced to fly to the ^{256.} ^{195 Con-}
island of *Lipara* with the loss of eighteen of their ves- ^{fulship.}
sels, of which eight were sunk, and the other ten ^{Polyb. B.}
taken. ^{I. c. 25.}

Little was performed this year by land, the armies engaging in no action of importance, and the contending powers being chiefly solicitous about the increase of their naval strength, which for good reason, as we shall presently see, was by each side deem'd to be more than ever its principal affair.

C H A P. V. The ninth Year of the War.

The Romans, under the conduct of Marcus Attilius Regulus and L. Manlius, defeat the Carthaginians in the memorable sea-fight of Ecnomus; after which they make a descent upon Africa. Carthage, tho' reduced to great extremity, rejects the hard conditions of peace proposed by Regulus.

TH E struggle between the rival Republics for the dominion of *Sicily* had now lasted eight years, and *Carthage* had already lost the greater part of her acquisitions in that island, when the *Romans*, to make her relinquish the rest, undertook to transfer the war into *Africa*. They imagined, that they should hereby *Polyb.* reduce the *Carthaginians* to the necessity of calling *c. 26.* home all their forces for the defence of their own country. The naval preparations of the *Romans* the last year, had been wholly in view to the execution of this design ; and the fleet which they now put to sea under the command of their new Consuls, *Marcus Attilius* ^{Y. of R.} *Regulus* and *L. Manlius*, was suitable to the importance *497.* of the enterprize ; for it consisted of no less than 330 *Bef. J. C.* ships of war. *255.* *106 Con-*

On the other hand the *Carthaginians*, who well knew how easy it was for an enemy, who had once got footing + A 2d 196 Con-
fulship. in time.

Y. of R. in their country, to subdue the inhabitants on the coast,
 497. and to march even to the walls of *Carthage*, had determined
 Bef. J. C. to exert their utmost strength in opposing the
 255. intended descent. Fully bent upon a sea engagement,
 196. fulship. they had equipped a fleet that was still more numerous
 than that of the *Romans*. They arrived at *Lilybæum*
 with 350 galleys. From this place they went afterwards to *Heraclea* where they staid at anchor, waiting
 the motions of the enemy.

The *Roman* fleet had touch'd at *Messina*, and had thence steer'd its course along the coast of *Sicily* that lay to the right, and having doubled the promontory of *Pachinum*, was come to *Ecnomus*, where their land-forces then were. From these the Consuls selected the ablest of the soldiers for the present service, providing all things necessary either for a battle with the enemy by sea, if it should be offer'd, or to make an irruption into *Africa*, if their voyage thither should not be obstructed. Each galley in the *Roman* fleet had 300 rowers and 120 soldiers, so that the whole army amounted to near 140,000 men. As the *Carthaginians* exceeded their enemies in number of ships, so was their army proportionably greater, consisting of above 150,000 mariners and soldiers. And now, says *Polybius*, who could behold, or but barely hear of such fleets and armies, and of the hazard to which these contending States were exposed, without being astonished at the mightiness of their power, and without taking part in the danger with which they threatned each other?

Ecnomus was not far from *Heraclea*; the two parties were obstinately determined, the one to *invade*, the other to *defend*; it was easy therefore to foresee they would soon come to a battle.

The *Romans* considering the advantage which the *Carthaginians* had over them in the lightness and ready working of their galleys, took especial care to draw up their fleet, that it should be difficult to break its order. They divided their ships into four squadrons, to three of which they gave the names of *the first, the second,* and

and the *third fleet*; and these, in three lines, composed Y. of R. the form of a wedge or triangle, pointing towards the enemy. ^{497.} Bef. J. C.

The *first fleet* to the right, and the second to the left ^{255.} Con- (keeping the prows of their vessels turned outwards) fulship. made the sides of the triangle; and at the head of these two lines, that is, at the point where they met, were the Consuls *Regulus* and *Manlius*, in two galleys abreast of each other. The *third fleet* made the base of the triangle, and towed the vessels of burden, which carried the horses and baggage.

In the rear of all was the fourth division, which they called the *Triarians*, a term taken from the land-forces. This squadron was drawn up in a line parallel to the base of the triangle, but was stretched so far in length, that its two extremities extended a good way beyond those of the base.

The several divisions of the *Roman* fleet being thus disposed, the whole, says *Polybius*, was fit for action, and very difficult to be broken.

The *Carthaginian* fleet was commanded by *Hanno*, *Polyb. B. I.* who had succeeded so ill during the siege of *Agrigentum*, c. 27. and by *Hamilcar*, who had fought near *Tyndaris*. These admirals observing how the *Roman* galleys were drawn up, and rightly conjecturing the intention of such a disposition, turned their thoughts to disappoint it, by the order in which they shoud dispose their own vessels, and by stratagem. Having divided their whole fleet into four squadrons, they drew three of them up in one long line frontways, their prows pointing directly on the enemy. *Hanno* was with the squadron which formed the right of this line, and which stretched a great way out into the sea. He had with him all the best rowing galleys, such as were proper to attack and retreat, and could row round the *Romans* at pleasure. *Hamilcar* was with the squadron in the left of the line. The third squadron, which made the centre, was designedly drawn up very thin, that the *Romans* might be tempted to begin the attack there, in which case this squadron had orders to retreat, thereby to engage the *Roman* galleys, which

Y. of R. which made the two sides of their triangle, in a pur-
 497. suit, which would separate them from the base.
Bef. J. C.

255. The fourth division of the *Carthaginian* fleet, in form
 196. Con- of a Tenail, kept close under the shore which lay to
 fulship. the left of their long line of battle.

The stratagem abovementioned, and which *Polybius* imputes to *Hamilcar*, succeeded. The *Romans* began their attack on the *Carthaginians* in the middle of their line. The galleys that were attacked pretended to fly through fear, and the assailants, that is to say, the first and second fleets of the *Romans*, pursuing them warmly, disjoined themselves from their third fleet (which towed the baggage) and from the *Triarians* in the rear of all.

When the *Carthaginians* judged that the *first* and *second* fleets of the *Romans* were sufficiently distanced from the rest, the signal was given from *Hamilcar's* galley ; whereupon those that were chased by the *Romans* immediately tack'd, and made head against the pursuers, *Hamilcar* with his squadron charging them at the same time. And now the battle grew warm ; for tho' the *Carthaginians* had the advantage in the lightness and ready working of their vessels, yet the *Romans* lost not their assurance of success in the end ; they found themselves better men when they came to the sword's point, and they had great trust in their engines, with which they grappled and boarded the enemy ; besides, the soldiers were animated by the presence of their Generals, in whose eye they fought, and who themselves engaged in equal hazard with the rest.

Polyb. B. I.
c. 28.

During this conflict, *Hanno*, who commanded the squadron which had formed the right of the *Carthaginian* line, bearing down upon the *Roman Triarians*, attacked them vigorously, and succeeded so well, as to reduce them to very great extremities.

At the same time the fourth squadron of the *Carthaginians*, which in form of a Tenail had been posted close under the shore, ranged themselves into a front, and advanced against that squadron of the *Romans* which they called their *third fleet*, and which had made the base

base of their triangle. This fleet was therefore obliged Y. of R. to cast off the vessels they had in tow ; which having ^{497:} done, they received the *Carthaginians*, and fought them ^{Bef. J. C.} with great bravery. So that now might be seen three ^{255.} ¹⁹⁶ naval battles at one and the same instant. ^{Consulship.}

The fortune of the day was for some time doubtful, and would at length have infallibly declared for the *Carthaginians*, if *Hamilcar's* courage had been equal to his skill in stratagem, and if, with his two squadrons of the left and the center, he had only maintained the fight against the *first* and *second fleets* of the *Romans*, so as to hinder them from going to the assistance of their other fleets ; but he, after some loss, shamefully fled out of the battle. And now while *Manlius* employed himself in towing away such ships as had been taken, *Regulus*, who perceived the great danger the *Triarians* were in from *Hanno's* attack, advanced with all diligence to their relief, taking with him those ships of his colleague's squadron, which had not suffered any thing in the engagement with *Hamilcar*. The *Triarians* hereupon, though now almost quite vanquished, recovered heart, and renewed the battle with alacrity. *Hanno* seeing himself thus assaulted, contrary to all expectation, both in front and rear, betook himself to his oars, and made off to sea, yielding the day to the *Romans*.

About the same time *Manlius* coming up, and joining *Regulus*, they both hastened to the succour of their *third fleet*, which had been forced under the shore by the *fourth squadron* of the enemy, and was in a manner besieged there. This *third fleet* would have been in great danger of destruction, before the *Consuls* could have come to its rescue, if the *Carthaginians* had had the courage to push their advantage ; but their dread of being grappled by the *Corvi*, and of coming to a close fight with the *Romans*, was so great, that they contented themselves with driving their enemies against the shore, and there keeping them beset. And now they were themselves entirely surrounded by the *Romans*, who took fifty of their ships with all their equipage. Such was the event of this last combat in particular.

The

Y. of R. The *Romans*, every where victors, took in all sixty-four
 497. of the *Carthaginian* galleys, and sunk thirty. Of their
Bef. J. C. own fleet they lost but twenty-four galleys, and these
 255. perished against the shore, not one was taken.

196 Con- The Consuls, after this victory, returned into the
sulship. ports of *Sicily* to take in provisions and fresh troops, and
Polyb. B. 1. prepare anew for a descent upon *Africa*.
 c. 29.

Whilst they were thus employed, *Hanno* made no scruple to go in person to amuse them by conferences about peace, which *Hamilcar* had refused to do, for fear he should be treated as the *Carthaginians* had treated *Cornelius Afina* five years before. *Hanno's* confidence was founded upon a different judgment of the temper of the *Romans*; and experience on the present occasion shewed that he judged rightly. For when a certain legionary Tribune cryed out, ‘That he ought to be detained prisoner by way of reprisal for the treachery practised towards *Cornelius*,’ both the Consuls immediately ordered him silence; and then turning to *Hanno*, ‘The faith of *Rome* secures thee from that fear.’ The *Carthaginian* was dismissed in safety, but his proposals were rejected, and the Consuls pursued their enterprize.

Polyb. B. 1. The *Romans* had a fortunate voyage, and landed in
 c. 29. the neighbourhood of *Clypea*, near the promontory of *Mercury*. Having made themselves masters of that town, they would not advance any farther till they had received fresh instructions from *Rome*: For such was the dependance of the Consuls upon the Senate at this time, that they did little more than execute the orders of the Fathers; most of whom being experienced soldiers, and having commanded armies, were very capable of directing the conduct of their Generals. The Consuls however did not continue in a perfect inaction; they fortified *Clypea* after the *Roman* manner, and detached parties to ravage the rich territory all around, and plunder the fine houses of the *Carthaginian* nobles. These detachments, meeting no opposition, brought away an immense booty, besides 20,000 prisoners, who were made slaves.

When the Consuls messenger came back from *Rome*,
 he

he brought orders for *Manlius* to return to *Italy* with Y. of R. the fleet, and for *Regulus* to continue in *Africa* with a sufficient number of troops to carry on the war. The people of *Rome* depended greatly on the courage and abilities of *Regulus*, and the city was in universal joy upon the publishing of this regulation. But when the news of it came to *Regulus*, he was much afflicted. His pretext was, the bad condition of his little farm of seven acres of land. He represented to the Senate, that Val. Max. upon the death of the husbandman, to whom he had committed the care of his farm, the management of it had fallen to a day-labourer, who had since stolen his instruments of husbandry, and carried off all his stock; so that his presence was necessary at home to provide for the subsistence of his wife and children. Upon this the Senate gave orders, that his losses should be repaired, his farm taken care of, and his family maintained at the public expence; but he himself was directed to stay in Africa. *Manlius* leaving behind him forty ships, 15,000 Polyb. B. I. foot, and 500 horse, returned to Italy with the rest of c. 29. the army, and with all the prisoners which had been taken upon the continent of Africa.

Regulus made incursions into the country, and pushed on his conquests with prodigious^a rapidity. All the towns in his way, that were unfortified, he took by assault, and those that were fortified, by siege; and now at length he sat down before *Adis*, a city of great importance, and pressed the siege of it with vigour.

* *Regulus*, in the progress of his conquests, encamping on the banks of the *Bagrada*, a river that discharged itself into the sea not far from *Carthage*, is said by many authors to have met there with a monstrous serpent of 120 feet long, which much infested his army, seizing his men, and swallowing them whole when they went to draw water. The skin of this animal was so tough, and its scales so thick, as to be impenetrable by the *Roman* weapons, insomuch that they were forced to employ their battering engines, called *Balista*, to destroy it. And even when they had killed it, the stench of its carcase infected the air and the water to such a degree, that the *Romans* were forced to decamp. Many other extraordinary things are related by the historians of this serpent, which was probably nothing more than an overgrown crocodile, a creature common in Africa, but to which the *Romans* were at this time strangers. *Catrou.*

Flor. B. 2.

Zon. B. 8.

Val. Max.

B. 1.

A. Gell.

B. 6.

Plin. B. 8.

Y. of R. Hitherto the *Carthaginians* had brought no army into
497. the field to oppose his progress. Upon the first notice
Bef. J. C. of their terrible defeat at sea, apprehending a sudden
255. invasion from the *Ronans*, they had dispatched away
196 Con- some troops to keep guard upon the coast; but this
fulship. care was over, so soon as they learnt that the *Romans*
Polyb. B. I. were landed. They proceeded therefore with all possi-
c. 30. ble application to reinforce their army with new levies,
and make due provision both for strengthening the city,
to command their forces, *Bostar*, and *Asdrubal* the son
of *Hanno*; they afterwards sent orders to *Hamilcar*, who
was then at *Heraclea*, to return home with all expedi-
tion. *Hamilcar*, brought with him to *Carthage* 5000
foot and 500 horse, and being there named third Gene-
ral of the Republic, and having consulted with *Asdrubal*,
it was determined no longer to endure that the *Romans*
should make such spoil upon the country, and to hasten
to the relief of *Adis*. They advanced with their army,
and encamped upon an eminence, which, tho' it over-
looked the *Roman* camp, was a very incommodious situ-
ation; for, as their greatest strength lay in their horse
and elephants, to abandon the plain country, and post
themselves in high and steep places, where neither ele-
phants, nor horse could be of any use to them, was in
effect to point out to their enemies the method to destroy
them. *Regulus*, who saw their mistake, gave them no
time to rectify it. At break of day he marched against
the enemy, his troops ascending the hill on both sides.
The mercenaries of the *Carthaginians* behaved them-
selves gallantly on this occasion, and repulsed the first
legion of the *Romans* which charged them in front; but
being presently after attacked in the rear by the soldiers
who had got up the hill on the other side, they could
no longer maintain the fight. The whole army dis-
banded itself, and in the utmost confusion fled out of
the camp. The elephants and the horse, which had
been wholly useless during the action, gained the cham-
paign country and escaped. The *Romans* having pur-
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sued the foot for some space, returned and pillaged the camp; after which they proceeded to make incursions as before, spoiling the country, and taking towns without opposition. Among others, they seized upon *Tunis*,^{255.} and there they pitched their camp within the walls of *Tunis*.^{196.} Y. of R.
497.
Bef. J. C.
255.

it; this being of all places the most commodious for distressing *Carthage* itself, and the country about it.

The *Carthaginians*, who had so unfortunately managed their affairs both by sea and land, not so much through the cowardice of their armies, as the insufficiency of their chiefs, began now to despair. For over and above the calamities that have been related, the *Numidians*, their implacable enemies, taking advantage of the present troubles, had entered their provinces with fire and sword, and compelled the inhabitants to fly for refuge to the capital, whither they brought both fear and famine, a mighty multitude of all sorts flocking at once thither.
Polyb. B. I. c. 31.

It is not surprizing therefore, if in such extremity the *Carthaginians* were overjoyed to receive a message from the *Roman General*, exhorting them to think of an accommodation. What moved *Regulus* to make this step was the apprehension lest a successor, who was expected from *Rome*, should deprive him of the glory of putting an end to the war. The Senate of *Carthage* with great readiness dispatched away some of their principal citizens to confer with him; but these were so far from yielding to his proposals, that they could not with patience even hear them mentioned. For *Regulus* would have had them esteem it as a singular grace and benefit, that he granted them peace upon any terms whatsoever; and those he demanded were so infamous for the *Carthaginians*, that in their imagination nothing worse could befall them, should they be entirely conquered. The deputies therefore returned to *Carthage*, not only without having consented to any thing, but full of indignation at the intolerable insolence of the *Roman*. The Senate likewise, when the report was made to them of what had passed at the conference, shewed so much

Y. of R. courage and greatness of mind, that tho' they were
 497. Bef. J. C. almost at the brink of despair, they determined rather
 255. to abide any adversity which their worst fortune could
 196 Con- bring upon them, then stain the nobility of their name
 fulship. and actions by so shameful a treaty.

C H A P. VI.

Xantippus, a Commander of Greek mercenaries in the service of Carthage, by his excellent advice and conduct gives a wonderful turn to affairs in Africa. The Roman army is totally defeated, and Regulus taken prisoner.

Polyb B. I. c. 32. IN the height of this distress, to which the victories and obdurate pride of *Regulus* had reduced the *Carthaginians*, there fortunately arrived at *Carthage* a body of recruits which they had hired in *Greece*. Among these was a certain *Lacedæmonian* named *Xantippus*, an officer well skilled in military affairs according to the *Spartan* discipline. This man having informed himself of the circumstances of the late overthrow, and of the number of horse and elephants, which yet remained, concluded within himself, and freely said it among his friends, that the *Carthaginians* had not been vanquished by the enemy, but by the ignorance of their own leaders. This discourse, being spread among the people, came at length to the ears of the magistrates, who thereupon commanded him to be brought before the great council. *Xantippus* offered such strong reasons in support of what he advanced, that it was impossible to resist the force of them. He shewed plainly, that if instead of encamping upon the high grounds they would keep in the open champain country, they might not only banish all fear of the enemy, but even be assured of victory. The whole assembly, the Generals not excepted, applauded what he said, and it was unanimously agreed to place him at the head of their troops; the only example of the kind in all history, and a sure proof that

that the *Carthaginians* were in the utmost perplexity and *Y. of R.*
confusion.

497.

Bef. J. C.

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196. Con-

The soldiers had already begun to conceive a favourable opinion of this stranger, and to hope for some advantage from him: but when, after he had led them without the walls of the city, they saw in what manner he drew them up, and the new exercise he taught them according to his rules, displaying such a skill in the art of war, as they had never seen in any of their former Generals, they were quite transported with joy; they pressed earnestly to be led against the enemy, being assured that they could not fail of success under the conduct of *Xantippus*. The army in a few days began to march. It consisted of 12,000 foot, 4000 horse, and about 100 elephants.

The *Romans* were at first a little struck with the *Polyb. B. I.* novelty, to see their enemies boldly marching in the *c. 33.* open flat country, but having no doubt as to the event, they advanced with all expedition to meet them, and incamped within about 1200 paces of them. Next day the *Carthaginians* held a council of war, to determine how they should proceed, while the soldiers assembling in great numbers, and proclaiming every where the name of *Xantippus*, demanded with much earnestness to be led against the enemy. The officers observing this forwardness of the army to fight; and being urged by the pressing instances of *Xantippus* not to let the ardour of the soldiers cool without action, directions were presently given to prepare for battle, and the whole conduct of it was committed to the *Spartan*, who disposed his troops in the following manner.

He drew up all his elephants in one rank, and behind these, at a reasonable distance, he placed the *Carthaginian* infantry in one phalanx. The foreign troops were posted one part of them in the same line with the phalanx, to the right of it; the other part, composed of light-armed soldiers, was placed in the intervals of the squadrons of horse, which made the two wings of the army.

Y. of R. On the part of the *Romans*, as the chief care of
 Regulus was to guard against the elephants, he to this
 end placed in front his *Velites*, or light-armed soldiers,
 that these with their darts or other missile weapons might
 drive back those huge beasts upon the enemy, or at least
 hinder them from rushing with their usual violence upon
 the legions. It was also out of fear of the same animals,
 that he made his battalions deeper in file than he had
 been accustomed to do; an excellent precaution, says
 Polybius, against the shock of the elephants; but then,
 by narrowing his front, he left himself more exposed to
 be attacked in flank by the enemy's cavalry, which greatly
 outnumbered his.

It does not appear of what number of men Regulus's army consisted; but supposing him to have lost none of those which his colleague left him, they amounted but to 15000 foot and 500 horse.

Polyb. B. I. The two armies being thus drawn up, and the signal
 C. 34. being given by Xantippus, the first onset was made by
 the elephants, which met with so little resistance from
 the *Velites*, that they presently broke into the *Roman*
 main body, making great destruction amongst the fore-
 most ranks of it. However the rest of that body stood
 firm for some time, by reason of its depth. But the
 Carthaginian horse, having quickly driven those of Re-
 gulus out of the field, began now to charge his batta-
 lions both in flank and rear, which put them in great
 distress; for they were forced to face every way, and
 could neither pass forward, nor yet retire, and had
 much to do, to make good the ground on which they
 stood. In the mean while such of the *Romans*, as with
 great difficulty had made their way through the ele-
 phants, and had left them at their backs, met with the
 Carthaginian phalanx, which not having yet engaged,
 and being therefore quite fresh and in good array, ob-
 tained an easy victory over a body of men already in
 disorder, and wearied with wounds and labour. These
 being entirely cut off, and the phalanx advancing, there
 was no longer any resource for the *Romans*. Surrounded
 on all sides, the greater part of them were crushed to
 death

death by the enormous weight of the elephants, or slain ^{Y. of R.} in their ranks by the arrows of the horse. Some attempted to escape by flight, but being in an open country, they were easily overtaken by the cavalry; and either cut off, or made prisoners. Five hundred who followed *Regulus* fell alive with him into the enemy's hands ^a.

^{497.}
Bef J. C.

^{255.}

¹⁹⁶ Con-
fulship.

Of the whole *Roman* army there escaped only 2000 men, who had been posted in the left point of their main body, and who in the beginning of the action, to avoid the shock of the elephants, had wheeled round them, and charged the mercenaries that were to the right of the enemy's phalanx, putting them to flight, and pursuing them even to their intrenchments. These 2000 as it were by miracle, got safely to *Clypea*, when the rest were all slain or taken.

On the enemy's side were killed but 800 men, of whom the greater part were of those mercenaries that had been attacked by the 2000 *Romans*.

The *Carthaginians*, having spoiled the dead, marched back to their city, leading in triumph the *Roman* General and the 500 other prisoners.

Whoever, says *Polybius*, reflects seriously on this adventure, will gather from it excellent instruction for the conduct of human life. The misfortune of *Regulus* affords us an admirable lesson of moderation, and teaches us to be always on our guard against the inconstancy of fortune. We see him who but a few days before was so elated by success, so haughty and inexorable, reduced at once to be the scorn of a people whom he had despised and insulted, and to stand in need of that clemency from his enemies, which he had with pitiless pride

Polyb. B. 1.
^{c. 35.}

^b Chevalier *Foland* is of opinion, that the loss of this battle was wholly owing to the mistake of *Regulus*, in not leaving (as *Scipio* did afterwards at the battle of *Zama*) sufficient spaces between the columns of his main body, for the elephants to pass freely through them. That if, by this precaution, the *Roman* infantry had shunned the mischiefs, which for want of it they suffered from the elephants, they would have had nothing to fear from the *Carthaginian* horse, which could have made no impression on them, (formed as they were) even after the *Roman* cavalry were driven out of the field.

Y. of R. refused them in their misery. We learn wisdom, says
 497. our author, two ways; by our own experience, and by
 Bef. J. C. the experience of others. The first is the more convin-
 255. cing, but the other is the easier and safer. And this is
 196 Con- fulship. the great benefit we reap from the study of History.
 Without any peril to ourselves, we gather rules of con-
 duct from a view of the miscarriages and misfortunes of
 other men.

Polybius also observes, that the event which has been just related, confirms that saying of *Euripides*, ‘ That one wise Head is of more value than a great many Hands.’ For it is manifest in the case now before us, that the counsel and abilities of one single person subdued the *Roman* legions that were esteemed invincible, restored a sinking and despairing Commonwealth, and revived the courage of a spiritless army, grown stupid by their defeats.

Polyb. B. I. ch. 36. The *Carthaginians*, whose affairs had prosper’d to their wish, express’d their joy by solemn thanksgivings to the Gods, and by congratulations and mutual good offices to one another. As for *Xantippus*, who had had so great share in restoring the Commonwealth, he shortly after (an admirable example of judgment and wisdom) took his leave and departed from *Carthage*, well foreseeing that his services, too great for a reward, would draw upon him both envy and calumny, against which a native perhaps might have been able to guard himself by the means of relations and friends, but which would in all probability bring ruin upon a stranger who had nothing to support him but his merit.

Appian. de Bell. Pun. c. 3. *Polybius* tells us, that some authors give a different account of *Xantippus*’s departure, and promises to take notice of it in another place: but that part of his history has not been transmitted to us. According to *Appian*, the *Carthaginians*, ‘ fearing least the honour of the victory should be ascribed to the *Lacedæmonians*, feigned a gratification of their General, made him magnificent presents, and appointed a convoy of their own ships to conduct him to *Sparta*, but with secret instruc-
 tions to the commanders of the galleys to throw him and

and his *Lacedæmonians* over-board, so soon as they could come into the open sea. Such, says our author, was the end of *Xantippus*, and such the recompence he received for so noble an exploit. But surely this is a very senseless account, or the *Carthaginians* must have been a very senseless as well as ungrateful people, first to do publick honour to the *Spartan*, as the known and undoubted author of the victory, and then to imagine they could rob him of that glory, and conceal their obligation to him, by treacherously throwing him into the sea.

C H A P . VII. From the 9th to the 14th Year of the War.

The Romans, after the misfortune of Regulus, vanquish the Carthaginians in a sea-engagement on the coast of Africa; but withdraw their forces from that country. In their return home they lose their own fleet by tempest. They build a new one, and this is also destroy'd by the like misfortune. Hereupon they resolve to think no more of naval enterprizes; but after two years, in which their land-forces perform nothing of moment, they change that resolution, and, while a third fleet is building, they gain a signal victory at land over the Carthaginians, near Panormus.

TH E Romans, having received an account of the miserable condition of their affairs in *Africa*, applied themselves with all diligence to repair and equip their fleet, in order to rescue out of danger the 2000 soldiers, who after the late battle had escaped to *Clypea*. In the mean time the *Carthaginians*, to reduce those remains of *Regulus's* army, laid siege to that place, and used their utmost efforts to carry it; but so brave and so obstinate was the resistance they met with, that they were forced at length to abandon the enterprize and retire. And now hearing of the naval preparations of the *Romans*, for a new expedition to *Africa*, they fitted out in a short time about 200 galleys, and put to sea to watch the arrival of the enemy.

Early

V. of R. Early in the summer, the new Consuls *Fulvius* and
498. *Aemilius*, with a fleet of 350 sail appeared off the pro-
Bet. J. C. montory of *Mercury*, and there came to an engagement
254. with the *Carthaginians*, who, not being able to sustain
197 Con- the very first shock, were entirely defeated, and lost
fulship. 114 of their vessels. The *Romans* pursued their course,
arrived at *Clypea*, took the garrison on board, and then
sleer'd back towards *Sicily* ^b.

They

^b There are two parts of the *Roman* conduct in this war, which Mr. *Rollin* and Chevalier *Folard* think very hard to be accounted for.

1. Why did the *Romans*, after their victory at sea near *Ecnomus*, and the fortunate descent made in *Africa* in consequence of that victory, leave so small a number of troops under *Regulus* to carry on the war in that country?

Mr. *Rollin* says, it was a manifest renouncing of the advantages gained by sea; and the Chevalier declares, that it is enough to distract a commentator, and wonders that *Polybius* makes no remark on this strange proceeding.

Again, 2. Why did the *Romans* just after this new victory at sea, near the coast of *Africa*, entirely abandon that country, instead of attempting to complete the conquest of it? *Polybius* relates this fact also without any remark upon it, to the great amazement of Chevalier *Folard*.

But as to both these difficulties, may it not be answered, that the only object of the *Romans* in this war, was the conquest of *Sicily*? To alarm *Carthage*, and induce her to withdraw her forces out of that island, are the reasons assigned by *Polybius* for the descent made by the *Romans* on *Africa*. But they were disappointed as to the effect of this measure; for the *Carthaginians* judging by the small army left with *Regulus*, that the enemy, in making their descent, had no farther view, than to cause a diversion, did not recall their troops out of *Sicily*; but seeing, as *Polybius* says, that the war would go on *slowly*, named two Generals, *Bostar* and *Afdrubal*, to command the forces they had at home; and when afterwards *Hamilcar* was sent for from *Sicily* to join those Generals, he brought with him but 5500 men.

It is plain therefore from the conduct of both the contending powers, that neither the *Romans* intended, or the *Carthaginians* feared, any serious attempt upon *Carthage* by *Regulus*, when he began the war in *Africa*.

But why did not the *Romans* resolve to attempt *Carthage* after the victory at *Ecnomus*? I answer; because from their knowledge of its great strength, and of the many resources its prodigious wealth furnished, they judged the conquest of it impracticable at this time, and before *Sicily* was subdued. And that they judged right, one may fairly conclude from *Polybius's* not reproving their policy, and from the

They had a prosperous voyage till they came near the ^{Y. of R.} Sicilian coast, in the territory of *Camarina*; but then so terrible a tempest overtook them, as no words are able to describe. Of above 400 vessels, only four-score escaped destruction; the rest either foundered at sea, or were dashed to pieces against the rocks; so that the whole coast from *Camarina* to cape *Pachynum* was covered with dead bodies and fragments of ships. History affords no example of a more deplorable shipwreck. And this calamity was owing, not to fortune, but to the obstinacy of the Consuls. For the pilots had often represented to them, that the season was come when it was no longer safe to navigate on that coast of *Sicily* which looks towards *Africa*: but they being full of expectation, that the towns situate thereon, terrify'd by the late victory, would readily submit to them on their first appearance, despised the admonition, to pursue

the difficulties they afterwards met with in that enterprize, even when masters of *Sicily*, and of all the islands between *Italy* and *Africa*.

But after the total defeat of *Regulus's* army by means of the elephants, the difficulty of succeeding in an *African* war was become infinitely great. We find, that the legions were possessed with such a dread of those animals, that for some years they durst not come to a pitch'd battle with the *Carthaginians* even in *Sicily*, where the *Romans* had many advantages which they must have wanted in *Africa*.

In a word, *Sicily* was the present object of the *Roman* ambition, and the only reasonable object it could now have; and we shall see by what follows, that they had need of all their forces for the reduction of this island: so that their leaving *Africa* after the victory at sea by *Fulvius* and *Æmilius*, ought not perhaps to have so greatly astonished the Chevalier *Folard*.

If we may credit some authors, we have a shorter way of getting rid of the Chevalier's difficulties, which is, to deny the facts that give occasion to them. According to these writers, *Regulus's* army was not so inconsiderable, as from *Polybius's* account it seems to have been. *Appian* and *Orosius* make it 30,000 strong; and *Eutropius* reckons 47,000 men, of whom 30,000 were slain, and 15,000 taken prisoners in the battle with *Xantippus*.

And as to the *Romans* quitting *Africa* after the victory at sea by *Fulvius* and *Æmilius*, the last named author [*Eutropius*] represents them, not as making this retreat by choice, but as being constrained to it by famine.

498.

Bef. J. C.

254.

197 Com-

Polyb. B.

I. c. 37.

Y. of R. sue an interest that was by no means worthy of the hazard.
 498. But such, as *Polybius* tells us, was the character
 Bef. J. C. of the *Romans*; impetuous, presumptuous, and obsti-
 254. nate, they would carry every thing by mere violence;
 197 Con- they would force all nature to their will: to them no-
 fulship. thing was impossible which they would desire; nay, it
 must of necessity come to pass, if they had once decreed
 that it should be done. And indeed, *adds our author*,
 in their enterprizes by land, and where they had to do
 only with men and the works of men, this inflexible
 audaciousness of spirit for the most part (not always) car-
 ried them through every obstacle to the end proposed;
 but in their naval expeditions, when they foolishly im-
 gined that the winds and the seas must be complaisant
 to their wishes and projects, they were sure to be chas-
 tised for their overweening presumption; and of this
 they had frequent experience.

Polyb. B.
1. c. 38. The *Romans*, tho' extremely afflicted, were not dis-
 couraged by the ruin of their fleet; they ordered a new
 one of 220 sail to be speedily built; and, which is al-
 most incredible, this powerful armament was complete-
 ly equipped in three months time.

Y. of R. The Consular *Fasces* had been transferred to *A. At-*
499. *tilius* and *Cn. Cornelius Afina* (the same *Cornelius* who
 Bef. J. C. was formerly made prisoner at *Lipara*, and had lived
 253. some time in captivity.) These commanders having
 198 Con- passed the *Straights* with the new fleets, and touched at
 fulship. *Messina* to take with them the eighty vessels which had
 escaped the late storm, shaped their course for *Cephale-*
dium, which was delivered to them by treachery;
 thence they sailed to *Drepanum*, and began to besiege
 it; but upon succours being brought thither by *Cartha-*

Diod. Sic. *lo* the *Carthaginian* General (who had retaken *Agrigen-*
 in Eclog. *tum*, and demolished the walls of it) they drew off and
 p. 877. sailed to *Panormus*, which, according to *Polybius*, was
Palermo then the capital city of the *Carthaginians* in *Sicily*. The
 Consuls besieged this place, and having carried the
 out-works by assault, the besieged capitulated, and
 surrendered the town. The inhabitants of *Selinus*,
Tyndaris, and other places, did the like, having first
 driven

driven out the *Carthaginian* garrisons. After these conquests, the *Romans* leaving a strong body of troops in *Panormus*, returned to *Rome*.

Early the next summer the succeeding Consuls, *Cn. Servilius* and *C. Sempronius*, sailed over to *Sicily* with all their naval force, and from thence soon after stood for the coast of *Africa*, where they made several descents, and brought away some booty, but performed nothing of moment. Coming at length near the island of the *Lotophagi*, (which was called *Meninx*,) not far from the *Syrtis*; and, being unacquainted with the coast, they ran upon some banks of sand, and there stuck fast: The sea ebbing left them dry, and they were utterly at a loss what to do, apprehending the destruction of the whole fleet. But the flood returning some hours after, and they lightening the vessels by throwing their booty over-board, made a shift to get off. Immediately they stood away for *Sicily*, as if they were flying before an enemy, and, having doubled the cape of *Lilybaum*, arrived safely in the port of *Panormus*. But from thence steering their course homewards at a time unskilfully chosen, they lost 150 of their vessels by a storm that overtook them in the passage.

So terrible a destruction of two fleets by tempest totally discouraged the *Romans* from all naval enterprizes. No more than sixty vessels were to be equipped for the future, and these were to be employed only to transport the troops with the baggage and ammunition into *Sicily*. Their thirst of glory and empire was not abated, but they determined to rely wholly on their land-forces for the achievement of the conquest they had in view. This conquest however could not be effected by land armies alone, while the maritime towns in the possession of the *Carthaginians* were open to receive provisions and recruits by sea, as occasion should require. Nay, ever since the defeat of *Regulus* by means of the elephants, the *Roman* soldiers were afraid of coming to an engagement by land, where they should have to do with those huge and furious animals.

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Y. of R. The *Carthaginians* had dispatched *Asdrubal* with 140
 500. elephants to *Lilybæum*, and had strengthened the army
Bef. J. C. which was there with troops drawn from other places ;
 252. 199 Con- and they had sent after him 200 ships of war. *Asdrubal*,
 fulship. after his arrival, having first applied himself diligently to discipline his soldiers and elephants, had boldly taken the field with a resolution to offer the enemy battle. But though the armies were on several occasions encamped within five or six furlongs of each other, sometimes in the territory of *Selinus*, sometimes about *Lilybæum*, the *Romans* for the space of two years together, had not once the resolution to come to an engagement with the enemy ; nor durst they descend into the open champaign country. So that during the

Y. of R. Consulship of *C. Aurelius* * and *P. Servilius*, and that of
 501. **Y. of R.** *L. Cæcilius Metellus* and *C. Furius*, no progress was
 502. made in their affairs, except the taking of two towns, which they could besiege, still keeping themselves posted in high and inaccessible places. This terror among the legions made the Senate of *Rome* at length change their measures, and resolve to try their fortune once

Y. of R. more at sea. And accordingly, after the election of *C.*
 503. **Bef. J. C.** § *Atilius* and *L. + Manlius* to the Consulate, they order'd the building of fifty new vessels, and that suitable
 249. 202 Con- levies should be made of men fit for that service.

fulship. In the mean time *Asdrubal* having observed the dread
 § A 2d that possessed the *Roman* army, whenever he presented them battle ; and having intelligence that
 time. *Furius* was returned to *Rome* with one half of the army,
 + A 2d and that *Cæcilius* with the other was at *Panormus* to protect
 time. his allies while they gathered in their harvest, he
 Polyb. B. marched from *Lilybæum*, and came with all his forces
 1. c. 40. to the borders of the territory of *Panormus*, hoping to provoke *Cæcilius* to fight. But the *Roman*, who well understood his own business kept close within the town, and pretending fear, suffered the *Carthaginians* to advance, and pillage the country without opposition,

* In this Consulate *Tib. Coruncanius* was chosen *Pontifex Maximus*, the first instance of a Plebeian raised to that high station.

till with all their elephants they had passed a river which ^{Y. of R.} ran within a mile of the place. He then sent out some ^{503.} light-armed troops, to skirmish and draw the enemy ^{Bef. J.C.} farther on, supporting his first detachment by others, as ^{249.} occasion required, till by this management he had ^{202 Con-} brought the whole *Carthaginian* army as near to the ^{sulship.} town as he wished them to be. At a proper distance from the walls he had caused a trench to be cut, which the elephants could by no means pass; and he had given his dart-men orders, in case those animals advanced against them, to retire by slow degrees till they came to that trench, into which they were then to leap and from thence to gall the elephants with their darts as much as possibly they could. He ordered the town's people at the same time to furnish themselves with great quantities of darts, and post themselves at the foot of the walls. *Cæcilius* himself, with the main body of his forces, remained in readiness at a certain gate of the town, which was opposite to the left wing of the enemy. When the battle grew warm, the leaders of the elephants, being desirous to have the chief honour of the victory, advanced in order upon the *Romans*, whom, retiring before them, they pursued to the very brink of the trench above mentioned. There they were at a stand, and the elephants being terribly gaul'd with the darts both of those who leap'd into the trench, and of those who were on the other side of it, began presently to grow unruly, and turning back furiously upon their own infantry, utterly disordered them. And now *Cæcilius*, who saw his advantage, sallied out with all his troops, fresh and in good order, and charging the enemy in flank, easily put them to the rout. The *Carthaginians* suffered a great slaughter, some of their elephants ^d were killed, and the rest were taken.

^d *Cæcilius*, according to *Pliny*, B. 8. ch. 6. caused the elephants to be transported to *Italy*, where they were baited to death in the *Circus at Rome*.

Y. of R. The news of *Cæcilius*'s exploit caused great rejoicings
 503. at *Rome*, not so much on account of the taking the e-
 Bef. J. C. lephants, tho' that was a very terrible blow to the ene-
 249. my, as because by the victory obtained against those
 202 Con- formidable animals, the courage of the *Roman* soldiers
 fulship. was entirely restored, and they no longer feared to keep
Polyb. B. in the open country. It was resolved therefore diligently
 1. c. 41. to pursue the design of sending the new Consuls in-
 to *Sicily* with a naval force, and by vigorous efforts
 both by land and sea, to put an end, if possible, to this
 destructive war.

C H A P. VIII.

Regulus is sent to Rome with some Ambassadors from Carthage to negotiate a peace. His behaviour on this occasion, and the consequences of it.

THE defeat of *Aesdrubal*^{*} before *Panormus* threw the people of *Carthage* into discouragement; they began now to think seriously of peace; and believing that if *Regulus*, a man so much esteemed by his countrymen, engaged in the affair, an accommodation might be easily effected, they sent him to *Rome* with the am-
 Appian. in bassadors appointed for this negotiation; having first
 Punic. taken an oath of him to return to *Carthage*, in case
 Bell. c. 3. there should neither be peace nor an exchange of pri-
Livy, Epit. soners. When after his landing in *Italy* he came to
 B. 18. the gates of *Rome*, he would by no means enter the
Eutrop. city, alledging, that he was no longer a *Roman* citizen,
 B. 2. but a slave of a foreign power, and that he did not
Cic. de come to infringe the laws and customs of his native
Offic. B. 3. country, which forbade the Senate to give audience to
Sil. Ital. strangers within the walls; nor, when his wife *Marcia*
 B. 6. *Val. Max.* with her children ran to meet him, did he shew any
 B. 1. c. 2. & B. 9. c. 1. signs of joy, but fix'd his eyes upon the ground, as
 A. Gell. B. 6. c. 4. one ashamed of his servile condition, and unworthy of
Aurel.
Vit. c. 40. ² This General, according to *Zonaras*, was crucified for his mi-
Zon. B. 8. conduct.

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their caresses. So extraordinary a behaviour raised the admiration both of the *Romans* and *Carthaginians*, and all were impatiently curious to know how he would conduct himself in the Senate. The *Fathers* being at length assembled without the walls, the ambassadors ^{Y. of R. 503. Ref. J. C. 249.} were admitted to an audience, and made their proposals ; and then *Regulus*, whose turn it was to speak next, only added, *Conscript Fathers*, being a slave to the Carthaginians, *I come on the part of my masters to treat with you concerning a peace and an exchange of prisoners.* He said no more ; and when he had utter'd these few words, sought to withdraw and follow the ambassadors, who could not be present at the deliberations. In vain the Consuls pressed him to stay, and give his opinion as a Senator and Consular Person ; he absolutely refused to take his place among the *Conscript Fathers*. However, he obey'd his *African* masters, who directed him to continue in the assembly. There he remained in a modest silence, till the oldest Senators had declared their opinions, and then he express'd himself to the following effect : ‘ *Romans*, I am sensible, that the fatigues and expence of so difficult a war put your virtue to a severe trial ; but what great enterprize can ever be atchieved without a steady fortitude ? I am an eyewitness of the distress of *Carthage*. ’ Tis nothing but the impossibility of maintaining the war, that makes the *Carthaginians* sollicit for a peace. You have lost one battle, (it was when I commanded) a misfortune which *Metellus* has repair'd by a notable victory. Except two cities, *Sicily* is entirely yours ; and your new fleet spreads a terror throughout the seas. You govern your allies in tranquillity, and they serve you with zeal. *Carthage*, drain'd of her wealth, can depend but little on the provinces of her dominion. With how much ease did I bring them into a revolt ! Your armies are composed of soldiers of one and the same nation, united by mutual esteem and affection : the troops of *Carthage* are chiefly made up of strangers who have no tie to her but their pay, and whom the example of *Xantippus* will deter from engaging

Y. of R. ‘ in her service. My opinion therefore is absolutely a-
 503. ‘ gainst a peace with our Enemies ; nor do I think it
 Bef. J. C. ‘ for your interest to make an exchange of prisoners.
 249. ‘ Among the *Carthaginian* captives you have thirteen
 202 Con- ‘ considerable officers, young, and capable of com-
 fulship. ‘ manding one day the armies of the enemy. As for
 ‘ me, I grow old, and my misfortunes have made me
 ‘ useless ; add to this, that the number of *Carthagini-*
 ‘ *an* captives of an inferior rank, infinitely exceeds
 ‘ that of the *Roman* prisoners, so that the exchange
 ‘ must be to your disadvantage. And after all, what
 ‘ can you expect from soldiers who have been van-
 ‘ quish’d and reduced to slavery ? Will they serve the
 ‘ Republic with the courage of men whose reputation
 ‘ is entire and untouch’d ? No, they will rather be
 ‘ like timorous deer, that have escaped out of the toils
 ‘ of the hunter, ever ready to fly at the approach of
 ‘ danger.’

This discourse fill’d the Senators with admiration and compassion, and though they approved his advice concerning the proposals made by the *Carthaginians*, yet they knew not how to consent to the ruin of a man whose contempt of life made him the more worthy to be preserv’d. The *Pontifex Maximus* being consulted, declared, that his oath having been extorted from him, he might without perjury continue at *Rome*. They press’d him therefore not to return to *Africk*; but *Regulus* was offended with these solicitations. ‘ What !
 ‘ have you then resolved to dishonour me ? I am too
 ‘ well acquainted with the inconstancy of the people’s
 ‘ favour, to trust them with the care of my reputation.
 ‘ At my first return they are full of good will, touch’d
 ‘ with a fresh remembrance of my misfortunes : this
 ‘ fit of joy once over, and I am no longer thought of.
 ‘ Nay, I doubt not but my stay here would be re-
 ‘ proach’d me by those who have seem’d the most af-
 ‘ flicted for my absence. How often shall I be called
 ‘ Slave ! May not *Rome* herself disdain to own me for
 ‘ one of her Citizens ? I am not ignorant, that death
 ‘ and

' and the extremest tortures are preparing for me; Y. of R.
 ' but what are these to the shame of an infamous action,^{503.}
 ' the wounds of a guilty mind? Slave as I am to
 ' *Carthage*, I have still the spirit of a *Roman*; I have^{249.}
 ' sworn to return, it is my duty to go; let the Gods fulfilship.^{202.}
 ' take care of the rest.'

The Senate, by the same decree which refused the *Carthaginian* ambassadors both peace and an exchange of prisoners, left *Regulus* at liberty to continue at *Rome*, or return to *Carthage*, as he should think fit. This was all that *Marcia* could obtain from the *Fathers* by her tears and solicitations. *Regulus*, to free himself from all farther importunity of his friends, assured them, that before his departure from *Africk* the *Carthaginians* had given him a slow poison, and that he could not long survive the negociation. As soon as it was ended, he quitted his native country, to go and resume his chains at *Carthage*, with the same serenity as if he had been going to a country seat for his recreation.

Those authors who have celebrated the heroism of *Regulus* on this occasion, tho' they all concur in reporting that he suffer'd at his return into *Africa* some cruel death from the revenge of the *Carthaginians*, yet are by no means agreed concerning the particular kind of torment he was made to undergo.

The most current opinion is, that they cut off or sew'd back his eye-lids, and then bringing him out of a dark dungeon, exposed him to the sun at mid-day: That after this they shut him up in a kind of chest or press stuck full, on the inside, with iron spikes, and there left him to die in torment*.

The

* Altho' this story of the cruel revenge which the *Carthaginians* took of *Regulus* after his return to *Carthage* be found in many of the best *Roman* authors, and altho' it be not expressly contradicted by any ancient writer; yet the reasons that are offer'd by some moderns against the truth of it may perhaps excuse our incredulity, should we look upon it as a meer fiction.

Palmerius, in a note upon *Appian*, offers two very weighty arguments for rejecting the account as fabulous.

V. of R. The news of this barbarity no sooner reached *Rome*,
 503. but the Senate, by way of retaliation, gave up the chief
 Bes. J. C.

249.

202 Con-
sulship.

1. The total silence of *Polybius* concerning every thing that happen'd to *Regulus* after his defeat and captivity.

How can we account for that author's silence upon matters of so interesting a nature, in his History of the First Punic War; a History, which in many parts of it is written rather with prolixity than brevity; I say, how can we account for this, but by supposing, that *Polybius* for good reasons disbelieved the tradition which had been greedily embraced by the *Romans* concerning *Regulus*'s death, and therefore disdained to record it; and that nevertheless he was unwilling to offend them by contradicting such a favourite story? It was hence, doubtless, that he avoided saying any thing of *Regulus*'s voyage to *Rome*, his behaviour there, and his return to *Carthage*; because had he mentioned these, without speaking of his death, (the supposed immediate consequence of them,) an affected silence in this particular only, would have amounted to a direct condemnation of the prevailing opinion.

2. A fragment preserved by *Valeius*, of the 24th book of *Diodorus Siculus*.

This fragment (speaking of *Regulus*'s wife and sons, into whose custody *Boscar* and *Hamilcar*, two captive *Carthaginian* Generals, had been given) begins thus:

" —— But the mother of the young men [the *Attili*] grievously
 " laid to heart the death of her husband, and thinking [or imagining]
 " that he had lost his life [*δι' αγέλων*] for want of good looking after,
 " stirred up her sons to use the captives cruelly."

Then it relates, that the captives being thrust together into a close place, where they could hardly stir, and being kept from food, *Boscar*, after five days of extreme misery, expired: That *Hamilcar*, who yet held out, telling the wife of *Regulus* how careful he had been of her husband, with tears implored her compassion; but that she, far from being touched with the least sense of humanity, kept him five days after this in the same hole, shut up with the carcase of his companion, giving him only so much sustenance as would serve to prolong his life in misery: That by means of some servants in the house, a report of this horrible cruelty came to the ears of the Tribunes of the people: That the magistrates having well assured themselves of the fact, summoned the *Attili*, and threaten'd them with the severest punishments, if for the time to come they did not take all due care of the prisoners; nay, that they were very near pronouncing sentence of death upon the young men, for having brought a dishonour upon the *Roman* name: That the *Attili*, to excuse themselves, laid the blame upon their mother: That they burnt the body of *Boscar*, and sent the ashes to his relations, and for the future cherish'd *Hamilcar*, whom they had so barbarously treated.

Palmerius's conjecture from the whole is this:

That

chief of the *Carthaginian* captives to be treated at the ^{V. of R.} discretion of *Marcia*, (the widow of *Regulus*,) who ⁵⁰³ condemned ^{Bef. J. C.}

^{249.} ^{502 Con-}
That *Bostrar* and *Hamilcar* being taken prisoners, [probably in that sea-fight on the coast of *Africa*, where the *Carthaginians* lost 114 ships, because no mention is made of them in the war after that time,] the Senate, to console the wife and sons of *Regulus*, put those captive Generals into their hands, that they might have the price of his ransom in their possession.

That *Regulus*, died of some distemper in captivity, whereat the wife being extremely vexed, as having lost the pleasing hope of recovering her husband by exchange, treated the captives cruelly; that the magistrates being angry at this conduct, she, to give a colour of justice to her cruelty, told this fable of her husband's perishing by hunger, want of sleep, and other torments, to her neighbours and gossips; that hence the story by degrees spread far, gathering strength as it went, and easily gained credit through the hatred borne to the *Carthaginians*.

Palmerius might have added, That as some women have imaginations very creative, and as, especially where their passions are concerned, they easily believe the real existence of what meer imagination exhibits, the wife of *Regulus* might possibly have persuaded herself without any ground, that her husband had lost his life through the hardships of his imprisonment. And this is conformable to the fragment of *Diodorus*, which says, that she thinking that he had lost his life through neglect, stirred up her sons, &c.

3. A third argument against the story of *Regulus*'s death by torture, may be drawn from the disagreement among those who report it, concerning the kind of torture he was made to undergo. Did he perish by being kept from sleep? Was he starved to death? Was he crucified? Or did he end his life in a chest or barrel stuck with spikes? All these are reported by different authors. If it were certain that the *Carthaginians* put him to death by torture, is it not strange that the kind of torture should not be more certainly known? *Florus* doubts whether he died by the hardships of his imprisonment, or upon a cross.

4. Where there is any good reason to suspect the evidence to a fact, the improbability arising from the situation of things, makes strongly against the belief of such fact. Now it seems highly improbable, that the *Carthaginians* should treat *Regulus* in the manner pretended, at the very time when two of their Generals and many of their inferior Officers, as well as multitudes of their common Soldiers, were in the hands of the *Romans*.

5. We may observe, that the *Senate's* giving up the *Carthaginian* prisoners to be treated at the discretion of *Regulus's* sons, upon the news of the cruel death he had suffered, a fact reported by *A. Gellius*, and which, if true, would be the strongest argument in favour of the common opinion, is absolutely inconsistent with what *Diodorus* relates

Y. of R. condemned them to the same kind of death her husband had suffer'd.
503. Ref. J. C.

249. 202 Consulship. lates of the anger of the *Roman* magistrates at the conduct of the *Attilii* with regard to the captives.

Thus much concerning the credibility of the story of *Regulus's* sufferings. Before we take leave of him, let us see Sir *Walter Raleigh's* judgment of that part of his behaviour, which is supposed to have drawn upon him the *Carthaginian* resentment, and brought him to so miserable an end. Sir *Walter's* words are these :

" The death of *Attilius Regulus* the Consul was very memorable. " He was sent from *Cartilage* to *Rome* about the exchange and ransom " of prisoners on both sides, giving his faith to return if the busi- " ness were not effected. When he came to *Rome*, and plainly saw " that his country should lose by the bargain, so far was he from " urging the Senate unto compassion of his own misery, that he ear- " neatly persuaded to have the prisoners in *Africk* left to their ill " destinies. This done, he returned to *Cartilage*, where for his pains " taken, he was rewarded with an horrible death. For this his con- " stancy and faith all writers highly extol him. But the *Carthaginians* " seem to have judged him an obstinate and malicious enemy, that " neither in his prosperity would hearken to reason, nor yet in his " calamity would have the natural care to preserve himself and o- " thers, by yielding to such an office of humanity as is common in " all wars (not grounded upon deadly hatred) only in regard of some " small advantage. Whatsoever the *Carthaginians* thought of him, " sure it is, that his faithful observance of his word given cannot be " too much commended. But that grave speech which he made in " the Senate, against the exchange of prisoners, appears, in all " reason, to have proceeded from a vain-glorious Forwardness, ra- " ther than from any necessity of State. For the exchange was " made soon after his death; wherein the *Romans* had the worse " bargain, by so much as *Regulus* himself was worth. As for the " authority of all Historians, that magnify him in this point; we " are to consider that they lived under the *Roman Empire*: *Philinus*, " the *Carthaginian*, perhaps did censure it otherwise."

C H A P. IX. From the 14th to the 18th year of the war.

The Romans, flush'd with their late victory at land, imagine, that, with the assistance of their new fleet, they shall now be able to take Lilybæum, and thereby put an end to the war in Sicily. After considerable progress made in the siege, they are forced to turn it into a blockade: and not long after, their whole navy is utterly destroyed.

destroyed. More fortunate by land, they take Eryx from the enemy, Amilcar Barcha is sent from Carthage to command the forces of that republic in Sicily.

WHEN the Consuls *Attilius* and *Manlius* had got Y. of R. all things ready for their expedition into *Sicily*, ^{503.} Bef. J. C. they put to sea with a fleet of 200 sail, and arrived on the coast of *Lilybæum*, in the neighbourhood of which place their land forces were already assembled. ^{249.} ²⁰² ^{Consulship.}

It was the strongest, and, except *Drepanum*, (about 15 miles from it northward) the only city of importance, which the *Carthaginians* possessed in the island; and the *Romans* had therefore resolved to besiege it, as knowing that, could they make this conquest, it would be easy for them afterwards to transport the war into *Africa*. ^{Polyb. B. I. c. 41.}

Lilybæum stood almost at the extremity of the cape ^{c. 42.} ^{Diod. Sic.} of the same name, and was surrounded by a strong ^{in Eclog.} wall and a deep ditch, filled with water from the sea. ^{p. 879.} The *Romans* sat down before it, and having fortified ^{Zon. B. 8.} themselves by an intrenchment which ran from sea to sea, made their first approaches against some towers of defence. These they soon beat to the ground; after which they filled up the town ditch, and by their battering engines, and by mining, so weaken'd the wall in many parts of it, that the besieged began to be extremely terrified; although the garrison, without reckoning the inhabitants, consisted of more than 10000 men. *Himilco*, who commanded in the place, performed the part of a gallant and able officer. He repaired the breaches, made countermines, and was in a manner every where present, watching an opportunity to set fire to the enemy's wooden towers, and engines of battery; and, in this view, making frequent sallies by night and by day, with a boldness little short of temerity; on which occasion the slaughter was sometimes not less than what commonly happens in ranged battles, in the field.

In the mean while, though they were ignorant at ^{Polyb. B.} *Carthage* of what passed at *Lilybæum*, yet concluding ^{I. c. 44.}

Y. of R. that the garrison must be sorely distressed, they dis-
 503. patched an officer, named *Hannibal*, with 10000 men
 Bef. J. C. on board a fleet of 50 galleys to their relief. *Hannibal*
 249. being arrived at the island of *Aegusa*, lying a little off
 202. fulship. of *Lilybæum*, waited there for a favourable and brisk
 gale, which no sooner presented, but crowding all his
 sails he came to the entrance of the port, having ranged
 his soldiers in a fighting posture on the decks of the
 vessels. The *Romans*, (whose ships were stationed on
 each side of the mouth of the haven) partly through
 fear of being forced by the wind into the port with the
 enemy, made no motion to attack them, but contented
 themselves to look on and wonder at their hardy at-
 tempt. Thus *Hannibal* without any opposition made
 his way into the haven, where he landed his men,
 to the great joy of the besieged, who were yet more
 pleased with the consternation, in which they beheld
 their enemies, than with the succour they themselves
 received.

Polyb. B. 1. c. 45. *Hamilco* observing the alacrity and good dispositions,
 both of the inhabitants, whose courage was raised by
 the reinforcement, and of the new comers, who had
 yet suffered nothing of the hardships incident to a
 town besieged, resolved now to make a general sally
 and attempt what he had long meditated, the burning
 of the enemy's towers and engines. The conflict on
 this occasion was extremely bloody, all the forces on
 both sides being engaged in it, and fighting with the
 utmost obstinacy and emulation. In conclusion the *Ro-
 mans* happily preserved their works; for at the very
 instant when they were beginning to despair of it, *Hi-
 milco*, seeing great numbers of his men slain, and his
 purpose not effected, sounded a retreat and put an end
 to the fight.

c. 46. After this action, *Hannibal* sailing away in the night,
 went with his fleet to *Drepanum*, there to consult with
Adberbal, who was his intimate friend, and who com-
 manded in that place for the *Carthaginians*.

But now the *Romans* kept *Lilybæum* so straitly shut
 up, and watched the entrance of the haven so narrow-
 ly,

ly, that no body durst make an attempt to come out Y. of R. of it. In the mean while they were very impatient at ^{503.} *Carthage* to have some account of the condition of the besieged; and at length a certain *Rhodian*, named ^{249.} *Hannibal*, ²⁰² *Con-*
sulship. a man of distinction, undertook to satisfy their desire. Having prepared a light galley expressly for this enterprize, he put to sea from *Carthage*, (or perhaps from *Drepanum*) and got under covert of one of those islands lying off of *Lilybæum*. Early the next morning, with a fair and fresh gale, passing in view of the enemy, who could not thrust from the shores on either side time enough to stop him, he got by ten o'clock into the Port. The *Romans* doubted not, but this bold adventurer would soon attempt to return. The Consul therefore, to keep a better guard, posted at the entrance of the Port ten of his nimblest vessels (on each side five) which with their oars displayed like wings kept themselves ready to fly upon the expected prey. The *Rhodian* nevertheless in broad day light made his passage safely through these guards, and not only so, but when he was got out to sea, turned about, and, lying upon his oars, with an insulting mockery, challenged any one of them to come and fight him. In this manner he passed and repassed several times, bringing orders and carrying intelligence, to the great encouragement of the besieged, and the amazement of the *Romans* at so successful a temerity. But the boldness of the *Rhodian* was founded on his perfect knowledge of the channel, and how to keep clear of the rocks and sand-banks on each side. His success so often repeated, encouraged others, who had the same skill, to follow his example: which the *Romans* finding to be of very ill consequence, they undertook to choak up intirely the mouth of the haven. For this purpose they filled a great number of round ships (or ships of burden) with huge stones, and sunk them in the channel; but the force of the stream carried the most of these away. However they grounded so many of them in the best of the entrance, as at last it made a manifest rising and heap, like a ragged island in the passage.

A certain

Polyb. B. I.

c. 47.

Y. of R. A certain *Carthaginian* galley coming out of the port
 503. in the night, and not suspecting any such impediment,
 Bef. J. C. ran herself aground upon it, and so fell into the enemy's
 249. hands. The *Romans* immediately mann'd her with chosen
 202 Con- soldiers and their best rowers, and then placed her on
 fulship. the watch to catch the *Rhodian*. He had happily got into
 the port by night, and was returning in open day, when he found himself chased by a galley that gathered upon him. He soon perceived what she was by her form and her swiftness, and as he was not able to run from her, he had no way left but to turn about and fight with her. This he resolutely did, but she being too well mann'd for him, he was presently taken; after which no more attempts were made to go in or out of the port of *Lilybæum*.

Polyb. B. I. The besieged however were not so disheartned by c. 48. this disadvantage, as to remit any thing of their attention to a vigorous defence; and though they had lost all hope of destroying the works erected against their fortification, they continued indefatigable in repairing the breaches made in it. And now a favourable accident, when they least expected such good fortune, delivered them at once from the fear of those wooden towers which overtopt their walls, and of all the battering engines of the besiegers. So violent a tempest arose on a sudden, as made the galleries of the *Romans* totter, and threw *some of their towers to the ground. This was thought by some *Greek* soldiers, in the service of *Carthage*, an opportunity which ought not to be neglected, to attempt once more the burning of the enemy's works of battery. Having communicated the project to their commanding officer (who both approved it, and prepared every thing necessary for its execution) out they rushed and set fire to the works in three places. The flames spread themselves with great swiftness, by reason of the violence of the wind and the dryness of the timber, the works having been long erected. The *Romans*, all in confusion and surprize, knew not which way to turn themselves; for they were blinded by the smoke and the sparks of fire which the wind

wind drove in their faces, so that many of them were slain before they could approach the places where help was wanted. On the other hand, the wind favouring the *Carthaginians*, not only they could see clearly, and so take their aim, but whatever they threw either ^{Y. of R.}_{Bef. J. C.}^{503.}_{249.}_{202 Con-}fulship. against the enemy, or against their batteries, was carried with the greater violence to the mark, while the darts of the *Romans* could take no effect. In a word, the fire became irresistible, and spreading every way, it consumed to ashes all the *Roman* works, and even melted the brazen heads of their battering rams.

The besiegers by this blow were totally discouraged from the thoughts of renewing their attacks. They turned therefore the siege into a blockade, encompassing the place with a rampart and a ditch, and patiently hoping to obtain by some happy turn of fortune, or by starving the enemy, what they now despised of carrying by assault.

But when the news came to *Rome* that great numbers both of the sea and land forces had been lost in fighting to defend the works, and in the other service of the siege, the people were only the more animated by it to pursue the enterprize with vigour, insomuch that 10000 of them voluntarily offered themselves to go and serve before *Lilybaeum*. Upon the arrival of these troops at the camp, *Claudius Pulcher*, who was then in the Consulate, (with *L. Junius Pullus*) and had the command of the forces in *Sicily*, having called his officers together, proposed to them instantly to embark and sail with all the fleet to *Drepanum*. To engage their approbation of this project, he represented to them, that *Adherbal* the Governor of that place had not a sufficient strength to resist them; that he knew nothing of the reinforcement they had received, and would never imagine they could be masters of a naval army, after the losses they had sustained in the siege. The design being generally approved, the seamen, both old and new comers, were ordered forthwith to embark, together with the bravest soldiers of the legions, who readily offered themselves for this expedition, not doubting but

Polyb. B. I.
c. 49.
^{Y. of R.}
^{504.}
Bef. J. C.
^{248.}
_{203 Con-}
fulship.

Y. of R. but they should enrich themselves with the plunder of
 504. *Drepanum.*

Bef. J. C. 248. For this place then the fleet, consisting of 124 gall-
 203 Con- lies, set sail about midnight; and at break of day the
 fulship. headmost of the vessels were descried from the town.

Adberbal was at first struck with the unexpected appear-
 ance of the enemy, but, soon recovering himself, he determined to run any hazard, rather than endure
 a siege, with which he plainly saw that he was threat-
 ened. Instantly he called together, upon the sea shore,
 all his seamen and soldiers, both those that were on
 board his gallies and those that were in the town, and
 set before them in a few words how easily they might
 be victors in a naval battle, if they would but resolve
 to behave themselves with courage; and, on the other
 hand, what dreadful calamities (the consequences of a
 siege) they must unavoidably undergo, if on the present
 occasion they let themselves be intimidated by the ap-
 prehension of danger. The army unanimously declared
 their readiness to follow him, whithersoever he should
 please to conduct them. Hereupon he instantly ordered
 them all on board, and embarking himself, directed
 them to keep their eyes on his galley (which should
 lead the van,) and to do as she did. Then putting to
 sea he brought his fleet out of the port, and hid them
 behind some rocks which lay on the side of the haven
 e. 50. opposite to that by which the *Romans* were going to
 enter.

The headmost of the *Roman* vessels were already en-
 tered into the port, other gallies were entering, and
 others were not far off, when *Adberbal*, quitting his
 concealment, appeared on a sudden with his fleet out
 at sea, and in a posture to give battle. At this sight
Claudius, extremely surprized and disappointed, made
 a sign to his foremost gallies to tack and stand back
 again; but when those that had entered the port, or
 were in the haven's mouth, began to hasten back, they
 encountered with others that were yet standing in, so
 that falling foul of one another, many of the ships re-
 ceived

ceived great damage, and were in danger of perishing. Y. of R.
 At length, in such manner as they could, they drew ^{504.}
 out; and as fast as they got clear and obtained room, Bef. J. C.
 put themselves in order of battle along the shore, with ^{248.}
²⁰³ Con-
 their prows pointing towards the enemy. *Claudius*, who fulship.
 had been in the rear of all his fleet, now placed himself
 in the left of his line. He had it once in his power (as
 some report) to sheer off, but was obstinately bent to try
 an engagement; insomuch that when the sacred chickens
 were consulted and refused their meat, he threw them
 cage and all into the sea; *If they wont eat*, said he, *let Cic. B. 2.*
them drink, not reflecting that such a contempt of ^{de Nat.}
 religion might discourage those who were witnesses of ^{Deor.}
^{Val. Max.} it. ^{B. 1. c. 4.}

In the mean while *Adherbal*, having with five great vessels passed the left wing of the *Romans*, turned the prow of his own galley upon the enemy, making a signal for the rest of his fleet, which followed, on the same line, to do the like. And now the whole *Carthaginian* fleet being drawn up in front, advanced against the *Romans*, who, as was before said, were drawn up along the shore, a situation than which none could be more dangerous. As soon as the two fleets were near each other, the flags of defiance were hoisted by the two admirals, and the battle began. At first the conflict ^{c. 50.} ^{c. 51.} was equal on both sides, each fleet having on board the hardiest men they could pick out of their land forces. But victory by degrees began to declare for the *Carthaginians*, who indeed had many advantages above the *Romans*, by the lightness of their vessels, the expertness of their rowers, and especially by the wise precaution they had taken to have sea-room, wherein to work their vessels as occasion required; for at any time when they were pressed by the enemy, they could at pleasure retire, spread themselves, or draw close together, in which movements the lightness of their gallies greatly availed. Moreover when any of the *Roman* gallies (heavily built and unskillfully managed) chased any of theirs, and thereby separated themselves from their own fleet, those who were chased could tack upon the pursuers,

Y. of R. pursuers, and intercept them, or rowing round them,
 504. Bef. J. C. come upon their flank with their prows and sink them.
 248. All these benefits were wanting to the *Romans*; but
 203. Con- their greatest evil was their situation; because when any
 fulship. of their vessels were hard press'd, they could by no means
 retire for the shore; they must either run aground upon
 the flats, or bulge against the rocks.

The Consul at length, observing the distress of his fleet, that some were split upon the rocks and others stranded, stood away to the left, and with only thirty vessels that were the nearest to him, escaped out of the battle. The rest, to the number of ninety three, fell into the enemy's hands, together with all the men, except a few soldiers who had got ashore, after their vessels were run aground or broken to pieces. Eight thousand of the

Orof. B. 4. *Romans* are said to have been slain, and 2000 taken prisoners.

Polyb. B. 1. This was a glorious action for *Adherbal*, to whom the
 c. 52. *Carthaginians* did very great *Honour*, ascribing the suc-
 cess to his sole virtue and bravery; while on the other hand, *Claudius* was recalled to *Rome*, where he was reproached with his shameful defeat, and with the loss his country had sustained, as entirely owing to his folly and temerity. Nevertheless when he was ordered to name a Dictator, he, to insult the senate, nominated to that su-
Sueton. life preme dignity one *Claudius Glycia*, a mean fellow who
 of *Tib.* had been his viator or tipstaff: but this mock dictator
Faſt. Capit. c. did not hold the place; *M. Attilius Calatinus* was sub-
 stituted in his room. After which the Consul (now de-
 posed) was brought to a formal trial for his misconduct, and was loaded with a rigorous sentence.

Polyb. B. 1. As for the other Consul, *Junius Pullus*, he had been
 c. 52. dispatched over to *Sicily* with order to supply the camp before *Lilybæum*, with provisions and all necessary stores; for the safe convoy of which, he had a squadron of 60 galleys. Being arrived at *Messina*, he there augmented his fleet with what ships had been sent thither from

^c According to *Liv. Epit.* he was suffered afterwards to wear the *prætexta* at the publick shows.

Lilybæum,

Lilybæum, and from other places in the island, and then Y. of R. set sail for *Syracuse*; his whole fleet now consisting of 120 ships of war and 800 storeships. From *Syracuse* he dispatched his Quæstors with one half of his vessels of burthen, and some of his galleys, that they might without delay furnish the camp with necessaries, while he himself staid at this port, waiting the arrival of that part of his fleet which had not been able to keep him company, and was not yet come up, as also to receive the corn which the Islanders, in the alliance of *Rome*, had provided for him.

About this time *Adherbal*, studious to make the best advantage of his victory, and having sent away to *Carthago*, the ships and the Prisoners taken in the battle, delivered 30 of his Gallies to *Carthalo*, who had already under his own command 70, with which he was lately arrived, and sent him to try what mischief might be done to the *Roman* fleet in the harbour of *Lilybæum*. *Carthalo* suddenly entered the mouth of the haven, and finding the *Romans* more attentive to the keeping in of the besieged, than to the defence of their fleet, without difficulty seized and towed away some of the Gallies and set fire to others. The *Roman* camp took the alarm, and the soldiers hastened to the rescue: but *Himilco* governor of the town sallying out at the same time, and putting the *Romans* in great distress, gave *Carthalo* leisure to go through with his enterprize. After this exploit the *Carthaginian* ran all along the South coast of *Sicily*, with a view to obstruct, what in him lay, the succours that were coming to the *Roman* army. And receiving advice by his scouts, that a great fleet of all sorts of vessels was approaching, and was not far off, he advanced with much joy to encounter them; for both he and his men were full of courage by reason of their late victories. The fleet which had been descried was that under the conduct of the *Roman* Quæstors; who when they got notice that the *Carthaginians* were at hand, not conceiving themselves of sufficient strength to hazard an engagement, presently made for the coast, and drew up their vessels under covert of a poor town belonging

504.
Bef. J. C.
248.
203. Con-

Y. of R. belonging to their party. Here was indeed no safe harbour, yet they found some sort of shelter in certain coves, and small retreats among the rocks; and the town having furnished them with engines for casting stones and shooting arrows, they waited here, in a posture of defence, the attack of the enemy. But *Carthalo* knowing that they could not long ride under those rocks, but would be forced by any great change of wind either to put out into the deep, or to abandon their ships in order to save the men, he, after he had taken some few of their vessels, would not pursue the assault any further, but retired into the mouth of a neighbouring river, and there lay waiting for an opportunity to seize the rest, without hazard to himself.

Polyb. B. I. In the mean while the Consul *Junius*, having dispatched those affairs which had detained him at *Syracuse*, departed thence, and doubling the cape of *Pachynus*, shaped his course for *Lilybæum*, totally ignorant of what had happened to his Quæstors. The *Carthaginians* perceived his approach, and quitting their station sailed away to attack him before he could join the other part of his fleet. *Junius* was yet a great way off when he first despaired the enemy; yet finding himself too near to fly, and too weak to fight, he also, like his Quæstors, ran in close on a part of the coast that was quite harbourless and full of rocks, imagining no danger so great as that of the enemy. *Carthalo* did not care to attack him in a place where it was difficult to work a ship with safety; he betook himself therefore to a station between the two fleets, and there watched to see which of them would first dare to put out to sea. Thus all the three fleets were on the south coast of *Sicily*, between the cape of *Pachynus* and *Lilybæum*, a tract exceedingly dangerous when the wind stormed at south. The *Carthaginians*, who knew the times of tempest and their signs, and who now perhaps observed some swelling billow, or some other such like indication of an approaching storm, immediately weighed anchor and made all haste to double the cape of *Pachynus*, thereby to cover themselves from the rage they feared. This, though with great

great difficulty, they effected, and secured their ships. Y. of R. But the *Romans*, who knew better how to fight than how to navigate, remaining exposed on that rocky coast, were so terribly assaulted by a boisterous south-wind, that not a single ship of either fleet escaped being dashed to pieces.

In this manner was *Rome* once more deprived of all her naval force; and, thus deprived, she renounced once more the empire of the seas.

Notwithstanding all these disasters the *Romans* were still superior to their enemies by land, and though driven to hard shifts for provisions, they continued the blockade of *Lilybaeum*, firmly fixed to abide the utmost extremity rather than abandon their enterprize. As for the Consul *Junius*, who had not lost his men when his ships were destroyed, he repaired with all expedition to the camp, full of anxious thoughts, how to retrieve his honour, by some remarkable service. Between *Panormus* and *Drepanum*, on the side of a mountain, the highest in all *Sicily*, except *Aetna*, stood the city of *Eryx*; and on the top of the mountain was the temple of *Venus Erycina* *, the fairest and richest temple in the whole island. *Junius* formed a design upon these, and, being assisted by the treason of some of those who had been appointed to defend them, got possession of them by surprize. The city was difficult of access, the only way to it being steep and narrow; and the Consul, the better to secure his conquest, built a Fort at the entrance of the passage to it, whare he placed a garrison of 800 men. He also posted another body of men on the top of the mountain, not doubting but by these precautions he should keep quiet possession both of the city, and of the whole mountain.

Zon. B. 8.

Zonaras reports, that *Junius*, after this, was taken prisoner by *Carthalo*; but *Cicero* and *Val. Maximus* tell

* It does not appear at what time the *Carthaginians* made themselves masters of these places; it was probably after the defeat of *Claudius Pulcher*, for, according to *Polybius*, they had nothing in the island but *Drepanum* and *Lilybaeum*, at the time when the latter was first besieged by the *Romans*.

us that he killed himself to avoid an ignominious sentence at *Rome*, for his losing the fleet.

Upon the death or disgrace of the two Consuls, the Dictator *Calatinus* passed into *Sicily* to command the army, the first instance of a *Roman* Dictator appearing out of *Italy*. He performed no exploit.

In the following year † nothing very memorable was done by either party. *Zonaras* relates, that *Carthalo*,
 Y. of R. to draw one of the Consuls out of the island, made a
 505. descent on the *Italian* coast, but without success: for
 Bef. J. C. hearing that the Prætor of *Rome* at the head of an army
 247. was advancing against him, he presently reembarked
 204 Con- and returned to *Sicily*. Here his troops, (whom he had
 fulship. not been able to satisfy with the plunder of the *Roman*
 territories) began to murmur for want of their pay.
 To put a stop to the mutiny, he punished the most clamorous with rigour; but this exasperating even those
 who were more peaceably inclined, a general sedition would probably have ensued, to the ruin of the *Carthaginian* cause, if he had not been seasonably recalled, and a captain of much greater credit and abilities appointed to succeed him. This was *Amilcar Barcha*, the father of the famous *Hannibal*.

† *C. Aurelius Cotta, P. Servilius Geminus,* } Consuls.

C H A P. X. From the 18th year of the war to the end of it, in the 23d or 24th year after its commencement.

Amilcar Barcha, by his masterly conduct, binders the Romans, during 5 years, from making any progress in the conquest of *Sicily*. They at length provide themselves, once more, with a naval force as the only means to accomplish their enterprize; and this new fleet, under the conduct of *Lutatius Catulus*, obtaining a compleat victory over the fleet of Carthage, (commanded by *Hanno*) the Carthaginians are constrained to yield to their enemies the whole island, by a treaty of peace.

IT

IT was in the eighteenth year of the war, that *Amilcar* became commander in chief of the *Carthaginian* forces by sea and land. Having quieted the discontents of the army, he began his expeditions by sailing with the fleet to the coast of *Italy*; where making a descent he pillaged and laid waste the territories of the *Locrians* and *Bruttians*. After this he landed his troops in *Sicily*; and, because the *Carthaginians* were not masters there of any walled town so situated, as he could from thence infest the *Romans*, he took possession of a commodious piece of ground near the sea coast, between *Panormus* and *Eryx*. It was a mountain environed on all sides with rocks and precipices, and on the top of it was a plain of at least twelve miles in compass, the ground yielding both good pasture and good corn. To this mountain the avenues were only three, one from the sea, and two from the land; and being by nature strait and difficult, it required but little fortification to secure them.

Here^b then the brave *Amilcar* encamped his forces to confront as well those of the enemy, who were in *Panormus*, as those who were posted about *Eryx*, putting himself between the two armies with admirable resolution. And though he was thus in the midst of his enemies, and no ally from whom he could hope for succour, he nevertheless gave the *Romans* great and frequent alarms, obliging them to a constant exercise of all their courage, vigilance and severest discipline. For, as the place he was in had the command of a port^c, he made use of the opportunity, with which this furnished him,

^b Chev. Folard understands the words of *Polybius* to mean that *Amilcar* posted himself in the avenue from the sea to the mountain.

^c Frontinus (in lib. 3. *Strat.*) reports, that *Amilcar*, in order to supply *Lilybaeum* with provisions, made use of a stratagem to draw the *Roman* fleet out of the harbour. But, according to *Polybius*, the *Romans* had no fleet at this time, or, if any, none that was able to contend with *Amilcar*, and oblige him to have recourse to stratagem.

Polybius tells us, that the *Romans* abstained from all naval preparations for 5 years. And therefore when *Fiorus* speaks of a battle gained at sea by the *Romans* during this time, it seems to be a tale with foundation.

V. of R. to scour all the coast of *Italy* with his fleet, as far as to
 506. the territory of *Cuma*: and, when afterwards in *Sicily*,
 Bef. J. C. the Romans had brought their camp within five furlongs
 446. of his army, on the side towards *Panormus*, lie gave
 205. Con- them battle so often, and had such variety of encoun-
 fulship. ters with them, that (as *Polybius* tells us) it would be
 Polyb. B. I. scarce possible to relate all the particular actions. We
 c. 57. must judge, *says he*, of this war, as we do of a combat
 between two strong and vigorous gladiators, who in
 close conflict have been incessantly giving and receiving
 wounds. Neither the spectators nor the combatants
 themselves would be able to recount every feint and
 every stroke, and to say how and why they were made:
 but we judge of the skill, strength and resolution of
 the parties, by their perseverance in maintaining the
 fight, and by the event. So with regard to the war in
 question, a minute detail of the various stratagems,
 surprizes, advances, attacks, which were daily practised
 on both sides, would be very difficult to an historian,
 and not very useful to the reader. A general relation
 of what was performed, with the success of the whole,
 will suffice to make us know the worth and abilities of
 the commanders.

In a word then, no stratagem which could be learnt
 from history, no new one which present circumstances
 and opportunity could suggest, none that required even
 the utmost hardiness and impetuosity to execute it, was
 neglected: and yet, all this while, nothing decisive was
 done. The strength on both sides being equal, the
 camps impregnable, and the space between them very
 small, it hence came to pass that there were every day
 skirmishes and encounters between parties, but a gene-
 ral action never. For in all the engagements, so soon
 as one party found themselves hard pressed by the other,
 the weaker instantly threw themselves behind their en-
 trenchments, where they knew they had a secure shel-
 ter; and from whence they presently returned to the
 charge.

c. 58. In this manner was the war carried on for almost three
 years;

years^d; till at length (as our author speaks) Fortune, Y. of R.
who presided as an impartial umpire at this contention,
transported the combatants to another theatre, where
shutting them up in yet closer lists they were engaged
in a more perilous conflict. 506. Bef. J. C. 246. 205. Con-
fulship.

The *Romans* (as has been before observ'd) had placed garrisons on the top and at the bottom of mount *Eryx*. *Amilcar* nevertheless found a way, lying towards the sea, by which he convey'd his men (before the enemy had the least notice of it) into the city of *Eryx*, that was about the middle of the ascent. By this means the *Romans*, who held the top of the mountain, were in a manner besieged, and it is wonderful with what resolution and constancy they sustain'd all the hardships to which their situation exposed them: but it is yet more wonderful, that the *Carthaginans* should be able to defend themselves, when hard press'd by the enemy both from above and from below, and when deprived of all means of subsistence, except by one avenue from the sea. And here again on this new stage of action war exerted, on both sides, all the art and vigour that can possibly be conceived, in an infinite variety of stratagems and assaults. Nor was an end put to this fierce

^d Y. of R. 506. { L. Cæcilius Metellus, 2d time.
N. Fabius Buteo.

Y. of R. 507. { M. Otacilius Crassus, 2d time.
M. Fabius Licinus.

Y. of R. 508. { N. Fabius Buteo.
C. Atilius Balbus.

[‡] In the year 507 there happened at Rome an accident, which serves to shew how much it behoved even persons of the highest rank to avoid all petulance of speech, and not by any indecent words to violate the dignity of Roman discipline. *Claudia*, the daughter of the famous *Claudius the Blind*; and sister to that *Claudius Pulcher*, who lost the battle of *Drepanum*, wherein many thousand *Romans* perished, returning in her chariot from the public show, happened to be stopt in her way by the multitude that thronged the street. The Lady proud and impatient, cryed out, *Gods, how this city is over-crowded! I wish my Brother Claudius were alive again, and had the command of another Fleet!* These words, even from a woman, were thought unpardonable. She was brought into judgment for them by the *Ædiles*, before the Tribes, and was there fined 25000 asses of brass. [80*l.* 14*s.* 7*d.*] [†] A. Gell. B. 10. c. 6. Val. Max. B. 8. c. 1. Sueton. life of Tib. Liv. Epit. B. 19. Arbuthnot.

struggle (as the historian *Fabius* falsely reported) by the failure of strength in the contending parties, exhausted by the sufferings they underwent; for they sustain'd famine, fatigue, and all the hardships incident to sieges with so unweary'd a fortitude, that they scarcely seem'd to feel them: but a conclusion was given to the war after a different manner, and before either party in *Sicily* had gain'd any superiority over the other. *Polybius* compares the rival powers to two valiant birds, that, weaken'd by a long combat, and unable any more to make use of their wings in the fight, yet support themselves by their sole courage, and with joint consent coming close together, peck and maul each other with their bills, thus mutually striving by these last efforts to obtain the victory.

Polyb. B. 1. c. 59. Two whole years were wasted by the *Romans*, in fruitless attemps to dislodge the invincible *Amilcar* from *Eryx*. And now the Senate of *Rome*, who had hoped every thing from the bravery of their land forces, became perfectly convinced that they should never achieve the conquest of *Sicily* without the help of a naval strength. If, by means of a fleet, they could once get the mastery of the sea, it would then be impossible for the *Carthaginian* General to hold out much longer, because his supplies of provision would be totally obstructed. But where to find money at this time for a naval armament of sufficient strength, was a difficulty that seemed not easy to be surmounted; for the expence would be great, and the public treasury was exhausted. On this pressing occasion the richest of the citizens shew'd a laudable zeal for their country's service. They built each of them a *Quinqueremis* at his own cost; and this example had so good an effect, that those, who were not able singly to do the like, yet concurring, two or three of them fitted out a galley at their joint ex-

• Y. R. 509. { *A. Manlius Torquatus.*
 { *C. Sempronius Blæsus*, 2d time.
 { *C. Fundanius.*
 { *C. Sulpicius.*

pence.

pence. In short a fleet of 200^f Quinqueremes was thus put to sea by private citizens, who required no other condition, but to be reimbursed when the state of the public affairs would allow of it. And this armament was vastly better than any of the former, in as much as all the new gallies were built upon the model of that light vessel, which had been taken from *Hannibal the Rhodian*.

The Consuls chosen for the new year were *C. Lutatius Catulus*, and *A. Posthumius*. The latter being at the same time High-Priest of *Mars*, the *Pontifex Maximus* declared it unlawful for him to abandon his priestly functions; nay, he absolutely forbade it, accompanying his prohibition with threats, and *Posthumius* was obliged to submit. But this religious scruple occasioned the creation of a new magistracy in the republic. The senate and people, not thinking it advisable to trust the command of their army to one general alone, nor yet to expose themselves to the inconveniences which might arise from the too long absence of the *Prætor of Rome*, to whom it naturally fell to supply the place of *Posthumius* in the field, they created a second *Prætor* for that purpose. This officer they stiled *Prætor Peregrinus*; and he was not only to assist the general abroad, but to judge or appoint judges in all civil causes between *Roman* citizens and strangers. The former *Prætor* took the title of *Prætor Urbanus*; and it was now regulated, that his residence should be at *Rome*, and his jurisdiction confined to the cognizance of causes between *Roman* citizens only. It was also decreed, that the persons who were to fill these offices, should be chosen annually in the *comitia by centuries*, but their different provinces be determined by lot.

Valerius Falto, the first *Prætor Peregrinus*, embarked with the Consul *Lutatius*, on board the new fleet for *Sicily*. They began the campaign with the siege of *Dreptorium*, and they very soon made a breach in the wall; nevertheless they did not carry the place; for as

^f Three hundred, according to *Eutropius*, B. 2. c. 27.

Y. of R. the Consul at the head of his men was mounting to
 511. the assault, he receiv'd a dangerous wound in his thigh;
 Bef. J. C. whereupon the soldiers quitted the entreprize, to take care
 241. 210 Con- of their general, whom they carried back to the camp.
 fulship. After this the siege was discontinued; for *Lutatius*
Oros. B. 4. being persuaded, that the *Carthaginians* would soon ap-
 c. 20. pear with a fleet upon the coast, and that a victory over
Polyb. B. them at sea, would contribute much more than any
 1. c. 59. other exploit towards the entire conquest of *Sicily*, turn'd
 all his thoughts to discipline his men, and prepare them
 for a naval engagement.

The *Carthaginians* greatly surprized at the news of a *Roman* navy at sea, had dispatched away a fleet, with all expedition, under the conduct of an eminent commander named *Hanno*; of whose character, because of the share he will have in several important events of this history, it may not be improper to give some features: an able pen, on the present occasion, has thus described him.

Sir W. R. — A man wise in picture, exceedingly formal,
 and skilful in the art of seeming reverend. How his
 reputation was first bred, I do not find, but it was
 upheld by a factious contradiction of things under-
 taken by men more worthy than himself. This Qua-
 lity procur'd to him (as it has done to many others)
 not only approbation among the ancient sort, whose
 cold temper is averse from new enterprizes, but an
 opinion of great foresight, opinion confirmed by every
 los received. More particularly he was gracious a-
 mong the people, for that he was one of the most
 grievous oppressors of their subject provinces; where-
 by he procured unto the *Carthaginians* much wealth,
 but therewithal such hatred, as turn'd it all to their
 great loss. He had before this been employed against
 the *Numidians*, and wild *Africans*, who, in making
 war, were more like rovers than soldiers. Of those
 fugitive nations he learned to neglect more manly ene-
 mies, to his own great dishonour, and to the great

* Of 400 sail according to *Eutropius*.

* hurt

‘ hurt of *Carthage*; which lost not more by his bad ^{Y. of R.} conduct than by his malicious counsel, when having ^{511.}
shewed himself an unworthy captain, he betook him-^{Bef. J. C.}
self to the long robe. Yet is he much commended in ^{241.} Con-
210 Roman histories as a temperate man, and one that fulship.
studied how to preserve the league between *Rome* and
Carthage: In which regard how well he deserved of
his own country, it will appear hereafter; how bene-
ficial he was to *Rome*, it will appear hereafter, and in
his present voyage, wherein he reduced the *Cartha-
ginians* to a miserable necessity of accepting, upon hard
conditions, *that PEACE*, which he thenceforth com-
mended^b.

Hanno had well furnished his navy with all necessary provisions for the soldiers at *Eryx* (for dexterity in making such preparations, was the best of his qualities) but he had neglected to man his galleys with able mariners, trained to the practice of sea fights; he had taken the first that presented themselves; and his soldiers were raw men that knew nothing of service. He had been *Polyb.* B. 1. c. 60. careless in these matters, through a foolish contempt of his enemies; not remembering that it was the resistless force of tempests, rather than any other strength of opposition, which had made them forsake the seas. Yet in one thing he judged right, or at least had been

^b It is proper to inform the reader, though Sir *W. R.* is here followed, in supposing that the *Hanno*, who now commanded the *Carthaginian* fleet, was the same with that *Hanno*, who afterwards headed the faction against *Amilcar Barcha* and his son *Hannibal*, there is some reason to doubt it. *Polybius*, indeed, says nothing from which we can infer, that they were different persons; and the importance of the present expedition makes it probable, that the *Carthaginians* would not commit the charge of it, but to a man in the highest reputation and esteem, as he, whom Sir *W. R.* characterises, was at this time. Yet by some words which *Livy* (as we shall see hereafter) puts into the mouth of that *Hanno*, who signalized himself by his opposition to *Hannibal's* measures, one would think that the speaker could not be the person who lost the battle at sea against *Lutatius*. For the historian makes the enemy of *Hannibal*, on two several occasions, remind the *Carthaginians* of that shameful and fatal overthrow, as an event which they ought never to forget.

And if we may believe *Zonaras*, the *Hanno* who suffered the defeat at the *Aegates*, was crucified at his return home for his misconduct.

well

Y. of R. well instructed; for his intention was, first of all to sail
 5th. to *Eryx*, and there to discharge his ships of their load-
Bef. J. C. ing, and when he had thus lightened them, to take on
 24th. board the choice of the land-forces together with *Amilcar*
 210 **Con-** himself; and then to offer the enemy battle.
 fulship. This was an excellent course if it could have been per-
 formed. But the Consul *Lutatius*, who, on the first
 notice of *Hanno's* being at sea, had sailed from *Drepanum* to the island of *Aegusa* (one of the *Aegates*¹) used
 all possible diligence to prevent the execution of the ene-
 my's design; not that he was informed of their design,
 but that he knew it was, for them, the best which
 they could have, and because he feared no danger so
 greatly as an encounter with *Amilcar*. For these rea-
 sons, though he was not yet cured of his wound, and
 though the weather was very rough, and the seas went
 high, when, the next morning he descried the *Cariba-*
ginian fleet, coming with a flown sheet from the island
 of *Hiera*², (where they had put in) he chose rather to
 fight with the enemy, who had the wind of him, than
 upon unlikely hope of better opportunity, to suffer
 their convoy to pass to *Eryx*.

Polyb. B. All that *Hanno* should have done, *Lutatius* had per-
 1. c. 61. formed. He had carefully exercised his men in row-
 ing: he had lightened his gallies of all unnecessary bur-
 thens, and he had taken on board the best men of his
 land-forces. The *Carthaginians* therefore, at the very
 first encounter, were utterly broken and defeated:
 fifty of their gallies were sunk and seventy taken, the
 rest by a sudden change of wind escaping to the island
 of *Hiera*. The Consul after the battle stood away with
 the fleet for *Lilybaeum*, there to dispose of his prizes and
 prisoners; of which latter the number amounted to near
 ten thousand.

When, at *Carthage*, they received the news of *Han-*
no's defeat, so contrary to all expectation, they were
 greatly at a loss what measures to take. If, to have
 their revenge, nothing had been necessary but courage

¹ Islands lying off of *Lilybaeum* and *Drepanum*.

² Another of the *Aegates*.

and emulation, they were never better provided than at Y. of R.
this juncture, to prosecute the war. But what could
they do? *Amilcar*, on whose valour and judgment the
honour and safety of the commonwealth depended, was ^{511.}
^{Bef. J. C.} ^{241.} surrounded by his enemies, and could not be relieved. fulship.
For as the *Romans* were now masters of the sea, it was
not possible for the *Carthaginians* to send either provisi-
ons or reinforcements to their armies in *Sicily*. In this
extremity they could fix upon nothing better than to
send by an express full powers to the General himself,
to take what course he should think most proper; and
this they did, leaving all conclusions to his election and
sole counsel.

Amilcar, who had done every thing that could be
expected from the most intrepid courage, and the most
consummate wisdom, and whom no adversity, accom-
panied with the least hope or possibility of recovery,
had ever vanquished, but who yet knew when to
yield as well as when to resist, began now to turn his
thoughts wholly to the preservation of the army under
his conduct; for he plainly saw, that *Sicily* was lost.
He dispatched therefore an Ambassador to the Consul,
with an overture of peace. *Lutatius*, having well con-
sidered it, gathered so many arguments from the pre-
sent poverty of the *Roman* state, exhausted beyond ex-
pectation by the war, that he readily listened to the
proposal. At first he demanded, that *Amilcar* and his
soldiers should deliver up their arms; but this the ^{Corn. Nep.} in *Amilc.*
Carthaginian absolutely refused, declaring that he c. 1.
would rather perish than undergo so great an infamy;
and the Consul acquiesced. In short, a treaty was con-
cluded on terms to this effect.

- “ There shall be peace between *Rome* and *Carthage* Polyb. B.
- “ (provided the *Roman* people approve of it) on the fol- 1. c. 62.
- “ lowing conditions.
- “ The *Carthaginians* shall evacuate all *Sicily*.
- “ They shall deliver up all the *Roman* prisoners ran-
som free.
- “ They shall pay to the *Romans*, within the space
“ of

Y. of R. " of twenty years next following, 2200 ^b talents of sil-
 511. " ver, whereof one thousand shall be paid immedi-
 Bef. J. C. " ately.

241. " They shall not make war upon King *Hiero*, nor up-
 210 Con- " on any of the allies of *Rome*; nor shall the *Romans*
 fulship. " molest any of the allies of *Carthage*.

" Neither of the contracting powers shall raise any
 " fortress, or levy any soldiers in the dominions of the
 " other.

" Nor shall either of them enter into confederacy
 " with the allies of the other."

Polyb. B. These articles being brought to *Rome*, and not being
 1. c. 63. entirely approved there, ten commissioners were sent
 into *Sicily* to terminate the affair. These added 1000
 talents to the former sum, and shortened the time for
 payment to ten years; and they also required, that the
Carthaginians should not only leave *Sicily*, but withdraw
 their troops from all the Islands between *Sicily* and
Italy. *Amilcar* not thinking it adviseable to break off
 the negociation for the sake of these new demands, the
 treaty was ratified in form: but (probably) not in the
 Liv. B. 30. Consulate of *Caius Lutatius*, but of his successors *Q. Lutatius* and *A. Manlius* in the year of *Rome* 512.

c. 44. Y. of R. Such was the end of the First Punic War, after it
 512. had lasted 23 ^c or 24 years: A war (*says Polybius*) the
 Bef. J. C. longest, the least interrupted, and the greatest (that is,
 240. 211 Con- the most abounding with great actions and events) of
 fulship. any to be met with in history. The *Romans* in the
 course of it lost 700 ships of war, and the *Carthaginians*

^b 4372501. *Arbutnot*.

^c Polybius makes this war to have lasted 24 years, and so do others. But Eutropius puts a conclusion to it in the 23d year; which reckoning agrees with the *Capitoline Marbles*, since, according to them, *Appius Claudius Caecus*, who began the war, was Consul in the year 489, and *C. Lutatius Catulus*, who made the treaty with *Amilcar*, was Consul in 511.

Livy, towards the close of his 30th book, says, the First Punic War ended when *Q. Lutatius* and *A. Manlius* were Consuls. These were the successors of *C. Lutatius*; and perhaps their Consulate was begun when the ten Commissioners came into *Sicily* and the peace was ratified.

ans about 500^d; the greatness of which losses, suffi- Y. of R.
ciently prove the greatness of the two states, and of the war itself, wherein, (according to the same author) the Romans in general shewed themselves the braver nation, and Amilcar the ablest Captain.

AND now the great affair at *Rome* was to determine the fate of *Sicily*, the manner in which it should be governed, and the emoluments which the republic should draw from so fine a conquest. The whole island, excepting the little kingdom of *Syracuse*, was declared a *Roman Province*, that is to say, a province that should be ruled by *Roman laws* and *Roman magistrates*. A *Prætor* was to be annually sent thither to be its Governor; and a *Quæstor* to take charge of the revenues. These revenues were either fixed or casual. The fixed were called *tributes*, and were a certain sum, which the province was obliged every year to pay into the public treasury. The casual were the tenths of the product of the lands, and the duties upon merchandize exported and imported. And these tenths and customs were generally farmed by the publicans ^{solinus}.

^d How came it to pass, that in *Polybius's* time, when the *Romans* were arrived at almost universal empire, they could not fit out such fleets, and make such naval preparations, as in the time of the First Punic War? This question is on the present occasion started by *Polybius* himself; who adds, that a plain and satisfactory reason may be assigned for the change, but defers giving it, till he shall come to speak of the form of the *Roman* commonwealth. His discourse on this latter subject not being transmitted to us, we are at a loss to know how the difficulty may be resolved.

B. I. c. 64.

Among the advantages which *Rome* gained from her wars in *Sicily*, may be reckoned an improvement of her taste for letters and juster notions of poesy. *Sicily* abounded with excellent poets. In the first year after her peaceable possession of this island, when *C. Claudius* and *M. Sempronius* were Consuls, appeared *L. Livius Andronicus*, the reformer of the Latin theatre. He introduced upon the stage connected fables after the *Greek* manner, instead of the buffooneries, and rambling discourses, with which the people were before entertained.

About this time was born at *Rudes*, a city of *Calabria*, *Ennius*, the famous poet and historian. He was the inventor of Hexameter verses among the *Latins*; but his *Life of Scipio Africanus*, which was his master-piece, he wrote in *Choraicks*. He is thought to have eclipsed the poet *Nævius*, his contemporary.

Caius

V. of R. *Caius Lutatius* the Consul, and **Q. Valerius** the Praetor,
Bef. J. C. had both of them the honour of the triumph at
512. their return to *Rome*. The Consul indeed disputed the
240. pretensions of the latter to it, because *Valerius* had not
211. fulfilled his conduct in the war had been uncommonly merito-
Val. Max. rious, he obtained his suit by a decree of the people.
B. 2. c. 8.

But the public joy at *Rome*, for the late important conquest, was greatly damped by two misfortunes, which about this time followed close upon one another. The *Tiber* on a sudden overflowed with such violence, as to overturn a great number of houses in the lower grounds; where the water continuing a considerable time, it much damaged also the foundations of many others.

Val. Max. After this there happened a greater calamity by fire, which breaking out in the night destroyed not only numberless houses, but an incredible multitude of people. It consumed all the buildings within the circumference of the forum. *Cæcilius Metellus* the *Pontifex*
B. 1. c. 4. signalized his pious zeal on this occasion: For when the fire had seized the temple of *Vesta*, and when the Virgins in a fright had all deserted it, he ventured his life to save the *Palladium*: Making his way through the flames, he brought it safely out of the sanctuary. One of his arms was much hurt in the attempt, and he entirely lost his sight. To reward so heroic an action of piety, it was decreed by the people, that he should have the privilege of being carried to the senate house in a chariot, as often as he went thither; a distinction which had never been granted to any man before.

Liv. Epit. It is probable that the *Roman* tribes (by the addition of those called *Velina* and *Quirina*) were about this time augmented to 35, which number was never after increased.
B. 19.

C H A P. XI.

The Falisci in Hetruria rebel against the Romans, but are quelled in a few days. Carthage is reduced to great extremities in a war, which for more than three years is carried on against her by her foreign mercenaries, in conjunction with her African subjects. The conduct of the Romans on this occasion.

THE peace between *Rome* and *Carthage* was hardly *Polyb. B. 1.* ratified, when both these states found themselves c. 65. on a sudden engaged in new and unexpected wars at home, by the rebellion of their own subjects.

The *Falisci* in *Hetruria*, through some unaccountable levity or madness, rose up in arms, and declared war against the *Roman* power. This intestine commotion caused a great alarm and terror throughout all *Italy*; and it occasioned no less wonder, by the speedy issue to which it was brought. The Consuls *Q. Lutatius* and *Y. of R. A. Manlius*, at the head of the legions, are said to have quelled the rebels in six days. Two battles were fought. In the first, the success was doubtful; but in the second, the *Romans* obtained a complete victory. The *Falisci* having lost 15000 men in the action, humbly submitted themselves, and sued for peace. They were despoiled of their arms, horses, household-goods, slaves, and half their territory. Their city, strongly situated in a steep craggy place, was ordered to be demolished; and the inhabitants to build a new one for themselves in the flat open country. Nay, the people of *Rome* were meditating a more severe revenge against a nation that had so often rebelled; but they restrained their wrath by the advice of a venerable *Roman* named *Papirius*, whom the Consuls had employed to draw up in writing the form of the rebels surrendry. He represented to the multitude, that the *Falisci* had yielded themselves, not to the power but the *faith* (or honour) of the *Romans*^b; and this sacred name of publick

^a *Faliscos non potestati, sed fidei se Romanorum commisisse.* *Val. Max. B. 6. ch. 5.*

faith

Y. of R. ^{512.} *faith* had such a prevalency on the minds of the people, that they readily acquiesced in what had been agreed upon.

^{240.} ²¹¹ Con-
fulship. *CARTHAGE*, not so fortunate as *Rome*, had a much longer and more dangerous conflict to sustain at the very gates of the capital.

The avarice of a republic of merchants, who better understood the value of money, than the merit of brave soldiers, was the source of this intestine mischief. They would needs persuade those foreign troops, who had fought so gallantly under *Amilcar* in *Sicily*, and had endured so steadily all the hardships of war, in the defence of a state, to which they had no tie but their wages; they would needs, I say, persuade these strangers to remit, *out of affection to that state*, some part of what was due to them from it, by compact, for their services: whereas in truth they ought rather to have rewarded them with rich gratuities beyond their stipulated pay. In the pursuit of this penurious project they fell into strange imprudences. It could not be well imagined, that a proposal to foreign mercenaries, to contribute out of their pay to the expences of the war, would be very chearfully received or easily digested. Nevertheless, that they might hear the grave oratory of *Hanno* on this head, the *Carthaginians* suffered these strangers, amounting to 20000 men, to assemble all in one place, in the neighbourhood of the capital; and this at a time, when *Carthage* had not, on foot, a sufficient body of her own people to resist such an army in case of a mutiny. And they committed a yet greater mistake, as *Polybius* observes, in constraining the soldiers to take with them from the city, to the place of rendezvous, their wives and children; because these, had they remained in *Carthage*, would have served as hostages for the good behaviour of the fathers and husbands.

In a word, the rhetoric of *Hanno* had no effect but to kindle the highest resentment. The mercenaries turned their arms with fury against their late masters; the *African* subjects of *Carthage*, easily drawn into rebellion,

rebellion, because greatly oppressed, took this opportunity to attempt the recovery of their freedom; and the *Numidians*, the old enemies of the republic, and greedy of her destruction, joined their forces to the rebels.

V. of R.
Bef. J. C.
240.
211 Consulship.

In this war*, which lasted three years and almost four months, it was not with the *Carthaginians*, as in former times, when they fought for glory, or to give a wider extent to their empire; it was no sportive enterprise of ambition; all was at stake; the very being of their government, their estates, their lives were all in the utmost peril, from the desperate fury and close attacks of the most cruel and implacable enemies they had ever contended with. *Amilcar* saved his country. Superior by his skill and courage, not only to the impetuous force of multitudes, but to the cautious bravery of an army, which he himself had trained, and disciplined, it was through his abilities, that his republic remained victorious in the conclusion of this *inexpiable* war; a war that was never to be ended but by the total destruction of one of the contending parties.

The African War, or War of the *Carthaginians* with their *Mercenaries*.

* This war being a very curious part of history, and serving greatly to give us a more perfect knowledge of the character of that Rival State, whose destruction alone could establish the Roman greatness, it may neither be unseasonable, nor disagreeable to the reader, if the substance of Polybius's account of it be here inserted.

WHEN *Amilcar* had finished the treaty, which put an end to the *First Punic War*, he led his troops from *Eryx* to *Lilybaeum*, and there committed to *Gisco* (Governor of the place) the care of transporting them into *Africa*. *Gisco*, as foreseeing what might happen, acted in this affair with great caution. For, instead of embarking the forces all at once, he

Polyb. B. I.
c. 66. &
seq. and
Sir W. R.

B. 5. c. 2.

‘ shipped them off successively, and in small parties, allotting so much time between the embarkations, as might suffice for his prudent purpose; which was, that those who were first sent might be paid off and dismissed to their own countries, before the others should arrive. The *Carthaginians*, however, whose treasury was much exhausted, did not correspond to the intention of *Gisco*, but hoping they should be able to obtain from the whole army, when assembled, a remission of some part of what was due to them, detained at *Carthage* the several divisions as they came.

Polybius does not assign any reason, nor does any reason readily occur, why it should have seemed more easy to obtain this *remission* from the whole army together, than from the parts when disjoined. ‘ One

*Sir W.R. ‘ would think, (as a judicious historian * observes,) that to persuade any small number of men, lodged in so great a city as *Carthage*, to have some consideration of the distress and poverty of the state would have been no hard matter; and if the first corners had been thus persuaded, and had been friendly discharged, it would have left a good precedent to the second and third, whilst their disjunction had made them unable to recover their whole due by force.’ Perhaps the best conjecture towards accounting for the conduct of the *Carthaginians* in this particular, is, That they had really no intention to disband these troops, and yet were unwilling, for good reasons, to let their design of keeping them on foot be known, before they were all safely arrived in *Africa*. And though avarice had determined the senate to try whether the soldiers could be persuaded to remit some part of what was due to them, there was no design to refuse them their full payment in case they insisted upon it. They never dreamt that the bare proposal of such a remission as they desired, would have the sudden and fatal consequences, which it had.

That the leading men at *Carthage* had resolved to continue these troops in the service, may, I think, be fairly

fairly collected from *Polybius*, who assures us that *Amilcar* left *Sicily* with firm resolution to renew the war against *Rome* without delay; and that he would have executed his purpose, if it had not been hinder'd by the revolt of the mercenaries. Now is it in the least probable, that the *Carthaginian* General, with this project of speedy revenge at his heart, would consent to break a veteran army, which he himself had disciplined, legions animated with the same spirit as himself?

*Polyb. L. 3.
c. 9.
Corn. Nep.
Amilc. c. 1.*

' Be this as it will, the *Carthaginians* did not follow the scheme of *Gisco*. They detained the first and second comers, telling them, that they would make a fair reckoning with all together. Thus every day the number increased, and many disorders (incident among soldiers) were committed, which much disquieted the city, not accustomed to the like. It was thought fit therefore to remove them all to some other place, where they might be less troublesome; and *Sicca*, a little town at no great distance, being pitched upon for this rendezvous, the officers were civilly requested to conduct all their men thither, who while they there waited the coming of their fellow-soldiers from *Sicily*, should receive, each of them, a piece of gold to bear his charges.

' This motion was accepted, and the soldiers began to dislodge; leaving behind them their wives, their children, and all their baggage, as intending very soon to fetch all away when they came back for their pay. But the *Carthaginians*, who wanted to rid the city entirely of these ungovernable guests, and who feared that if the women and children remained there, it would be difficult to hinder some of the soldiers from staying behind, and others from returning, which would frustrate the intention of the measure now taken, they prevailed with them to march away with all that belonged to them, wives and children, bag and baggage.

' To *Sicca* then they all removed, and there lay waiting for news of their fellows arrival, and their

own pay. Busines they had none to do, and therefore might easily be drawn to mutiny, the whole argument of their discourse inclining them to nothing else. Their daily talk was, how rich they should be, when all their money came in; how much would fall to every single share, and for how long a time the city was behind-hand with them in reckoning. They were all grown Arithmeticians; and he was thought a man of worth, who could find most reason to encrease their demands, to the very highest, even beyond their due. No part of their long service was forgotten; but the encouraging words and promises of their Captains, leading them forth to any dangerous fight, were called to mind as so many obligations, not to be cancelled, without satisfying their expectation by some extraordinary bounty.

In this manner passed the time away, till at length, the whole army being arrived and united, *Hanno* (chief magistrate of *Carthage*) appeared at *Sicca* to clear the accompt. Now was the day come, when they were all to be made rich, especially if they could hold together, in maintaining resolutely the common cause. Full of these thoughts and expectations they assembled themselves to hear what good news this messenger had brought; with firm purpose to help his memory in case he should happen to forget any part of the many promises made to them, which were all to be considered in the reckoning.

Hanno begins a very formal oration, wherein he bewails the poverty of *Carthage*; tells them how great a sum of money is to be paid to the *Romans*; reckons up the excessive charges the commonwealth had been at, in the late war, and in conclusion desires them to be contented with *part of their pay*, and out of the love which they bore to the city, to remit the rest.

Few of the hearers understood this Orator's course: For the *Carthaginian* army was composed of sundry nations, as *Greeks*, *Africans*, *Gauls*, *Ligurians*, *Spaniards* and others, all of different languages. But when

' when such as conceived the whole tenor of his speech
' had informed the rest what message he brought, they
' all broke out into such a storm of rage, that nothing
' would serve to appease them. The insurrection and
' revolt were universal, each nation at first caballing a-
part, and then all the several nations joining together
in a general sedition; of which the difference of lan-
guages greatly encreased the tumult and confusion.

' *Hanno* would fain have asswaged their fury, but he
' knew not how: for he less understood their dissonant
loud noises, then they did his oration. An army,
collected of so many countries, that have no one
language common to all, is neither easily stirred up
to mutiny, nor easily pacified, when once it is brok-
en into outrage. The best that *Hanno* could do,
was to use the help of their own officers as his in-
terpreters and messengers; but these interpreters
mistook his meaning, some for want of skill, others
on purpose; and such as delivered his errands in the
worst sense were the best believed. In short, nothing
was to be seen but fluctuation of mind, jealousies,
distrusts and caballing. Among the other causes of
the soldiers anger, was this also, that the *Carthagini-
ans*, instead of sending to them some one of those
officers, under whom they had served in *Sicily*, who
knew their merits, and who so often had promised
them rewards, had sent a man who had not been
present in any of those actions where they had sig-
nalized their courage. In short, they considered
themselves as not only wrong'd but insulted. Full
of indignation therefore, they hastily left *Sicca*, and
to the number of 20,000 men advanced towards
Carthage, as far as *Tunis*, where they took up their
quarters, about 15 miles from the capital. And now
when it was too late, the *Carthaginians* became con-
vinced of their mistakes; for it was a mighty fault
in them to permit such a body of strangers to af-
semble all in one place; and it was yet a greater er-
ror to turn out of their city the wives, children, and
goods of these poor soldiers, which, had they retain-

‘ ed them in shew of kindness, they might have used
‘ as hostages for their own safety, and as means to
‘ bring the army to their own terms : But now the ter-
‘ ror they were in from the neighbourhood of these
‘ mutineers, carried them to yield to every demand
‘ though never so unreasonable. They furnished a
‘ market at *Tunis* for the soldiers, whom they suffered
‘ to buy what they pleased, and at what price they
‘ pleased. Deputies out of the body of the senate
‘ were from time to time dispatched to them, to assure
‘ them, that all their demands, if possible to be per-
‘ formed, should be satisfied. The soldiers easily per-
‘ ceived the cause of this change; and taking advan-
‘ tage of the fright the city was in, they every day in-
‘ vented some new article to insist upon ; and their
‘ insolence was the greater from the persuasion, that
‘ having served with honour against the *Romans* in *Sicily*, neither the *Carthaginians* nor any other people
‘ would have the courage to face them in the field.
‘ No sooner therefore had they adjusted their de-
‘ mands of pay, but they proceeded further to exact
‘ satisfaction for the horses they had lost in the service.
‘ When that was agreed to, the next demand was on
‘ account of short allowance of provisions for many
‘ years. They would be paid for the deficiency ; and,
‘ in this reckoning, the corn should be valued at the
‘ highest price it had at any time borne during the whole
‘ war.

‘ In short, as there were many factious and seditious
‘ spirits in the army, these incited the multitude to
‘ make new and exorbitant demands, such as it was
‘ impossible for the republic to comply with ; never-
‘ theless, as the *Carthaginians* promised to do every
‘ thing in their power to satisfy them, it was at length
‘ agreed, that the differences should be referred to
‘ some one of the Generals who had been in *Sicily*, and
‘ that the soldiers should chuse the arbitrator. Ac-
‘ cordingly they pitched upon *Gisco*, partly out of af-
‘ fection to him, who had shewn himself at all times a
‘ friendly man to them, and careful of their good,
‘ especially

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especially when they were to be transported into *Africa*; and partly out of a dislike they had conceived of *Amilcar*, because he had not visited them in all this busy time. [It is probable that *Amilcar* had no Sir W. R. desire to be used as an instrument in defrauding his own soldiers of their wages; especially considering, that as he could best bear witness of their merits, so was he not ignorant, that means to content them were not wanting, had the citizens been willing to do it.]

Gisco then embarks and comes among them, and to please them the better brings money with him. He calls to him first of all the principal officers, and then the several nations apart, rebuking them gently for what had passed; advising them calmly concerning the present, and exhorting them to continue their affection to a state, which had long entertained them in its pay, and would be always mindful of their good services. He then offered to give them their whole pay in hand, proposing to defer the consideration of other reckonings to a more convenient time. This might have been well accepted, and might have served to restore things to quiet, if two seditious ringleaders of the multitude had not opposed it.

Among the mutineers there happened to be one *Spendius* a Campanian, who had been a slave to a *Roman* master. He was strong of body, and in all occasions of danger very forward; this fellow fearing to fall into the hands of his master, (for by the custom of *Rome* his fault was punished with death) laboured both with words and actions, to trouble and perplex the treaty they were upon; and to hinder by all means possible their agreement with the *Carthaginians*. Another there was, whose name was *Matbo*, an *African*, of free condition, and a soldier among them, who having been an active stirrer in this conspiracy, and fearing punishment, joined with *Spendius* to obstruct the accommodation, possessing the *Africans* with the belief, that as soon as the strangers should be paid, and dispatched to their own countries,

it would be their lot to pay for all ; and that the *Carthaginians* would take such revenge on them, for what they had done, that all *Africa* should tremble at it. The soldiers grew hereupon enraged anew, and in regard they were not likely to receive of *Gisco* any other satisfaction then their arrears of pay, what was due for their horses and bread being respite to another time, they therefore took thence occasion of fresh disorders, and ran together in a mutinous manner. To *Spendius* and *Matbo* they lent a willing ear, who railed both against *Gisco* and the *Carthaginians*, and if any one presumed to offer them temperate counsel, he was forthwith stoned to death, even before it could be understood what the purport of his discourse was, whether for or against *Spendius*; and now great slaughter was made both of officers and private soldiers, and nothing was heard during the tumult but *throw, throw, down with him*; and what greatly augmented the rage of those people, was the excess of wine they had drank, having newly risen from their repast. So that the word *throw* was no sooner heard, but the person against whom it was designed, was immediately slain. At length there appearing no one who presumed to open his mouth to divert their determinations, they chose *Spendius* and *Matbo* for their Leaders and Commanders in chief.

Gisco was not without a due sense of the danger he was in among these people, but he let that consideration give place to the duty he owed his country. He foresaw that if this mutiny once came to a head, the commonwealth would be driven to great straits; to prevent which, he was willing to be exposed to any hazard. He therefore with great constancy of mind pursued his purpose of reducing them to their duty by all means possible: Sometimes treating with the officers, sometimes with the sundry nations apart. It happened, that the *Africans* coming rudely to *Gisco* to demand the corn-money, which they pretended was due to them; he to reprove their insolence, bid them in a contemptuous manner go ask their Captain

Matbo

‘ *Matbo* for it. This answer put all into a flame. Without any hesitation they tumultuously ran, and seized on the money, which had been brought in order to their payment.

‘ *Matbo* and *Spendius* fomented with all their art and industry this audacious proceeding of the multitude, being persuaded, that to do some outrageous act, in violation of the treaty they were upon, and contrary to the law of nations, would be the surest way to put things past accommodation, and to kindle the war they so much desired. Thus therefore, not only the money and baggage of the *Carthaginians* were seized by the mutineers, but *Gisco* and all the *Carthaginians* who accompanied him were arrested, put in irons, and thrown into prison; and these violences were immediately followed by an open declaration of war against *Carthage*.

‘ AND now *Matbo* dispatched deputies to the cities round about, exhorting them to lend him succours, enter into confederacy with him, and bravely recover their liberty. It was not needful for the deputies to use much persuasion, the very fame of this rebellion sufficing to draw the whole country into it. The merciless impositions of the *Carthaginians* upon their *African* subjects, were the cause of this universal proneness to revolt. They had taken from the country people during the late war, one half of their corn, and had doubled the tributes paid by the inhabitants of the cities, not exempting even the poorest from these exactions. When new magistrates were to be elected for the provinces, the choice never fell upon those who were likely to govern the people with lenity and moderation, but on such whose rigour promised the Electors the richest fruits of oppression. *Hanno*, for example, was of this sort, and therefore a great favourite at *Carthage*.

‘ All these things considered, it is no wonder that the *Africans* were not backward to rebel. Not only such as could bear arms readily tendered their service in this commotion, but the very women (who had seen their

husbands

husbands and fathers dragg'd to prison by the tax-gatherers) brought forth their jewels and other ornaments, offering all to sale for the maintenance of so just a quarrel. And by this great forwardness, and liberal contribution, *Matbo* and *Spendius* were supplied with a strong reinforcement of 70000 *Africans*, and were moreover furnished with money, not only to give the soldiers the arrears of their pay, (which to engage them in the revolt they had promised) but sufficient to carry on the war begun, though it should be of long continuance.

The Mercenaries using the advantage of their present strength, laid siege to *Utica* and *Hippo*, two maritime cities of great importance, lying to the west of *Carthage* and not far from it; nor did they abandon their camp at *Tunis*, which, on the other side, lay commodiously to hinder the *Carthaginians* from passing up into the country that way.

Carthage was situate on a Peninsula, which is bounded on one side by the sea, and on the other by a lake. The *Isthmus* that joins this Peninsula to the continent is about three miles broad. *Utica* stood on that side of *Carthage* which regards the sea, *Tunis* on the other side, upon the lake: so that the enemy, from those two posts, marching sometimes by day, sometimes by night, to the very walls of the capital, filled the inhabitants with extreme terror. The *Carthaginians*, in this distress, appointed *Hanno* to be their General. He had gained some reputation in that capacity, when employed to conquer that part of *Africa* which lay towards *Hecatopolis*. *Hanno* did not fail to make with diligence all needful preparations (for that was his talent:) He got together whatever was necessary, as well to relieve a town besieged, as to batter and assaile any place defended against him. With these provisions and with a hundred elephants he came to *Utica* so suddenly, that the mercenaries, as men surprized, forsook their trenches and retired to a rising piece of woody ground, where

where they might be safe against the violence of his huge beasts.

' *Hanno*, having been accustomed to make war with the *Africans* and *Numidians*, who upon any defeat were wont to fly for two or three days together, imagined that the enemy he had only routed, were utterly ruined, even beyond a possibility of recovery ; neglecting therefore to keep guard, and leaving his men at liberty, he immediately entered the town, there to recreate and divert himself. But those old soldiers, with whom he was now at war, had learned of *Amilcar* to sustain such shocks as they had just suffered, without being discouraged, and to retire and to fight again many times in one day, as occasion required. Wherefore as soon as they perceived that *Hanno* knew not how to make use of a victory, they instantly rushed down from their retreat, assailed their own camp, and with great slaughter drove the *Carthaginians* out of it, forcing them to hide themselves within the walls of *Utica*; and they also got possession of all the stores that *Hanno* had brought for the relief of the town. Nor was this the only occasion wherein *Hanno* gave marks of his insufficiency. Twice he might have defeated the enemy in pitched battle, and twice by surprize, yet he unaccountably neglected these opportunities, and even suffered the enemy to take possession of all the passes in the *Istibmus*, which joins the Peninsula, whereon *Carthage* stood, to the firm land.

' The *Carthaginians*, dissatisfied with the conduct of *Hanno*, had now recourse to the undisputed abilities of *Amilcar*, whom they sent into the field with 10000 men and 70 elephants. *Amilcar* was for some time at a loss how to meet with the enemy upon equal ground. For, beside the other places of advantage, which the mercenaries had seized, *Hanno* had suffered them to get possession of the only bridge by which the river *Macar* or *Bagradas* was passable to those who were to travel from *Carthage* into the Continent. This river had not many fords, and the few it had

were

were so well watch'd, that it was not easy for even a single man to get over without being seen. As for the bridge itself the enemy guarded it with the utmost vigilance, and had built a town close by it, for the more commodious lodging of the troops that were appointed to that service. *Amilcar*, having in vain tried all means possible to force a passage, at length bethought himself of an expedient to gain one by stealth. He had observed that upon the blowing of certain winds, the mouth of the *Macar* used to be choaked up with sand and gravel, which form'd a kind of bar across it. Marching therefore to the mouth of the river, he there waited, without communicating his design to any body, the blowing of those favourable winds; which no sooner happened, but he passed the stream with his army by night unperceived, and the next morning appeared in the plain, to the great astonishment both of the *Carthaginians* and of the enemy.

Spendius and his followers were extremely troubled as well as amazed at this news, as knowing that they had no longer to deal with the improvident gravity of *Hanno*, but with an able captain, even their own master in the art of war, whom they still admired though they hated him. *Amilcar* marched directly towards those of the enemy, who guarded the bridge. *Spendius* advanced to meet him with 10000 men, whom he drew out of the town that was near it. He had ordered 15000 to come from before *Utica* and join him. Upon the arrival of this reinforcement, the fear with which the mercenaries had been struck was chang'd into presumption. They thought to surround *Amilcar*, and bear him down by numbers. *Amilcar* had disposed his elephants in the front, his cavalry and light armed infantry in the second line, and his heavy armed foot in the rear of all. He had * probably expected that the 15000 men from *Utica* would have fallen upon his rear, instead of joining the forces with *Spendius*; and this expectation was the reason of his placing his main strength in

* Chev.
Folard.

the rear. But when he saw, that the enemy, neglecting their advantage, had join'd their two bodies of troops together, he immediately chang'd the order of his battle, making his horse wheel about and go to the rear, and his infantry advance. This sudden retreat of the Carthaginian cavalry was mistaken by the mercenaries for a real flight and a mark of fear. They advanced therefore briskly to the attack without observing any order, and in full confidence of victory. But no sooner did they perceive that cavalry, which they had thought routed, appear again in good array, covering the whole body of the Carthaginian foot, (for by the general's order, the horse wheeling from the rear to the right and left, had now placed themselves in the same line with the infantry) than their astonishment at this movement quite took away their courage. They instantly turned their backs and fled, and being warmly pursued by the horse and elephants of Amilcar, suffered a very great slaughter. In this overthrow, 6000 of the mercenaries were slain, and 2000 taken prisoners; the rest escaped, some to the camp before Utica, others to the town by the bridge, whither Amilcar followed them so fast, that he easily possessed himself of that place, the enemy not having sufficiently recovered their spirits to make a defence, but flying thence to Tunis at his approach. After this he speedily reduced several other Towns, partly by force, partly by composition, and by this happy progress gave the Carthaginians some better hopes of their affairs.

As for Maibo, he still continued the siege of Hippo, advising Spendius, and Autarius, chief captain of the Gauls, to follow Amilcar so as never to lose sight of him, yet always to keep the higher grounds, or the foot of some hill, where they might be safe from the horse and elephants of the Carthaginians. He also sent into Numidia and Africa, admonishing the people to furnish those two commanders with supplies, and to exert themselves on this occasion for the recovery of their freedom. Spendius with six thousand men, chosen

‘ chosen out of the several nations encamped at *Tunis*,
‘ and with 2000 *Gauls*, that followed *Autoritus*, (these
‘ being all that remained of those who had served un-
‘ der this captain in *Sicily*, the rest having deserted to
‘ the *Romans* at *Eryx*) pursuant to the counsel of *Ma-*
‘ *tho*, continually coasted the *Carthaginians*, but always
‘ keeping the foot of the hills. One day, when *Amil-*
‘ *car* was encamped in a plain encompassed on all sides
‘ with hills, the succours which *Spendius* had waited for
‘ arrived, and the *Carthaginian* general was not a little
‘ embarrassed thereby; for he had now to deal with a
‘ body of *Africans* in front, and another of *Numidians*
‘ behind him, while the army of *Spendius* lay on his
‘ flank. In this difficulty the fame of *Amilcar*’s perso-
‘ nal worth was of great benefit to his country. In
‘ the enemy’s troops there happened to be a certain
‘ *Numidian*, named *Naravasus*, a man of distinction
‘ both for his birth and courage. He had inherited
‘ from his father an inclination to the *Carthaginians*,
‘ and it was much increased by what he had heard of
‘ *Amilcar*’s merit. Thinking that he had now an op-
‘ portunity of gaining the friendship of this people, he
‘ came to the camp attended by about 100 *Numidian*
‘ horse. Having halted near the lines without any
‘ shew of fear, he there made a sign with his hand.
‘ *Amilcar* not a little wondering at the hardines of the
‘ action, sent out to him a horseman; to whom *Nara-*
‘ *vasus* signified, that he desired a conference with the
‘ general. The latter not readily complying with the
‘ motion, the *Numidian* no sooner perceived his distrust,
‘ but dismounting, he gave his horse and arms to those
‘ who were with him; and with a noble confidence,
‘ entered the camp alone. Every body wondered at
‘ the bravery of the man, but received him amicably.
‘ Being conducted to *Amilcar*, he told him, he wanted
‘ not good inclinations for the *Carthaginians* in general;
‘ but that his principal motive of coming there was to
‘ engage in a friendship with *him*; which if he ap-
‘ proved, he should find him for the future a faithful
‘ friend, both in counsel and in action. This discourse,

‘ together

‘ together with the manly assurance and ingenuous simplicity with which it was spoken, fill’d *Amilcar* with unspeakable joy ; infomuch, that he not only consented to make him his companion in all his enterprises ; but, to purchase his fidelity to the *Carthaginians*, promised him his daughter in marriage.

‘ After this conference and treaty, *Naravasus* brought to the camp 2000 *Numidians*, that were under his command ; with which reinforcement *Amilcar* offered the enemy battle. *Spendius*, on his part being strengthened by the *Africans*, advanced boldly into the plain, where the battle was obstinately fought. *Amilcar*, in the end, had the day : the elephants did great service ; and *Naravasus* signalized himself most eminently. *Spendius* and *Autaritus* escaped by flight, about 10000 of their men being slain, and 4000 taken prisoners. *Amilcar* received kindly all those of the prisoners, that were willing to take his pay, and serve under him, and he armed them with the spoils of the dead. As for those that were not willing to serve, he assembled them all, and then told them, that he freely pardoned their past fault, and gave them their liberty ; but bid them remember, that if ever they were taken again in arms against the *Carthaginians*, they were to expect no mercy.

‘ During these transactions, the mercenaries that were in garrison in *Sardinia* mutinied, after the example of *Matbo* and *Spendius* ; and having shut up *Bostrar* their chief commander in the citadel, they at length murdered both him and all the *Carthaginians* with him. Hereupon the republic, in order to quell these mercenaries, dispatch’d from *Carthage* into that island a body of troops, which, if we may judge from their proceedings, were also mercenaries (a strange policy of the magistrates.) These soldiers no sooner arrived, but they entered into the views of the mutineers and joined the revolt. The united forces seized on the leader of the new comers and crucified him ; they likewise in the most cruel manner murdered all the *Carthaginians* they could meet with, possessed themselves

themselves of the town, and remained masters of the whole island; until at length a quarrel happened between them and the natives, who prevailing, constrained them to leave the country, and fly for refuge into *Italy*. But thus *Sardinia* became intirely lost to the *Carthaginians*.

To return to the mercenaries in *Africa*.

Matbo, Spendius and *Autaritus* having advice of the clemency which *Amilcar* exercised towards the prisoners, and fearing the effect it might have upon the *Africans*, and their other troops, resolved to engage them in some new act of villainy, such as should put them past all hopes of indemnity. With this view they assembled the whole army. A messenger presently arrives with a pretended letter from those who had followed their steps in *Sardinia*. This letter admonishes them to be careful in guarding *Gisco*, and the rest of the prisoners (whom they had seized at the treaty of *Tunis*) there being some persons in the army, who held secret intelligence with the *Carthaginians* for their release. *Spendius* took occasion from this letter to warn the soldiers not to rely on the specious humanity of *Amilcar* towards those who had fallen into his hands; whose real intention, he said, was not to spare them, but by a feigned clemency, to draw the rest to submission; to the end, that having all at his mercy, he might at once take vengeance upon all. He likewise counselled them, to be especially watchful not to suffer *Gisco* to escape; who being a principal leader, and in great authority, would prove one of their most dangerous enemies. *Spendius* had hardly ended his discourse, when a second courier, pretending to come from *Tunis*, arrived with a letter pressing the same matter that was contained in the other. Upon this *Autaritus*, the *Gaul*, immediately step'd forth and declared to the assembly, that their safety and success could only be found in renouncing all hopes of reconciliation with the *Carthaginians*; and that whoever should appear to have turned his thoughts that way, ought to be distrusted

as

as a traitor to the common cause, and as being in secret correspondence with the enemy ; and he advised them to be guided wholly by those, who were for carrying things to the utmost extremity against the *Carthaginians*. After this he gave it as his opinion, that they ought to put to death by torments, not only *Gisco* and all the *Carthaginians* then in their custody, but all those that should hereafter fall alive into their hands. *Autaritus* was always in these assemblies of the soldiers a leading man, having the advantage, by his knowledge of several languages, of being able to make himself understood by the greatest part of his hearers. His proposal was received with almost universal applause ; nevertheless there were some of every nation, who joined in one common request, that in regard of the many benefits they had received from *Gisco*, he might at least have the favour to suffer only death, and not be put to torment. As they spoke in several languages, and all at once, it was not presently understood what they demanded ; but no sooner was their intention known, and some one in the assembly had cried out, *down with them, knock them all on the head*, but these intercessors were stoned to death by the multitude. Then, by order of *Spurius Spendius*, was *Gisco* with the other *Carthaginian* prisoners, to the number of 700 persons, brought out to suffer the sentence pronounced against them. The executioners (beginning with *Gisco*, that same *Gisco*, whom but a little before the whole army had owned for their benefactor, and whom they had made choice of to be arbitrator of their differences with the republic) cut off their hands, broke their legs, and then threw them alive into a ditch, there to expire in misery. The *Carthaginians* receiving intelligence of this cruelty, and being deeply affected with the sad fate of so many of their citizens, sent orders to *Amilcar* and *Hanno*, to use their utmost diligence to revenge it. They likewise dispatch'd heralds to the mercenaries, to demand the bodies of the dead ; but the villains were so far from complying with this demand, that

‘ they threatened to treat whatever messengers should hereafter be sent to them, in the same manner they had treated *Gisco*. And in fact it became an established law among them, that all *Carthaginian* prisoners they took should be tormented to death; and that those who were allies of the *Carthaginians* should have their hands cut off, and in that condition be sent back to them; and this law was afterwards rigorously executed.

‘ *Amilcar*, seeing no means left to put an end to the unbounded audaciousness of the enemy, but by utterly exterminating them, sent to *Hanno* to come and join him with the forces, which, without performing any thing worthy of notice, he had hitherto separately commanded. It was hoped that with their united strength they might be able to give a happy issue to the war. And in the mean time it was resolved, that in return for the barbarity practised by the enemy, all those of them, who should fall alive into the hands of the *Carthaginians*, should be thrown to wild beasts to be devoured.

‘ But now when affairs began to have a promising aspect, a dispute, that arose on a sudden between the two generals, was carried so far, that by it they lost many fair occasions of beating the enemy, and even gave them frequent advantages in the war. Upon the news of this division, the magistrates of *Carthage* came to a resolution, that one of the two should quit his command, and that the option should be left to the army.

‘ This quarrel so unseasonable, and its consequences above-mentioned, were not the only misfortunes that befel the *Carthaginians* at this time. A convoy from *Emporium* with provisions, and other stores, much wanted for the army, was lost by tempest at sea: and, to fill the meaure of their adversity, the towns of *Utica* and *Hippo*, that had hitherto stood firm to the *Carthaginian* party, not only in this war, but even in the time of *Agathocles*, and when the *Romans* made their descent on *Africa*, now abandoned them on

' on a sudden, without any plausible motive; and not only entered into a league of fast friendship with the Africans, but conceived an implacable hatred against the Carthaginians; which they sufficiently testified by murdering all those they had of that nation in garrison, and throwing their bodies over the walls, without suffering them to be buried. These events encouraged Matbo and Spendius to think of laying siege even to Carthage itself.

' The Carthaginian army having declared in favour of Amilcar, Hanno was constrained to relinquish his authority and was succeeded by Hannibal, whom the Senate appointed to command in his stead. Assisted by this new colleague, and especially by Naravasus, who was eminently useful in all expeditions, Amilcar scoured the country, and endeavoured to cut off all means of subsistence from the enemy, who now invested Carthage.

' The city, blocked up on all sides by land, was forced to have recourse to her allies. Hiero king of Syracuse, who had all along had a watchful eye upon the events of this war, and had supplied the republic with every thing she had desired of him, was now in her greatest distress, more than ever diligent to assist her; as being well aware, that to maintain his own authority in Sicily, and his alliance of friendship with the Romans, it was necessary that Carthage should be preserved in a condition to ballance their power; otherwise he himself might soon be at their mercy, and instead of their friend become their subject.

' In this, says Polybius, he acted wisely; for it greatly behoves a Prince not to neglect a mischief of this kind in the beginning, nor to suffer the exorbitant growth of a neighbouring power, till he is no longer able to contest with it for his own indisputable right.

' Not only king Hiero, but the Romans also, (faithfully observing their treaty of peace) supply'd the Carthaginians with such provisions and stores as they

‘ wanted ; so that the city, being thus succoured, was
‘ in condition to defend itself against the efforts of the
‘ besiegers.

‘ In the mean time *Amilcar* was so active and diligent in preventing any supplies from going to the camp of *Matho*, and *Spendius*, that he at length reduced them to great straits for provisions, and in the end constrained them to raise the siege. And now *Spendius*, assisted by one *Zarxas* an *African* leader, and by *Autaritus* the *Gaul*, issued into the field, at the head of 50000 chosen men, to try the fortune of war against *Amilcar*. (*Matho* was left at *Tunis*, to negotiate with their friends, and take a general care of the business.) The elephants of *Carthage* and the horse of *Naravasus* made *Spendius* afraid of descending into the plains, so that he betook himself to his former method of keeping the hills and rough grounds, or occupying the streight passages, wherein the desperate courage of his men might shew itself with little disadvantage. But *Amilcar*, having more skill than he in the trade of war, artfully contrived to draw him to many skirmishes ; in all which the success was such, as added courage to the *Carthaginians* and abated the strength and spirit of their enemies. Thus he continued alarming and provoking them by night and by day ; and, through his skill in laying ambuses, never failed to entrap some of them, when they engaged in small parties, nor to cut off great numbers when the action was more general ; and those that fell alive into his hands he gave to be devoured by wild beasts.

‘ At length he surprised them in a place that was very commodious for his own army, and very disadvantageous to theirs. They presently saw their disadvantage, and therefore had no heart to fight. *Amilcar* prudently foreseeing that necessity might draw them to attempt the most desperate enterprizes, took the opportunity of their present fear, and shut them close up with a trench and rampart. There they waited miserably and in vain for succour from

‘ *Tunis* ;

' *Tunis*; and having spent all their provisions were so pressed with hunger, that they fed upon the bodies of their prisoners. This they suffered patiently, as knowing they had not deserved any favour from Carthage; and hoping still that their friends at *Tunis* would not neglect them. But when at length they were driven to such extremity, as to be forced to devour their own companions, and yet saw no appearance of relief, then was their obstinacy quite broken, and they began to threaten their captains. *Spendius*, *Zarxas* and *Autaritus* having therefore consulted together, came to a resolution to yield themselves to *Amilcar*, if required, as the condition of peace. They sent a herald to demand a pals, which being granted them, they came in person to the *Carthaginian* general. What they could say to him is hard to conjecture; yet by the conditions that *Amilcar* granted, it would seem that they took the blame upon themselves, and begged pardon for the multitude. The conditions were, That the *Carthaginians* should chuse out of the whole number of these enemies, any ten whom they pleased, to retain at their discretion; and that the rest should all be dismissed, each in one single coat. When the treaty was thus concluded, *Amilcar* told *Spendius*, and those who were with him, that he chose them as part of the ten; and then immediately ordered them to be seized and secured. The army receiving intelligence that their leaders were detained, and not knowing that a treaty was concluded for them upon such gentle terms, presently imagined they were betrayed. In amazement therefore they all ran to arms. But now they wanted captains to order and conduct them; and the same astonishment that made them break the covenants of peace, of which they were ignorant, gave *Amilcar* both colour of justice in accomplishing revenge, and facility in doing the execution. They were all slain, being 40000 or more in number.

' The news of this exploit, (as may well be supposed) gave new life and spirit to the people at *Car-*

‘*thage*, and was terrible to the revolted cities. *Amilcar*,
 ‘with *Naravasus* and *Hannibal*, carried the war from
 ‘town to town, and found all places ready to yield,
 ‘except *Utica*, *Hippo*, and *Tunis*, the two first stand-
 ‘ing out through fear of deserved vengeance, and the
 ‘last being held by *Matho*, with the remainder of the
 ‘rebel army. It was thought fit to begin with *Tunis*,
 ‘where lay the chief strength of the enemy. Coming
 ‘before this town, they brought forth *Spendius* with
 ‘his fellows, and, in view of the garrison, crucified
 ‘them under the walls, to terrify those of his old com-
 ‘panions, that were still in arms. With this rigour the
 ‘siege began, as if speedy victory had been assured.
 ‘*Hannibal* quartered upon that side of *Tunis*, which
 ‘lay toward *Carthage*; *Amilcar* on the opposite side;
 ‘too far asunder to help one another in sudden ac-
 ‘cidents. It behoved them therefore to be more cir-
 ‘cumspect. Nevertheless, *Hannibal* secure, as if all
 ‘danger were past, neglected to keep good guard.
 ‘*Matho* perceived it, and, using his advantage, sallied
 ‘out with unexpected fury against that part of the
 ‘*Carthaginian* army, and so successfully, that, after a
 ‘great slaughter of the enemy, he put the rest to
 ‘flight, forced their camp, pillaged it, and took *Han-*
 ‘*nibal* himself prisoner. After the victory, having
 ‘caused the dead body of *Spendius* to be taken down
 ‘from the cross, he ordered *Hannibal* to be fixed alive
 ‘in his place, and executed him with unspeakable tor-
 ‘ments. The rest also of the noblest of the *Cartha-*
 ‘*ginians*, who had fallen into his hands, were by his
 ‘command slain round the body of *Spendius*. Of all
 ‘this *Amilcar* knew nothing, till it was too late; nei-
 ‘ther had he strength enough remaining, after this great
 ‘loss, to continue the siege; but was obliged to break it
 ‘up, and remove to the mouth of the river *Bagradas*,
 ‘where he encamped.

‘The terror in *Carthage*, upon the news of this dis-
 ‘aster, was not less than had been the joy for the
 ‘late important victory. All that could bear arms
 ‘were sent into the field under *Hanno*; and the Senate
 ‘commissioned

commissioned thirty principal men of their body to labour with all the force of persuasion, to bring *Amilcar* and him to a reconciliation. This could not be effected presently. *Amilcar* was perhaps nearly touched in his honour, that the carelessness of *Hannibal* seemed to be imputed to him, by sending his enemy to share with him the conduct of affairs, and be a check upon his proceedings. Nevertheless, after many conferences, the authority of the Senators prevailed, and the two Generals passed their words to live in friendship, and act in concert for the public good. And thenceforward all affairs were successfully managed to the satisfaction of their fellow citizens.

Malbo, during these transactions, was come abroad into the field, wisely purposing to make advantage of the reputation of his late success, while it gave some life to his cause. But this *African* Leader wanted the necessary skill to cope with *Amilcar*, who in all skirmishes and encounters between parties never failed to worst him, and thereby to diminish both his strength and his credit. *Malbo*, sensible of this growing mischief to his affairs, resolved therefore to try the fortune of one battle, whereby either his ambition should be accomplished, or his cares at an end. The *Carthaginians* were no less disposed to a general action, having many advantages above their enemies, and especially (which was worth all the rest) such a commander, as was not easily to be matched in that age. Both parties being thus agreed, the confederates and friends of both were called together, and the towns drained of their garrisons to augment the armies. At length with joint consent, in time and place, the battle was fought. The *Carthaginians* won the day. The greatest part of the *African* army was slain upon the spot; the rest fled to a town, that not being defensible quickly surrendered; *Malbo* himself was there taken alive. Immediately upon this victory all the *African* cities which had been in the rebellion, submitted to their old masters, *Utica* and *Hippo* only excepted; these, by their treacherous and outrageous

proceedings, having cut off from themselves all hopes of pardon. However, these also were constrained to surrender at mercy. *Matho* and his companions, being led in triumph to *Carthage*, were put to death by all the torments that revenge could devise.

Thus was a period given to this *inexpiable* war, which had lasted three years and near four months, and had abounded with more acts of wickedness and cruelty, than any other to be met with in story.'

ROME during all this ^b time took no advantage of her rival's distress to promote her ruin, but continued faithfully to observe the treaty of peace with her; and even assisted her as a friend in many instances. Once indeed there seemed to be some danger of a rupture, For as the *Carthaginians*, at the beginning of this war, made prize of all vessels that came on the coast of *Africa* to supply the rebels with provisions, it happened that they had at one time in custody 500 *Italians*, whom they had taken carrying on this traffic for the profit of private merchants. The *Romans*, offended at the detaining of these traders in prison, began to turn their thoughts to revenge; but they were soon appeased by a respectful embassy from *Carthage*, who restored the prisoners in so frank a manner, that the *Romans*, not to be behind her in courtesy, enlarged, without ransom, all the *Carthaginian* captives, that yet remained of those who had been taken during the *Sicilian* war. They also permitted their merchants to supply *Carthage* with whatsoever she stood in need of, and prohibited all commerce with her enemies. Nay, more than this, when the people of *Utica*, having revolted from the *Carthaginians*, would have put that city into the hands of the *Romans*, the latter rejected the overture; as they also did an offer made them of the Island of *Sardinia* by

^b Part of the Y. of R. 512. *Q. Lutatius*, and *A. Manlius*.

Y. of R. 513. *C. Claudius*, and *M. Sempronius*.

Y. of R. 514. *C. Mamilius*, and *Q. Valerius*.

Part of the Y. of R. 515. *Tib. Sempronius*, and *P. Valerius*.¹

the

the mercenaries there, who, following the example of those in *Africa*, had turned their arms against the masters in whose pay they were, and had forcibly seized upon that island.

This behaviour towards a rival power (says a learned writer) might have served as a notable example of *Roman* faith to all posterity, had not the issue proved that it proceeded wholly from the hope of greater profit thereby, than could reasonably be expected from an open violation of the treaty of peace. The whole estate of *Carthage* depended, at that time, upon the virtue of *Amilcar*; and had he been overthrown by the rebels in one main battle, that mighty city must either have fallen into the hands of merciless villains, or have humbled herself under the protection of the *Romans*, with whom she had lately contended for superiority. She was once, during the war, reduced by the rebels to so great extremity, as not to be far from such a miserable choice. Wherefore it was not unwisely done of the *Romans*, to make such demonstration of kindness, and honourable dealing, as might invite a rich, but sinking ship to run herself aground upon their shore. But when all was well ended in *Africa*, and the *Carthaginians* began to prepare for the recovery of *Sardinia*, then did ambition put off her goodly vizour. Though the *Romans* had formerly refused this Island, when offered them by the mercenaries, (who were afterwards driven thence by the natives) they now resolved to take possession of it by force of arms. One of the Consuls passed thither with an army and denounced war against *Carthage*, under the shameless pretence, *That the preparations made* (by that enfeebled and impoverished city) *to reduce Sardinia, were indeed designed* *Sardi Venales.* The *Carthaginians* were in no condition at this time to enter upon a new war with so potent an enemy: yielding therefore to necessity, they relinquished all pretensions to the Island for ever; and not only so, but submitted to the exactions of the Consul, who further demanded of them, as the price of a peace, the sum of * 1200 talents: Detestable injustice and extortion,

*Polyb. B. I.
c. 88.*

*Sinnius
Capito a-
pud Pomp.
Fest. in
voce
Sardi Ve-
nales.*

*232500L
Arbutibnot.

extortion, which, as *Polybius* assures us, were the chief cause of that bloody war, in which *Hannibal* afterwards, with hereditary hatred and an implacable spirit of revenge, pushed the *Romans* to the very brink of destruction.

C H A P. XII.

Wars of the Romans with the Boian Gauls, Ligurians, Sardinians and Corsicans.

*Eutrop. L.
3. c. 1.*

DURING the three years and some months that the war of *Carthage* with her mercenaries had lasted, the *Roman* Consuls had no affairs abroad, and seem to have chiefly employed their thoughts to establish good order in *Italy*, and to secure the frontiers against the *Gauls* and *Ligurians*, by planting colonies in their neighbourhood. The Republic however would gladly have engaged in some quarrel, if she could have found a plausible pretence for it. *Eutropius* tells us that after the conclusion of the war in *Sicily*, she sent Ambassadors to *Ptolemy Euergetes*, King of *Egypt*, to offer him her assistance against *Antiochus* of *Syria*, surnamed *the God*: But the *Aegyptian* having got rid of his enemy before the Ambassadors arrived, his answer was only a compliment of thanks. And we have seen, that after the conclusion of the *African* war, in which *Carthage* was triumphant, the *Romans* would have renewed hostilities against that hated rival, on account of *Sardinia*, if they had not been prevented in this project, by an unwilling cession of that Island to them.

*Y. of R.
515.
Bef. J. C.
237.
214 Consulship.
See B. 3.
ch. 25.
§. 1. 2.
Polyb. L. 2.
c. 21.*

But about the same time these ambitious and restless spirits found sufficient opportunity to keep their hardy legions in exercise. In the Consulate of *Tib. Sempronius*, and *P. Valerius*, those *Italic Gauls* who were called *Boii*, and who, after infinite losses and calamities sustained in their struggles with the *Romans*, had continued quiet 45 years, resolved at length, upon some very trivial pretences, to break the peace, which had been so long maintained with the republic. The old

old men, all those who had felt the hardships and sufferings of the former wars, being extinct, the young men, their successors, who had experienced nothing of those miseries, and feared nothing from fortune, began, according to the nature of man, to grow turbulent and desirous of some change in their condition; and this was the true source of their rash enterprize.

The *Ligurians* also (whom *Rome* had not yet begun to subdue,) being in motion, and seeming to threaten her with war, the Consuls for the year were obliged to divide their forces.

Valerius led a *consular* army against the *Gauls*, and was vanquished in his first battle with them, in which he lost 3500 men. Upon the news of this defeat, the *Romans* immediately dispatched *M. Genucius Cipus*, one of the *Prætors*, from the city, with a reinforcement for the Consul. *Valerius* looking on this precaution as a personal affront, and believing that he was still strong enough to cope with the enemy, notwithstanding the blow he had received, hastened to attack them again, before *Cipus* could arrive. His soldiers were no less zealous than himself to recover their honour; and being animated by this motive, behaved themselves so gallantly that they slew 14000 of the *Gauls* and took 2000 prisoners. However, this victory did not obtain the Consul a triumph, because he had been rash in the attempt, and had not paid sufficient deference to the sentiments of the senate and people.

In the mean time *Sempronius*, the other Consul, gained a battle, (though not a decisive one) against the *Ligurians*.

These wars were continued by the next year's Consuls *L. Cornelius Lentulus*, and *Q. Fulvius Flaccus*. *Fulvius* acquired no honour by the campaign. It was with great difficulty that he preserved his camp from being forced by the *Gauls*, whose country on this side of the *fulship*.

Liguria comprehended at this time the whole extent of country between the *Arno*, the *Apennines*, the country of the *Ananes*, the *Po*, the maritime *Alps* and the *Ligurian sea* (now the sea of *Genoa*.)

Y. of R. Po he had entered ; he was obliged to keep within his
 516. intrenchments, and to act entirely on the defensive.

Bef. J. C. Cornelius had better success against the Ligurians near

236. 215 Con. Hetruria. He obtained a victory, for which he was re-
 sulship. warded with a Triumph.

Eutrop. During these wars, preparations were made at Rome
 B. 3. c. 1. to celebrate the ^d secular games : Hiero King of Syracuse
 came

Ken. Antiq. ^d *Ludi Sæculares*, the most remarkable games that we meet with in
 Part 2. B. the Roman story. The common opinion makes them to have had a
 5. c. 7. very odd original, of which we have a tedious relation in *Valerius
 Lib. II. Maximus*, of the Ancients, and *Angelus Politianus* of the Moderns.
cap. 4. Monsieur Dacier, in his excellent remarks on the secular poem of *Ho-
 ræce*, passes by this old conceit as trivial and fabulous, and assures us,
Miscel. that we need go no farther for the rise of the custom, than to the
cap. 58. *Sybilline oracles*, for which the Romans had so great an esteem and
 veneration.

In these sacred writings, there was one famous prophecy to this effect ; that if the Romans, at the beginning of every age, should hold solemn games in the *Campus Martius* to the honour of *Pluto, Proserpine, Juno, Apollo, Diana, Ceres*, and the *Paræ*, or three fatal sisters, their city should ever flourish, and all nations be subjected to their dominion. They were very ready to obey the oracle, and, in all the ceremonies used on that occasion, conformed themselves to its directions. The whole manner of the solemnity was as follows : In the first place, the heralds received orders to make an invitation of the whole world to come to *a feast which they had never seen already, and should never see again*. Some few days before the beginning of the games, the *Quindecimviri*, taking their seats in the capitol, and in the *Palatine* temple, distributed among the people purifying compositions, as flambeaux, brimstone and sulphur. From hence the people passed on to *Diana's* temple on the *Aventine* mountain, carrying wheat, barley, and beans, as an offering ; and after this they spent whole nights in devotion to the destinies. At length, when the time of the games was actually come, which continued three days and three nights, the people assembled in the *Campus Martius*, and sacrificed to *Jupiter, Juno, Apollo, Latona, Diana, the Paræ, Ceres, Pluto, and Proserpine*. On the first night of the feast, the Emperor accompanied by the *Quindecimviri*, commanded three altars to be raised on the bank of *Tiber*, which they sprinkled with the blood of three lambs, and then proceeded to burn the offerings and the victims. After this they marked out a space which served for a *Theatre*, being illuminated by an innumerable multitude of flambeaux and fires : here they sung some certain hymns composed on this occasion, and celebrated all kinds of sports. On the day after, when they had been at the capitol to offer the victims, they returned to the *Campus Martius*, and held sports to the honour of *Apollo* and

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came to see the show, and brought with him 200000 ^{Y.} of R. Modii (measures containing a peck and a half) of wheat, ^{516.} Bet. J. C. that ^{236.}

215 Con-

and Diana. These lasted till the next day, when the noble matrons, sulship. at the hour appointed by the oracle, went to the capitol to sing hymns to Jupiter. On the third day, which concluded the feast, twenty-seven young boys, and as many girls, sung in the temple of Palatine Apollo, hymns and verses in Greek and Latin, to recommend the city to the protection of those deities whom they designed particularly to honour by their sacrifices.

The famous secular poem of Horace was composed for this last day, in the secular game held by Augustus. Dacier has given his judgment on this poem, as the master-piece of Horace; and believes that all antiquity cannot furnish us with any thing more happily compleat.

There has been much controversy, whether these games were celebrated every hundred, or every hundred and ten years. For the former opinion, Censorinus* alledges the testimony of Valerius Antias, * De Die Varro and Livy; and this was certainly the space of time which the Natali, Romans called *sæculum*, or an age. For the latter he produceth the cap. 17. authority of the registers, or commentaries of the Quindecimviri, and the edicts of Augustus, besides the plain evidence of Horace in his secular poem; 21.

Certus undenos decies per annos, &c.

This last space is expressly enjoined by the *Sybilline* oracle itself; the verses of which, relating to this purpose, are transcribed by Zosimus in the second book of his history.

'Αλλ' ὅπε ἀν μήκις οὐ ἵη χρόνος αὐθεώσωσι
Ζωῆς, εἰς ἑτέων ἐκατὸν δίκαια κύκλοις ὁδεῖν, &c.

Yet according to the ancient accounts we have of their celebration in the several ages, neither of these periods are much regarded.

The first were held A. U. C. 245, or 298.

The second A. 330, or 408.

The third A. 518.

The fourth either A. 605, or 608, or 628.

The fifth by Augustus, A. 736.

The sixth by Claudius, A. 800.

The seventh by Domitian, 841.

The eighth by Severus, A. 957.

The ninth by Philip, 1000.

The tenth by Honorius, A. 1157.

The disorder, without question, was owing to the ambition of the Emperors, who were extremely desirous to have the honour of celebrating these games in their reign; and therefore upon the slightest

that the vast concourse of people might not cause a scarcity of provisions.

Y. of R. The year of the *secular games* was not a year of
 517. tranquillity. The new Consuls, *P. Cornelius Lentulus*,
 Bef. J. C. and *C. Licinius Varus*, were obliged to take the field
 235. to oppose the *Gauls*. The confidence of their leaders
 216 Consulship. being raised by the multitudes of men they had assembled, and by the expectation of a strong reinforcement of their countrymen from the other side the *Alps*, the demanded the restitution of *Ariminum*, formerly taken from them by the *Romans*. *Lentulus* and *Varus*, to gain time (not having their troops compleat) referred the matter to the determination of the senate, and in the interim agreed upon a truce with the enemy, whose commanders were very ready to consent to a cessation of arms, till they should be joined by the forces they expected from *Transalpine Gaul*. When these forces arrived, their number proved so great as to give umbrage to those whom they came to assist. The *Cisalpine Gauls*, more afraid of the new-comers than of the *Romans*, turned their arms against them and put them to flight, but first slew their own two Generals (or Kings) *Ates* and *Galatus*, for having of their own head, and without consulting the nation, invited such dangerous allies to cross the *Alps*. The enemy being thus defeated by themselves, two consular armies were no longer necessary to repress them. *Lentulus* with his

slightest pretence, many times made them return before their ordinary course. Thus *Claudius* pretended that *Augustus* had held the games before their due time, that he might have the like excuse to keep them within sixty-four years afterwards. On which account, *Suetonius* tells us, that the people scoffed at his cryers, when they went about proclaiming games that no body had ever seen, nor would see again; whereas there were not only many persons alive who remembered the games of *Augustus*, but several players, who had acted in these games, were now again brought on the stage by *Claudius*. *Sueton. Claud. 21.*

Mr. Walk- What part of the year the secular games were celebrated in, is un-
 er of Coins, certain; probably in the times of the commonwealth on the days of
 p. 168. the nativity of the city, i. e. the 9, 10, 11, *Kal. Maii*, but under the
 Emperors, on the day when they came to their power.

legions

legions alone, not only reduced the *Boii* to yield a part of their country as the condition of a peace ; but took a great number of forts from the *Ligurians*, partly by force and partly by composition.

In the mean time, *Varus* made preparations for going to the Island of *Corsica*, which, by the secret intrigues of the *Carthaginians*, had been induced to throw off the *Roman* yoke. The Consul, not finding a fleet ready to transport his whole army, sent away before him a small number of ships with a detachment under the command of that *Claudius Glycias* who had formerly been named to the Dictatorship in derision. *Claudius* had served, since that time, with good reputation, in several posts of a lower order, but had never commanded in chief. Seeing himself now at the head of a part of the Consular army, his ambition was raised, and fancying it would be much for his honour to gain this Island to the republic without bloodshed ; he, without the consent of Consul or Senate, made a shameful peace with the *Corsicans*. The Consul, at his arrival, *Zonaras*,
annulled the treaty, renewed the war, and subdued B. 8.
the Island by force of arms. As for *Claudius*, by a decree of the Senate, he was delivered up to the resentment of the *Corsicans*, for having drawn them (as it was alleged) into a bloody war by a fallacious peace : In B. 6. c. 3. which sentence the republic, beside the punishing a breach of duty and order, had the further view of preventing the reproach which might have been cast upon the Consul, for having made war on a people who depended on the faith of a treaty. However, the *Corsicans* disdained this reparation, and sent *Claudius* back to *Rome*. There he was put to death in prison, and then his body, being first carried to the top of the steps called *Scalæ Gemonia*, on which the bodies of the greatest malefactors used to be exposed, was thence dragged away with an iron crook and thrown into the *Tiber*.

This execution of *Claudius* did not satisfy the *Corsicans* who had been amused by a treaty of peace, only to give their enemies the better opportunity to subdue them

Y. of R.
517.
Bef. J. C.
235.
216 Con-
sulship.
Zon. B. 8.

Dio apud
Vales. p.
593.
Val. Max.
In B. 6. c. 3. §. 3.

Y. of R. them by a war. The near neighbourhood of *Sardinia*
 517. made it easy for them to communicate their discontent
 Bef. J. C. to the people of that Island ; and it is said, that *Car-*
 235. *216* Con-*thage* under-hand excited the *Sardinians* to revolt from
 fulship. the *Romans*; and that *Rome*, for this reason, made pre-
 Zon. B. 8. parations for a new war with the *African Republic*.
Eutrop. B. Alarm'd at this news the *Carthaginians* sent ambassador
 3. c. 2. after ambassador to negotiate an accommodation ; but
 all in vain. At length they dispatched to *Rome*, for the
 same end, ten of the principal members of their
 state, among whom was one *Hanno*, a young man of
 great spirit and vivacity. When these new deputies had
 Orof. B. 4. for a while employed the lowest submissions and the
 c. 12. humblest entreaties to procure a reconciliation, and all
 to no effect ; *Hanno*, weary of so much cringing, and
 full of indignation at the rough and haughty answers
 Dio in of the Senate, cried out, with an air of confidence and
Excerp. dignity, ‘ Well then, if you are resolved to break the
 xi. p. 922. ‘ treaty, reinstate us in the condition we were in be-
 fore it was concluded. Restore to us *SICILY* and
 ‘ *SARDINIA*. With these we bought of you, not a
 ‘ *Short Truce*, but a *Peace* that was to be *perpetual*.’
 The Senators, ashamed, dismissed the Deputies with a
 milder answer.

Y. of R. After this the Consuls for the new year, *C. Attilius*
 518. *Balbus*, and *T. Manlius Torquatus*, drew lots for their
 Bef. J. C. provinces ; the former continued in *Italy*, while the lat-
 234. *217* Con-ter easily recovered *Sardinia*, and settled peace there,
 fulship. but without reducing it to a *Roman province*.
Eutrop. B. And now the temple of *Janus* was shut up for the
 3. c. 3. first time since the reign of *Numa Pompilius*. For near
Vel. Pat. B. 2. c. 38. 450 years the *Romans* had been almost continually in
Orof. B. arms : And so steady was their ambition, and so un-
 4. c. 12. wearied their constancy in pursuing its dictates, that in
Liv. B. 1. the succeeding parts of this history we shall see them,
 c. 19. in spight of numberless misfortunes, still forming new
 enterprizes upon the neighbouring nations, and never
 ceasing to push their conquests till they have attained to
 universal empire.

The present tranquillity lasted but a few months.

In

In the following Consulship of *L. Posthumius Albinus*, Y. of R. and *Sp. Carvilius*, three armies were raised to act against the *Sardinians*, *Corsicans* and *Ligurians* who had (probably) engaged themselves, by secret treaties, mutually to assist one another. *Posthumius* succeeded against the *Ligurians*; but the *Prætor Cornelius*, who commanded in *Sardinia*, was, with many of his soldiers, carried off by a distemper. *Carvilius* (from *Corsica*) transported his Legions thither, gained a victory over the *Sardinians*, and then returned to *Rome* to triumph.

In this Consulship, the *Censors*, observing the number of the *Citizens* to be considerably lessen'd and imputing it to mens marrying only with a view to interest, deserting their own wives for fear of having many children to maintain, and carrying on unlawful intrigues with other women, they obliged all the citizens to swear, that they would not marry with any other view, than that of increasing the subjects of the republic. This oath raised many scruples; and caused many ruptures between husbands and wives. Among the rest, one *Carvilius Ruga*, a considerable man, thought himself bound by his oath to divorce his wife whom he passionately loved, because she was barren; and accordingly he put her away, contrary to his inclination, and married another; the first instance of divorce at *Rome* in 519 years, notwithstanding that the laws had always allowed it. And it was on this occasion that marriage-contracts were first introduced, to secure womens portions in case of divorces, which we shall see hereafter grow scandalously frequent, as a corruption of manners prevailed in the republic.

The fresh revolts of the *Sardinians* and *Ligurians* obliged the new Consuls *M. Pomponius Matbo* and *Q. Fabius Maximus*, (the same *Fabius* who afterwards acquired so much glory in the wars of *Hannibal*) to divide the *Roman* forces. It now falling to *Fabius*'s lot to make war with the *Ligurians*, he drove them out of the flat country and forced them to take shelter under the *Alps*. In the mean time, his colleague *Pomponius* failed for *Sardinia*, and gained some victories there,

*Tab. Tri-
umpb.* for which a triumph was granted him at his return home.

It is conjectured, that about this time the *Æbutian Law* (so called from the two *Æbutii*, Tribunes of the people, who proposed it and got it passed) was promulgated. It retrenched many frivolous customs, ordained by the twelve tables to be observed in processses relating to civil affairs, and it also directed that three able and judicious men should be chosen out of each tribe, to form a new tribunal, which, subordinate to the Prætors, might assist them, and remedy the inconveniencies often occasioned by their absence from *Rome*. These new judges were called, for brevity's sake, *Centumvirs*^b, though they were 105 in number; and when they were afterwards augmented to 180, they still kept the same name.

Y. of R. The establishment of this new tribunal made no change as to the direction of state affairs which continued wholly in the Senate and *Comitia*. *Flaminus*, one of the *Tribunes*, made a motion to the Commons, at this time, to distribute a fruitful country lately taken from the *Gauls*, among the poor citizens of *Rome*. All motions of this kind had ever been opposed by the Senators, out of private interest; and now they had indeed a better reason to unite their strength, in order to hinder *Flaminus*'s motion from passing into a law. They foresaw that the *Gauls*, on both sides the *Po*, would impatiently bear the distribution proposed of those lands. Neither the threats of the present Consuls, *M. Æmilius Lepidus*, and *M. Publicius Malleolus*, nor the entreaties of the Senate, nor yet the tears of his own father, whom the *Patricians* had gained over to them, could prevail with *Flaminus* to desist. On

Plin. Fun. ^b They were divided into four courts or chambers. The causes, which fell under their cognizance, were such as related to prescriptive, guardianships, decrees of consanguinity, or affinity, damages occasioned by inundations, contests about building or repairing middle walls, the windows a man might open upon his neighbour, with an infinite number of other matters, that often raised disputes between the inhabitants of the same city.

the

the day appointed for proposing the law to the *Comitia*, *Val. Max.*
 he mounted the *Roftra* and spoke to the people in favour
 of it; but in the midst of his harangue, his father ap-
 pearing on a sudden ascended the *Roftra*, took him by
 the arm, and commanded him to follow him home; and
 then *Flaminius* immediately obeyed without reply; and,
 what is most extraordinary, not the least noise nor
 murmur was heard in the assembly. Nevertheless,
 the affair was now only postponed; it was afterwards
 carried into execution; and what the Senators had appre-
 hended came to pass; a dangerous war from the angry
Gauls. *Polyb. B.*
2. c. 21.

In the following year the new Consuls, *M. Pomponius Matbo*, and *C. Papirius Maso*, entirely finished the con-
 quest of the two islands of *Sardinia* and *Corfica*, which
 were then reduced to the state of a *Roman Province*, *Y. of R.*
522. *Bef. J. C.*
 upon the same foot as *Sicily*. It is probable, that after fulship.
 this regulation *Pomponius* continued in the new province *Zon. B. 8.*
 to govern it in quality of *Pro-Consul* or *Prætor*, when
 the year of his Consulate, which was not far from a
 conclusion, should expire; but *Papirius* returned to
Rome. At his arrival he found the grand elections over; *Fest. Ca-*
 a Dictator had been created to hold the *Comitia*, so *pit.*
 that during the few remaining days of his magistracy,
 he had nothing to do, and he also quickly perceived,
 upon trial, that he had no more credit than busines.
 The senate, dissatisfied with him for some reason un-
 known, refused him a triumph. This provoked him
 to take a method entirely new, to do himself honour.
 At the head of his army he marched to the temple of
Jupiter Latialis on the hill of *Alba*, with all the pomp *Val. Max.*
 with which triumphant victors were wont to march to *B. 3. c. 6.*
 the *Capitol*; he made no alteration in the ceremony, *Plin. B.*
 except that instead of a crown of laurel, he wore a *15. c. 29.*
 crown of myrtle, on account of his having defeated the
Corficans in a place where was a grove of myrtles. *Festus in*
 This example of *Papirius*, was afterwards followed by *voce Myr-*
 many Generals to whom the senate refused the honour of *tea.*
a Triumph.

C H A P. XIII.

The first Illyrian war.

Y. of R. **T**HE next year *M. Æmilius Barbula*, and *M. Junius Pera*, being Consuls, the republic engaged
 Bef. J. C. ^{523.} in a new war out of *Italy*. *Illyricum*, or rather that
^{229.} ^{222.} Con- part of the country so called, which lies upon the *Adriatic*, and confines upon *Macedon* and *Epirus*, was at
 fulship. *Polyb. B.* this time governed by a woman, named *Teuta*, the wi-
^{z. c. z.} *Appian in* dow of King *Agron*, and guardian to her son, *Pinæus*,
Illyr. under age. The success of her late husband's arms,
 who had vanquished the *Ætolians*, made her vain and
 presumptuous: and, being governed by evil councils,
 she, instead of prudently managing the affairs of her
 ward in peace, commissioned her subjects to practise
 piracy on the sea coast, and seize all the places they
 could; which was, in a manner, declaring herself a
 common enemy to all nations. Her pirates had taken
 many ships belonging to the *Roman* merchants, and
 Zon. B. 9. she was now besieging the island of *Issa* in the *Adriatic*;
 Dio. in Excerpt. the inhabitants of which, had put themselves under
 xii. the protection of the republic. Upon the complaints of
 those merchants, and to protect the people of *Issa*, the
 senate dispatched two ambassadors, *Caius* and *Lucius Co-*
Polyb. B. *runcanius*, to the *Illyrian* Queen, to require of her that
^{2. c. 8.} she would restrain her subjects from infesting the seas
 with their piracies. To this demand the Queen an-
 swered, that she would take care, that no injury should
 be done to the *Romans* by the *Illyrian NATION*, but that
 she thought it was never the custom of Princes to hinder
 private subjects from making what advantages they could
 from the sea. But the *Romans*, (replied the younger
 of the ambassadors) have an excellent custom, which is,
 to punish private injuries by a public revenge, and to re-
 lieve the oppress'd. Teuta, by the help of the Gods, we
 shall find means to make you speedily reform your royal in-
 stitutions. The proud Queen, angry to excess at these
 words, secretly contrived to have the ambassadors mur-
 dered

dered in their return homeward. Upon the news of this cruel breach of the law of nations, the senate, having first done honour to the *manes* of the ambassadors, by erecting, as was usual in such cases, statues, three feet high to their memory, equip'd a fleet with all *Pliny. B.* expedition to begin the war. *Teuta*, alarm'd with these *34. c. 6. Dio. in Excerpt. xii. Zon. B. 8.* preparations, dispatched an embassy to *Rome*, to disown her having had any share in the murder: yet, when the *Romans* demanded, that the murderers should be delivered up, she peremptorily refused it.

The Consuls therefore for the new year, *P. Postbu-* *Y. of R.*
mius Albinus, and *Cn. Fulvius Centumalus*, both em- *524. Bef. J. C.*
 barked for *Illyricum*. *Fulvius* had the command of the *228. Con-*
 fleet, consisting of 200 gallies, and *Postbumius* of the *223. fulship.*
 land-forces, which were 20000 foot, and a small body *Polyb. B.*
 of horse. The Queen, in the beginning of the spring, *2. c. 11.*
 had augmented her fleet, and sent it to plunder the ** Now
 coasts of Greece*. One part sailed to *Corcyra**, a small *Curzola.*
 island lying near *Pharos* in the *Adriatic*) the rest an-
 chored before *Epidamnum*. Those, who had thought
 to surprize the town, having failed of their hope, re-
 joined the squadron that lay before *Corcyra*: the people
 of which place had called in the *Acilians* and *Aeleans*
 to their assistance. Nevertheless, the *Illyrians*, being
 assisted by the *Acarnanians*, had the victory in a brisk
 action by sea: so that *Corcyra*, being no longer in a
 condition to defend itself, capitulated; and received an
Illyrian garrison, commanded by *Demetrius* of *Pharos*:
 after which, the conquerors sailed to *Epidamnum*, and
 renewed the siege of that Place.

Fulvius sailed directly for *Corcyra*; and tho' he learnt
 by the way that the city had surrender'd, he pursued
 his course, having a secret intelligence with *Demetrius*;
 who, knowing that some ill offices had been done him
 with *Teuta*, and fearing her resentment, had promised
 the Consul to deliver up the Place to him; and this he
 did with the consent of the *Corcyreans*, who thought
 it the only means of getting a protection from the insults
 of the *Illyrians*.

By the advice and assistance of the same *Demetrius*, the *Romans* (after *Posthumius* had landed his forces) made themselves masters of *Apollonia* (a great city, and one of the keys of *Illyricum* on the side of *Macedon*) and of many other places; of which, to reward his services, they appointed him governor. *Teuta* was quickly constrained by *Posthumius*'s army to retire for safety to the inner Part of *Illyricum*; while *Fulvius*, with his naval forces, cleared the sea of her pirates.

V. of R. Upon the election of *Sp. Carvilius*, and *Q. Fabius Verrucosus*, to the Consulate, *Fulvius* was recalled from *Illyricum* with the greater part of the fleet, and of the land-forces, and *Posthumius* received orders to stay fullship. *Teuta*, who perhaps had built some hopes on a change of the *Roman* magistrates, finding that *Posthumius* not only winter'd in *Illyricum*, but was raising fresh troops to pursue the war, sent, early in the spring, from *Rhizon*, (whither she had retired) an embassy to *Rome* to divert the storm. The Senate granted her a peace *Polyb. B.2.* on these conditions; *That she should pay an annual tribute to the Romans, and surrender to them all Illyricum, a few places excepted.* (*Appian* mentions *Corcyra*, *Pbaros*, *Issa*, *Epidamnum* (or *Dyrrachium*) and the country of the *Atintanes* as yielded to the *Romans*.) *And (which principally concerned the Greeks) that not more than two of her ships, and these unarmed, should be permitted to sail beyond Lissos, a sea-port on the confines of *Illyricum* and *Macedon*.* Thus ended the first *Illyrian* war, which had not lasted quite two years. As for *Teuta*, whether out of shame, or compelled to it by a secret article of the treaty, she abdicated the Regency, and *Demetrius* took her place.

Posthumius, after this, sent ambassadors to the *Aetolians* and *Achaeans*, to lay before them the reasons for which the *Romans* had undertaken the war, what had been the events of it, and upon what terms a peace had been concluded. The ambassadors, having performed their commission, returned to *Corcyra*, much pleased with the courteous reception they had met with from

from those states. In reality, the treaty was of great Y. of R. benefit to the *Greeks*, and deliver'd them from vexations and perpetual fears : for all *Greece* had been plagued and infested with the *Illyrian* pyracies. ^{525.} ^{Bef. J. C.} ^{227.}

²²⁴ Con-
fulship.

Polybius remarks that this was the first time that any Roman troops crost the sea into *Illyricum*; and the first time that there was any intercourse by ambassadors between the *Greeks* and the *Romans*. The latter, about the same time, sent ambassadors to *Corinth* and to *Athens*. They were honourably received. The *Corinthians*, by a public act, decreed that the *Romans* should be admitted to the celebration of the *Isthmian* games. ^{Polyb. R.} ^{2. c. 12.} And *Zonaras* tells us, that the *Athenians* declared the *Romans* *Citizens of Athens*, and decreed them the privilege of being admitted to the mysteries of *Eleusis*; that is, of the festival of *Ceres* celebrated at *Eleusis*, a city of *Attica*. ^{Zon. B. 8.}

C H A P. XIV.

The Romans vanquish the Gauls on both sides the Po.

BEFORE the *Illyrian* war was well ended, the *Italic Gauls* on both sides the *Po* began to be in motion. ^{Y. of R.} ^{526.} Nevertheless it does not appear, that *P. Valerius Flaccus*, and *M. Attilius Regulus*, the Consuls for the new year, ^{Bef. J. C.} ^{226.} took the field against them, or performed any military ²²⁵ Con-
exploit. ^{fulship.}

The *Romans* had the extremest dread of those enemies, who had formerly reduced their state to the very brink of total destruction. There was a prophecy, at this time current at *Rome*, *That the Gauls and Greeks should one day be in possession of it*. This prophecy is said

* Some authors say, that the first establishment of two *Provincial Praetors*, one for the government of *Sicily*, and one for that of *Sardinia* and *Corsica*, was in this Consulate, and not at the time before mentioned. Be that as it will, it was in this year that, at the motion of two Tribunes, *Villius*, and *Titius*, a law passed, empowering the *Roman Praetors* to appoint, as well in the provinces belonging to the republic, as at *Rome*, guardians to those women and children who had none. This law was called *Villa-Titia. Catrou.* ^{Pomp. de orig. Juris. Justinian. Instit. B. 1. Ulpian. c. 11. de tutelis.}

to have been found in the *Sibylline* books. The completion of it seemed now to approach, when the states of the republic were bounded on one side by the *Greeks*, and on the other by the *Gauls*. The succeeding Consuls therefore, *M. Valerius Messala*, and *L. Apustius*^{s. 27.} *Bef. J. C. Fullo*, consulted with the *Pontifices*, how to quiet the apprehensions of the people; and immediately an edict was published by the *Decemvirs*, who had the care^{s. 225.} of the *Sibylline* books commanding that two *Greeks*, a man and a woman, and two *Gauls*, a man and a woman, should be buried alive in the Ox-Market; and by this they persuaded the people, that the prophecy was fulfilled, and that the *Gauls* and *Greeks* had taken possession of *Rome*.^{c. 13.}

The difficulties raised by superstition being thus surmounted, the *Romans* applied themselves to create divisions among the *Gauls*, and to levy a prodigious force; which (according to *Polybius*^b) amounted to near
Polyb. B. 2. c. 24. 700000

	Foot.	Horse.
b The numbers found upon the muster, as recorded by <i>Polybius</i> , are as follow. With the Consuls marched four legions of <i>Romans</i> , each legion consisting of 5200 foot, and 300 horse.	20800	1200
They had also with them, of the allies,	30000	2000
Of the <i>Sabines</i> and <i>Hetrurians</i> were sent, under the command of a <i>Prætor</i> , to the frontiers of <i>Hetruria</i> .	50000	4000
Of the <i>Umbrians</i> and <i>Sarcinates</i> (from the <i>Appen-</i> <i>nines</i>) 20000, and as many of the <i>Veneti</i> and <i>Cenomani</i> were appointed to invade the <i>Boii</i> , in order to oblige them to keep a part of their forces at home, for their own defence,	40000	
At <i>Rome</i> were kept ready to march, (on any exigence) of the citizens,	20000	1500
These were strengthened by a body of the allies, amounting to	30000	2000
On the muster rolls sent to the senate, from the allies were,		
Of the <i>Latines</i> ,	80000	5000
Of the <i>Sannites</i> ,	70000	7000
Of the <i>Iapyges</i> , and <i>Messapuges</i> ,	50000	16000
Of the people of <i>Lucania</i> ,	30000	3000
Of the <i>Marsi</i> , <i>Marrucini</i> , <i>Ferentini</i> , and <i>Vefini</i>	20000	4000
		The

700000 foot, and near 70000 horse; so great was the terror which the threatened invasion from these Barbarians spread over all *Italy*. The *Gauls* nevertheless, *Polyb. B. 2. c. 23.* with only fifty thousand foot, and twenty thousand horse,

	Foot,	Horse.
The Romans had also in <i>Sicily</i> and <i>Tarentum</i> two legions, consisting each of 4200 foot and 200 horse	8400	400
Beside all these, of the common people, in <i>Rome</i> and in <i>Campania</i> , were mustered, as fit to bear arms,	250000	23000
	<hr/> 699200	<hr/> 69100

Polybius, on occasion of this muster, expresses his admiration of the hardy enterprize of *Hannibal*, to attack an empire of such prodigious strength with an army of scarcely 20000 men.

But Sir *Walter Raleigh* observes, that this muster seems to have been like to that which *Lodowic Sforza* made, when *Lewis the XIIth* invaded *Milan*; at which time, the better to encourage himself and his subjects, he took a roll of all persons able to bear arms within the Dutchy, though indeed he was never able to bring a tenth part of them into the field. Certain it is (adds our historian) that the battles of *Trebia*, *Thrasimene*, and *Cannæ*, did not consume any such proportion as was answerable to this large account. Yet were the *Romans* fain to arm their slaves, even for want of other soldiers, after their overthrow at *Cannæ*. Wherefore the marvel is not great, that the *Carthaginians* and others were little terrified with the report of such a multitude: for, all heads are not fit for helmets; though the *Roman citizens* were, in general, as good fighting men as elsewhere might be found.

Another reason may be also assigned why *Hannibal* should not be much frightened at these muster rolls, even supposing the far greater part of the men, there registered, to be fit to bear arms. *Polybius* tells us, that the people of *Italy*, terrified at the approach of the *Gauls*, did not consider themselves now as being to fight only as allies of *Rome*, and for the preservation of her empire, but for their own proper safety, their families, their fortunes, all that was dear to them; and that it was for this reason they so readily executed the orders, that were sent to them from the senate. The contest with the *Gauls* was looked upon as the common cause of all *Italy*.

But when *Hannibal* passed the *Alps*, the case was widely different; for we may well conclude from the neutrality and cold behaviour generally observed by the allies of *Rome*, on that occasion, that they looked upon this war as regarding her only, and in which they themselves had little concern.

horse,

horse, began the hostilities, entered *Hetruria*, pillaging and laying waste the country, without opposition.

Y. of R. The republic had promoted *L. Æmilius Papus*, and
528. C. Attilius Regulus, to the Consulship. The latter went
Bef. J. C. 224. into *Sardinia*, to quiet some commotion there; while
227 Con- *Æmilius* took upon him the conduct of the war with the
fulship. *Insubrian* and *Boian Gauls*, joined by a numerous army,
from the other side of the *Alps*, of the *Gæsatæ*, so
Polyb. B. 2. c. 22. called (says *Polybius*) because they served for pay, the
word having that signification. They were commanded
by two kings, *Concolitanus*, and *Aneroestus*.

B. 2. c. 26. *Æmilius* being uncertain what rout the *Gæsatæ* would
take after they had passed the *Alps*, had led his troops
to *Ariminum*, to hinder the enemy from entering upon
the *Roman* lands by the coasts of the *Adriatic* sea. At
c. 25. the same time a *Prætor*, with a body of 5000 foot,
and 4000 horse, had been ordered into *Hetruria*, to
defend the frontiers of that country. But in his march
he missed of the enemy; who were advanced to the
neighbourhood of *Clusium* (within three days march of
Rome) when they heard that a *Roman* army was behind
them, and would soon be at their heels. They imme-
diately turned back to meet the *Prætor* and give him
battle. It being about the close of day, when the two
armies came in sight of each other, they both en-
camped. But in the night, the leaders of the *Gauls*,
having meditated a stratagem, marched away with
their infantry towards *Fæsula*^a, leaving only their ca-
valry to appear in the field, when day should return.
In the morning, the *Prætor* seeing nothing but horse
to oppose him, sallied out of his entrenchments and
attacked them. The *Gallic* cavalry, according to their
instructions, instantly gave ground, and took the road
to *Fæsula*. Their flight drew the *Romans* after them,

^c According to the *Jesuits*, the *Gæsatæ* were not a particular peo-
ple of *Transalpine Gaul*, but probably *Germans* dispersed through all
the *Gallic* nation, whose profession was arms, and who hired them-
selves to whoever would employ them in war. They had their name
from a weapon they bore, called *Gæsum*.

^d A city of *Hetruria*, at the foot of the *Apennines*.

never

never suspecting that they should find the enemy's in- Y. of R.
fantry in their way. The latter on a sudden appeared ^{528.}
and fell vigorously upon the Prætor's troops already ^{Bef. J. C.}
fatigued with the pursuit. 6000 of his men were killed ^{224.}
upon the spot; the rest in disorder fled to a neigbour- ^{227 Con-}
ship. ^{fulship.}
ing hill, where they entrenched themselves. The first
thought of the *Gallic Generals* was to force the enemy
immediately in this post; but considering afterwards
that their own troops were wearied with the former
night's march, they thought it best to give them some
repose, and defer the attack till the next day.

In this distress of the Prætor's army, the Consul *Polyb. B.*
Æmilius came seasonably to their relief. Being in- ^{2. c. 26.}
formed of the approach of the *Gæsatæ* towards *Rome*, ^{to c. 31.}
he had instantly quitted his camp at *Ariminum* and had
marched with expedition to the defence of his country.
He was now encamped within a small distance from
the enemy; and the Prætor's troops seeing the fires in
his camp, and conjecturing the truth, took courage.
The *Gauls*, perceiving the same fires, were greatly al-
armed at the Consul's unexpected arrival; and being
unwilling to hazard by a battle the loss of the rich
booty they had got, they, by the advice of their King
Aneroësus, decamped in the night, purposing to march
home through *Insubria*; and when they had secured
their booty, to return to the war. In their march they
kept along the shore of the *Hetrurian sea*. *Æmilius*,
though his army was now strengthened by the remains
of the Prætor's troops, did not think it adviseable to
hazard a pitched battle; but chose rather to follow the
enemy close, and watch his opportunity to harraus them
in their retreat, and, if possible, to recover some part
of the spoils they were carrying off. It luckily hap-
pened, that his colleague *Attilius*, having put a speedy
end to the troubles in *Sardinia*, had, in his return
home, landed with his army at *Pisa*, and was now
marching along the coast of the *Hetrurian sea* towards
Rome: he was overjoyed when, near *Telamon*, a little
port of *Hetruria*, he learned, by his scouts, the situa-
tion of things. And, in order to intercept the *Gauls*,

he

Y. of R. he immediately drew up his infantry, making as wide
 528. a front as he could; and then commanded them to
 Bef. J. C. advance slowly to meet the enemy. He himself
 224. hastened with his cavalry to the top of a hill, by the
 227 Consulship. foot of which the enemy must necessarily pass. His
 ambition was to have the chief glory of the success; and he persuaded himself, that by being the first to begin the battle, he should obtain that advantage.

The Gauls imagined at first that this body of Roman horse was only a detachment from *Æmilius's* army, and therefore ordered their cavalry to advance and drive them from their post. As for *Æmilius*, as soon as he perceived fighting at a distance, he concluded it was his colleague *Attilius*, attacking the enemy in front, for he had been informed of his landing at *Pisa*. He immediately detached all his horse to fetch a compass and join those of *Attilius*. Upon the arrival of so powerful a reinforcement the Romans renewed the attack with more briskness than ever. *Attilius*, fighting with the utmost intrepidity, was killed in the engagement. A Gaul cut off his head, and sticking it on the top of a lance carried it through all the files of the Gallic troops. However the death of this brave man proved no advantage to them. One of his lieutenants took his place, and the action was continued as before. The Romans in the end had the victory and kept possession of their post.

During the conflict between the cavalry on both sides, the Gallic Generals had time to form their infantry. Having two *Consular* armies to deal with, one in their front, the other in their rear, they divided their battalions pretty equally, one half of them turning their backs to the other half; and, to avoid being attacked in flank, they placed all their waggons and other carriages on the wings. The plunder they had carried to a neighbouring hill, where they left it under a good guard.

The *Gæsatæ*, who made the first line of the troops that faced *Æmilius*, confiding in their gigantic stature and

and strength, and observing that the plain where they Y. of R.
were drawn up was full of bushes and briars, to avoid 528.
being incommoded in the battle by the thorns catching Bef. J.C.
in their clothes, stripped themselves naked, keeping 224. Con-
only their arms. But this vain confidence proved their fulship.

1 destruction. For having only small bucklers, which
were not sufficient to ward their huge bodies from the
darts that were unexpectedly showered upon them by
the *Romans* at a distance, they presently fell into dis-
couragement and perplexity. Some transported with
rage and despair threw themselves madly upon the
enemy, where they found certain death; others, pale,
discomfited and trembling, drew back in disorder, break-
ing the ranks that were behind them. And thus were
quelled at the very first attack the pride and ferocity
of the *Gæsatae*.

And now the *Roman* dartmen retiring within the in-
tervals of the army, the cohorts advanced to encoun-
ter the *Insubrians*, *Boians*, and *Tauriscans*, who fought
with great resolution; for though they were hard
pressed, and covered with wounds, they sustained the
shock and kept their post, and may be truly said to
have been inferior to the *Romans* only in their arms.
Their shields were not so large as those of the *Ro-
mans*, and their swords were made only for cutting.
Nevertheless they maintained the fight till the *Roman*
cavalry who had been victorious on the eminence, driv-
ing at once full speed upon them, put an end to the
struggle. The defeat was general; 40000 of the *Gauls* Diod. Sic.
remained dead upon the field of battle, and 10000 B. 25. in
were made prisoners, together with *Concolitanus*, one Eclog.
of their kings. The rest escaped by flight, but *An-
roetus* their other king, the bravest soldier, and most
experienced commander of all the *Gauls*, cut his throat
afterwards in rage and despair. *Æmilius* after this
victory marched his army into the country of the
Boian Gauls, enriched his soldiers with booty, and
then returned to *Rome*, where he had a magnificent tri-
umph.

The fear of the *Gallic* war was over, but the desire
of

Y. of R. of revenge remained; and the next year's Consuls
 therefore, T. Manlius Torquatus, and Q. Fulvius Flaccus,
 had Gaul assigned them for their provinces. But these great men did not succeed, to the expectation of fulship. Con- the Romans, nor pass the Po, as was hoped they would.
Polyb. B. Their marches were retarded by violent rains, and a plague infected their army, which latter calamity not suffering them to return to Rome at the usual time, the famous Cæcilius Metellus was created *Dictator*, to hold the Comitia in their absence, for the new elections.
Faſt. Capit.

Y. of R. C. Flaminius Nepos, and P. Furius Pbilo, being chosen Consuls, put the design of their Predecessors in executi-
 on, and notwithstanding the vigorous opposition of the Gauls, passed the Po, and entered *Infubria*; but having suffered much both in their passage, and afterwards, and finding they could perform nothing of moment, they made a truce with this people, and retired into the territory of their friends the *Cænomani*. There they continued a while augmenting their army with auxiliaries; and then renewed their incursions on the *Infubrian* plains at the foot of the *Alps*. Hereupon the princes of this nation, perceiving the fixed determination of the Romans to subdue them, resolved to put all to the hazard of a battle; and having collected their strength, which amounted to 50000 men marched against the enemy, and encamped within sight of them.

Zon. B. 8. It happened a little before this that the *Romans* were Plut. Life much frighten'd by various prodigies in the heavens, in of Marcel. the waters, and upon the earth. In *Hetruria* extraord- and Orosf. B. 4. ordinary lights appeared in the air. At *Ariminum* three c. 13. moons were seen at the same time. A river of *Picenum* rolled waters as red as blood. The *Italians* felt the violent earthquake that overturned the *Colossus* of *Rhodes*. At *Rome* a vulture lighted in the middle of the *Forum*, and staid there a considerable time. The *Augurs* being consulted upon these prodigies, declared that there must have been some defect in the ceremonial at the election of the *Consuls*: upon which, a courier was immediately dispatched from the senate, with letters commanding them

them to return to *Rome*. But when these letters arrived, Y. of R. the *Consuls* being on the banks of the river *Addua*, were ^{530.} in sight of the powerful army of the *Insubrians*; and ^{Bef. J. C.} *Flaminius* either guessing at the substance of the letters, ^{222.} or having been informed of it by his friends, prevailed ^{229.} with his colleague not to open the packet till after the battle.

The *Romans*, being sensible that the enemy exceeded ^{Polyb. B.2.} them in numbers, had intended to use the aid of those ^{C. 32, 33.} *Gauls* with whom they had reinforced their army. But now remembering the faithlessness of these people, who were to be employed against troops of the same nation, they could not resolve to trust them in the present important conjuncture. At the same time it was by no means proper to express a diffidence of them, in such a manner as should give them occasion of quarrel. *Flaminius*, to free himself from this perplexity, made his *Gauls* pass to the other side of the river on a bridge of boats; and then, by causing the boats to be haw'd to his own side, put it out of the power of those suspected troops to do him any harm during the action. By this means also his own army was left without any hopes but in victory; for the river which they had at their backs was unfordable. Thus far the conduct of *Flaminius* appears commendable: but he was guilty of a great oversight in drawing up his army too near the brink of the river; for he left so little space between that and his rear, that had the *Romans* been ever so little pressed during the engagement, they had no whither to retire but into the water. However this defect of the Consul's management was supplied by the bravery and skill of his soldiers, instructed by their Tribunes. These officers had observed in former conflicts, that the *Gauls* were not formidable but in the ardour of their first attack, and that their swords were of such a fashion and temper as, after two or three good cuts, to stand bent in their hands, and so become useless to them if they had not time to straighten them on the ground with their foot. The Tribunes therefore furnished the first line of the *Roman* troops with the arms of

Y. of R. of the triarii, or third line; that is to say, with long
 530. javelins, like our halberts, and ordered the soldiers,
 Ref. J. C. first to make use of these, and then to draw their swords.
 222.

•229 Con. These precautions had the desired success. The swords
 fulship. of the Gauls by the first strokes on the Roman javelins
 became blunted, bent, and useless; and then the Romans closing in with them, stab'd them in the face and
 breast with their pointed swords, making a terrible
 slaughter. Nine thousand of the enemy were killed,
 Oref. B. 4. and seventeen thousand taken prisoners.

c. 13. After the action the Consuls opened the packet. *Furius*
 Zon. B. 8. was for immediately obeying the order; *Flaminius* insisted on pursuing the war: *The victory*, he said, *was a sufficient proof that there had been no defect in the auguries, and that the letters of revocation were wholly from the envy of the Senate; that he would finish his enterprize, and would teach the people not to be deceived by THE OBSERVATION OF BIRDS, or any thing else.* Pursuant to this resolution he attacked and took several castles, and one considerable town with the spoils of which he enriched his soldiers, to prepare them for his defence in that quarrel which he knew would arise between him and the Senate. His colleague would not accompany him in these expeditions, but continued encamped, waiting to join him when he should return from his incursion.

Life of
Marcel-
lus.

When the two colleagues came back to *Rome* with their armies, the people as well as the Senate at first show'd their resentment, by a very cold reception; but the troops of *Flaminius*, whom he had enriched, found means to prevail with the former to grant both the Consuls the honours of the triumph. The Senate, however, obliged these magistrates afterwards to depose themselves; such a respect, says *Plutarch*, had the Romans for religion, making all their affairs depend on the sole will of the Gods, and never suffering, even in their greatest prosperities, the least contempt or neglect of the ancient oracles, or of the usages of their country; being fully persuaded, that what most contributed to the welfare of their state was not the success of their arms, but their steady submission to the Gods.

The

The *Comitia* being held by an interrex, *M. Claudius Marcellus* (of a *Plebeian* branch of the *Claudian* family) who became afterwards so famous, was raised to the *Consulate*, with *Cn. Cornelius Scipio*. They were scarce enter'd upon their office when a deputation came to *Rome* from the *Insubrians*, to implore a peace; but the Senate at the instigation of the new *Consuls*, who represented those *Gauls* as an untractable people, on whom there could be no dependance, dismissed their deputies with a refusal. Upon this they resolved to bring into *Italy* a fresh inundation of *Gæsatae*, who were always ready to fight for hire. Thirty thousand of those mercenaries cross'd the *Alps* under the command of their king, *Viridomarus*.

Early in the spring the *Consuls* pass'd the *Po*, and laid siege to *Aceræ*, a place near that river, and in the neighbourhood of *Cremona*. The *Gauls* were now ninety thousand strong, yet they thought it more advisable to oblige the *Romans* to raise the siege of that frontier town, by making a useful diversion, than to hazard a battle. *Viridomarus* therefore with ten thousand men pass'd the *Po*, entered the *Roman* territories, and advanced towards *Clastidium* in *Liguria*. Upon the news of this motion of the *Gauls*, *Marcellus* followed by only two-thirds of the *Roman* cavalry, and about six hundred of the light-armed infantry, left his camp and came up with the enemy near the place before named. He drew up his little army all in one line, giving it as much extent as he could. The *Gauls* seeing the infantry of the *Romans* so inconsiderable, and always despising their cavalry, had no doubt of the victory. But when the two armies were just ready to join battle, *Viridomarus* advancing before his troops, defied the *Roman* general to single combat. *Marcellus* joyfully accepted the challenge (for single combat was his talent), rushed upon his enemy, killed him and stripped him of his armour; and then the *Gæsatae* were so dishearten'd that the victor, with his handful of *Romans*, put them intirely to flight.

During the absence of *Marcellus*, his colleague had taken

Y. of R. taken *Acerræ*, and laid siege to *Milan* (or *Mediolanum*)
 531. Bef. *J. C.* the chief city of *Insubria*, but was himself besieged by
 221. the *Gauls*, while he lay before the town. The return
 230 Con- of the victorious *Consul* changed the scene; the *Gæsatæ*
 fulship. quite discouraged broke up their camp, fled, and
 Eutrop. B. repass'd the *Alps*; and *Milan* immediately surrendered
 3. c. 6. 3. c. 8. *Zon.* B. 8. at discretion. *Como* was reduced to the same necessity;
Vide Pigb. and, in short, the whole nation of the *Insubrians* sub-
 ad *Ann.* mitted to receive law from the republic. *Insubria* and
 531. *Liguria* were now made one province, and called *Cisal-*
pine Gaul: and thus did all *Italy* become subject to
Rome, from the *Alps* to the *Ionian sea*.

Plut. Life of Marcel. The Senate decreed *Marcellus* a triumph, and it was
Fest. Ca- said in the decree to be, *for having conquered the Insub-*
pit. *rians and Germans*, which makes it probable that the
 See vol. I. *Gæsatæ* were originally *German*. The *Consul*, in his
 B. 1. c. 2. triumphal procession, carried on his shoulders a trophy of
 §. xii. & the spoils of *Viridomarus*; and this was the third and
 B. 2. c. last triumph in which any *opima spolia* were seen at
 33. § 1. *Rome*. As for *Cornelius*, *Marcellus*'s colleague, he was
 Y. of R. continued in the new province as *Pro-Consul*, to regu-
 532. Bef. *J. C.* llate the affairs of it; and the same *Comitia* which allot-
 220. *Cornelius Scipio Afina* to be the *Consuls* for the new
 231 Con- year. The conquest of *Istria*, on the borders of the
 fulship. *Adriatic*, was the only military exploit during their ma-
 Eutrop. B. gistracy.
 3. c. 7.

C H A P. XV.

The second Illyrian war.

Polyb. B. **A** BOUT this time *Demetrius* of *Pbaros*, whom the
 3. c. 16. *Roman* republic had placed in the government of
App. Illyr. *Illyricum*, and guardianship of the young king *Pinæus*,
Dio. in seeing the *Romans* engaged in a troublesome war with
Eclog. ap. the *Gauls*, and that *Carthage* wanted only a fair oppor-
Vales. tunity to break with them, had despised their orders,
 forced the *Atintanes* to renounce their alliance with the
 republic, and sent fifty ships of war beyond *Lyssos*
 to pillage the Islands, called *Cyclades*, in the *Archipe-*
lago. The

The new *Consuls* *L. Veturius Pilo*, and *C. Lutatius*, would have sailed for *Illyricum*, if they had not been forced to depose themselves upon some defect found in the ceremony of their election. They were succeeded by *M. Æmilius Lepidus* and *M. Valerius Laevinus*; but the season was now too far advanced to begin the expedition, so that it was postponed to the next *Consulship*. [By a *Census* taken this year, the number of *Roman citizens* fit to bear arms, appeared to be two hundred seventy thousand, two hundred and thirteen. The *Census*, as usual, was followed by a *Lustrum*, the forty third from its institution.]

BOTH the *Consuls* of the new year, *M. Livius Salinator*, and *L. Æmilius Paulus*, embarked for *Illyricum*. *Demetrius* had assisted *Philip*, king of *Macedon*, (while a minor under the tuition of his uncle *Antigonus Dodson*) in his wars with the *Lacedæmonians*, and had thereby secured himself a retreat with that prince, in case of a disaster. He had also fortified *Dimalum*, a city of importance in *Illyricum*; and having assembled the choicest of his troops in the Island of *Pbaros*, his own country, held his court there. Early in the spring *Æmilius* sat down before *Dimalum*, and by surprizing efforts took it in seven days; upon which all the old allies of *Rome*, who had been compelled to submit to the tyrant, returned joyfully to their former engagements. The next attempt was upon *Pbaros*, the last refuge of the traitor. As the enterprise was difficult, *Æmilius* thought it necessary to join artifice to valour. The *Roman fleet* had two *Consular* armies on board it; one of them was ordered to land in the Island, in the night, and hide itself in forests, and behind rocks. This done, a detachment of the fleet appeared off *Pbaros*, in open day, as it were with design to land some forces there. *Demetrius* drew his army out of the town, to the sea-shore, to hinder the descent; which when the *Legionaries*, that were already landed, perceived, they left their ambush, and marching silently seized an eminence between the city and the port. It was of the last consequence to *Demetrius* to drive the *Romans* from this

Y. of R.
Bef. J. C.

219.

232 Consulship.

Vide Pigb.
ad Ann.

533.

Liv. Epit.

20.

534.

Bef. J. C.

218.

233 Consulship.

Polyb. B.

3. c. 16.

c. 18, 19.

Y. of R. post, and therefore having encouraged his men he led
 them strait to the attack.

^{534.}
 Ref. J. C. This gave the *Consuls* on board the fleet an opportunity
^{218.}
^{233.} Con- nity to make their descent, and then the *Illyrians* find-
 fulship. ful themselves invested on all sides presently took to
^{Polyb. B.}
^{4. c. 66.} flight. As for the regent he made his escape to *Macedon*
 in a bark kept ready for that purpose.

B. 3. c. 19. The defeat of the *Illyrian* army was followed by the taking of *Pbaros*, which the *Romans* first plundered and then levelled with the ground. Thus *Rome* became a second time mistress of *Illyricum*. However, she did not reduce it to the state of a *Roman* province, having some compassion for the young king, who had been embarked in these affairs merely by the fault of his guardians.

^{App. in Illyr.}
^{Auth. of}
^{the lives}
^{of illust.}
^{men, c.}
^{50.} The *Consuls* returned to *Rome* and obtained a triumph for their victories. Their conduct, nevertheless, had not been, in all respects, pleasing to the people, as appeared after the expiration of their magistracy.

^{Frontin.}
^{Strat. B.}
^{4. c. 1. §.}
^{45. Livy.}
^{B. 29. c.}
^{37.} *Livius* and *Æmilius* were then accused before the *Tribes* of having applied a great part of the spoils taken from the enemy to their own use, and of having distributed the rest of the booty partially among the soldiers. *Æmilius* upon his trial was acquitted, but *Livius* was condemned by all the *Tribes*, except the *Mae-cian*, an affront which he resented to excess, as we shall see hereafter when he comes to be *Censor*.

In this Consulship the Senate observing, that the great concourse of strangers from *Egypt* and the *Le-vant* had introduced into the city the worship of *Ijis* and *Osiris*, to whom several sanctuaries were already built, ordered these to be all demolished, agreeable to one of the twelve *Tables*, forbidding the worship of strange Gods. No workman, however, would venture the

^{Plin. B.}
^{29. c. 1.} * It was at this time *Archagathus* of *Peloponnesus* introduced surgery into *Rome*. At first he met with great applause, and a shop was built for him at the public charge, in a part of the city where four streets met: But as his constant practice in the cure of wounds was to make large incisions, which are painful remedies, his art soon fell into disrepute.

guilt

guilt of sacrilege by doing it; such credit had their worship gained among the people. The Consul *Æmilius* therefore, full of zeal for the religion and laws of his country, laid aside his *Consular* robe, took a hatchet and beat down those oratories to the ground.

Y. of R.
534.
Bef. J. C.
218.

233 Consulship.

Val. Max.
B. 1. c. 3.
§. 3.

Liv. Epit.
B. 20.

Liv. B.
21. c. 25.

But the most important transaction of this year was the planting colonies at *Placentia* and *Cremona* in the *Gallic* territories; this being the chief motive which inclined the *Boians* and *Insubrians* to favour *Hannibal* in his attempt upon *Italy*, that memorable and surprising event which is next to engage the reader's attention.

C H A P. XVI. The second *Punic* war, or the war of *Hannibal*.

Its causes and commencement.

TWENTY-TWO years were now past, since *Carthage*, bending to the superior fortune of *Rome*, had with shame and reluctance submitted to the hard conditions of that treaty, which put an end to the FIRST PUNIC WAR. To relinquish the fair Island of *Sicily* to an imperious rival was a sore and grievous article; and perhaps the payment of those large sums, that were further exacted for the peace, was a yet more sensible mortification to a republic of avaricious merchants: But necessity compell'd; nor could even the courage and abilities of the incomparable *Amilcar* furnish any remedy, in the then *distressful* situation of affairs. For after the defeat of *Hanno* at the *Ægates*, which made the *Romans* masters of the sea, neither the army of *Amilcar* at *Eryx*, nor the garrisons of *Lilybaeum* and *Drepanum* could receive any supply of provisions or military stores. *Sicily* therefore was unavoidably lost: The army might be preserved; but the only visible way to preserve it was by a peace with the enemy. *Amilcar*'s immediate object in the treaty was this preservation of the troops. Yet even this, neither he nor they would consent to purchase at the expence of their honour

Y. of R.
534.

honour as soldiers. They chose rather to perish, than to give up their arms. As for the annual sums which the Consul *Lutatius* demanded from *Carthage*, *Amilcar*, on the part of his republic, readily yielded to that imposition. Nor did he much hesitate in complying with the further demands of money, which the ten commissioners from *Rome* insisted upon, before they would ratify the peace. What render'd him so tractable on this head, was doubtless (beside the danger of his army) the resolution he had secretly form'd, that no more of the stipulated tribute should be paid, than was required to be paid at the time of the ratification. For

B. 3. c. 9. as we learn from *Polybius*, he was determined to renew the war against *Rome* as soon as it should be possible to do it. Whatever fears some of the citizens of *Carthage* might have of the war's being transfer'd from *Sicily* to their own gates, if a peace were not concluded, it is evident that *Amilcar* with that army of hardy veterans he then commanded, feared no enemy but famine; and could he have found means to transport those troops safely into *Africa*, without a peace, he would have enter'd into no treaty with the *Romans*.

Polyb. L.

3. c. 9.

The *indignation* of *Amilcar*, when he was thus constrain'd to leave *Eryx* and abandon *Sicily*, is assign'd by *Polybius* for the FIRST CAUSE of that memorable war which we are going to enter upon: For though this implacable enemy of the *Romans* did not live to attempt that vengeance, which to his last breath he was ever meditating, we shall presently see, that his spirit of revenge was not extinguished by his death.

The dreadful and destructive conflict at home, to which on his return thither from *Sicily* he was obliged to give all his attention during more than three years, unavoidably suspended the execution of his purpose against *Rome*. And when that domestic disturbance was happily quell'd, the treasury and strength of *Carthage* were too much exhausted to furnish what was necessary to support her in so arduous an enterprize. The *Romans* sensible of her weakness, took advantage of it (as we have seen) to extort from her not only the cession
of

of *Sardinia*, but the sum of 1200 talents; a fine shamelessly demanded for the reparation of an injury they had not received. And this odious extortion is held to be the SECOND and the PRINCIPAL CAUSE of that war which followed it at almost 20 years distance. For so barefaced an injustice, so insulting a procedure, as it furnished *Carthage* with a just ground to attack the *Romans* whenever she should be in a condition to do it, so it also brought all the *Carthaginians* in general to concur with their brave captain in his resentment and designs; it being now sufficiently manifest that they must either resolve to become obedient subjects of *Rome*, or take some effectual measures to render themselves the more potent republic.

With this view *Amilcar*, soon after the re-establishment of tranquillity at home, by the suppression of the mercenaries and rebels, had a new army committed to him, to be employ'd in extending the *Carthaginian* empire in *Spain*; a country that both abounded with riches and was able to supply the republic with a sufficient number of brave troops to make head against those multitudes of soldiers with which *Italy* furnish'd the *Romans*.

How deeply *Amilcar's* hatred to *Rome* had rooted itself in his heart, and that revenge was his chief aim in this expedition, we have a singular and incontestable proof, in what he did just before his departure from *Africa*. His son *Hannibal*, at that time about nine years old, was with him, when he perform'd a sacrifice to *Jupiter* for the success of his intended voyage. The rites being all ended, and *Amilcar* having order'd the rest of the assistants to withdraw, he call'd his son to him, and tenderly caressing the boy, asked him, whether he were willing to accompany him into *Spain*? The boy not only most readily declared his consent, but with all the blandishments and eager vivacity peculiar to children, begg'd of his father, that he would permit him to go. *Amilcar* then taking him by the hand led him to the altar, made him lay his hand

upon it, touch the sacrifice, and swear, that he would never be in friendship with the Romans.

Polyb. B. 2. c. 1. THE CARTHAGINIAN pass'd the Streights of Hercules, and landed with his army on the western coast of Spain. Nine years he conducted the war in this country with uninterrupted success, reducing many nations to the obedience of his republic^c: but at length, in a battle which he fought wth the *Vettones*, a people of Portugal. *Lusitania*, (defending himself a long time with admirable resolution) he was encompassed and slain; carrying with him to the grave the same great honour and reputation, which by many signal victories he had acquired, *21. c. 10.* together with the name of a second *Mars*.

See p. 245. This happened about the time when the Romans made their first expedition against the *Illyrians*.

Polyb. B. 2. c. 13. Upon the death of *Amilcar*, the command of the army was given to his son-in-law *Afdrubal*, at that time *Livy. B. 21. c. 2.* admiral of the gallies. He was no bad soldier, and a very able statesman; by his wisdom and gentle manners attracting the good will of many princes of that country, and gaining more subjects to *Carthage* by his wonderful address in negotiation, then his predecessor had done by the sword. He also built new *Carthage*, (the present *Carthagena*) a town commodiously situated to be a magazine of arms, and to receive succours from *Africa*,

^c According to *Zonaras*, in the Consulate of *Q. Fabius* and *M. Pomponius*, [in the 520 of *Rome*, when *Amilcar* had been about five years in Spain] the Romans believing that the wars they had to sustain against the *Ligurians* and *Sardinians*, were owing to the secret practices of the *Carthaginians*, sent to these some ambassadors, who demanded of them in harsh terms, certain sums of money due by treaty, and that they should forbear touching at any of the islands in the *Roman* jurisdiction: and to gain the readier compliance to these demands, the ambassadors presented a caduceus and a javelin, the one a symbol of peace, the other of war, bidding the Senate take their choice. The *Carthaginians* nothing terrified at this menace, answer'd that they would chuse neither, but would readily accept whichever they should think fit to leave them.

If this story [which does not seem probable] be true, the boldnes of the *Carthaginians* proceeded doubtless from the great success of *Amilcar* in Spain.

ROME began now to be alarm'd. Her jealousy of *Carthage* had been asleep during *Amilcar's* remote conquests in *Spain*: But the formidable growth of her rival's power under the management of *Asdrubal* awakened it. She did not dare, however, to exact any thing of the *Carthaginians* very grievous, or to commence hostilities against them, being at this time in extreme dread of the *Gauls*, who threatened her with an invasion. Ambassadors were therefore sent to^d *Asdrubal*, to draw him by fair words into a treaty, wherein he should covenant, *that the Carthaginians would confine their arms within the Iberus*. No mention was made of any other part of *Spain* in this treaty.

As the *Spanish* affairs had no relation to the peace between the two states, this demand was unreasonable; and the *Romans* seem to have sought by it a *pretext of quarrel*, when by freeing themselves from the *Gauls*, they should be in a condition to begin a new war with *Carthage*. For should *Asdrubal* refuse to engage, or engaging not perform, they would in either case be furnished with such a pretext, though perhaps in neither would the pretext be just^e.

Asdrubal was full of the same spirit as *Amilcar*, and had the same designs ever at heart. However he made no difficulty to comply with the motion of the ambassadors, having much to do before he could pass that boundary which the *Romans* were for fixing to his conquests.

By this treaty, *Rome* acquired some reputation in *Spain*. For when it was conceived by the *Spaniards*, that the *African* republic, which sought to be mistress over them, stood herself in fear of a more potent state, they began to turn their eyes hither for protection; and the *Saguntines*, whose city was on the south-side of the *Iberus*, entered into a confederacy with the *Romans*, and were gladly received.

^d According to *Appian* the treaty was made at *Carthage*, but the sequel proves this to be false.

^e This will be explained when we come to the proper place for it.

- Polyb. B. 2. c. 36.* WHEN *Aesdrubal* had govern'd in *Spain* for the space of eight years, he was treacherously murder'd ^f by a certain *Gaul* whom he had provoked by some injury.
- and B. 3. c. 13.* The *Carthaginians*, upon receipt of this news suspended the nomination of a new commander, till they could learn the inclinations of the army; and they no sooner understood that the soldiers had unanimously made choice of ^g *Hannibal* for their leader, than they called an assembly, and with one voice ratified the election.
- Liv. B. 21. c. 3.* *Hannibal*, soon after his confirmation in the command of the troops, undertook the reduction of the

^f *Livy* and *Appian* say, that *Aesdrubal* was killed in revenge by a slave, whose master he had put to death.

^g It is surprising that the judicious Mr. *Rollin* (in his Hist. Anc. 380.) should follow *Livy*, in relating an idle story full of absurdity, and which he afterwards (following again the same author) manifestly contradicts.

The Latin historian reports, " that *Aesdrubal* [about three years before his death] wrote to *Carthage* to have *Hannibal*, who was then " hardly at the age of puberty, sent to him, that the young man might " be trained up to war, so as one day to imitate his father's prowess. " He adds, that *Hanno* and others opposed this motion in the Senate, " imputing to *Aesdrubal* dishonest intentions with regard to the lad; " but that it was carried by a majority. That *Hannibal*, arriving in " *Spain* drew all eyes upon him; and that the old soldiers observed " in his person and manner, a wonderful resemblance to his father. " &c. That he served three years under *Aesdrubal*, and was then " declared general of the army." Now is there the least probability, either that *Hannibal* should arrive at such a masterly knowledge in the art of war in three years service; or that the *Carthaginians* should trust the conduct of their army and their empire in *Spain* to a young man of so short experience? That *Livy* was very careless in delivering this tradition, appears sufficiently from the age he gives to *Hannibal*, at the time of his being sent into *Spain* at *Aesdrubal's* request, HUNC VIX DUM PUBEREM, when he was scarce fourteen. By the historian's own account *Hannibal* was nine when *Amilcar* went into *Spain*; *Amilcar* lived there nine years; and *Aesdrubal* had commanded near five years, before he sent for the young man.

Mr. *Rollin* aware, I suppose, of this inconsistency, drops the *vix dum puberem*, and makes *Hannibal* to be twenty-two at the time of his going from *Carthage* to *Aesdrubal*; and by this indeed he avoids the anachronism: but then he seems not to have been aware, that the whole story is overthrown by what *Hannibal* says in the Senate of *Carthage* at the end of the second Punic war, That he had never before been at home since he was nine years old. See *Livy*, B. 30 and Mr. *Rollin*, Vol. I. p. 486.

Olcades.

Olcades. The success was answerable to his desires. Having amass'd much treasure by the sale of the booty taken in several towns, he marched to New *Carthage*, which he made his winter quarters; where liberally paying the soldiers who had served under him; and promising them farther gratifications, he both gain'd their affections, and inspir'd them with extraordinary hopes.

Early the next spring he led his army against the *Polyb. B. Vaccei*, and made a fortunate expedition: but in his 3. c. 14. return home, being attack'd by the *Carpetani*, whom great numbers of the fugitive *Olcades* and *Vaccei* (driven out of their own countries) had joined, he was reduced to very great straits. Could the enemy have compelled him to a pitched battle, he had inevitably been undone; but he, with great skill, making a slow retreat, till he had got the river *Tagus* betwixt him and them, so judiciously disposed his horse and elephants, as entirely to defeat their endeavours to cross the river after him, which they attempted to their prodigious loss, by several fords at one and the same time. After which passing the river himself, and pursuing his advantage, he, with terrible slaughter, routed this army of 100000 *Barbarians*.

The *Vaccei* being thus vanquish'd there remained no nation on that side the *Iberus*, who durst think of opposing the *Carthaginians*, except the *Saguntines*. *Hannibal* had hitherto carefully forbore all hostility against this people, being ever mindful of his father's advice, which was, to avoid giving occasion to the *Romans* to declare war against *Carthage*, untill such time as by the enlargement of her dominion and strength she was in a condition to cope with them. This time was now at hand; and the great success of the *Carthaginian* arms in *Spain*, under the conduct of *Amilcar*, *Afdrubal*, and *Hannibal*, is therefore assigned by *Polybius* for the THIRD CAUSE of the SECOND PUNIC WAR.

While *Hannibal* was meditating the first blow he intended to give, and was clearing the way for the attack, 10. by the several enterprizes abovementioned, the *Saguntines*

Polyb. B. 3. c. 15. times dispatched frequent messengers to the *Romans*, partly out of apprehension of their own impending danger, and partly out of friendship to their allies, that they might be perfectly informed of the progress of the *Carthaginians*. Little attention was given, at *Rome*, to these advices, for a long time; but at last it was judged proper to send some ambassadors into *Spain*, to examine into the truth of the facts.

Hannibal having carried his conquests as far as he had proposed that year, returned to take up his winter quarters in *New Carthage*, which was then become the seat of the *Carthaginian* government in *Spain*. There he found the *Roman* ambassadors; and, giving them audience, was by them admonished, ‘ upon no account ‘ to attempt any thing against the *Saguntines*, a people ‘ received into the protection of *Rome*; and also to be ‘ mindful of the treaty with *Afdrubal*, and to forbear ‘ passing the river *Iberus*.’

HANNIBAL, young, full of martial fire, fortunate in his enterprizes, and mortally hating the *Romans*, answered with a careless and haughty air, (personating a friend to the *Saguntines*) ‘ That a sedition having formerly happened among the citizens of *Saguntum*, the *Romans*, to whose arbitration they referred the dispute, had unjustly condemned to death some of the magistrates; and that he would not suffer this injustice to go unpunished; for it had ever been the custom of the *Carthaginians* to undertake the cause of those who were wrongfully persecuted.’

c. 16. The ambassadors departing with this answer, sailed to *Carthage* (pursuant to their instructions, in case of such a reception from *Hannibal*) there to expostulate upon the matter with the Senate; though they well saw, that a war was unavoidable. Little indeed did they imagine that *Italy* would be the theatre of it; but concluded that *Saguntum* and its territory would be the scene of action.

c. 15. *Hannibal* at the same time sent to *Carthage* for instructions how to proceed, with regard to the *Saguntines*, ‘ who, as he said, encouraged by their confederates,

‘ racy

'racy with *Rome*, committed many outrages against *Liv. B. 21.*
'those who were in alliance with *Carthage*.' According *c. 6.*
to *Livy*, these allies of *Carthage* were the *Turdetani*,
between whom and the *Saguntines*, *Hannibal* had con-
trived to raise a quarrel, that he might have a pretence,
in quality of friend to the former, to attack the latter.

What answer the *Roman* ambassadors received from
the *Carthaginian* Senate is not recorded; but we may
well gather from the sequel, that it was by no means
satisfactory. The Senate of *Rome*, nevertheless, being
in the same prepossession as their ambassadors, concern-
ing the seat of the war, that it would be in a remote
country; and considering also that the war when once
begun would probably be carried to a great length, re-*Polyb. B. 3.*
solved, before they entered upon it, to give a period *c. 16.*
first to their affairs in *Illyricum*, and punish the perfidy
of *Demetrius*; believing that they should be able to ef-
fect this, and yet have sufficient opportunity to defeat
the designs of *Hannibal*.

But these proved vain deliberations; for *Hannibal*
was too much in earnest. He marched with his army
towards *Saguntum*, at the same time that the *Roman*
Consuls embarked for *Illyricum*; and before the Con-
suls had finished their expedition *Saguntum* was taken.

The *Carthaginian* used the more diligence in attacking *c. 17.*
this strong and wealthy city, for many weighty considera-
tions. The reduction of *Saguntum* would probably
deprive the *Romans* of all hope of making war in *Spain*:
the nations, he had already conquered, terrified by this
new success of his arms, would be held in better obe-
dience; and those who were yet unconquered would
stand in greater awe of his power. And, what was
still of greater importance, he should be able to pursue
his enterprizes with more security when he had no ene-
my at his back. He farther considered, that this town,
should he take it, would yield him large supplies of
treasure for carrying on the war; that his army would
be more at his devotion when he had enriched them
with booty; and that he should be enabled to secure to
himself

himself friends at *Caribage*, by sending thither a part of the spoil.

Liv. B.
21. c. 6

From all these motives he was indefatigable in pressing the siege; which nevertheless lasted many months. The *Roman* Senate no sooner received advice of his having begun it, but they sent ambassadors into *Spain* with instructions to give him warning to desist, and, in case of his refusal, to sail to *Carthage* and there demand of the Senate, the delivering up of their general to the *Romans*, by way of compensation for the breach of the league between the two states.

c. 9.

HANNIBAL hearing of the arrival of these ambassadors on the coast of *Spain*, dispatched some messengers to meet them at the sea-side, and to signify to them, ‘that neither would it be safe for them to come to his quarters; nor had he leisure to give them audience.’ And, as he knew very well to what place they would direct their course, after receiving such a message, he without delay sent proper emissaries to *Carthage* to prepare the chiefs of the *Barchine* faction for the occasion.

c. 10.

Livy reports that *Hanno*, the avowed enemy of *Amilcar*’s family, and the head of the opposite faction, was the only man, in the *Carthaginian* Senate, who was for complying with the demands of *Rome*; and that he spoke to this effect:

‘ How often have I conjured you by those Gods, who are the witnesses and arbiters of leagues and treaties, not to suffer any of *Amilcar*’s race to command your armies! How often have I told you, that neither the manes nor the progeny of that man would ever be at rest, and that no friendship, no peace with the *Romans* could be preserved inviolate, so long as there remained one alive of the *Barchine* name and family! *Hannibal* is an aspiring youth, proudly ambitious of being a monarch; and who thinks nothing so conducive to his purpose, as to draw upon us war after war, that so he may live in arms, and be always surrounded with legions: and you, by making him the general of your armies, have furnished fuel to his

‘ his fire; you have fed the flame which now scorches
 ‘ you. Your forces at this time besiege *Saguntum*,
 ‘ contrary to the faith of treaties. What can you expect,
 ‘ but that *Carthage* will be soon invested by the *Roman*
 ‘ legions, under the conduct of those very Gods, who
 ‘ in the former war took vengeance on us for the like^s
 ‘ perfidiousness? Are you yet to learn what kind of
 ‘ enemies they are whom you provoke? Are you still
 ‘ strangers to yourselves? Are you ignorant of the for-
 ‘ tunes of the two republics?

‘ Your worthy general would not vouchsafe the am-
 ‘ bassadors of your allies a hearing; he has violated
 ‘ the law of nations. The ambassadors of our friends,
 ‘ worse treated than the messengers from an enemy
 ‘ were ever known to be, have now recourse to you.
 ‘ They demand satisfaction for the unjust violation of
 ‘ a treaty. They would have you clear the body of
 ‘ the nation from the shame of so odious a breach of
 ‘ faith, by giving up into their hands the author of the
 ‘ crime. The more moderate they are at present, the
 ‘ more exasperated, I fear, and the more implacable
 ‘ will they be hereafter. Remember the *Aegates*, and See p.
 ‘ the affair of *Eryx*, with all the calamities you suffered 248.
 ‘ for four and twenty years together. And yet we had
 ‘ not then this boy at the head of our armies, but his
 ‘ father, *Amilcar* himself, a second *Mars*, as some are
 ‘ pleas'd to style him. But we could not then forbear
 ‘ making attempts upon *Tarentum* in violation of trea-
 ‘ ties, as we do now upon *Saguntum*. The Gods de-
 ‘ clared themselves against us in that war, and, in spight
 ‘ of all our pretences of right, made appear by giving

* *Hanno* refers here (as he afterwards explains himself) to some attempts of the *Carthaginians* upon *Tarentum*, [at the time, I suppose, when *Pyrhus*'s troops held that city. See Vol. III. p. 60.] In the Epit. of *Livv*, B. 14. it is said, that the *Carthaginians* came with a fleet to the succour of *Tarentum*, whereby they broke their league with the Romans. And this doubtless is the foundation whereon *Zonaras* builds his report, that the motive assign'd by the Romans for their beginning the first Punic war, was the assistance which the *Carthaginians* had given the *Tarentines* against Rome. See p. 132. of this Vol.

“ victory

‘ victory to our enemies, which of the two nations had
‘ unjustly broken the league.

‘ ‘Tis against *Carthage* that *Hannibal* now plants his
‘ mantelets and erects his towers; it is her wall that
‘ he now shakes with his battering rams. The ruins of
‘ *Saguntum* (I wish I may prove a false prophet!) will
‘ fall upon our heads; and the war begun with the *Sa-*
‘ *guntines* must be maintained against the *Romans*.

‘ But, say you, shall we then deliver up *Hannibal*
‘ into the hands of his enemies? I know that my opi-
‘ nion will have little weight with you, because of the
‘ old animosities between his father and me: yet I
‘ must declare, that, as I rejoiced when *Amilcar* fell,
‘ because, had he lived, he would have engaged us
‘ before now in a war with the *Romans*, so I hate and
‘ detest this youth as a fury and the firebrand to kin-
‘ dle a *Roman* war. Yes, I think it fit, that *Hannibal*
‘ be delivered up to expiate the breach of the league;
‘ and, if no body had demanded him, I should vote to
‘ have him transported to the remotest corner of the
‘ earth, whence his name might never reach our ears
‘ to disturb the repose of our state.

‘ My conclusion therefore is, that deputies be forth-
‘ with sent to *Rome* to pacify the Senate, others into
‘ *Spain*, with orders to the army to raise the siege of
‘ *Saguntum*, and deliver up their general to the *Ro-*
‘ *mans*; and a third deputation to the *Saguntines* to
‘ make reparation for the injuries they have sustain-
‘ ed.^h

The Senate, though they heard this orator with
respectful attention, as a man of authority and reputa-
tion among them, paid no regard to his remonstrance,
invective, or advice on the present occasion. Nay, the

^h The reader, I am persuaded, will not easily believe, that a speech of this tenor was really delivered either by *Hanno* or any other *Carthaginian* Senator. The greater part of the matter of it doubtless belongs to *Livy* no less than the form. However, thus much we may conclude from the party spirit of *Hanno*, that he dis-
approved the proceedings of *Hannibal*, and was against a rupture
with *Rome*.

Senators in general exclaimed, that he had spoken *Liv. B.* more like an enemy than a subject of *Carthage*. As *21. c. 11.* for the *Roman* ambassadors, they were dismissed with this answer, ‘ That the war was begun by the *Saguntines* and not by *Hannibal*. And that the *Romans* would act injuriously to *Carthage*, if to her ancient alliance with them, they preferred the later friendship of the *Saguntines*.’

Hannibal was all this time pressing the siege of *Saguntum* with uninterrupted diligence. He animated his soldiers in person, working in the trenches among them and mingling with them in all hazards. The defence was brave even to obstinacy; and it is said to have lasted eight months. When the besieged could no longer hold out, many of the citizens, rather than listen to the hard terms of peace which *Hannibal* exacted, (as the giving up their arms, leaving their city to be demolished, and moving off with nothing more of all their substance than two suits of apparel) threw themselves into a great fire, where they had first cast all their most valuable effects. While this was doing, it happened that a tower, which had been much battered and shaken, fell down on a sudden. A body of *Carthaginians* immediately entered at the breach; and *Hannibal*, upon notice of this accident, seizing the opportunity, made a general assault and carried the place without difficulty. He gave orders, that all who were found in arms should be put to the sword; an unnecessary order, for they themselves were firmly determined to die fighting: many of the inhabitants shut themselves up with their wives and children, and burnt the houses over their heads. But notwithstanding all this destruction of men and effects, the place yielded to the conqueror great store of wealth and many slaves. The money he appropriated for carrying on the war against *Rome*; the slaves he divided among the soldiers; and all the rich household stuff he sent to *Carthage*.

The *Roman* ambassadors who had been dispatched to the *Carthaginian* Senate brought the answer, they had

there received, to *Rome*, about the same time that the news arrived of the destruction of *Siguntum*.

Livy tells us, that the compassion of the *Romans* for this unfortunate city, their shame for having failed to succour such a faithful ally, their indignation against the *Carthaginians*, and their apprehension of the main event of things, (as if the enemy were already at the gates of *Rome*;) all these various passions were so strong in their minds, that at first they only mourned and trembled, instead of consulting for the common safety.

But it being now no longer a question whether they should enter into a war, they quickly began to make the necessary preparations for action. The Consuls *P.*

Y. of R. *Cornelius Scipio*, and *Tib. Sempronius Longus* drew lots for their provinces. *Sicily* and *Africa* fell to *Sempronius*, and *Spain* to *Cornelius*. *Sempronius* with two *Roman* legions, consisting each of 4000 foot and 300 horse, and with 16000 foot and 1800 horse of the allies on board a fleet of 160 gallies, was to go first into *Sicily* and thence into *Africa*, in case the other Consul should prove strong enough to hinder the *Carthaginians* from coming into *Italy*. *Cornelius* for this purpose had two *Roman* legions, with 14000 foot and 1600 horse of the allies committed to his conduct; and with a fleet of 60 quinqueremes, he was to sail to *Spain*, and endeavour to prevent *Hannibal's* leaving that country. The Consul had no stronger a navy appointed him, because it was supposed that the enemy would not come by sea, nor chuse to fight in that kind of service. And his army was also the less numerous, because the *Prætor Manlius* had two *Roman* legions with 10000 foot and 1000 horse of the allies to guard the province of *Gaul*. The whole number of the forces raised by the republic on this occasion was 24000 *Roman* foot and 1800 horse, 40000 foot and 4400 horse of the allies; and their ships of war amounted to 220.

These extraordinary preparations sufficiently shew the terror the *Romans* were in at the approaching war. And indeed it will not appear to be ill grounded, if we consider, that the *Carthaginians* ever since *Amilcar's* going

going into Spain had been fighting and conquering, Y. of R. and that the Spaniards, by whom their army was strengthened, were men steady even to obstinacy. Be- sides, the Roman republic had now no general equal to Hannibal, a man of immense views; ever judicious in his enterprizes; a wonderful genius for seizing the critical moment to execute his designs; the greatest master in the art of appearing not to act, when he was most busy; inexhaustible of expedients; as skilful in recovering himself out of danger, as in drawing an enemy into it. He had been bred up to arms from his infancy, and though now only in the flower of his age, had the experience of several years command of an army. For Asdrubal being himself no great warrior had committed to him the conduct of all dangerous and difficult enterprizes. So that no general then living had had more exercise than he; nor were any troops better disciplined than his. Hannibal's design of carrying the war from the remote parts of Spain into the very center of Italy, is said by an ingenious writer, to be the boldest project that ever captain durst conceive, and what was justified only by the event. But this does not seem to have been the opinion of Polybius, who tells us, that Hannibal had taken all prudent measures for facilitating his march, and for securing the assistance of the Gauls about the Alps and about the Po, which it was the easier to do, because he and they had one common interest with respect to the Romans, the hated enemies of both.

Though the Romans made the preparations above mentioned for war, as a thing certain and unavoidable, yet that nothing might be wanting to the exact observance of forms, they dispatched a third embassy to Carthage,

¹ Polybius mentions only two embassies from Rome to the Carthaginians, on the affair of Saguntum, one before the siege, another after the town was taken. Livy also mentions only two; but, according to him, the first was during the siege, when (he tell us) Hannibal refused the ambassadors an audience; the second, after the reduction of the place. That we may not reject Polybius's authority, who relates an audience

Y. of R. *Carthage*, to demand once more, what they did not
 535. expect would be yielded, *That Hannibal and his coun-*
Bef. J. C. cil should be delivered up to them; and the ambassadors
 217. were also now instructed to declare war in case of re-
 234. Con-fusal.

When they were come to *Carthage*, and admitted to audience, the Senate heard the haughty demand they brought with a coldness, approaching to contempt. Nevertheless, one of the Senators best qualified, was directed to speak in maintenance of the *Carthaginian* cause. This orator, *without taking the least notice of the treaty made with Asdrubal*, (as if no such treaty had been made, or, if made, was nothing to the purpose, because made without authority) dwelt wholly on that which was concluded at the end of the *Sicilian* war; in

Polyb. L.
3. c. 21.

audience which *Hannibal*, before the siege of *Saguntum*, gave at *Carthage* to some ambassadors from *Rome*; nor yet accuse *Livy* or his vouchers of inventing the story of *Hannibal's* refusing audience, and of all that followed thereupon at *Carthage*, we have supposed (what seems most probable) that there were three embassies from *Rome* in relation to *Saguntum*, the first before the siege, the second while it was carrying on, the third after the place was taken.

To the first ambassadors *Hannibal* gave audience and a haughty answer, of which they made complaint to the *Carthaginian* Senate. Those who came next were refused audience by him, and they also carried their complaints to *Carthage*. The last embassy was sent only to *Carthage*.

Father *Catrou*, not liking, I suppose, that the *Romans* should appear in so disadvantageous a light as they do, upon this occasion, is angry with *Livy*, for making them send even twice to *Carthage* before they declare war; though if any thing may be depended upon in the *Roman* story, this fact has a title to credit.

It may indeed seem hard to be accounted for, that the *Romans*, contrary to their former methods of proceeding, should so shamefully neglect to succour their allies, the *Saguntines*, and, when the case required the most vigorous measures, should lose so much time in vain and fruitless embassies to a people they had formerly vanquished and rendered tributary. Chevalier *Folard* conjectures, that the *Romans* were really intimidated by *Hannibal's* superior genius and skill in war, being conscious of their having no general of equal ability with the *Carthaginian*. And may we not also reasonably suppose, that at the time when *Hannibal* began to threaten *Saguntum*, the *Roman* republic was not in a condition to send by sea into *Spain* an army of sufficient strength to make head against the numerous and victorious troops of *Carthage*?

which,

which, as he alledged, there was no mention of *Spain*. Y. of R. He allowed indeed, that it was there covenanted, that neither of the contracting parties should make war on the allies of the other, but added, that the *Saguntines* were entirely out of the question, they not being at that time in alliance with *Rome*; and he caused the articles of the treaty to be read.

535.

Bef. J. C.

217.

Con-

234.

The *Romans* refused absolutely to enter into a verbal discussion of this point. They said, there might have been room for such a discussion, had *Saguntum* been then in the same state as formerly, but that this city having been sacked, contrary to the faith of treaties, the *Carthaginians* must either clear themselves of perfidy, by delivering up the authors of the injustice, or confess themselves guilty, by refusing the satisfaction required. And finding that the Senate would give no answer to the question, whether *Saguntum* was besieged by private or public authority, but would confine the debate to the justice or injustice of the action,

Livy, B.

21. c. 18.

& Polyb.

B. 3. c.

the eldest of the ambassadors, gathering up the skirt of his gown, and making a hollow in it, ‘Here, said he, we bring you *Peace* and *War*, take which you will.’ At which 33. they all cried out with one voice, ‘Give us which you please.’ I give you *War* then, said the ambassador, letting his robe loose again. We accept it, they all answered, and with the same spirit that we accept it, we will maintain it.

A mutual denunciation of war being thus made, the ambassadors did not return directly homeward, but, pursuant to their instructions, passed into *Spain*, to solicit the states and princes of that country, who were on the north side of the *Iberus*, to enter into an alliance with *Rome*, or at least not to contract any friendship with the *Carthaginians*. They were courteously entertained by the *Bargusians*. But when they came to the *Volsicians*, they received from this people an answer, which being reported all over the country, was a means to turn away all the other nations from siding with the *Romans*, ‘With what assurance, said they, can you ask of us to prefer your friendship to that of the

Y. of R. *Carthaginians*, after we have seen the *Saguntines*, who
 535. did so, more cruelly betrayed by you, their allies,
 Ref. J. C. than destroyed by their open enemies. Go, seek for
 217. confederates among those who never heard of the ruin
 234. Con- of *Saguntum*. The miserable fate of this city will be
 fulship. a warning to all the nations of *Spain*, never to repose
 confidence in *Roman* faith or amity.' The same kind
 of reception they met with from all the *Spanish* states to
 which they afterwards addressed themselves. So that,
 finding their negotiations in this country fruitless, they
 passed into *Gaul*, endeavouring to persuade the several
 Livy, B. nations there, not to suffer the *Carthaginians*, to march
 21. c. 20. through their territories into *Italy*. The first public
 assembly of *Gauls*, to whom they made this proposal,
 burst into so loud a laughter, mixt with a murmur of
 indignation, that the magistrates and seniors could hard-
 ly still the noise of the younger sort, so impudent and
 foolish did it seem, *to request* of them, ' That they
 would suffer their own lands to be ravaged and spoil-
 ed, to preserve those of other men who were utter
 strangers to them.' But silence at length being made,
 the ambassadors were answered, ' That neither had the
 Romans deserved so well, nor the *Carthaginians* so ill at
 their hands, that they should take arms, either in be-
 half of *Rome*, or against *Carthage*. That, on the
 contrary, they had heard, that some of their country-
 men had been driven out of their possessions in *Italy* by
 the *Romans*, constrained to pay tribute, and made to
 undergo other indignities.' The like answers to the like
 demands were made in the other public councils of
Gaul. Nor did the ambassadors meet with any thing
 like friendship or even peaceable disposition towards
 them, till they came to *Marseil'es*, which was in alli-
 ance with *Rome*; and where, upon careful enquiry made
 by their allies, they learnt that *Hannibal* had been be-
 forehand with them, and by the force of gold, of which
 the *Gauls* were ever most greedy, had gained them over
 to side with him. And with this unpleasing news they
 returned to *Rome*.

Hannibal

Hannibal was all this time extremely busy in settling Y. of R. the affairs of *Spain*, and in taking all the proper mea- 535. Bef. J. C.
sures his foresight could suggest, for the happy execu- 217. Con-
tion of his great designs. After the reduction of Sa- 234 *Sulship*.
Saguntum he had retired into winter quarters at *New Carthage*. And the better to dispose his *Spanish* soldiers Polyb. B. to his service, he had given them permission to retire to 3. c. 21. *Livy*, B. their respective homes till the beginning of the spring, 21. c. 21. when, he told them, he expected their appearance again. In the mean while, as one of his chief cares was to provide for the safety of *Africa*, he transported thither, of *Spaniards*, (raised among the *Theresites*, *Masii*, and *Olcades*) 13850 foot, and 1200 horse, together with 800 slingers of the *Baleares*. And while he thus furnished *Africa* with *Spanish* troops, he took order for the security ^c of *Spain*, by sending for a supply of near 15000 *Africans*, to be commanded by his brother *Asdrubal*, whom he intended to leave governor in his absence. He furnished him also with 50 quinqueremes, 4 quadriremes, and 5 triremes, that he might be in a condition to oppose any descents that should be attempted there by the *Romans*.

Livy and *Polybius* commend the prudence of the *Carthaginian* in this exchange of troops; because both the *Africans* and *Spaniards* would probably prove the better soldiers for being thus at a distance from their respective countries, and they would be a kind of pledges or hostages for the mutual fidelity of the two nations.

Besides these precautions, *Hannibal* (as has been al- Polyb. B. ready hinted) had dispatched ambassadors to the *Gauls* 3. c. 34. on both sides the *Alps*, to sound their dispositions, and to engage them to take part with him in his enterprize. For this end he was extremely liberal, not only of his

^c *Livy* reports, that *Hannibal* selected 4000 young men out of the chief cities in *Spain*, and of the best families, and caused them to be brought to [New] *Carthage*, there to remain as hostages for the fidelity of the *Spaniards*. These were probably the same youths which are afterwards said to be left by him in *Saguntum*, as we shall see in its proper place.

Y. of R. promises, but of his gold, believing it would be a main
 535. step towards a happy issue of his undertaking, if, by
 Bef. J. C. avoiding war in his way to *Italy*, he could lead his army
 217. 234 Con- entire against the *Romans*. The answers he received
 fulship. were favourable to his wishes; *That the Gauls most willingly agreed to his proposal, and expected him with impatience.* They also sent him word, that though the passage of those mountains was difficult, it was not insuperable. Animated with new hope by these reports, he began early in the spring to march his troops out of their winter quarters; and having now the concurrence of the Senate and people of *Carthage* to his purpose, he began openly to discourse of his intended war against *Rome*, exhorting the soldiers (whom he assembled for this purpose) cheerfully to engage in the expedition; and telling them, in order to raise their indignation against the *Romans*, that they had impudently demanded a surrendry of both him and all his chief officers into their hands. He also expatiated on the fertility of the country which he proposed to invade, the good will of the *Gauls*, and the confederacies he had made with their princes: And when the army had loudly declared their readiness to go whithersoever he was disposed to conduct them, and he had, with thanks, applauded their fidelity, and prefixed the day for their march, he dismissed the assembly.

The *Spaniards*, whom *Hannibal* had permitted to visit their families during the winter, being returned to the service, and the day^d appointed for the general rendezvous being come, the whole army took the field. It consisted of 90000 foot and 12000 horse, and with this mighty force the *Carthaginian* immediately began his march from *New Carthage* towards the river *Iberus*.

Polyb. B.
3. c. 35.

^d According to *Livy*, *Hannibal*, before he began his expedition against the *Romans*, went from *New Carthage* to *Gades*, there to discharge some vows he had made to *Hercules*, and to bind himself by new ones, in order to obtain success in the war he was going to enter upon. *Polybius* says nothing of the matter.

BUT

BUT now, before the reader accompanies *Hannibal* Y. of R. into Italy, he may perhaps be willing to make a pause, ^{535.} and enquire into the justice of the cause that leads him ^{Bef. J. C. 217.} thither.

' If the destruction of Saguntum (says Polybius) be considered as the CAUSE of the SECOND PUNIC WAR, we must necessarily determine, that the Carthaginians engaged in it very unjustly: Whether regard be had to the treaty of Lutatius, whereby each party became bound to offer no violence to the allies of the other: Or See p. regard be had to the treaty of Asdrubal, in which it was stipulated that the Carthaginians should not carry their arms beyond the Iberus. <sup>234 Con-
fulship. Polybius,
B. 3. c. 30.</sup>

' But if, for the CAUSE of the war made by Hannibal, we assign the seizure of Sardinia by the Romans, and the money which they extorted from Carthage at that time, we shall be obliged to confess, that the Carthaginians acted not unjustly in entering upon this war. For they did no more than lay hold of a favourable opportunity to revenge themselves on those, who had taken advantage of their distresses, to injure and oppress them. ^{p. 265.}

Here then the question of right is decided by our author. For he had before declared, and enlarged upon B. 3. c. it, that the siege of Saguntum and the passing the Iberus 6. were only the beginnings of the war and not the causes; and that the affair of Sardinia, and the money extorted at that time were the principal cause of it. And he now declares, that this principal cause is sufficient to justify the Carthaginians.

Our author nevertheless in another part of his history, observes, that though Hannibal had a just motive to begin the war, and though he did begin it from that just motive, yet because he did not publicly assign that motive for beginning it, but made use of a false pretext, his enterprize seemed contrary to justice. After relating the haughty and evasive answer of Hannibal to the first ambassadors that were sent to him from Rome, ^{See p. 268.} he adds,

' Thus

V. of R. ‘ Thus *Hannibal*, transported by a violent hatred,
 535. Bef. *T. C.* ‘ acted in every thing without consulting his reason,
 217. 234. Con- ‘ and, instead of declaring the true motives of his pro-
 sulship. ‘ ceeding, had recourse to false pretexts, after the man-
 Polyb. B. ‘ nner of those, who, prepossessed by their passion, do
 3. c. 15. ‘ what they had determined, without regard to equity
 or honour: Otherwise, had it not been better to have
 demanded of the *Romans* the restitution of *Sardinia*,
 and the money which, during the weakness and dis-
 tress of the *Carthaginian* republic, they had extorted
 from her, and, in case of refusal, to declare war
 against them? But as he concealed the true cause, and
 made use of the *false pretext* of *injuries done to the Sa-*
guntines, he seemed to enter into that war without rea-
 son, and contrary to justice.’

The reader observes, that *Polybius* here takes it for granted, that *Hannibal*, in attacking *Saguntum*, made war upon the *Romans*. Now *Hannibal* and the *Carthaginians* denied that the treaty with *Lutatius* could be broke by the siege of *Saguntum*. They alledged, that, as the *Saguntines* were not allies of *Rome* at the time of making that treaty, they could not be comprehended in it. *Polybius* indeed thinks, that *future allies* as well as *present* ought to be understood to be comprehended in that treaty; and so said the *Romans*. But what then; It was surely a point that might well bear a debate. Yet the *Roman* ambassadors (as we have seen) would enter into no discussion of this matter with the *Carthaginians*, but upon their refusal to give up *Hannibal*, as having unjustly violated that treaty by the siege of *Saguntum*, declared war.

And this makes it difficult to conceive, why *Polybius*, on the present occasion, mentions the treaty with *Asdrubal*; that treaty, according to him, relating only to the *Carthaginians passing the Iberus*, which river *Hannibal*, did not attempt to pass till after the declaration of war by the *Romans*. *Polybius* never speaks of the *Saguntines* as concerned in that treaty, but says expressly, that, when it was concluded, *no mention was made in it of any other part of Spain*, i. e. of any part on the south

south of that river; consequently no mention of the * Y. of R. Saguntines.

Livy indeed tells us, that the *Saguntines* were included in the treaty with *Asdrubal*, and makes the *Carthaginians* confess it; which, if true, we must suppose that a new article in favour of the *Saguntines* was inserted into that treaty, after *Rome*, had entered into an alliance with them.

Livy adds, that the *Carthaginians*, in their conference with the *Roman* ambassadors, would have evaded the obligation of the treaty with *Asdrubal*, by saying^a, that it was concluded by him without authority from *Carthage*, and that, in paying no regard to it, they did but follow the example of the *Romans*, who had refused to abide by the first treaty of *Lutatius* in *Sicily*, for the like reason. Doubtless, if the *Carthaginians* employed this subterfuge, it was weak and trifling, because, (as the same author, from *Polybius*, observes) in the treaty of *Lutatius* this clause was added, *That it should be firm and inviolable, if ratified by the people of Rome*; but in *Asdrubal's* treaty there was no proviso of like import.

But it is possible that *Asdrubal* might make an absolute treaty, and yet have no authority for so doing. At least, it was a common practice with the *Roman* generals, to make such Treaties; and it was as common with the *Roman* Senate to break them, as having been concluded without sufficient authority.

^a*Livy*, in making the *Carthaginians* use this plea at the time of the conference in question, seems to found himself on *Polybius*; and perhaps *Polybius* ought to be so understood: But as the Greek historian tells us, that the *Carthaginian* orator past over the treaty of *Asdrubal* in silence, as if no such treaty had ever been made, or, if made, was nothing to the purpose; I imagine, that the plea abovementioned was not employed at the time of the conference; but that afterwards, when they used to speak of the justice of their cause, they urged among other things the nullity of *Asdrubal's* treaty: For, as *Polybius* relates, the *Roman* Ambassadors did not, at their audience in the *Carthaginian* senate, object that treaty, nor set forth their rights, or pretensions of right, till after the war was begun. B. 3. c. 29.

To

Y. of R. To return to the main question, the justice of the
 war made by *Hannibal*:

Bef. J. C. It is plain that if the treaty of *Sicily* could not be
 construed to extend to future allies as well as present ;
 and if *Asdrubal's* treaty was made without sufficient
 authority from *Carthage*, (both which the *Carthaginians*
 pleaded) there can be no pretence to charge *Hannibal*
 with beginning a war against *Rome*, by his attacking
Saguntum.

But let us suppose, with the *Romans*, that the *Saguntines* were unquestionably within the treaty of *Sicily* ; and also, that *Asdrubal*, in his treaty, acted with ample authority. What will follow ? Not, that the second *Punic* war is to be imputed to the injustice of *Hannibal* and the *Carthaginians*, or that they were the first violators of the treaty of peace between the two nations. No : The *Romans* had scandalously violated that treaty by their seizure of *Sardinia*, and extortion of the 1200 talents ; and all conventions between *Rome* and *Carthage* following that first violence and breach of the peace, were no better than *Roman* injuries, as implying this menace, on the part of the *Romans*, *Do whatsoever we require ; otherwise we will make war, without regard to our oath, which we have already broken*. And as their engaging *Asdrubal* to covenant, that he would not pass the *Iberus*, was a new breach of the *peace of Sicily*, and a new insult upon *Carthage* ; because *Rome* had as yet no foot in *Spain*, on the one side of that river, whereas *Carthage*, on the other side, held almost all the country : So the alliance, which the *Romans* made with the *Saguntines*, was in reality a breach of their treaty with *Asdrubal*. For the *Romans* could have no sort of colour for requiring that *Asdrubal* should not pass the *Iberus*, but an implicit covenant that this river should be a boundary, over which they themselves would not pass in any discovery or conquest by them intended to be made upon *Spain* ; and that the *Carthaginians* should be free to push their conquests as far northward as to this limit. And so *Livy* says expressly, that by *Asdrubal's* treaty, *the river Iberus was*

Sir W. R.

to be the boundary between the two empires. Only he adds Y. of R. (inconsistently with Polybius's account) that the Sagun-^{535.} *tines* were included in that Treaty. ^{Bef. J. C.}

It would seem then that the *Carthaginians* were not ^{234. Con-} obliged, by any treaties with *Rome*, or by any consider-^{217. fulship.} ration of justice, to abstain from the war which *Han-*^{B. 21. c.} *nibal* began. And as to that open declaration of his true motives, the want of which made his enterprize seem dishonourable, he could not have made that declaration, without throwing a bar in the way to the execution of his main design, *the marching into Italy*. For by demanding the restitution of *Sardinia*, and of the 1200 talents, he would have discovered the extent of his meditated revenge, and would thereby have put the enemy on such preparations for war, as might have disappointed all his views of doing justice to his country. It was to avoid this inconvenience, that he would seem at first to have no design but against the *Saguntines*; and we find his policy had its effect: For the *Romans* (as has been observed) had not the least apprehension of ^{Polyb. B:} his intending so soon to invade *Italy*, but imagined that ^{3. c. 16.} the seat of the war, they should have with him, would be in *Spain*.

C H A P. XVII.

The march of Hannibal, from the Iberus in Spain, to the Po in Italy: and how the Roman arms were employed in the mean time.

First Year of the war.

HANNIBAL, having passed the *Iberus*, subdued Y. of R. in a short time all those parts of *Spain*, which he ^{535.} had not before entered, and which lie between that ^{Bef. J. C.} river and the *Pyrenees*. His successes however cost him ^{217. 234. Con-} many hard conflicts in which he lost abundance of fulship. men. Of this newly conquered country he appointed ^{Polyb. B. 3.} one *Hanno* to be governor, instructing him to have a ^{c. 35. &} particular watch over the *Burgundians*, of whom he had ^{seq.} the

Y. of R. the greatest jealousy, on account of the friendship they
 had contracted with the *Romans*. And for the support
 of his government, he left under his command 10000
 foot and 1000 horse; and he committed likewise to his
 keeping all the heavy baggage of the main army, who
Livy, B.
 left it behind them, that they might march light and
 21. c. 23. disencumbered.
&c. seq.

Being arrived at the borders of *Spain*, 3000 of his
Spanish soldiers, (not so much for fear of the war, as
 of the fatigue of so long a march, and of passing over
 the *Alps*) returned home without asking leave; which
 that others might not also do or attempt, he courte-
 ously dismissed above 7000 more, who seemed willing
 to be gone; a condescension that made the journey
 seem less tedious to those that did follow him, as not
 being enforced by compulsion. His army consisted
 now of but 50000 foot and 9000 horse; but they were
 good men, and had been long trained, and in continual
 action during the wars in *Spain*, under the ablest cap-
 tains that *Carthage* could ever boast. With these he
 passed the *Pyrenees* and entered into *Gaul*. He found
 the *Gauls*, that bordered upon *Spain*, ready in arms to
 forbid his entrance into their country. However by
 gentle words and rich presents to the leaders, he gained
 them over to favour his expedition, which he assured
 them was not designed against them; and he continued
 his march without any dangerous molestation, till he
 arrived upon the banks of the *Rhone*.

Polyb. B.3. Here he bought up from the *Gauls*, (who, on the
c. 42. west side of the river, favoured his passage for money
 and to get rid of him) all the boats large and small he
 could meet with, whereof the inhabitants, practising
 commerce, had a great number; and he also amassed
 prodigious quantities of timber for making floats, of
 which the soldiers, labouring in that employment with
 great diligence, in two days time made abundant pro-
 vision. Nevertheless the *Carthaginian* found that it
 would be impossible to compass his passage without
 some stratagem, because of the opposition of the *Gauls*
 on the east side the river, who, in great multitudes,
 had

had determined to defend their bank. Wherefore Y. of R. after three days deliberation, he in the night detached an officer named *Hanno* with a considerable part of the army, to go a good way up the river, then cross it, and endeavour to get behind the enemy. *Hanno* passed the stream about 25 miles from the Carthaginian camp, made silent marches towards the camp of the Gauls, and, in the morning after the fifth night, by smoke in several places, (the appointed signal) gave notice of his approach to *Hannibal*, who thereupon immediately began to attempt his passage. He put into the larger boats a part of his cavalry, ready for action. The horses of the rest, which could not be embarked, swam in tow after the small boats, one man, on each side of a boat, holding three or four horses by the bridles. The horsemen and the infantry went in small vessels and on floats; and that their passage might be the easier, the largest vessels were so disposed, a little higher up the stream, as to break the force of the current. When the Gauls perceived the Carthaginians advancing on the river, they by dreadful howlings, (according to their custom,) signified, that they waited the attack with resolution. But when they heard a great noise behind them, saw their tents on fire, and themselves assailed in rear, as well as front, they made but a short resistance. Vanquished and broken, they fled every man to his own village.

It has been already observed, that the Romans, without waiting the return of their ambassadors from Carthage, had ordered the Consul *P. Cornelius Scipio* into Spain, and *Tib. Sempronius* into Sicily from whence he was to go into Africa. See p. 274. Polyb. B. 3. c. 40.

Cornelius, though, before he set out, the news arrived that *Hannibal* had passed the Iberus, was still in hopes he should be able to hinder him from marching out of Spain. For this end having embarked his forces at Pisa, on board the fleet of sixty gallies, which had been assigned him, he steered along the coast of Liguria*, and in five days arrived at Marseilles. Learning here that *Hannibal* had already passed the Pyrenees, he

Y. of R. he proceeded no further in his voyage than to the nearest mouth of the *Rhone*, where he landed his men, with intention to wait for the enemy on the banks of that river, and there put a stop to their further progress. The difficulties of the way from the *Pyrenees*, and the divers nations, through which *Hannibal* was to make his passage, induced the Consul to conclude, that he was yet a great way off. The *Carthaginian* however was at this time actually employed in passing the *Rhone*, at the distance of about four days march from the sea. The Consul heard a report of this; but it seemed so incredible, that he could not believe it. Nevertheless, thinking it advisable to endeavour after such intelligence as he might rely on, while the army lay to refresh themselves after the fatigue of their voyage, he commanded out 300 chosen horse to make discovery, giving them, for guides, some *Gauls* in the service of *Marseilles*.

This detachment met with a party of 500 *Numidian* horse, not far from the *Carthaginian* camp. For *Hannibal*, the next morning after his passage, and while his men were wasting over the elephants, having received intelligence of the Consul's arrival at the mouth of the *Rhone*, had sent this party out to bring him an account of the strength and situation of the enemy. The conflict between the *Romans* and *Numidians* was very bloody, an hundred and sixty of the former were left dead upon the spot, and more than two hundred of the latter. The *Romans* had the honour of the day, forcing the *Numidians* to quit the field, and pursuing them so near their entrenchments as to be eye-witnesses of what they were sent to learn. After which they returned with all diligence to carry the news to the Consul.

Hannibal, while these things passed, was giving audience, in the presence of his whole army, to *Magilus* a *Gallic* Prince, who was come to him from the countries about the *Po*. *Magilus* (with whom the *Carthaginian* had before had a private conference) assured him by an interpreter, that the *Gauls* impatiently expected his

Livy, B.

21. c. 29. very bloody, an hundred and sixty of the former were

Polyb. B.

3. c. 45. left dead upon the spot, and more than two hundred of the latter.

c. 44.

his arrival, and were ready to join him ; and that he ^{Y. of R.} himself would be the guide to conduct the army ^{535.} through places, where they would find every thing ne- ^{Bef. J. C.} cessary, and by a road, which would bring them spe- ^{217.} dily and safely into *Italy*. When the Prince was with- ^{234 Con-} fulship. drawn, *Hannibal* in a speech to his troops reminded them of all their exploits to that time, and of the suc-
cess they had met with in every occasion of danger, by following his counsels. He exhorted them to continue their confidence in him, and to fear nothing for the fu-
ture ; since having passed the *Rhone*, and secured such good allies as they found the *Gauls* to be, the greatest obstacles to their enterprize were now surmounted. The soldiers applauded all he said, expressing great wil-
lingness, and even ardour, to follow him whithersoever he should lead the way. He commended their good dispositions, made vows to the Gods for the preservation of all his troops, admonished them to refresh themselves well, and prepare to march next day, and then dis-
missed the assembly.

Just at this time the *Numidians*, who had survived the ^{Polyb. B.} skirmish, returned with an account of their adventure. ^{3. c. 45.} *Hannibal*, as he had before resolved, broke up his camp, the next morning as soon as it was day, and posting his horse as a body of reserve, a little down the river, or-
dered his infantry to march. He himself staid behind, waiting the arrival of the elephants that were not yet all wafted over the stream.

The method of doing it was this. From the bank ^{c. 46.} of the river they threw a large float of timber, which, being strongly held by great ropes twisted about some trees, they covered over with earth, that the elephants might be deceived by this appearance, and take it for firm ground. At the end of this first float was fastened a second, but so as it might be easily loosened from it. The female elephants were brought upon the first float, the males followed them ; and when they were all got upon the second float, this was loosened from the first, and by the help of small boats towed to the op-
posite shore. It does not appear how many of these

Y. of R. animals were transported at a time. But when the first
 535. were landed, the float was sent back to fetch others,
 Bef. J.C. and so on till the whole number was brought over.

217. 234 Con- Some of them being unruly fell into the water, but
 fulship. they at last got safe to shore; not a single elephant was
 * *Polybius* drowned, though some of their conductors were.

(c. 47.) And now *Hannibal*, making his horse and elephants
 says *East-* the rear-guard to his infantry, marched along the banks
ward, but of the river *northward**, (though that was not the
 this agrees shortest way to the *Alps*,) being resolved to avoid an
 not with engagement with *Scipio*, that he might lead his troops
 the con- as entire as possible into *Italy*.

Liv. B. 21. c. 31. *Scipio*, upon the information brought him by his
Polyb. B. discoverers, having immediately ordered all the baggage
 3. c. 49. on board his ship, was coming by long marches with
 his whole army to attack the *Carthaginians*; but he
 did not arrive at the place where *Hannibal* had passed
 the *Rhone*, till three days after he was gone from
 thence. Despairing therefore to overtake him, he
 made haste back to his fleet, embarked his army, dis-
 patched his brother *Cneius* with the greatest part of it
 into *Spain*, to carry the war into that country, and set
 sail himself for *Italy*, in hopes, by the way of *Hetruria*,
 to reach the foot of the *Alps* before *Hannibal* could ar-
 rive there.

The *Carthaginian* after four days march arrived in a
 country which, from its situation, was called *the Island*,
 being washed on two sides by the *Rhone*, and another
^m river which runs into that. Its form is triangular
 and

^m It has been much disputed whether this other river was the *Arar*, [now called the *Saone*,] or the *Isara*, [the *Isere*.]

' The text of *Polybius*, says *Mons. Rollin*, as it has been transmitted
 to us, and that of *Livy* place this island at the conflux of the
Rhone and the *Saone*, that is, in the place where the city of *Lyons*
 now stands. But this is a manifest error. It was, in the Greek,
 Σκυρας, instead of which ὁ Αράς has been substituted. *J. Grono-*
vius says, that he had seen in a manuscript of *Livy*, *Bisarat*, which
 shews, that we are to read *Isara*, *Rhodanusque amnes*, instead of
Arar, *Rhodanusque*; and that the island in question is formed by the
 conflux of the *Isara* and the *Rhone*.'

and resembles the *Delta* of *Egypt*, with this difference, Y. of R.
that the country here spoken of, is bounded on it's third

535.
Bef. J. C.
side 217

234 Con-
fultship.

Chevalier *Folard*, who knows perfectly well the road from the place where *Hannibal* passed the *Rhone* (which is agreed to be between *Orange*, and *Avignon*) to *Lyons*; and who also knows perfectly well what an army like *Hannibal*'s is capable of doing, maintains, that it was absolutely impossible for it to march to *Lyons* in four days, it being 35 leagues; and, though he does not omit the reasons brought by Mr. *Rollin*, he lays the main stress of his argument (in behalf of the *Isere*) on the length and badness of the way to the *Saone*, there being three rivers to pass, and almost the whole way being through defiles.

I know not whether some aid to this cause might not be drawn from the time employ'd in *Scipio*'s march, who was so eager to come up with the *Carthaginians*, and give them battle. It is said that he did not arrive at the place where *Hannibal* had passed the *Rhone*, till three days after he was gone from thence. Now it is reasonable to suppose that he began his march the very same morning that *Hannibal* began his; the skirmish between the parties having happened the morning before, and there being time enough for *Scipio* to receive intelligence by his scouts where the enemy was: and though, to get to that place, he had not half the way to make, that *Hannibal* had, to reach *Lyons*, it cost him, with all his expedition, three days march.

On the decision of this question, another is made very much to depend, *Over what part of the Alpes the Carthaginian army passed into Italy?* Whether over the *Alpes Penninæ*, that stand a good way to the north of *Turin*, or over the *Alpes Cottiae*, that stand a little to the west of that city? *Livy* is for the latter, and wonders that this fact should ever be questioned, since it is agreed that the part of *Italy* which *Hannibal* first enter'd, was the territory of the *Taurini*, [the people of *Turin*] into which country the other passage would not have brought him; nor does he believe that passage was then open. He tells us also that the army crossed the *Durance*, in its way to the mountains, which agrees very well with the opinion of it's going over the *Alpes Cottiae*, as may be seen by the maps. But the rest of *Livy*'s account does not well accord with these particulars, nor indeed with common sense.

Chevalier *Folard*, who is well acquainted with the *Alps*, and all the roads thither, is sure, that *Hannibal* went the shortest road, from the country of prince *Brancus* to *Turin*; not only because it was the shortest, but because it was the safest and the best. He won't allow, that *Hannibal* went so far northward, along the banks of the *Rhone*, as even to the conflux of that river and the *Isere*. He says, there was no occasion to do it, on account of any danger, either from *Scipio* or any allies of *Rome*. According to the chevalier, *Hannibal*, leaving *Grenoble* on his left, passed the *Drac* [which runs into the

Y. of R. side by high mountains, whereas the *Delta* which the
^{535.} Nile washes on two sides, is bounded on the third by
 Bef. J. C. the sea.

^{217.}
234 Con-
sulship.

Here

Isere] over against *Vizille*. Thence he successively march'd to *Eourg* .
d'Oisans, *Le Mont de Lens*, *Le Lautaret*, *Briant*, *Le Mont Genevre*,
Sezanne, *Le Mont Sestrieres*, *Suze*, *Col de la Fenestre*, and *Pignerol*; at
 a small distance from which last he encamp'd in the plains.

THE fathers *Catrou* and *Rouille* differ from the chevalier on both
 these questions. According to them, *Hannibal* crossed the *Rhone*,
 at its conflux with the *Saone*, and then turning eastward march'd
 along the *Rhone*, on its north-side; then cross'd it again marching on
 its south-side to the *Durance*, (which they suppose to be *Livy's Dur-*
rance) and thence to the foot of the *Alpes Penninæ*, which he passed
 by the Great St. *Bernard*.

As to the objection of the 35 leagues march, in four days, they
 think it is sufficient to say, that *Hannibal* was in haste to get out of
Scipio's way.

+ Cluverius.

And as to Σκόρας [Scoras] (the supposed + ancient name of the
Isere) ' It can only impose, say they, on those who don't know that
 ' the *Saone* was anciently called *Scona*, and by corruption *Saucona*.
 ' Ammianus Marcellinus calls it so, and it had the name of *Matiscona*,
 ' because *Macon* is situated upon its banks. So that here is correction
 ' for correction. Is it not more natural and more probable that
 ' *Scoras* should be changed into *Sconas*, then that *Scoras* should be
 ' changed into *Isaras*?

* B. 3.
ch. 47.

But the main strength of their argument is from *Polybius*, who
 tells us *, that *Hannibal* continued his march along the *Rhone* EAST-
 WARD. ' Now, say the reverend fathers, it is evident by a cast of an
 ' eye on the map, that if the Carthaginian army march'd up the
 ' *Rhone* from west to east, it must first have marched along it as far as
 ' to *Lyons*. The necessity of this consequence I don't see. However, much
 doubtless might be built on this passage of *Polybius*, if we did not meet
 with it at a time when it is impossible it should be true; but it is just when
Hannibal is setting out to go NORTHWARD along the river, and even 35
 leagues northward, if he went to the conflux of the *Rhone* and the *Saone*.
Casaubon seems to have been shock'd at this inconsistency; for in his
 translation he has neglected the words παρὰ τὸν πόταρον (along the river.)

As to the PASSAGE OF THE ALPS, ' There are six reasons, say
 ' the Jesuits, which incline us to believe that *Hannibal* cross'd the *Alps*
 ' by the Great St. *Bernard*, [one of the *Alpes Penninæ*.]

I shall mention only three of them.

' 1. *Livy* and *Polybius* say, that this general, to encourage his
 ' troops, shewed them from the top of the mountain the rich plains
 ' of Italy that lay near the *Po*. Now supposing he had march'd by
 ' the *Alpes Cottiae*, as *Livy* pretends, he could not possibly from thence
 ' discover those plains; other mountains would have intercepted his
 view.

* 2. *Polybius*

Here he found two brothers disputing for the kingdom, and the nation engaged in a civil war. The two armies were just ready to give battle when *Hannibal* arrived. At the request of the elder brother (named *Brancus*) he assisted him, and forced the younger to retire. *Hannibal* had foreseen, that it would be very advantageous to him to have the friendship of a prince of this country; and he immediately reaped many benefits from it. The *Gaul* furnished his troops, not only with provisions and arms, but with clothes; for they were in a tattered condition, most of them barefoot, and very ill provided for a march over the snows and ice of the mountains. But the most essential service he did was by putting his troops in the rear of *Hannibal's* army, (which could not without great dread enter the territories of the *Gauls* called *Allobroges*) and escorting it to the place where it was to ascend the *Alps*.

Hannibal, thus attended, marched 100 miles in ten days without molestation. So long at he was in the flat country the petty princes of the *Allobroges* made no opposition to his progress, either fearing the *Carthaginian* cavalry, or being held in respect by the *Gauls* that were in the rear of the army. But when these had retired to go home, and the *Carthaginians* began to ascend the mountains, they perceived that the mountaineers had possessed themselves of the highest cliffs that command the streight through which the army was to pass, with a resolution to oppose its passage.

' 2. Polybius reckons 1400 stadia, or about 175 miles from the place where *Hannibal* pass'd the Rhone to the foot of those Alps which he ascended to go into Italy. And if we say with *Livy*, that he passed any of the *Alpes Cottiae*, it is impossible to make out that distance.

' 3. Polybius tells us, that *Hannibal* passed the *Alps* near the place where the Rhone rises. Consequently he passed over the *Alpes Penninae*.

These reasons seem decisive, as to the passage of the *Alps*, (whatever becomes of Scorus, and the 35 leagues march) Polybius's authority being unquestionable, since as he tells us, he made a journey on purpose to visit the places where *Hannibal* had pass'd, that he might be the better able to give an account of them.

Y. of R. Here *Hannibal* therefore was obliged to make a halt
 535. and encamp. Had the mountaineers, says *Polybius*,
 Bef. J. C. conceal'd their designs till the *Carthaginian* army was
 217. 234 Con-advanced a good way into the narrow passages, it had
 fulship. been inevitably destroyed. *Hannibal* having learnt by
 the means of some of those *Gauls*, who served him for
 guides, that the enemy quitted their posts every night,
 retiring to a town not far off, he took his opportunity
 with a detachment of his best men (leaving the greatest
 part of his forces with the baggage) to advance by night
 and seize those posts, before the return of the *Barba-*
rians; who in the morning were extremely surprized
 to find themselves thus dispossesed. However, as
Polyb. B. they perceived the cavalry and beasts of burden mov-
3. c. 51. ing forward in the streights at a great distance, they
 ran thither and fell with fury upon the rear-guard of
 the army. The *Carthaginians* suffered a great loss of
 men, horses, and beasts of burden upon this occasion;
 which destruction was owing more to the difficulty of
 the passage, than the swords of the enemy. For the
 horses, when wounded by the mountaineers, or fright-
 ed by their howlings, rush'd upon the beasts of burden,
 oversetting them and every thing else that stood in
 their way, and hurrying all down the precipices that
 border'd the road.

Hannibal being sensible, that the loss of his baggage
 would alone be sufficient to destroy his army, hastened
 with his detachment to the succour of the troops that
 were thus embarrass'd. Falling on the enemy from
 the higher ground he slew most of them, and put the
 rest to flight, yet not without sustaining considerable
 loss of men himself. What remain'd of his horses and
 beasts of burden now pass'd the streight, but with
 much difficulty, because of the ruggedness of the way.
 After which, taking with him those of his men who
 were the least fatigued with the combat, he attacked
 the town, from whence the enemy had sallied upon
 him, and he easily made himself master of it, the in-
 habitants having been almost all drawn out of it by
 the hopes of plunder. This conquest proved of great
 advantage

advantage to him; for he recovered a good number Y. of R. of men, horses, and beasts of carriage which had fallen ^{535.} into the enemy's hands. He also found a sufficient Bef. J. C. quantity of corn and cattle to sustain his army for two ^{217.} _{234.} Con- or three days. And he gained this farther benefit, that fulship. the mountaineers of these parts were now so struck with dread, that they thought no more of interrupting his march.

Here he encamped and staid a whole day to refresh Polyb. B. his troops. He then pursued his march, which for 3. c. 52. some time was unmolested. On the fourth, the people inhabiting the places near the road, having contrived a stratagem to attack him by surprize, came to meet him with olive branches and garlands, the usual signals of peace among these nations. *Hannibal*, mistrusting them, was very inquisitive concerning the intention of their coming. They told him, that having been informed of what had happened to their neighbours, and being themselves unwilling either to do or to suffer any injury, they were come to assure him of their peaceable dispositions; of which if he doubted they would give him hostages, for his security.

Hannibal was for a while in suspense what resolution to take: but considering that if he accepted their offer with condescension, they might possibly become more easy and tractable, and that, if he rejected it, he should have them immediately for open enemies, he at length pretended a great willingness to be upon terms of friendship with them.

Upon which they brought him hostages, furnished him with cattle, and seemed to place intire confidence in the *Carthaginians*. *Hannibal* seeing this, and either having, or seeming to have a better opinion of them, told them, they should be his guides to conduct him through the remaining part of his way over the mountains. Thus for two days they marched at the head of the army. But when it was got into a hollow way, overlooked by steep and craggy rocks, these faithless friends, in concert with others of their countrymen who had lain concealed, fell suddenly upon the troops

Y. of R. in front, flank and rear. The greatest number at
 535 tacked the rear. The army would have been utterly
 Bef. J. C. destroyed, says *Polybius*, if *Hannibal*, who all along re-
 217. 234 Con- tained some diffidence of these Barbarians, had not
 fulship. taken his precautions to guard against them, by placing
Polyb. B. his baggage and his cavalry in the van, and his heavy
 3. c. 53. armed infantry in the rear-guard. These sustained the
 shock of the enemy. Nevertheless he lost a great
 number of men, horses, and beasts of burden. For
 the *Gauls* having possessed themselves of the cliffs, and
 advancing thereon as the *Carthaginians* advanced in the
 hollow way, rolled down upon them huge stones, which
 occasioned an exceeding terror among them. *Hannibal*
 was obliged, with one half of his army, to remain all
 night in the open air upon a rock to defend the horses
 and beasts of carriage, as they filed along through the
 streight below; for which movement that night was
 hardly sufficient, the train was of such a length.

The next day, the enemy being retired, *Hannibal*
 rejoined his horse and baggage, and continued his
 march. The *Gauls* after this made no more attempts
 upon him, except in small parties, that, sallying out by
 surprize from their lurking places in the hollows of the
 rocks, sometimes upon his van, sometimes upon his
 rear, seldom failed to carry off a part of his baggage,
 which was their chief purpose. The elephants were of
 great use to the *Carthaginians* on these occasions, for
 wherever they chanced to appear, they struck such a
 terror into the mountaineers as made them instantly take
 to their héels.

Hannibal at length, after nine days march from the
 first ascent, gained the summit of the mountain. Here
 he staid two days, that those of his men, who with
 infinite toil had climbed to this height, might take
 breath; and that his sick and wounded, who were still
 behind and moving slowly on, might have time to
 crawl up. And *Polybius* adds, that while the troops
 continued here, they had the agreeable surprize of see-
 ing many of the horses and beasts of burden which
 had fallen in the way, or had by fear been driven out

of it, and were thought lost, arrive safely at the camp, Y. of R.
having followed the track of the army.

It was now about the end of autumn, and abundance
of snow was newly fallen on the top of the mountain. Hannibal
perceiving his soldiers to be extremely dis-
couraged by the sufferings they had already undergone,
and by the apprehension of those that were to come,
called them together, that he might try to revive their
hope. Having led them to a convenient spot for taking
an extensive view of the plains below ; “ There! said
‘ be, cast your eyes over those large and fruitful
countries. The Gauls who inhabit them are
‘ our friends. They are waiting for us, ready, and
‘ impatient to join us. You have scaled, not only the
‘ rampart of Italy, but the walls of Rome itself. What
‘ remains is all smoothness and descent. One battle
‘ gained, or two at most, and the capital of Italy will
‘ be ours.’

The next day he broke up his camp and began to descend. But now, though he had no enemies to encounter except a few lurking robbers, he is said to have lost almost as many men and horses in going down the mountain as in coming up. The way was so steep and slippery in most places, that the soldiers could neither keep on their feet, nor recover themselves when they slipped ; and the ground being covered with snow, it was difficult to hit the right path, and if they missed it, they fell down frightful precipices, or were swallowed up in depths of snow. Nevertheless being inured to such dangers, they supported this with fortitude. But at length they came to a place much worse than any they had before met with, and which quite took away their courage. The path, for about a furlong and a half, naturally very steep and craggy, was rendered much more so by the late falling away of a great quantity of earth ; so that neither elephants nor horses could pass. Here therefore they stopt short. Hannibal wondering at this sudden halt, ran to the place, and, having viewed it, plainly saw there was no advancing farther that way. His first thought was to try another, by fetching

535.
Bef. J. C.
217.
234 Con-
fuslship.
Polyb. B. 3.
c. 54.

Liv. B.
21. c. 35.

Y. of R. fetching a compass. But he quickly desisted from this
 535. attempt, it being found impracticable. For though
 Bet. J. C. the snow that had last fallen, being soft and of no
 217. great depth, yielded good footing enough for the sol-
 234. Con- diers and horses that marched foremost; yet when
 fulship. Polyb. B. this had been so trampled upon, by them, that the
 3. c. 55. feet of those who followed came to the hard snow and
 ice under it, the latter could by no means advance,
 or even keep upon their feet. And when they endeavoured to sustain themselves on their hands and knees,
 they often slid down and were lost in pits and precipices. And as for the horses and beasts of burden,
 when they struck their feet into the ice to preserve themselves from falling, they could not draw them out again, but remained there as if they had been themselves frozen. It was necessary therefore to seek some other expedient.

Hannibal having caused all the snow to be removed that lay upon the ground near the entrance of the first way, he there pitch'd his camp; and then gave orders to cut out a winding path in the ^a rock itself; and this work was carried on with so great diligence and vigour, that at the end of one day the beasts of burden and the horses were able to descend without much difficulty.

variorum easculatim recensit. non

^a Mr. Rollin seems very loth to part with *Livy's VINEGAR*, which was poured upon the rock to soften it, after this had been first made red hot under flaming piles of huge trees. Many, says Mr. Rollin, reject this fact as fabulous. Pliny observes, that vinegar has the force to break stones and rocks. *Saxa rumpit infusum, quæ non ruperit ignis antecedens.* Lib. 23. For which reason he calls vinegar *Succus rerum dormitor.* Lib. 33. c. 2. Dio, speaking of the siege of *Eleutherae*, lays, that the walls of it were made to fall by the force of vinegar. L. 36. p. 8

It is likely, [appararent] adds Mr. Rollin, what makes people question the truth of *Livy's account*, is the difficulty that *Hannibal* would have to procure in those mountains a sufficient quantity of vinegar for the operation. Doubtless the unbelievers do imagine this to be an insuperable objection to the story. But this is not all. For a better authority than *Livy* assures us, that *Hannibal* had no wood to make a fire with: That there was not a tree in the place where he then was, or near it. Polybius B. 3. c. 55. Των γαρ ἀλπιῶν τα- μεν ακρα, καὶ πέρος τὰς υπερβόλας αὐγούστα, τελίως ἀδυνάτα καὶ φύγα παντες εἴη.

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He immediately sent them forward, and, removing his Y. of R. camp to a place that was free from snow, put them to pasture. It now remained to enlarge the way that the elephants might pass. This task was assigned to the ⁵³⁵ *Bef. J. C.* ^{217.} *Con-* ²³⁴ *fulship.* *Numidians*, and it took up so much time, that *Hannibal* did not arrive with his whole army in the plains below, on the confines of *Insubria*, till four days after he began to descend. He had been 15 days in passing the *Alps*, and, these included, five months and a half in his march (of about 1000 miles) from *New Carthage*.

Of the thirty eight thousand foot with which the *Polyb.* B. *Carthaginian* general had crossed the *Rhone*, he had now but 12000 *Africans*, and 8000 *Spaniards*; and his eight thousand horse were reduced to about 6000. This enumeration is according to *Hannibal*'s own register, which he afterwards caused to be engraved on a column near the promontory of *Lacinium* in *Calabria*.

His first care, after entering *Italy* and pitching his *Polyb.* B. camp in the plain at the foot of the mountain, was to refresh his men, who stood in great need of it. Famine and fatigue had so disfigured them, that they looked like Savages. But as soon as he saw that both men and horses had recovered their strength, and were fit for action; he marched against the *Taurini**, who * The were at that time in war with the *Insubrians*, and who people of had rejected his repeated solicitations to enter into an alliance with him. He sat down before their chief city *Turin*. and took it in three days, putting all who had opposed him to the sword. This expedition struck such a terror into the *Gauls* of this neighbourhood, that they came of their own accord and surrendered themselves at discretion. The remoter *Gauls* of the plains about the *Po* would have also been glad to join him, as they had long intended to do. But as the *Roman* legions had passed beyond those plains, and had escaped the ambushes there laid for them, these *Gauls* thought it better now to keep quiet; nay, some of their nation were constrained to take arms for the *Romans*. *Hannibal*

Y. of R. *bal* therefore judging that he had no time to lose, re-
 535. solved to march into their country, and endeavour by
 Ref. *J. C.* some exploit to raise the courage of a people who were
 217. so well disposed to favour him.
 234. Con-

fulship. He was full of this design when he received intelligence
Polyb. B. that *Scipio* had passed the *Po* with his army, and
 3. c. 61. that he was not far off. The two Generals are said to
Liv. B. have conceived a high opinion of each other. *Hannibal's* name had been long renowned, even before the taking of *Saguntum*; and, that *Scipio* must be a captain of eminent worth, the *Carthaginian* had well concluded, from the *Romans* having chosen him, preferably to all others, to be his opponent. But this mutual impression was now become much stronger, by the *hardy enterprize* of the one to march over the *Alps*, with the *happy execution* of it; and the expeditious courage of the other in coming from the banks of the *Rhone*, to meet him, at the foot of those mountains.

But nothing had ever so astonished the people of *Rome*, as the news of the *Carthaginians* being so near. They had scarce ordered one of their Consuls into *Africa* to attack *Carthage*, and another into *Spain* to stop *Hannibal*, when they hear, that this same *Hannibal* is in *Italy* at the head of an army besieging towns. Such

Polyb. B. terror seized them, that they immediately dispatched an
 3. c. 41. express to the Consul *Sempronius*, then at *Lilybæum*, to
 and *Liv.* postpone every other affair, and come with all expedition to the defence of his country.
 B. 21. c.

49. & seq. *Sempronius*, to whom a considerable army, and a fleet of 160 gallies had been committed, and who had made mighty preparations at *Lilybæum*, for a descent upon *Africa*, was so elated with ambitious hope, that he thought of nothing less than laying siege to *Carthage* itself, when he had first cleared the coasts of *Italy* and *Sicily* of the *Carthaginian* fleets: Before he went into *Sicily*, the *Roman* prætor of that province had gained some considerable advantages by sea over the *Carthaginians*, and had disappointed a design formed by them to possess themselves of *Lilybæum* by surprize. When the Consul arrived at *Messina* he was there met by king

Hiero,

Hiero, who, continuing his friendship to the *Romans*,^{Y. of R.} not only cloathed the legions and furnished them with corn at his own expence, but with his fleet accompa-^{535: Bef. J. C.} nied theirs to *Lilybæum*. From this place *Sempronius*^{217.} made a successful attempt upon the Island of *Malta*; a fulship.^{234.} conquest which served to cover *Sicily* on that side. After which, being returned to *Lilybæum*, and having learnt there, that a *Carthaginian* fleet was ravaging the coasts of *Calabria*, he made preparations to drive the enemy from thence; but while he was getting ready for this expedition, he received the order abovementioned to return into *Italy* to the assistance of his colleague. Hereupon he gave one part of his fleet to his lieutenant *Pomponius*, to guard the coast of *Italy*, another to *Æmilius* prætor of *Sicily*, and with the rest, having embark'd his army, set sail for *Ariminum* in the *A-
driatic*.

C H A P. XVIII.

The battle of the TICIN.

WHILE the forces of *Sempronius* from *Sicily* were on their voyage, *Hannibal* and the Consul *Publius Scipio* were advancing to meet each other. *Sci-
pio* (as was before * obſerved) had, from the mouth of See p.
the *Rhone*, sent almost all his own consular army, un-^{290.} der the conduct of his brother *Cneius*, into *Spain*. The forces which he now commanded were chiefly the re-
 mains of an army † which had been assigned to the See p.
Prætor *Manlius*, to guard the province of *Gaul*, and^{274.} which had since been defeated by the *Boii*.

For these *Gauls* had no sooner heard of *Hannibal's* passing the *Iberus*, in his way to *Italy*, but, regardless of the hostages they had given at the conclusion of the last war with *Rome*, they rose in arms against her, and drew the *Insubrians* into the revolt. What made the *Boii* so forward in this matter, was their extreme dis-^{Polb. B.} satisfaction with the republic, for planting two colo-^{3. c. 56.} nies in their neighbourhood at *Placentia* and *Cremona*;
an

Y. of R. an affair which, though long intended, was not quite
 535. finished when the *Carthaginian* began his march from
 Ref. J. C. Spain. The *Boii* fell first upon those lands which had
 217. been destined for the new colonies, pursuing the *Roms*
 234. Consulship. mans who fled before them, to *Mutina**, another *Ro-*
 * Modena man colony. In this place, which they besieged, were
 three *Roms* of great distinction, (one of them having
 been Consul, and the other two, Prætors) who had
 been commissioned to make the partition of the lands.
 The *Gauls*, contrary to their faith given, seized upon
 the persons of these commissioners at a conference for
 an accommodation, hoping by this treachery to recover
 their hostages. The news of it roused the Prætor
Manlius. He hastened to the relief of *Mutina*: But the
Gauls having got notice of his approach, fell upon him
 by surprize, in his passage through a forest, and cut off
 a great part of his army, he himself narrowly escaping
 with the remainder to *Tanetum*, a small town on the
 banks of the *Po*. To this place the enemy pursued
 him, and there held him invested, till the Prætor *Attilius*,
 with a legion, that had been raised for *Spain*, and
 5000 men of the allies, was sent from *Rome* to his as-
 sistance. Upon the approach of these troops the *Gauls*
 Liv. B. raised the sieges of both *Mutina* and *Tanetum*, and reti-
 21. c. 26. ring thence dispersed themselves about the country.

Polyb. B. The forces of *Manlius* and *Attilius*, which had been
 3. c. 56. thus employed, composed the army, which *Scipio*, (who
 Livy, B. had landed at *Pisa*, and gone thence to *Placentia*) led
 21. c. 39. against *Hannibal*. Having passed the *Po*, he turned to
 & 40. the left, and advanced to the *Ticin**, over which he
 caused a bridge to be laid. But before he marched
 further he thought it proper to assemble his soldiers,
 and endeavour to animate their courage for the ap-
 proaching occasion. He spoke to them in words to this
 effect.

‘ Were you, Soldiers, the same army, which I had
 with me in *Gaul*; I might well forbear saying any
 thing to you at this time. For, what occasion could

* A small River on the north side of the *Po* and running into it.
 ‘ there

‘ there be to use exhortation to a CAVALRY, that had Y. of R.
 ‘ so signally vanquished the squadrons of the enemy 535.
 ‘ upon the Rhone; or to LEGIONS by whom that same Bef. J. C.
 ‘ enemy, flying before them to avoid a battle, did in 217.
 ‘ effect confess themselves conquer’d? But, as those 234 Con-
 ‘ fulship.
 ‘ troops, having been enrolled for Spain, are there with
 ‘ my brother Cneius, making war under my auspices (as
 ‘ was the will of the Senate and People of Rome) I, that
 ‘ you might have a Consul for your captain against Han-
 ‘ nibal and the Carthaginians, have freely offered myself
 ‘ for this war. You then have a new general; and I a
 ‘ new army. In this circumstance a few words from me
 ‘ to you will be neither improper nor unseasona-
 ‘ ble.

‘ And that you may not be unapprized of what sort
 ‘ of enemies you are going to encounter, or of what is
 ‘ to be feared from them, they are the very same,
 ‘ whom in a former war, you vanquished both by
 ‘ land and sea; the same from whom you took Sicily
 ‘ and Sardinia, and who have been for these twenty
 ‘ years your tributaries. You will not, I presume,
 ‘ march against these men with only that courage, with
 ‘ which you are wont to face other enemies, but with a
 ‘ certain anger and indignation, such as you would
 ‘ feel, if you saw your slaves on a sudden rise up in
 ‘ arms against you. Conquer’d and enslaved, it is not
 ‘ boldness but necessity that urges them to battle: unless
 ‘ you can believe that those, who avoided fighting when
 ‘ their army was entire, have acquired better hope by the
 ‘ loss of two thirds of their horse and foot, in the passage
 ‘ of the Alps.

‘ But you have heard perhaps, that, though they be
 ‘ few in number, they are men of stout hearts and ro-
 ‘ bust bodies, heroes of such strength and vigour, as
 ‘ nothing is able to resist.—Meer effigies! nay sha-
 ‘ dows of men! wretches emaciated with hunger, and
 ‘ benumbed with cold! bruised and battered to pieces
 ‘ among the rocks and craggy clifts! their weapons
 ‘ broke, and their horses weak and foundered! Such
 ‘ are the cavalry, and such the infantry with which
 ‘ you

Y. of R. ' you are going to contend ; not enemies, but the
 535. ' fragments of enemies. There is nothing which I
 Bef. J. C. ' more apprehend, than that it will be thought, *Han-*
 217. ' *nibal* was vanquished by the *Alps*, before we had any
 234 Con- ' conflict with him. But perhaps it was fitting that so
 fulship. ' it should be ; and that with a people and a leader,
 ' who had violated leagues and covenants, the Gods
 ' themselves, without man's help, should begin the war,
 ' and bring it near to a conclusion ; and that we, who,
 ' next to the Gods, have been injured and offended,
 ' should happily finish what they began.

' I need not be in any fear, that you should suspect
 ' me of saying these things merely to encourage you,
 ' while inwardly I have different sentiments. What
 ' hindered me from going into *Spain*? That was my
 ' province; where I should have had the less dreaded
 ' *Asdrubal*, not *Hannibal* to deal with. But hearing,
 ' as I past along the coast of *Gaul*, of this enemy's
 ' march, I landed my troops, sent the horse forward,
 ' and pitched my camp upon the *Rhone*. A part of
 ' my cavalry encountered and defeated that of the e-
 ' nemy; my infantry not being able to overtake theirs
 ' which fled before us, I returned to my fleet, and
 ' with all the expedition I could use in so long a voyage
 ' by sea and land, am come to meet them at the foot
 ' of the *Alps*. Was it then my inclination to avoid a
 ' contest with this tremendous *Hannibal*? And have I
 ' lit upon him only by accident and unawares? Or
 ' am I come on purpose to challenge him to the com-
 ' bat? I would gladly try, whether the earth, within
 ' these twenty years, has brought forth a new kind of
 ' *Carthaginians*; or whether they be the same sort of
 ' men who fought at the *Ægates*; and whom, at *Eryx*,

* 11s. 7d. ' you suffered to redeem themselves at 18 * denarii per
 $\frac{1}{2}$ Arbuth. ' head : Whether this *Hannibal*, for labours and jour-
 ' nies, be, as he would be thought, the rival of *Her-*
 ' *cules*; or whether he be what his father left him, a
 ' tributary, a vassal, a slave of the *Roman* people. Did
 ' not the consciousness of his wicked deed, at *Sagun-*
 ' *tum*, torment him and make him desperate, he would
 ' have

‘ have some regard, if not to his conquered country, Y. of R.
 ‘ yet surely to his own family, to his father’s memory, ^{535.}
 ‘ to the treaty written with *Amilcar*’s own hand. We ^{Bef. J. C.}
 ‘ might have starved them in *Eryx*; we might have ^{217.} Con-
 ‘ passed into *Africa* with our victorious fleet, and in a sulship.
 ‘ few days have destroyed *Carthage*. At their hum-
 ‘ ble supplication we pardoned them; we released
 ‘ them when they were closely shut up without a pos-
 ‘ sibility of escaping; we made peace with them when
 ‘ they were conquered. When they were distressed by
 ‘ the *African* war, we considered them, we treated
 ‘ them as a people under our protection. And what
 ‘ is the return they make us for all these favours? Un-
 ‘ der the conduct of a hare-brained young man, they
 ‘ come hither to overturn our state and lay waste our
 ‘ country.—I could wish indeed, that it were not so;
 ‘ and that the war we are now engaged in, concerned
 ‘ only our glory and not our preservation. But the
 ‘ contest at present is not for the possession of *Sicily*
 ‘ or *Sardinia*, but of *Italy* itself. Nor is there, behind
 ‘ us, another army, which, if we should not prove
 ‘ the conquerors, may make head against our victori-
 ‘ ous enemies. There are no more *Alps* for them to
 ‘ pass, which might give us leisure to raise new forces.
 ‘ No, Soldiers, here you must make your stand, as if
 ‘ you were just now before the walls of *Rome*. Let
 ‘ every one reflect, that he is now to defend, not his
 ‘ own person alone, but his wife, his children, his
 ‘ helpless infants. Yet let not private considerations a-
 ‘ lone possess our minds; let us remember that the
 ‘ eyes of the Senate and People of *Rome* are upon us,
 ‘ and that as our force and courage shall now prove,
 ‘ such will be the fortune of that City, and of the *Roman*
 ‘ empire.’

This discourse, supported by the authority of the speaker, the certainty of some things he had said, and the probability of others, had the wished for effect on the minds of the hearers.

On the other side, *Hannibal* made use of a new kind ^{Polyb. B.} of rhetoric to inspire his soldiers with resolution. He ^{3. c. 62.}
 VOL. III. U had

Y. of R. had taken prisoners, some young men of the moun-
 taineers who opposed his march over the *Alps*; and, to
 Bef. J. C. 535. prepare them for his purpose, had caused them to be
 217. treated in the severest manner, loaded with irons, tor-
 234. Con- fumented with hunger, and macerated with stripes. In
 fulship. Liv. B. this miserable condition he had them brought into the
 21. c. 42. presence of his whole army; where shewing them
 seq. such weapons as the *Gallic* Princes were accustomed to
 use in single combat, and placing also before their eyes
 horses and handsome suits of apparel, he demanded,
 Who of them would be willing, with those weapons, to
 fight in duel one against another, to the death of one
 of the duellists, on the condition, that the victor should
 have his liberty, and the prizes they beheld? There
 was not a single wretch of these prisoners, who did not
 instantly and eagerly call out for the arms; for, at
 worst, they were sure of this advantage, to be by
 death delivered from all their miseries. *Hannibal* Here
 upon directed that they should draw lots for entering the
 lists. At the hearing of this order, all the young men
 lifted up their hands to heaven, each conjuring the Gods
 that he might be of the number of the combatants; and
 all those, whose fortune it proved to be so, exceedingly
 rejoiced and exulted, while the rest were as much
 dejected.

When these duels were over, those of the prisoners
 who had been only spectators, seemed to envy the con-
 quered, no less than they did the conquerors.

The spectacle had made the like impression on the
 greater part of the *Carthaginians*, who comparing the
 fortune of the dead with that of the living, who had
 not fought, compassionated these, and thought the others
 happy.

Hannibal, having thus brought his soldiers to the
 temper and disposition he desired, advanced into the
 midst of them, and then spoke in the following man-
 ner.

‘ If in the estimation of your own fortune, you
 will but bear the same mind which you just now did,
 in contemplating the fortune of others, the victory,
 Soldiers,

Soldiers, is ours. What you have seen, was not a ^{Y.} of *R.* meer shew for amusement, but a representation of ^{535.} your own real condition. I know not whether you or your prisoners be encompassed by fortune with the ^{Bef. J. C.} ^{217.} ^{234.} Con stricter bonds and necessities. Two seas inclose you fulship. on the right and left; — not a ship to fly to, for escaping. Before you is the *Po*, a river broader and more rapid than the *Rhone*; behind you are the *Alps*, over which, even when your numbers were undiminished, you were hardly able to force a passage. Here, then, Soldiers, you must either conquer or die, the very first hour you meet the enemy. But the same fortune which has thus laid you under the necessity of fighting, has set before your eyes those rewards of victory, than which no men are ever wont to wish for greater from the immortal Gods. Should we by our valour recover only *Sicily* and *Sardinia*, which were ravished from our fathers, those would be no inconsiderable prizes. Yet, what are those? The wealth of *Rome*, whatever riches she has heaped together from the spoils of nations, all these, with the masters of them, will be yours. You have been long enough employed in driving the cattle upon the vast mountains of *Lusitania* and *Celtiberia*; you have hitherto met with no reward worthy of the labours and dangers you have undergone. The time is now come to reap the full recompence of your toilsome marches over so many mountains and rivers, and through so many nations, all of them in arms. This is the place, which fortune has appointed to be the limit of your labours; it is here that you will finish your glorious warfare, and receive an ample recompence of your completed service. For I would not have you imagine that victory will be as difficult, as the name of a ROMAN WAR is great and sounding. It has often happened that a despised enemy has given a bloody battle, and the most renowned kings and nations have by a small force been overthrown. And if you but take away that glitter of the *Roman* name, what is there,

‘ wherein

Y. of R. ' wherein they may stand in competition with *you*?
 535. ' For, (to say nothing of your service in war for twenty
 Bef. J. C. ' years together with so much valour and success) from
 217. ' the very pillars of *Hercules*, from the ocean, from the
 234 Con- ' utmost bounds of the earth, through so many
 fulship. ' warlike nations of *Spain* and *Gaul*, are you not come
 ' hither victorious? And with whom are you now to
 ' fight? with raw soldiers, an undisciplined army, beaten,
 ' vanquished, besieged by the *Gauls* the very last sum-
 ' mer, an army unknown to their leader, and unacquain-
 ' ted with him.

' Or shall *I*, who, I might almost say, was *born*,
 ' but certainly brought ^b up in the tent of my father,
 ' that most excellent general, shall *I*, the conqueror of
 ' *Spain* and *Gaul*, and not only of the *Alpine* nations,
 ' but, which is greater yet, of the *Alps* themselves,
 ' shall I compare myself with this half-year-captain?
 ' A captain before whom should one place the two
 ' armies, without their ensigns, I am persuaded he
 ' would not know to which of them he is *Consul*? I
 ' esteem it no small advantage, Soldiers, that there is
 ' not *one* among you, who has not often been an eye-
 ' witness of my exploits in war; not *one*, of whose
 ' valour, I myself have not been a spectator, so as to
 ' be able to name the times and places of his noble
 ' achievements; that with soldiers, whom I have a
 ' thousand times praised and rewarded, and whose
 ' pupil I was, before I became their general, I shall
 ' march against an army of men strangers to one a-
 ' nother.

' On what side soever I turn my eyes, I behold all
 ' full of courage and strength; a veteran infantry, a
 ' most gallant cavalry^c; you, my allies, most faithful

^b Here we have another proof from *Livy* himself of his own in-
adverency in delivering the idle story mentioned, p. 266.

^c *Livy's* Expression is, *Generosissimarum gentium equites frenatos & infrenatos*, horsemen that ride with bridles, and those that ride without bridles, by the latter meaning the *Numidians*, who had no bridles nor saddles to their horses, and who in action resembled the modern *Hussars*.

' and

and valiant ; you, *Carthaginians*, whom not only *V. of R.*
 your country's cause, but the justest anger impels to
 battle. The hope, the courage of assailants is al-
 ways greater, than of those who act upon the de-
 fensive. With hostile banners displayed you are come
 down upon *Italy* ; you bring the war. Grief, injuries,
 indignities fire your minds, and spur you forward to
 revenge—First they demand *me*, that I, your gene-
 ral, should be delivered up to them ; next, *all you*,
 who had fought at the siege of *Saguntum* ; and we
 were to be put to death by the extremest tortures.
 Proud and cruel nation ! Every thing must be yours,
 and at your disposal ? You are to prescribe to us, with
 whom we shall make war, with whom we shall make
 peace ? You are to set us bounds, to shut us up
 within hills and rivers ; but *you*, you are not to ob-
 serve the limits which yourselves have fixed^d ? *Pass*
not the IBERUS. What next ? *Touch not the SAGUN-*
TINES ; *SAGUNTUM* ^e *is upon the IBERUS* ; *move not a*
step towards that city. Is it a small matter then, that
 you have deprived us of our ancient possessions, *Sicily*
 and *Sardinia* ; you would have *Spain* too ? Well,
 we shall yield *Spain* ; and then—you will pass into
Africa. *Will pass* did I say ?—This very year they
 ordered one of their Consuls into *Africa*, the other
 into *Spain*. No, Soldiers, there is nothing left for
 us but what we can vindicate with our swords. Come
 on then. Be men. The *Romans* may with more
 safety be cowards ; they have their own country be-
 hind them, have places of refuge to fly to, and are
 secure from danger in the roads thither : But for *you*

^d By the words which *Livy* here puts into the mouth of *Hannibal*, it is plain, that the *Saguntines* were not included at first in the treaty with *Asdrubal* ; that this treaty only restrained the *Carthaginians* from passing the *Iberus*, as *Polybius* declares ; and that the alliance of the *Romans* with the *Saguntines* was posterior to it, and a real infraction of it. See pag. 284, 285.

^e *Hannibal*, the more to incense his hearers against the *Romans*, makes these assert an impudent falsehood, that *Saguntum* is upon the *Iberus*.

535.
 Bef. J. C.
 217.
 234 Cos-
 fulship.

Y. of R. ' there is no middle fortune between death and victory.

^{535.} Bef. J. C. ' Let this be but well fixed in your minds, and once again I say, you are CONQUERORS.'

^{217.} 234. Con. *Livy* reports, that *Hannibal*, further to animate his consulship. men, assured them, that they should have every one of them lands in property, either in *Africa*, *Spain*, or *Italy*, or else an equivalent in money, if they preferred money. And those assurances he ratified in form. Taking a flint in one hand, and holding a lamb with ^{Liv. B.} the other, he said, *Great JUPITER, and all ye Gods, if* ^{21. c. 45.} *I do not perform my promise, slay me as I do this lamb!* at which words he broke with the flint the skull of the lamb; a solemnity which much augmented the confidence of his troops.

Polyb. B. The next day the two armies advanced towards each other along the *Ticin*, on that side of it which is next the *Alps*, the *Romans* having the river on their left, the *Carthaginians* the same river on their right. The day following each army receiving intelligence by its foragers that the enemy was near, encamped in the place where it then was. The third, *Scipio* with his cavalry and light armed foot marching forward to discover the strength and situation of the *Carthaginians*; and *Hannibal*, with his cavalry only, coming on with the like intention, they soon perceived each other's approach by the dust they raised in the plain, and thereupon immediately prepared for battle. The *Roman* General sent before him his *Gaulic* horse, assisted by his dartmen to begin the fight, he himself with the rest of his cavalry in one line following slowly in good order. The *Gauls* behaved themselves courageously, but the foot that should have aided them, shrank at the first onset, or rather fled cowardly through the intervals of the squadrons without casting a dart, fearing to be trodden down by the enemy's horse. Nevertheless the *Gauls* maintained the fight, as presuming they should be well sustained by the *Roman* Horse behind them. Nor did the Consul neglect his part, but hazarded his person so far, that he received a dangerous wound, and

and had been left upon the place, if his son^f, a meer Y. of R. youth (afterwards the great *Africanus*) had not, by a surprising effort of courage, brought him off. Whilst the Romans were busied in assisting their Consul, an unexpected storm came driving at their backs, and obliged them to look to their own preservation. For Hannibal had ordered his *Numidians*, who were in the wings, to wheel and give upon the Romans in flank and rear, while he with his *Spanish* and other horse sustained their charge in front. The *Numidians*, performed their instructions, and having first cut in pieces the scattered foot that had run away at the beginning of the action, fell instantly upon the backs of the Roman cavalry, who by this impression were intirely broken and forced to betake themselves to their speed, leaving to their enemies the honour of the day.

Scipio the night following decamped secretly, and marched with expedition over the plains to the *Po*, which he now repassed, retiring to the neighbourhood of *Placentia*. For he thought it not safe, wounded as he was, to stay in a flat open country, with an enemy so near, that was much superior to him in horse. Hannibal, who had expected to have an engagement with the enemy's infantry, no sooner learn'd that the Romans were retired, but he followed them as far as to their bridge^h upon the *Ticin*. Here he surprized and made

*Polyb. B.
3. c. 66.*

^f So *Livy* is inclined to believe, with the greater number of authors; but adds, that *Celius* the historian gives the honour of the Consul's rescue to a *Lugurian* slave.

^g *Livy* says, that *Scipio* retired to *Placentia*; which if true, *Placentia* must have had a different situation from what it has now, and must have been, not on the *east* but the **west* side of the *Trebia*. * See *Po-* For we find, that *Scipio* after this first retreat, passed the *Trebia* to get *lyb. B. 3.* further from *Hannibal*. *Polybius*'s words import no more than that c. 74. the Romans retired to the neighbourhood of *Placentia*, τις πολις Πλα-
κεντια.

^h *Livy*, who, in this part of his history, plainly borrows from *Po-lybius*. seems to have misunderstood him with regard to the *Bridge*, at which *Hannibal* is said to have arrived in his pursuit of the *Romans*. The Latin Historian makes it to be their *bridge over the Po*, as if they had no river to pass in their way to the *Po*; which, if true, we must

Y. of R. made prisoners 600 men who had been left behind to
 535. destroy the bridge so soon as the army should be passed.
 Bef. J. C. The work was however effected; the boats which had
 217. composed the bridge being loosened from one another
 234. Con-ship. were floating down the stream; which *Hannibal* per-
 ceiving, and hearing also that the *Romans* were far ad-
 vanced in their march, he immediately turned back,
 went down the *Ticin*, and then up along the banks of
 the *Po*, to find a convenient place where he might lay a

Polyb. B. 21. c. 39. say, that the battle was fought on the *east side* of the *Ticin*, the side towards *Placentia*: For *Polybius* expressly affirms that *Scipio* at the head of the battle had the *Ticin* to his left, and *Hannibal* the same river to his right. Yet, that the battle was fought on the *west side* of the *Ticin*, we have *Livy's* own authority. He makes *Scipio's* march, in order to meet *Hannibal*, to have been from *Placentia* to that river, over which he passed by a bridge, before he gave battle to the *Carthaginian*. *Ponte perfecto traductus Romanus exercitus in agrum Insubriam*, B. 21. c 45. And in this he does not disagree with *Polybius*. Now, if the battle was fought on the *west bank* of the *Ticin*, and *Scipio* had this river to his left, it is evident that the *Carthaginians* were between him and the *Po*, and that he could not steal a march to the *Po* (in the way to *Placentia*) without first repassing the *Ticin*; which *Hannibal* must also have crossed in the pursuit of his enemy to the *Po*. But not one word is anywhere said of *Hannibal's* passing, or attempting to pass, the *Ticin*.

The bridge therefore to which *Hannibal* came, in pursuit of the *Romans*, must have been their bridge over the *Ticin*; at the entrance of which, according to *Livy*, *Scipio* had raised a fort and placed a guard. And it was this guard which *Hannibal* surprised.

The reason which *Polybius* assigns for *Hannibal's* turning back, when he came to the broken bridge, is the *distance* of the enemy: He heard that the *Romans* were got a great way off (too far to be overtaken.) This furnishes another proof that the river in question was the *Ticin* and not the *Po*. For as he had determined to pass the *Po* with all expedition, how could he find a more convenient time to lay his bridge, than when he had no enemies to oppose him? But the *distance* of the enemy was a good reason why he should not lay a bridge over the *Ticin*; since this would be only loss of time and labour, and could not in the least further his intention of passing the *Po*, or coming up with the *Romans*. And what necessity could he be under of spending two days (as *Livy* says he did) in search of a convenient place to lay a bridge over the *Po*, if he was already at that very place where the *Romans* had laid their bridge over that river. Chevalier *Folard's* translator of *Polybius*, understands him as *Livy* does. Yet the chevalier, in his comment, regardless of his text, speaks of the bridge in question, as the bridge over the *Ticin*, tom. 4. p. 129.

bridge

bridge of boats over this river. After two days march, ^{Y. of R.} a proper place being found, and the bridge formed, he ordered *Asdrubal* to lead over the army, while he himself was employed in giving audience to ambassadors come to him from the *Gauls* of the neighbouring countries, who, after his success at the *Ticin*, retaining their first design, now offered to join their forces to his, and to furnish him with whatever he wanted.

When the army was all passed, the *Carthaginian* took his march down the river, and at the end of the second day came within view of the *Romans*. The third, he drew up his forces in *battalia*, in the face of the enemy: but finding his challenge not accepted, he retired and pitched his camp about six miles from them.

At this time certain *Gauls*, to the number of 2000 foot and 200 horse, who served in the Consul's camp, observing the fortunate state of *Hannibal*'s affairs, plotted together to desert to him. After supper they retired to their tents, and there kept quiet till towards day-break; but then, having suddenly armed themselves, they fell upon the sleeping *Romans*, who lay nearest to them, slew a great number and wounded many others, after which they fled out of the camp, carrying with them to *Hannibal* the heads of those they had slain. The *Carthaginian* received these traitors kindly, exhorted them to continue their zeal, and promised them rewards proportionable to their services; but distrusting perhaps their fidelity, he did not enrol them among his troops, but dismissed them to their respective towns and villages, that they might publish among their countrymen the success of his arms, and exhort them to enter into alliance with him. There was in truth little need, for that end, of the exhortations of these emissaries, whose recent treachery alone sufficed to put the rest of the *Boii* under a necessity of siding with the *Carthaginian*. A party of them at this very juncture, brought to *Hannibal*'s camp the three *Roman* commissioners, whom, contrary to faith given, they had seized at a conference (as was before mentioned) and they put them

Polyb. B.
3. c. 67.

^{Y. of R.} them into his hands. *Hannibal*, after many kind words and promises to these *Gauls*, made a treaty with them, and then restored to them the three captives, whom he advised them to keep under strict guard, and to make use of (as they had at first proposed) to recover their hostages from the *Romans*.

^{535.} *Scipio*, alarmed at the bloody treason of his *Gallie* deserters, and not doubting but the *Gauls* in general would quickly declare themselves in favour of *Hannibal*, thought it adviseable to retire into a country where the friendship of the inhabitants was more to be depended upon. He decamped therefore about three hours after midnight, to pass the *Trebia*¹, and take post upon the eminences near that river, where he believed the enemy would not have the boldness to attack him. *Hannibal*, upon notice of this motion of ^{Polyb. B.} ^{3. c. 68.} the *Romans*, detached his *Numidian* cavalry after them, he himself soon following with the rest of the army. The *Numidians*, finding the *Roman* camp deserted, stopt to set fire to it, a delay very fortunate to the *Romans*, who, had they been overtaken in the plain, and before they had got their baggage over the river, would have been extremely embarrassed. But when the *Numidians* came up, the main body of the Consul's army, together with the baggage, had already passed the stream. There remained on the other side some of his rear guard only, of which the enemy slew a part and took the rest prisoners.

The Consul having fortified himself in his new camp, resolved to wait there the arrival of his colleague *Sempronius* with the troops from *Sicily*, and, in the mean time, to attend carefully to the cure of his wound, that he might be in a condition to act, when, after the junction of the two armies, a favourable opportunity should present. *Hannibal* advanced, and pitched his camp about five miles from that of the Consul, the *Trebia* running between them. Great numbers of *Gauls* from the circumjacent country flocked to the

¹ A small river running northward into the *Po* near *Placentia*.

Carthaginian, and supplied him abundantly with arms ^{Y. of R.}

^{535.}
and provisions.

Bef. J. C.

^{217.}

^{234.} Con-
fulship.

C H A P. XIX. The Battle of the TREBIA.

Hannibal passes over the Apennines into Hetruria.

WHEN the news came to *Rome* of the action ^{Polyb. B.} *Ticin*, though the public expectation ^{3. c. 68.} was much disappointed by the ill success, yet they endeavoured to account for it by reasons that would leave no discouragement upon their minds. Some imputed the misfortune to rashness in the Consul, stimulated by too eager a desire of fighting: others to perfidy in the *Gauls* of his army, whom they supposed to have designedly suffered themselves to be vanquished; a conjecture founded on the subsequent treachery of some of their countrymen: and as the *Roman* infantry remained unbroken, no danger to the republick was yet apprehended, from a defeat which the horse alone had sustained. The arrival of *Sempronius*, from *Sicily*, at *Ariminum*, with his legions, confirm'd this confidence. It was imagined that when these had joined the forces of *Scipio*, the very appearance of so powerful an army would alone be sufficient to put the *Carthaginians* to flight.

Sempronius marched with all diligence from *Ariminum* to join his colleague. Having pitched his camp near him, and refreshed his legions, which had been fatigued by their voyage^k and march from *Lilybæum*, to *Ariminum*, which took up forty days, he gave orders to get all things ready for battle. While these preparations were going forward, he made frequent visits to *Scipio*, enquiring of him all the circumstances of the late action upon the *Ticin*, and consulting with him upon future measures.

In the mean time *Hannibal* found means to get possession of *Claudium*, a small town on the confines of ^{c. 69;}

^k *Livy* sends the troops of *Sempronius*, all the way from *Lilybæum* to *Ariminum*, by sea. *Polybius* represents them traversing the city of *Rome*, and marching from thence to *Ariminum*.

Liguria,

Y. of R. Liguria, where the *Romans* had formed a magazine of
 535: arms and provisions. To give an impression of his
 Bef. J. C. clemency, and engage more of his enemies to have re-
 217. course to it, he treated the garrison with all gentleness.
 234 Con- And as the governor had betrayed the place to him, he
 fulship. most richly rewarded him, in hopes thereby to allure
 other officers intrusted by the *Romans* to the like trea-
 chery.

Soon after this, having notice that certain *Gauls* who inhabited between the *Trebia*, and the *Po*, and who had made alliance with him, continued nevertheless (that they might have a refuge in all events) to hold a secret correspondence with the enemy, he detached 2000 foot and 1000 horse to pillage and lay waste their lands. His orders were punctually executed, and the booty proved considerable; the plundered *Gauls* flocking to the *Roman* entrenchments to ask succour.

Sempronius, who had impatiently waited an occasion of fighting, seized this pretext. He sent out the greater part of his cavalry with a thousand light armed foot, who expeditiously passing the *Trebia*, attack'd the pillagers that were carrying off the booty, put them to flight, and obliged them to retire within their intrenchments. But a vigorous sally being made from thence, the pursuers were repulsed, and obliged in their turn, to fly to their camp. Hereupon *Sempronius* put all his cavalry and all his light arm'd troops in motion, so that the enemy were once more forced to retire. *Hannibal*, who was not prepared for a general action, and who thought it not the part of a prudent commander, to hazard one lightly, and without a premeditated design, contented himself with stopping the flight of his men, and making them face about. He forbade them by his officers, and by his trumpets, either to charge or pursue the enemy; who after they had continued some time upon the place, retreated to their camp.

Polyb. B.
3. c. 70. The loss of men had not been very considerable on either side; but as the *Romans* had lost fewer than the *Carthaginians*, *Sempronius*, much elated with this trivial advantage, could think of nothing now but a decisive action.

action. Nevertheless, he continued to observe the decency of advising with his colleague. *Scipio's opinion* was, that in prudence they ought to avoid fighting, till the troops, having been trained and exercised during the winter, might more reasonably be depended upon. *Y. of R.* *Bef. J. C.* *535.* *217.* *234.* *Con-*
than at present: he added, that the *Gauls* were naturally too fickle and inconstant, to keep long in friendship with the *Carthaginian*, and would infallibly turn against him, if they found him out of a condition to enterprise any thing of importance; and he therefore intreated *Sempronius* to lay aside, for some time, all thoughts of a *general battle*; an occasion, in which (he modestly added) he himself, when his wound was healed, might perhaps be of some use. *Sempronius* could not but be sensible, that this advice was judicious; but his passion to distinguish himself overpowering his reason, and begetting a confidence of success, he, notwithstanding the repeated remonstrances of his colleague, bent his whole mind to bring on a general action, as soon as possible; that so neither *Scipio's* cure, nor the election of new consuls (the time for which drew near) might prevent his acquiring the sole glory of finishing the war. And thus, says *Polybius*, as he considered not what was seasonable for the publick, but for himself, it was impossible but he must take wrong measures.

Hannibal formed the same judgment as *Scipio* upon the situation of things, and was therefore no less desirous than *Sempronius* of coming to a decisive battle without delay. He was well aware of his present advantages in the favourable disposition of the *Gauls* to him, the inexperience of the *Roman* troops, and the inability of *Scipio* to be in the action: but his strongest motive was the necessity an invader is under of being almost incessantly active, and of performing repeated exploits, if he would preserve to himself the esteem, and keep alive the hopes of his confederates.

The *Carthaginian* had viewed and fully examined the ground between the two armies. It was an open plain, through which ran a winding rivulet. The banks

Y. of R. banks of this small stream being pretty high, and also
 535. thick set with bushes and brambles, *Hannibal* perceived
 Bef. J. C. that it was easy, not only for foot, but even for horse-
 217. men to be there conceal'd. Having imparted to his
 234. Con- chief officers the design he had formed, and finding it
 fulship. universally approved, he after supper sent for his brother
Mago, a young man of great spirit and a good
 soldier, and directed him to choose out a hundred horse
 and a hundred foot of the bravest men in the army,
 and to bring them before night to his tent. This done,
 and the general having exhorted the two hundred to
 behave themselves gallantly in the post he should assign
 them, he bid each man go and choose out of the corps
 to which he belonged, nine others, such as he knew
 to be the stoutest soldiers in it, and then to repair
 to him at a certain place in the camp. The whole
 number came, a thousand horse, and a thousand foot.
 He furnish'd them with guides, and under the conduct
 of his brother, to whom he signified the time when they
 should fall upon the enemy, sent them to the place he
 had chosen for the ambush.

The next morning, at day break, he assembled his
Numidian cavalry, a hardy people, inured to fatigue;
 and when he had promised ample rewards to every
 one that should distinguish himself in the discharge of
 his duty, he ordered them instantly to pass the *Trebia*,
 brave the enemy in their camp, skirmish with them if
 they sallied out, and, in skirmishing, retire and repass
 the river.

Hannibal's view in making this movement so early in
 the morning, was to provoke the *Romans* to an engage-
 ment while they were yet fasting, thoughtless of fight-
 ing, and unprepared for it.

Sempronius no sooner saw the *Numidians* approach,
 Polyb. B. but he sent out his cavalry to attack them. The ca-
 3. c. 72. valry were followed by 6000 dartmen; and the general
 himself not long after came out of his entrenchment
 with all the rest of his army. His numerous forces,
 and the light advantage he had gained the day before, made

made him vain enough to think, that there needed little ^{Y. of R.} more than his appearance in the field to secure the ^{535.} victory. ^{Bef. J. C.}

It was yet winter, it snowed, the weather was ex- ^{217.} tremely cold, and the soldiers had begun their march ^{234.} Con- fulship. before they had eaten any thing to sustain them. And therefore, though they moved forward briskly at first, and with an eager desire of fighting, yet when they came to ford the river, which being swelled by the rain of the night before, was breast-high, they began to shrink; and when they had waded through it (the day being then pretty far advanced) they found themselves extremely pinched and weakened both with cold and hunger: whereas on the other hand the *Carthaginians* had, by *Hannibal's* order, taken a good repast in their tents, rubbed themselves with oil, and put on their arms before the fire.

When *Hannibal* perceived that the *Romans* had passed the *Trebia*, which was the favourable moment he had waited for, he instantly sent out, to the succour of his *Numidians*, the slingers of the *Baleares*, and his other light armed infantry, to the number of 8000; after which he led forth his main army. His foot consisted of 20000 men, *Gauls*, *Spaniards*, and *Africans*. His cavalry, including the *Gauls* his allies, amounted to above 18000. He drew up the whole horse and foot, in one line, about a mile from his camp, posting the horse on the wings. His elephants he placed before the points of his body of infantry.

In the mean time, *Sempronius* by a signal called off his cavalry that were fatiguing themselves to little purpose against the *Numidians*. For it was the custom of these to attack briskly; then on a sudden break their ranks, turn their backs and fly; and presently after return to the charge in as good order, and with as much boldness as at first: a manner of fighting, which being entirely new to the *Roman* cavalry, perplexed and disconcerted them.

The

Y. of R. The Consul's infantry consisted of ¹ 16000 Roman legionaries, and 20000 foot of the allies. He formed his battle after the usual manner of the *Romans*, the infantry in three lines, and the horse, amounting to 4000, upon the wings. In this order he advanced slowly towards the enemy. The light armed troops on both sides began the action, much to the advantage of the *Carthaginians*: for the dartmen of the *Romans*, having suffered cold and hunger ever since the morning, and having spent the most of their darts against the *Numidians*, were by no means a match for those of *Hannibal*, who had but just left their camp well armed, fresh and vigorous.

When these skirmishing troops had retired through the intervals of the respective armies to which they belonged, a general charge ensued. The *Roman* cavalry being soon routed and driven from their ground by the superior numbers of the *Carthaginians*, left the wings of their infantry exposed to be attacked in flank. The *Numidians* who had been employed to provoke the battle, and the light armed troops who had begun it, were ready on the part of *Hannibal* for this service, having, after their retreat, posted themselves to the right and left behind the *Carthaginian* cavalry; falling furiously therefore on the two wings of the *Roman* infantry in flank, they put them into great disorder, and disabled them from defending themselves against the elephants, that attacked them in front. These wings utterly broken and put to flight were chased into the river.

c. 74. At the same time the 2000 men, who had lain in ambush in the brook beforementioned, came out, and fell upon the rear of the *Roman* legions in the center, which caused a terrible confusion there. The foremost ranks of this center were the only troops of the Consul's army that could keep their ground. They fought a long time with undaunted bravery against the heavy

¹ *Livy* says 18000. He adds, that the Consul's army was strengthened by a body of the *Cenomani*, the only nation of the *Gauls* that continued faithful to the *Romans*.

armed forces of the enemy, and at length, urged by Y. of R. necessity, broke their way through them with great slaughter. But seeing that their wings were defeated, and not thinking themselves able either to succour them, or to return to their camp, by reason of the ^{535. Bef. J. C.} ^{217.} ^{234.} enemy's numerous horse and the river that were in the way, they formed themselves into a close compact body, to the number of 10000, and took the direct road to *Placentia*. Hither they retreated without the least danger, or opposition; and they were followed by all those of the rout, horse and foot, that could escape out of the field, without passing the river. Of the remainder of the *Roman* army, some had the good fortune to get safely over the stream to their camp; but the greater part perished on the banks of it, either trodden down by the elephants or slain by the horse. The *Carthaginians* pursued the enemy no farther than to the river, which the rigour of the season restrained them from passing. They returned to their intrenchments. Their victory was complete, and their loss inconsiderable. A few only of the *Africans* and *Spaniards* remain'd upon the field; the *Gauls* suffered most. Yet after this victory the *Carthaginians*, through the inclemency of the weather, lost a great number both of men and horses; and of the elephants all died but one ^m.

As for the Consul *Scipio*, and those that were with him, they stole away from their camp, the very night ^{Livy. B. 21. c. 56.} after the battle, crossed the *Trebia* upon boats or upon rafts, and got safe to *Placentia*; the enemy either not perceiving their flight, or not being able to pursue them, for cold and weariness.

Sempronius, to conceal the shame of his defeat, sent *Polyb.* ^{B. 3. c. 71.} messengers to *Rome*, whose tidings imported only, that

^m *Livy*, B. 21. c. 58. speaks of seven elephants that, after this time perished of cold, in a fruitless attempt which *Hannibal* made to pass the *Apennines*, being forced back from the top of those hills by a hurricane. The same author relates a battle that presently followed *Hannibal*'s return into the plains, and was terminated by the night's coming on, when there had been no great slaughter on either side. *Polybius* says nothing of all this, and there is nothing of probability in the story, but a good deal of poetry.

Y. of R. there had been a battle, and that [the severity of the
 535. weather had snatched the victory out of his hands.
 Bef. J. C. This report passed currently at first, but the true situa-
 217. tion of affairs was quickly known ; that the Roman
 234 Con- sulship. forces had been utterly vanquished ; that the rout had
 fled to the neighbouring colonies for refuge ; that Scipio after his flight to *Placentia*, not to ruin that place by
 21. c. 56. keeping too great a number of soldiers there, had crossed the *Po* with his part of the army, and retired to
Cremona ; that the troops had no provisions but what were brought by sea and up the *Po* ; and lastly, that all the nations of the *Gauls* had declared for *Han-nibal*.

The people of *Rome* were yet in their first fright and consternation at all this bad news, when *Sempronius* himself, after escaping many dangers from the enemy's cavalry that were dispersed, in parties, over the country, arrived in the city. His business was to hold the Comitia by centuries, for electing new Consuls.

See p.
254, and
255.
Liv. B.
21. c. 63.

Notwithstanding the late disasters and the present distress; party favour had a greater share in the elections, than a due regard to the exigencies of the state. For (with *Cn Servilius*) was raised to the Consulate *C. Flaminius*, a rash hot-headed man, who, when in the same station six years before, had signalized himself by his disobedience to the senate, and his contempt of religion. His merit with the people, and what now procured him the fasces, was his having been the only man of the *Conscript Fathers*, that assited in promoting a law, which enacted, that no Senator, nor father of a Senator, should have a ship at sea, carrying above eight tons or thereabouts. A vessel of that burden was thought sufficient for transporting to *Rome* the produce of any man's lands ; and it was intended by this law to confine commerce to the *Plebeians*.

Sempronius's year not being yet expired, he immediately after the elections returned to his winter quarters at *Placentia*.

Polyb. B. The senate provided for the next campaign. They
 3. c. 75. made new levies amongst the allies, ordered troops into

into *Sicily* and *Sardinia*, put garrisons into *Tarentum*, Y. of R. and other places where they were most wanted, and sent provisions to *Ariminum* and into *Hetruria*; through which country the army was to march against *Hannibal*. ^{535.} ^{Bef. J. C.} ^{217.} ^{234.} They also dispatched ambassadors to ask assistance of *fulship*. King *Hiero*, who furnished them with 500 *Cretan* archers, and 1000 other light armed soldiers. And lest the *Carthaginians* should from *Africa* attempt to land troops in *Italy*, they equipt sixty quinqueremes to guard the coast. In a word, they omitted nothing that was necessary for carrying on the war with the utmost vigour, it being the peculiar character of the *Romans*, says *Polybius*, that they are then most to be feared when they are most afraid.

On the side of *Spain* all was safe; for in that country *Polyb.* B. during the late unfortunate campaign in *Italy*, the 3. c. 76. arms of the republic, under the conduct of *Cn. Scipio*, had prospered beyond expectation. He had entirely defeated *Hanno* *, the *Carthaginian* General, and re- * See p. duced almost all the nations between the *Iberus* and the ^{285.} *Pyrenees*, to the obedience of *Rome*.

As for *Hannibal* he did not remain inactive after his *Liv. B.* victory at the *Trebia*. Wounded and repulsed in an ^{21.} c. 57. attack upon one town belonging to the *Romans*, he assaulted and took another called *Vietumvæ*, in *Insubria*, and gave it up to be plundered by the soldiers.

The *Carthaginian*, during his winter quarters among *Polyb. B.* the *Gauls*, with whose levity he was well acquainted, 3. c. 78. and who, he feared, might repent of their newly contracted alliance with him, is said to have put in practice some of his *Punic* arts, to preserve himself from their snares. He not only wore false hair, but at different times the habits of different ages, frequently changing his dress in order to disguise himself. And because the *Gauls* were extremely dissatisfied that their country continued to be the seat of the war, and were impatiently desirous (from a hatred, as they pretended, to the *Romans*, but in truth, from an eagerness to enrich themselves with plunder) of being led into the territories of the allies of *Rome*, he resolved to pass as soon

Y. of R. as possible over the *Apennines* into *Hetruria*. Just before he entered upon this expedition, he assembled all his captives that were of the *Roman* allies, and when he had assured them that he was come into *Italy*, not as their enemy, but their friend, to restore them to liberty and to the possession of the towns which the *Romans* had taken from them ; and when he had exhorted them to join with him in the common cause, and to engage their countrymen to do the same, he dismissed them all without ransom.

c. 78. After this, having made enquiry about the several roads into *Hetruria*, he learnt that there was one much shorter than any of the rest, but very difficult to pass, as it led through marshy grounds ; the other roads more easy, but known to the enemy, and in their possession. *Hannibal*, for these reasons, or perhaps because he had naturally a turn for those dangerous enterprises, which are apt to raise mens admiration of a general, and strike his enemies with terror, chose the difficult road, which was now rendered more so by the overflowing of the *Arnus*. Having passed the *Apennines*, he entered the marshes. His *Africans* and *Spaniards*, who were inured to this sort of fatigue, and who marched first, went into the water without hesitation, and kept their order. The *Gauls* had more difficulty (the way being made much worse by the multitudes of men and beasts of burthen that had gone before them) and many of them were killed with the fatigue : for, to add to the distress, they were obliged to march thus in mire and water four days together, with but very little sleep, such as they could get lying upon their baggage, or upon the beasts which had carried it, and had perished in the mud. *Hannibal* himself was not without his share of the inconveniences of this march ; for though he rode upon an elephant (the only one remaining) his continual watchings, and the unwholesome damps, brought such a defluxion upon his eyes that he lost one of them. When he was come out of the marshes, he halted for some days that he might refresh his army, and enquire into the situation of

of the country, the strength and designs of the enemy, and the character and disposition of their General.

C H A P. XX. SECOND YEAR of the War.

The BATTLE of the Lake THRASYME^NUS.

Fabius Maximus Cunctator is sent against Hannibal ; who deceives him by a very singular stratagem.

Transactions in Spain.

FLAMINIUS, as was before observed, had obtained the consulship by the favour of the people, contrary to the inclinations of the Senate. Being apprehensive that the augurs, influenced by his enemies, would, to render his election invalid, pretend some defect in the auspices, he took a bold unprecedented step, left *Rome*, without performing the usual ceremonies of religion, went straight to *Ariminum* (where he had ordered the army to rendezvous) and was there invested in the consulate. The Senate, highly offended at this proceeding, sent two of their body to recall him to *Rome*, that he might perform those ceremonies which he had despised. But the Consul paid no regard to their orders. At the head of four legions (two of which he received from *Sempronius*, and the other two from the Praetor *Atilius*) he crossed the *Apennines*, and encamped his army under the walls of *Aretium* in *Hetruria*; and there he still was when *Hannibal* came out of the marshes.

The *Carthaginian* having learnt that *Flaminius*'s chief talent was haranguing the people, in whose assemblies he was a leading man, but that he wanted the skill for conducting a war, was of a hasty disposition, easy to be inflamed, and confident of his own abilities, did not doubt but he should be able, by provoking his high spirit, to lead him whithersoever he pleased. With this view, having put his army in march, he laid waste, before the Consul's eyes, the fertile fields of *Hetruria*,

Polyb.L.3.
c. 80. 82.

V. of R. and in seeming contempt of him, passed by his camp
 536. at *Aretium*, and advanced nearer to *Rome*, as if he in-
 Bef. J. C. tended to carry on his devastations to the walls of the
 216. Con-capital. *Flaminus* beheld the lands of *Cortona* (one of
 fulship. the most considerable cities of *Hetruria*) in a flame be-
 Liv. B. hind him. Enraged at being thus insulted by *Hanni-*
 22. c. 4. *bal*, he immediately called a council of war, but
 would not listen to his officers who advised him to
 continue in his camp till he was joined by his colleague,
 and in the mean time to content himself with sending
 out strong parties to hinder the enemy from ravaging
 the country. He rushed out from the council in great
 wrath, and gave orders for marching. And when
 word was brought him, that one of the standards stuck
 so fast in the ground that they could not pull it out, he
 asked the messenger whether he had not likewise
 brought letters from the Senate forbidding him to
 c. 3. fight. He added, *since fear has not left the soldiers*
strength enough in their hands to pull up the standard, bid
them dig it up. He then began his march with a full
 resolution to fight *Hannibal* as soon as he could over-
 take him. And though his officers were greatly dissi-
 tisfied, yet the common soldiers applauded the confi-
 dence of their General, who to such an extravagant
 height had raised the hopes of the vulgar, that an im-
 mense number of them followed the camp in expectati-
 on of booty, and went loaded with chains for the multi-
 tudes of enemies that were to be taken prisoners.

Polyb. B. *Hannibal* was pursuing his march in the way towards
 3. c. 82. *Rome*, having the lake *ibrasymenus* (now *Lago de Perugia*)
 close on his right, and the town of *Cortona* at some dis-
 tance on his left, when, he learnt that the Consul was
 following him. Upon this advice, he turned his
 thoughts to seek out a convenient spot of ground
 where he might draw the enemy into an ambuscade.
 Nor was it long before he found a place fit for his pur-
 pose. He came to a valley, which, extended length-
 ways from the lake to a hill very steep and difficult of
 access, was lined on the two sides by ridges of little
 hills

Y. of R.
his *Africans* and *Spaniards* in open view. Behind the ridge of hills, on the right of the valley, he placed in a long line the *Baleares* and other light armed infantry ; and behind that on the left, his cavalry and the *Gauls*, who formed a line, the extremity of which reached to a narrow pass, whereby he had entered the valley. These dispositions being made in the beginning of the night, he continued the remaining part of it in quiet and silence in his camp.

536.

Bef. J. C.

216.

235 Con-

fulship.

It was late before the Consul arrived at the lake, he therefore encamped that night by the side of it. But next morning by break of day, without examining the ground, he marched into the valley through the pass before mentioned. As soon as *Hannibal* was apprised that the *Roman* army were entered, and that their vanguard was not far from him, he gave orders for a general onset. So thick a fog from the lake at this time covered the valley, that the *Romans* found themselves attacked in front, flank and rear, almost before they saw the enemy. Many of them were slain in the order of their march, not having had time to form themselves for battle : and so closely was the greater part hemm'd in, that they could neither fight nor fly ^g. Fifteen thousand were slaughtered in the valley, among whom was the Consul *Flaminus*. Great numbers being pushed into the lake perished there. A body of six thousand men forced their way through the enemy. Could those brave legionaries have seen (says *Polybius*) what passed, they might, by facing about, and falling upon the backs of the *Carthaginians*, have given a turn to the fortune of the day. But they expecting to encounter new enemies, continued advancing on till they arrived at the summit of a hill : from which, when the

^g *Livy* and *Plutarch* tell us that this battle was fought with so much eagerness and fury on both sides, that the combatants were not sensible of an earthquake, which happened during the engagement, and which ruined many cities in *Italy*, overturning mountains, and changed the course of rivers. *Livy*, B. 22. c. 5. *Plut.* life of *Fabius*.

Y. of R. fog was dispersed, seeing the total defeat of the rest of
 536. the army, they retreated to a neighbouring village.
 Ref. J. C. The Carthaginian General detached *Mabarbal* after
 216. 235 Con- them with a large body of horse and foot, to whom
 fulship. they surrendered next day upon a promise of their lives,
 Liv. B. and, if we may credit *Livy*, their liberties: whence he
 22. c. 6. takes occasion to reproach *Hannibal* with breach of faith,
 because when the next day he had assembled all his
 prisoners to the number of 1500, and had separated
 the *Romans* from the other *Italians*, he delivered the
 former to his soldiers, to be kept in chains and released
 Polyb. L. only the latter. *Polybius* tells us that *Hannibal* de-
 3. c. 83. clared he did not think himself bound by the promise
 which *Mabarbal* had made, as being without authority
 from him; but then, according to the same historian,
 that promise was only of their lives, which, if true,
Hannibal cannot on this occasion be charged with
 breach of faith, whether he was in reality bound by
Mabarbal's promise or not. The loss on the side of
 the Carthaginians amounted only to 1500 men, most of
 them Gauls.

The first report of the defeat of the *Roman* army
 spread an unspeakable consternation in *Rome*. The
 people flocked in crowds to the forum, calling upon
 their magistrates to give them an account of the battle.
 It being impossible for these to conceal or disguise the
 truth for any long time, the Prætor *Pomponius*, towards
 sun-set, mounted the *rostra*. All he said was, *We are
 vanquished in a great battle*. And the people, little ac-
 customed to misfortunes in war, much less to hear their
 magistrates, plainly and publicly own that they were
 conquered, could not bear this so heavy a calamity
 with patience and moderation. In this universal dejec-
 tion the Senators alone preserved their steadiness. The
 Prætors assembled them, and kept them sitting several
 days together from sun-rising to sun-set. Before they
 came to any fixed resolution in what manner to oppose
 the conqueror, they were alarmed with the news of a
 second defeat. The Consul *Servilius* having heard at
Ariminium that *Flaminus* was following *Hannibal* with an
 intention

intention to give him battle, had detached *C. Centenius* Y. of R. with 4000 horse to strengthen the *Roman* army. But this reinforcement had come too late. And *Hannibal*, after the action, hearing of *Centenius*'s approach, had sent *Mahabal*, with the light armed foot, and part of his cavalry, to encounter him. Near 2000 *Romans* were killed in the engagement; the rest fled to a rising ground, but being invested by the enemy, were next day obliged to surrender.

It was thought by the Senate that the present exigency required a magistrate with dictatorial authority. Yet because there was no precedent of the people's naming a Dictator, and because their only Consul *Servilius*, to whom that nomination legally belonged, was absent, and all communication between him and Rome cut off by the enemy, it was agreed that the Comitia should create a magistrate, whose authority should be superior to the Consular, but somewhat inferior to the Dictatorial; and that he should be styled Pro-Dictator. *Fabius Maximus* was the person pitched upon; and the only privilege he seems to have wanted of those belonging to a Dictator was that of naming his General of the horse. To this office the people appointed *M. Minucius Rufus*, a young man much in their favour. *Fabius* was a Senator distinguished for the coolness of his temper, and the great caution with which he proceeded in all his actions. He was as wary and circumspect in his conduct, as *Sempronius* and *Flaminius* had been rash and impetuous. The Pro-Dictator began the exercise of his office by acts of religion. The Sibylline books were consulted to know the causes of the present calamities; and the guardians of those oracles declared, that the misfortunes of the republic were owing to the undue performance of a vow to *Mars*; that it ought to be repeated, and four new vows made to several Deities, besides a dedication to *Jupiter* of all the pigs, lambs, kids and calves which should be produced in one spring. This last required the authority of the people; the other were made by proper magistrates. *Liv. B. 22. ch. 8.* This done, *Fabius* and *Minutius* immediately applied themselves

Y. of R. themselves to repair the fortifications of the city. They
 536. also posted guards in proper places, caused the bridges
 Bef. J. C. over the rivers to be broke down, and sent orders to the
 216. people all over the country through which it was thought
 235. Con-
 fulship. *Hannibal* would pass, to burn their houses, destroy the
 fruits of the ground, and retire into places of strength
 and safety.

Before the Pro-Dictator took the field, he advised with the Senate concerning the troops that should serve under him. They allotted him the army of *Servilius*, and decreed that he should make what new levies he pleased, either at *Rome* or amongst the allies. *Fabius* raised but two new legions, which, having commanded to repair to *Tibur* upon the *Anio*, he set out for *Orciculum*, a city of *Umbria*, there to meet the troops from *Ariminum* under the Consul *Servilius*. These forces he himself led to *Tibur*, where he was joined by the new recruits. And having been informed that a *Carthaginian* fleet had taken, near the coast of *Hetruria*, some *Roman* ships of burthen which were carrying provisions to the army in *Spain*, he sent the Consul *Servilius* to equip with all diligence what vessels were at *Rome* and *Ostia*, and with them to take upon him the guard of the coast of *Italy*. After these regulations *Fabius* began his march towards *Hannibal*, in which he proceeded with great caution, carefully searching all the places through which the army was to pass.

*Polyb. B.
3. c. 86.* The *Carthaginian*, immediately after the defeat of *Centenius*, had led his army through *Umbria* and *Picenum* to the territory of *Adria*, a considerable town on the *Adriatic*, destroying the country wherever he passed, and putting to the sword all the *Romans* he found in his way, that were able to bear arms; such was his hatred to the *Roman* name. Here he halted for some time, because the country abounded with good provisions and store of old wines, which served to recruit the strength of his exhausted troops, who had contracted distempers from bad food, and the fatigues they had undergone. He armed his *Africans* after the *Roman* manner, out of the spoils he had taken from the enemy

enemy. And being now near the sea, for the first Y. of R. time since his coming into *Italy*, he laid hold of the opportunity, and sent to *Carthage* an account of his success. Then having ravaged the territories of *Aスクルム* and *Adria*, he proceeded to the countries of the *Prætutiani*, the *Marsi*, the *Marusini*, the *Peligni* and *Frentani*. Last of all he entered *Apulia*, and was laying waste this country, when *Fabius* arrived and pitched his camp upon the hills near ^h *Æce*, within six miles of him. *Hannibal* instantly led his army to the *Roman* entrenchments, and offered battle to the enemy. But the Pro-Dictator remaining quiet in his camp, the *Carthaginian*, after waiting some time, drew off his men, openly reproaching the *Romans*, (says *Livy*) that at length their martial spirit was broke, that the war was at an end, and that they plainly owned themselves vanquished. Nevertheless he was inwardly grieved to find he had to do with a General very different from *Sempronius* and *Flaminius*, and was much more afraid of *Fabius*'s prudence than his strength. He had not yet try'd his constancy. To provoke him to battle he made frequent incursions into the countries of the *Roman* allies, and destroyed them with fire and sword; employing likewise all his arts by sudden marches and counter-marches to ensnare him. All was to no purpose; he could neither surprize *Fabius*, nor make him leave his hills, where he kept himself continually on his guard against so active an enemy. He did not suffer his soldiers to stir out of their camp, except in large bodies; he followed the *Carthaginians*, but at a considerable distance, because he would on no account hazard a pitched battle; yet he had frequent skirmishes with the enemy, and intercepted such parties of them as ventured too far from their camp. And indeed this was the surest method to ruin *Hannibal*. The *Romans* were in no danger of wanting men or provisions in their own country; whereas the *Carthaginian* could only subsist by pillage, and when his men dropped off, had but small opportunities of recruiting. While the Pro-Dictator was

^h A town on the borders of *Apulia*

thus

Liv. B.
22. c. 12.

Polyb. B.
3. c. 90.

Y. of R. thus baffling his enemy, he had the continual murmurs of his General of the horse, and of his soldiers to contend with. *Minucius* being a favorite of the people, and ambitious of the chief command, openly accused *Fabius* of real cowardice concealed under the appearance of prudence. But neither the invectives of this seditious man, nor the fresh devastations of *Hannibal*, who passed over the *Apennines* into *Samnium*, could make him alter his wise measures.

The *Carthaginian* having ravaged *Samnium*, and taken the town of *Telesta*, resolved to penetrate into *Campania*, one of the finest countries in the world, and at the same time the most inaccessible. Except on one side where it is bounded by the sea, it is encompassed by a chain of high mountains through which there are but the passes, and those very narrow and difficult. It was a bold step in *Hannibal* to undertake this expedition in sight of a *Roman* army commanded by an expert General; but he had his reasons for it. He would thereby either force the enemy to a battle, or shew plainly to the neighbouring nations that he was master of all the open country; by which means he hoped to draw over some of the towns to his party, not one of which had hitherto fallen off from the republic. Add to this that the cities of *Campania* were the richest of any in *Italy*, and their trade the most considerable. *Hannibal* entered *Campania* by a pass at the foot of mount * *Callicula*^k, near the *Vulturnus*, and encamped on the banks of that river. *Fabius* was indeed surprised at the boldness of the *Carthaginian*, but *Minucius* and the rest of the army, transported with rage at the being thus insulted, impatiently demanded to be led to battle,

* Polyb.
calls it
Eribanus.

* *Livy* tells us (B. 22. c. 13.) that *Hannibal* designed to enter *Campania* by a pass near *Casinum*, a town of *Latium*, beyond the *Liris*, because by guarding that pass he was told he might prevent the *Romans* from assisting their allies. But the *Carthaginian* not pronouncing the word *Casinum* well, his guides thought he had said *Caslinum*, and accordingly led him to that town, which was situated on the *Vulturnus*, at the foot of mount *Callicula*. *Hannibal* was so enraged at the mistake, that he immediately ordered the chief of his guides to be crucified, for a terror to the rest.

infomuch

insomuch that the Pro-Dictator was forced to pretend Y. of R.
 the same eagerness to fight, and march with much 536.
 greater expedition than usual. But when he came near Bef. J. C.
 the enemy, he returned to his former conduct, en- 216. 235 Con-
 camped upon mount *Massicus*, and from thence quietly fulship.
 beheld the *Carthaginian* army gathering the fruits *Plut. life*
 and rich harvests of the *Falernian* fields. This so pro- of *Fab.*
 voked his soldiers, that they called him in derision *the Pædagogue of Hannibal*. And *Minucius* joining in the
 insolent raillery, said, their General had chosen for
 them a fine theatre, from whence they might conveniently
 behold the ravages of *Italy*. He then asked the
 friends of *Fabius*, whether the Pro-Dictator did not
 think the earth an unsafe place for him, and was there-
 fore going to pitch his camp in heaven, and cover
 himself with the clouds. When these things were told
Fabius, he only replied, that he should indeed be more
 cowardly than they made him, if he changed his reso-
 lution through fear of idle railleries or reproaches.
 He added, *it is no inglorious thing, to fear for the safety*
of our country. That man is not fit to rule others who
will be influenced by foolish calumnies, or subject himself
and his government to the caprice of those whom he ought
to command. *Fabius* continued the same conduct the *Livy, B.*
 whold summer, though he was not ignorant that his *22. c. 15.*
 caution was blamed at *Rome* as as well as in the army.

Hannibal despaired of bringing the *Romans* to a bat-
 tle, and therefore having got an immense booty, he
 began now to look out for a place in which to secure
 it, and where he might likewise take up his winter quar-
 ters; for though *Campania* abounded with fruits and
 wine, yet it yielded not corn sufficient to subist a nume-
 rous army for any considerable time. For these rea- *Polyb. B.*
 sons *Hannibal* began to draw towards the pass by which *3. c. 92.*
 he had entered this country. *Fabius* perceiving his de-
 sign, detached 4000 men to seize the streight, which
 being commanded by mount *Callicula*, he encamped
 the rest of his army towards the top of that hill. From *Livy, B.*
 thence he sent a garrison into *Casilinum*, a town on the *22. c. 15.*
Vulturnus, on the other side the pass, and ordered *L.*

Hofilius

Y. of R. Hostilius Mancinus, with 400 horse, to observe the enemy.
Bef. J. C. 216. This young officer rashly engaging with a party of *Numidians*, was himself slain together with the greatest part of the detachment. The same day *Minucius* joined *Fabius*. He had been sent to guard a pass at *Terracina*, a city of *Latium*, to hinder *Hannibal* from penetrating that way into the territory of *Rome*¹.

The Carthaginian, not being able to dislodge *Fabius*, contrived the following stratagem to be executed in the night. Being encamped at the foot of mount *Callicula*, *Polyb. B. 3. c. 93.* he ordered *Asdrubal* to pick out 2000 of the strongest oxen, to cause faggots of dry wood to be tied to their horns, and then to keep the cattle, with the herdsmen, ready without the camp. After supper, when all things were quiet, the oxen were brought to the foot of an eminence not far from the pass, that was guarded by the 4000 *Romans*. Upon a signal given, the wood on the horns of those beasts was set on fire, and the herdsmen, who had been instructed to drive them if possible to the top of the eminence, immediately set out, being followed by the light armed infantry. These had orders to assist the herdsmen as long as the cattle kept together, but upon their dispersing, to seize the top of the hill, making as great a noise as they could, and to be in readiness to defend themselves in case they were attacked by the enemy. In the mean time *Hannibal* led his army to the very entrance of the pass. The *Africans* marched first, next followed the cavalry, then the booty, and last of all the *Spaniards* and *Gauls*. The *Roman* detachment seeing the fires approach the top of the eminence, thought *Hannibal* was endeavouring to escape that way; they therefore left the pass in all haste, and marched up in order to oppose him. But as they came nearer the cattle, which now were running up

¹ *Hannibal*, according to *Livy*, advanced towards *Fabius*, and sent his light horse to try once more to provoke him to battle. But though the Pro-Dictator had greatly the advantage of the ground, he would not hazard a general action, but contented himself with skirmishing with the enemy's cavalry, of whom he killed eight hundred, with the loss of only two hundred of his own men.

and down, firing the bushes wherever they went, they Y. of R.
knew not what to think of these lights, their imagina- 536.
tions suggesting to them a thousand fears. In this per- Bef. 7. C.
plexity they began to skirmish with the *Carthaginians* 216.
on the top of the hill, but the cattle running in among fulship.
the combatants separated them; after which both par-
ties continued quiet waiting for day-light. *Fabius* was
surprised at what he saw, but suspecting it to be some
stratagem of the enemy, would not stir from his camp,
lest he should be entrapp'd, or, contrary to his intenti-
on, be forc'd to hazard a general action. *Hannibal*
finding the pass open, marched safely through it with
his army and baggage: but that his light arm'd foot
might not be overpowered by the *Romans* on the emi-
nence, he, as soon as it was day, sent his *Spaniards*
to their assistance, who brought off the detachment,
with the slaughter of a thousand of the enemy. The
Carthaginian continued his march to the neighbourhood
of *Alifæ*, a city on the confines of *Samnum* and *Cam-*
pania.

Fabius, though rallied by his soldiers for being thus *Liv. B.*
over-reached, kept steady to his first resolution; he ^{22. c. 18.}
marched directly after *Hannibal*, but encamped on the
eminences near him. The latter having again pillaged
Samnum and the country of the *Peligni*, returned to
Apulia, where he took *Geronium*, the houses of which
he turned into granaries, and pitched his camp under
the walls. From thence he sent out two thirds of his
army to forage; part of the remainder he kept to guard
the camp, and the rest he disposed in different stations
to protect his foragers. As these were in great number,
and the country was very fertile, vast quantities of
provisions were brought in daily. The Pro-Dictator,
continuing to follow him, at length encamped in the
territory of *Larinum*, in the country of the *Frentani*.
From thence he was recalled to *Rome* to perform a so-
lemn sacrifice which required his presence. Both the
Senate and people were at this time much discontented
with him. For beside that his caution had not succeed-
ed to their wishes, *Hannibal*, by sparing the lands of

Fabius

Y. of R. *Fabius* in the general devastation, had rendered him suspected at *Rome* of holding a secret correspondence with the enemy. And as he had, without consulting the Senate, agreed upon an exchange of prisoners with *Hannibal*, and to purchase the redemption of 247 captives which the *Carthaginian* had more than he, the Senate refused him the money. *Fabius*, determined to keep his word and release his countrymen, directed his son to sell his lands, and paid the sum stipulated. And though most of the prisoners afterwards offered to reimburse him their respective ransoms, he would not consent to it.

Plut. life of Fab. *Fabius*, upon his leaving the army, had advised, entreated, and by his authority commanded his General of the horse not to fight during his absence. But *Minucius*, even while the Dictator was making his exhortation, had his thoughts wholly intent upon a battle, which he was determined to hazard the very first opportunity. After *Fabius*'s departure, he indeed stayed some time on the hills in hopes that *Hannibal* would give him an opportunity of coming to an engagement with him there. But in this being disappointed, he marched down into the plain, and drew nearer the enemy. The *Carthaginian*, upon his approach, leaving one third of his army to be employed in foraging, advanced with the rest from *Geronium* to meet him. Between the two camps there was a rising ground, that would be very commodious to which ever party should possess it. A detachment of 2000 *Carthaginian* light armed troops seized it by night. *Minucius* the next day drove them from it, and there entrenched his forces. As *Hannibal*'s principal affair at this time was to provide abundantly not only for his men but for his horses, that they might be in good condition for action the next summer; and as the *Romans* did not for several days stir from their camp, the *Carthaginian* detached great numbers of his soldiers to forage. *Minucius* laid hold of this advantage, and marched his legions to the very entrenchments of the enemy, at the same time sending out his horse and the light armed men, in parties, to attack

attack their foragers, who being dispersed over the Y. of R.
fields, and loaded with booty, could make no resis-^{536.}
tance. Nor had *Hannibal* sufficient strength within his
camp to venture out against those that assailed it. He
was reduced to keep upon the defensive, till *Asdrubal*,^{Bef. J. C. 216.} Con-
sulship.
informed of the danger by those who had escaped the
Roman horse, came from *Geronium* with 4000 men to
the assistance of his General. Upon the arrival of this
succour he sallied out, and *Minucius* retired. The
Carthaginian fearing least the *Romans* should attack his
camp at *Geronium*, and make themselves masters of the
plunder and provisions he had laid up in it, returned thither,
and, after this time became more cautious in sending out parties to forage.

When *Minucius*'s success was known at *Rome*, his friends took advantage of it to extol his bravery and abilities above those of *Fabius*. *M. Metilius*, a tribune ^{Liv. B. 22.} of the commons, assembled the people, and made a speech to them full of injurious reflections upon *Fabius*'s conduct, and concluded with a motion to give the General of the horse an equal authority with the Pro-Dictator. The latter thought it to no purpose to defend himself in the assemblies of the people, since he had not a favourable hearing even in the Senate. There he endeavoured to convince the *Fathers* that their losses had been owing to the rashness of their Generals; and he did not scruple to say, that if the Dictatorial power continued in him, he would call *Minucius* to an account for disobeying his orders; that he hoped soon to make it evident to all the world, that fortune was of small moment to an able General, and that reason and good conduct sufficed; adding, that for his part he thought it a greater glory for a General to preserve his army (if he did it without ignominy) than to destroy many thousands of enemies. Having assisted at the sacrifice to which he had been called, and presided at the election of a new Consul, (*M. Atilius Regulus*, who was substituted in the room of *Flamininus*) he left the city the night before the *comitia* were to determine in his affair, that he might not be present at the affront

Y. of R. which was going to be put upon him. Next day, when
536. the people were assembled, though they were prejudiced
Bef. J. C. against *Fabius* and zealous for *Minucius*, yet scarce
216. any one had courage enough to harangue them in fa-
235 Con- vor of *Metilius*'s proposal. *C. Terentius Varro* was the
fulship. only man that seconded the Tribune. *Varro* was the son of a butcher, had been a shopkeeper, then a pleader, undertaking poor mens causes right or wrong. By this practice, and by railing at the nobility, he had ingratiated himself with the multitude, and by their favour obtained successively the offices of *Quæstor*, *Ædile* and *Prætor*, and was now aiming at the *Consulship*. The motion in short was carried; *Minucius* was put upon an equal foot with *Fabius*, and the Senate confirmed the decree of the people.

Polyb. B. *Fabius* being arrived at the camp, it was agreed be-
3. c. 103. tween him and his late Master of the horse, now his colleague, to divide the army equally between them. The former kept on the hills, and *Minucius* posted himself at a distance of 1500 paces below him. Between the entrenchments of *Minucius* and those of the *Carthaginian* at *Geronium*, was an eminence from whence either camp might be annoyed. This post *Hannibal* resolved to seize, not doubting but *Minucius* would attempt to dispossess him; and he hoped to draw him into a snare. With this view he had over night chosen out 5000 foot and 500 horse, divided them into bodies of 200 and 300 men each, and hid them in several cavities at the foot of the hill. And least his ambush should happen to be discovered, he, to fix the attention of the *Romans* another way, sent a detachment to take possession of the eminence as soon as it was light. When *Minucius* perceived the *Carthaginians* upon the top of the hill, to dislodge them, he sent first his light armed foot, then his cavalry, and last of all (seeing that *Hannibal* sustained his own men by successive detachments) he followed in person with the legions. When the battle became general, the ambush, upon a signal given, rose on all sides. *Minucius*'s army was quickly routed, and would have been entirely de-
stroyed,

stroyed, but that *Fabius* had too much zeal for his country to let himself be swayed by private resentment. *We must make haste*, said he, to those that were about him, *to rescue Minucius, who is a valiant man, and a lover of his country. And if he has been too forward to engage the enemy, we will tell him of it at another time.* Instantly he gave orders to march to the relief of his colleague and his routed troops, who at his approach began to rally, and retire to him for protection. *Hannibal*, seeing a fresh army advancing against him in good order, was obliged to give over the pursuit and found a retreat. He is reported to have said to some of his friends while he was retiring, *Have not I often told you that that cloud which hovered upon the mountains, would one day break upon us in a storm?* The *Carthaginian*, after the battle, having possession of the eminence, fortified it, and placed a guard on it to secure his camp on that side.

Minucius and *Fabius* returned each to his entrenchments. The latter did not drop a word which favoured of contempt for his colleague, and *Minucius*, now convinced of his error, did justice both to *Fabius* and himself. Having assembled his troops, he ingenuously owned to them that he had learnt by experience, he was not fit to command, adding that both he and they for the future ought to obey the orders of *Fabius*. Then marching them to the Pro-Dictator's camp, he presented himself before him, made his acknowledgements, and resigned the dignity last conferred on him by the people. *Fabius* received him with great kindness, the soldiers embraced one another, and there was an universal joy. The Pro-Dictatorship being almost expired, *Fabius* sent for the Consuls *Servilius* and *Atilius* to take upon them the command of the army.

Servilius, with a fleet of a 120 ships, had made an expedition into *Africa*, where, as he was ravaging the coast, he fell into an ambuscade, and was forced to retire to his fleet with the loss of a thousand of his men. Weighing anchor in all haste he sailed to *Lilybæum* in

V. of R. Sicily, and from thence, after delivering up the fleet to
 536. the Praetor *Otacilius*, was returned to Italy.
 Ref. J. C.

216. The Consuls following the advice and example of
 235 Con. *Fabius*, no action of moment happened between the
 fulship. two armies, though *Hannibal* still continued at *Geronium*,
 Polyb. B. 3. and the Romans held their camp so near him as to watch
 c. 106. all his motions.

Liv. B. 22. THE SAME YEAR, while the war was thus carried on
 c. 20. in *Ita'y*, *Cn. Scipio* had great success, both by sea and
 land, against the *Carthaginians* in *Spain*². Ambassadors
 came to him from all the nations between the *Iberus*
 and the *Pyrenees*, and a hundred and twenty cities sur-

² The Romans at first divided this country into *Hither Spain* and *Further Spain*. *Augustus Cæsar* afterwards divided *Further Spain* into two provinces, *Bætica* and *Lusitania*, and gave the name of *Tarragonia* to *Hither Spain*.

* Guadal- * *Bætica*, so called from the river * *Bætis*, which runs through the
 quiver. middle of it, was the most southern province, and comprehended the present kingdom of *Granada*, *Andalusia*, part of *New Castile*, and *Estramadura*. *Cadiz*, called by the ancients *Gades* and *Gadira*, is a town situated in a small island of the same name, on the western coast of *Andalusia*, about nine leagues from *Gibraltar*. It is said that *Hercules* having extended his conquests to the ocean, and imagining he was come to the extremity of the world, raised two pillars near *Gades*, as monuments of his victories. Geographers are not agreed about the place where these pillars were erected. *Bætica* was the most fruitful, the wealthiest and the most populous part of *Spain*. It contained two hundred cities, the chief of which stood on the *Bætis*, *Casculo* towards the source of that river, *Corduba* (the native place of *Lucan* and the two *Seneca's*) lower down, and * *Hispalis* nearest the sea. Its chief inhabitants were the *Turdetani*.

Strabo I. 3. p. 139. *Lusitania* was bounded on the west by the ocean, on the north by
 3. p. 171. the river *Durius*, and on the south by the river *Anas*. Between these two rivers runs the *Tagus*. *Lusitania* included what is now called *Portugal*, together with part of *Old and New Castile*.

* Seville. * *Tarragonia* comprehended the rest of *Spain*, that is to say, the Kingdoms of *Murcia* and *Valencia*, *Catalonia*, *Arragon*, *Navarre*, *Biscay*, the *Asturias*, *Gallicia*, the kingdom of *Leon*, and the greatest part of the two *Castiles*. *Tarraco* + a city on the sea coast, not far from the *Iberus*, gave name to the province. Pretty near this town lay *Barcino*, which from its name is thought to have been built by *Amilcar Barca* the father of the great *Hannibal*. The chief nations of *Tarragonia* were the *Celtiberi* beyond the river *Iberus*, the *Cantabri*, where *Biscay* now lies, the *Carpetaxi*, whose capital was *Toledo*, and the *Overtani*, &c. *Rollin Hist. Anc.* Tom. I. p. 247.

rendered

rendered to him. To add to this good fortune, his Y. of R. allies, the *Celtiberians*, defeated *Asdrubal* in two bat-^{536.}
tles, killed 15000 of his men, and took 4000 prisoners. Bef. J. C.
This was the state of the *Roman* affairs in *Spain*, when ^{215.} Con-
P. Scipio, the brother of *Cneius*, arrived there with the fulship.
character of Pro-Consul. The view of the Senate in
carrying on the war with vigour in this country, was
to divide the forces of *Carthage*, who would be more
jealous of her conquests in *Spain* than of those in *Italy*,
and by sending powerful succours to *Asdrubal*, would
be less in a condition to supply his brother *Hannibal*. *Liv. B. 22.*
P. Scipio brought with him thirty ships of war, 8000 c. 22.
Roman soldiers, and a great quantity of arms and
provisions.

Asdrubal being employed in the *Celtiberian* war, the
two brothers with joint forces passed the *Iberus*, and
advanced to *Saguntum* without seeing an enemy. This *Polyb. B.*
city *Hannibal* had rebuilt, placed a garrison in it, and ^{3. c. 98.}
assigned it for the residence of all the young noblemen,
whom he had obliged their parents to put into his hands
as pledges of their fidelity. There was then at *Saguntum* a *Spaniard* named *Abelox*, of a good family,
and considerable interest in his country, and hitherto
looked upon as firmly attached to the *Carthaginians*.
This man seeing their affairs declining in *Spain*, while
the *Romans* were daily gaining ground, began to think
of going over to the prevailing party. But considering
at the same time that a deserter, how well born soever,
makes but an indifferent figure, unless he can gain
himself credit, by some important services to his new
friends, formed a scheme to put the young hostages
into the hands of the *Romans*. At this time *Bostrar*
commanded the *Carthaginians* in those parts, having
been sent by *Asdrubal* to hinder the *Scipios* from passing
the *Iberus*; but not daring to wait for them, he had
retired to *Saguntum*, and encamped under its walls.
Bostrar was a good natured easy man, and placed great
confidence in *Abelox*, which the latter abusing, insinuated
to him, that the *Romans* having now passed the *Iberus*, it would be no longer possible for the *Carthaginians*

Y. of R. ans to keep *Spain* in obedience by fear; that *Saguntum*
 536. being threatened with a siege, he had an opportunity
 Bef. J. C. of attaching all the *Spaniards* to the interest of his
 216. 235 Con-republic, by restoring the hostages to their parents,
 fulship. who would think themselves under a perpetual obliga-
 tion to him for so early providing for the safety of their
 children, and that if the *Romans* should by force or
 artifice get them into their hands, they would certainly
 act the part which he advised him to act, and by that
 means bring over many nations to their party. *Abelox*
 added, that if he was sent to conduct the hostages to
 their respective countries, he did not doubt but he
 should be able to represent the obligation in such a light
 to the *Spaniards*, as that they should continue firm to
 the interest of a Republic, who had given so eminent
 an example of her regard for her allies. The easy
Carthaginian, deceived by an appearance of friendship,
 gave his consent to the proposal. *Abelox* hereupon stole
 away in the night to the *Roman* camp, acquainted the
 Pro-Consul with what he had done; and it was agreed
 between them that a detachment of *Romans* should
 lye in ambush the night following, and intercept the
 youths with their leader. The project was executed
Liv. B. 22. with success; and *Scipio*, by sending back the hostages
c. 33. to their relations, gained to himself a considerable interest
 in the country.

To return to *Italy*: The Senate at *Rome* was atten-
 tive to every thing that concerned the interest of the
 Republic. To maintain her dignity, and preserve to
 her the respect of foreign nations, they sent to *Pineus*
Polyb. B. the *Illyrian* king for the annual tribute he had engaged
5.c. 101. to pay, and to *Philip* of *Macedon* to demand the trea-
Liv. B. cherous *Demetrius*, who had sheltered himself in his
22. c. 32. dominions and was exciting him to take advantage of
 the misfortunes of *Rome*, and make a descent upon
Italy; at the same time she refused to accept a present of
 forty vases of gold from the city of *Naples*, that the
 world might see her finances were not exhausted.

C H A P. XXI. THIRD YEAR of the War.

BATTLE of CANNÆ.

THE time for a new election of Consuls drawing Y. of R. on, and the present Consuls *Servilius* and *Atilius* 536. not thinking it safe to leave the army, one of them, at the desire of the Senate, nominated a Dictator to 216. hold the *comitia*. *L. Veturius Philo* was the person 235. pitched upon; but as he seems to have been attached *Livy*, B. to the interests of the people, it was probably for this 22. c. 34. reason that the Senators made the Augurs find some defect, with regard to religion, in his nomination. After fourteen days exercise of his office he was forced to abdicate; an interregnum ensued. *P. Cornelius Afrina*, one of the *interreges*, convened the *centuries*; and then amongst the candidates for the consulship appeared *C. Terentius Varro*, who had scarce any thing to recommend him but his hatred of the nobility, and the zeal he had lately shewn for advancing *Minucius* the General of the horse to an equal authority with the Pro-Dictator *Fabius*. The *Patricians*, as the most effectual way to disappoint the hopes of *Varro*, set up against him competitors of such known merit, both out of their own body, and from among the *Plebeans*, as must naturally prepossess the people in their favour. But *Varro* happen'd to have among the tribunes of the commons a relation named *Q. Bebius Herennius*. This man, in a speech to the people, inveighed bitterly against the nobility. He asserted that it was the *Patricians* who had brought *Hannibal* into *Italy*; that an end might have been put to the war had they not fraudulently protracted it; and that the *Carthaginian* would never be conquered till a true *Plebian*, not such a one as was only *Plebian* by extraction, and being dignified and ranked among the nobility, had imbibed the patrician spirit, but a new man, not infected with their maxims, was at the head of the *Roman* armies. The people full of these impressions declared *Terentius Varro*

Y. of R. Consul, and would name no other that day, that *Varro*
 537 *Bef J. C.* might preside in the *comitia* for choosing his colleague.
 215. 236 *Con-* The nobility, vexed at their disappointment, prevailed
 fulship. See p. 260. with great difficulty upon *L. Aemilius Paullus*, an enemy to the *Plebeians* (on account of the affront they had put upon him after his victories in *Illyricum*) to offer himself as a candidate; and the other competitors yielding to him, he was chosen Consul in the next assembly. The other offices were bestowed with great judgement. *Servilius* and *Atilius* were directed to remain in quality of Pro-Consuls, at the head of the same armies they at present commanded. *P. Scipio* was continued Pro Consul in *Spain*, *M. Cl. Marcellus* was appointed *Prætor* in *Sicily*, and *L. Posthumius Albinus* in *Cis-Alpine Gaul*. All these, except *Terentius Varro*, had borne the same offices before; so careful were the Romans to have men of experience to conduct their affairs at so critical a time.

The Senate also in the present exigence augmented the army to eight legions (each consisting of 5000 foot and 3000 horse) without reckoning the allies.

B. 3. c. 107. The usual practice (says *Polybius*) is to raise yearly but four legions, each of 4000 foot and 200 horse; and it is only in the most important conjunctures that these numbers are increased to 5000 and 300. The *Infantry* furnished by the allies is only equal to that of the legions, but the *cavalry* * twice the number of the *Roman* horse. Generally speaking each Consul has two legions and one half of the auxiliary forces, and com-

* We read *thrice* in *Polybius*, doubtless through a mistake of the copyist. *Livy* says *twice*, and this must be the truth, otherwise the cavalry of the *Roman* army at the battle of *Canne* (which is going to be related) would have amounted to 9600. and *Polybius* himself says they were little more than 6000. Here again there must be some mistake, it should be *little more than* 7000: for reckoning 300 horse to each of the eight legions, and supposing the allies to have furnish'd double the number that the *Romans* did, the whole amount will be 7200. And so *Livy*, who frequently copies *Polybius*, seems to have understood him in this place. Some historians, says he, write, that when the battle of *Canne* was fought, the *Romans* were 87200 strong (i. e. 80000 foot and 7200 horse.) B. 22. c. 36.

mands his army separately, against a different enemy. Y. of R.
It rarely happens that the four legions, with a proporti-⁵³⁷
onable number of auxiliaries, are employed in the same
expedition. But in *this* the Romans employed not only ^{215.} Con-
four but eight legions, so great was their apprehension fulship.
of the impending danger.

Though the Republic would not receive any presents *Liv. B.*
from her dependents in *Italy*, she readily accepted at ^{22. c. 37.}
this time a very rich one from King *Hiero*, a statue of
Victory, of massy gold, and of great weight, 75000
bushels of wheat, 50000 bushels of barley, and a 1000
dartmen and slingers to oppose the *Baleares* and *Numi-*
dians. The King's present was accompanied with an
exhortation to the Senate to employ a fleet and some
land forces to make a descent upon *Africa*. The
Conscript Fathers returned him a grateful answer, and
in pursuance of his advice ordered a reinforcement of
twenty five quinqueremes to *T. Otacilius* the Pro-*Praetor*
in *Sicily*, (for *Marcellus* was not yet arrived there) giv-
ing him permission to carry the war into *Africa* if he
thought proper. Before the Consuls took the field,
the soldiers (which had never been done before) were
required to take an oath to this effect, that they would
assemble at the command of the Consuls, and not de-
part afterwards without leave; and whereas they had
been accustomed *voluntarily* to swear that they would
not forsake their ensigns through fear, nor go out of
their ranks unless to take up a weapon, or to smite an
enemy, or to save the life of a citizen, this oath also was
now enjoined them by authority.

While these preparations were making at *Rome*, the *Polyb. B.*
army under the Pro-Consuls *Servilius* and *Atilius* conti-^{3. c. 106.}
nued to observe the motions of *Hannibal*. As those
Generals had received orders from the Senate not to
venture a battle, but only to train and discipline their
men, and harass the enemy by frequent skirmishes, all
the spring passed, as the winter had done, without any
considerable action on either side.

But the time of harvest being come, *Hannibal* de-
camped from *Geronium*, and, to drive the enemy to the
necessity

Y. of R. necessity of fighting, seized upon the castle of *Cannæ*
537. where the *Romans* had lodged the ammunition and
Bef. J. C. provisions they had brought from *Canusium*. The town
215. of *Cannæ* had been destroyed the last year ; the castle
236. Con- was left standing, and *Hannibal*, by possessing himself
fuslship. of it, threw the *Roman* army into great perplexity : for
beside being master of those provisions, he was now in
a post which by its situation commanded all the adjacent
country. The Pro-Consuls dispatched messenger after
messenger to ask instructions from the Senate, concerning
the measures they should take. In their letters they
represented that the country all around was ruined,
that it was impossible to advance near the enemy with-
out being obliged to fight ; and that all the allies, at-
tentive to the uncertain state of things, were in sus-
pense waiting the event. The Senate judged it ex-
pedient to come to a decisive action with the enemy, but
wrote to *Servilius* and *Atilius* to defer it, till the Consuls
(whom they now sent from *Rome*) were arrived in the
camp. Great dependance had the *Fathers* on the vir-
tue and abilities of *Æmilius* ; and indeed his known
prudence, and the eminent services he had done his
country some years before in the *Illyrian* war, justified
the confidence they reposed in him. At his departure
from *Rome*, when they had represented to him the
great importance of the present occasion, they urged
him to exert himself, as a true citizen mindful of the
majesty of the *Roman* name. Nor was *Æmilius* want-
ing either of a just sense of his country's danger,
or of the warmest zeal for it's preservation : so that
when he was arrived at the camp, and had assembled
the soldiers to impart to them the pleasure of the Se-
nate, he made use of all the arguments he could think
of to restore their courage, much abated by so many
preceding disasters. He told them that several good
reasons might be assigned for the defeat of the former
armies ; but that no excuse could be found if *this*
should fail of victory. That the soldiers of those ar-
mies were new raised men without discipline or experi-
ence, and entirely unacquainted with the sort of ene-
my

my they had to deal with : that those who fought at Y. of R.
the *Trebia* were not recovered from the fatigue of their
voyage from *Sicily* when they were led to battle : that
at the lake *Thrasymenus*, the *Romans*, so far from seeing
the enemy before the battle, did not even see them ^{537.}
^{Bef. J. C.} ^{215.} ^{236.} ^{Con-}
during the conflict . that in none of the preceding en-
gagements had there been two Consuls with two con-
sular armies ; but that now all circumstances were
changed : ‘ By frequent skirmishes with the enemy you
‘ have learn’d their manner of fighting. You have
‘ not only both the Consuls of the present year to con-
‘ duct you, but both the Consuls of the last year,
‘ who have consented to continue with us and share
‘ the fortune of the day. With equal numbers you
‘ have seldom failed of beating the enemy in small en-
‘ gagements : it would be strange therefore, nay, I
‘ think it impossible, that now, when you are double
‘ their number, you should be vanquished by them in a
‘ general action. But what need of further exhortation ?
‘ The fate of *Rome*, the preservation of whatever is
‘ dear to you, depends at this time upon your courage
‘ and resolution.’

The next ⁵ day the Consuls put their army in march ^{Polyb. B.}
towards the place where the *Carthaginians* were posted, ^{3. c. 100.}
and the day following pitched their camp within six
miles of them. As it was a smooth plain, and the
Carthaginian cavalry were far superior to the *Roman*,
Ælius judged it not proper to come to a battle in

⁵ *Livy* differs from *Polybius* with regard to the particulars that happened before the battle *Cannaæ*. The *Latin* historian tells us that *Hannibal* had not yet removed from *Geronium* when the Consuls began their march from *Rome* ; that he had then scarce ten days provi-
vions in his camp, that the *Spaniards* were ready to desert him, and
that he himself had thoughts of running away into *Gaul* with his ca-
valry, and leaving his infantry to shift for themselves. He adds se-
veral other circumstances as little worth relating as these. And in-
deed, the accounts that he, *Appian*, and the later writers give of
these affairs, are intermixt with so many things evidently fabulous,
and often inconsistent with one another, that in the text *Polybius* has
been chiefly followed, who wrote the nearest to the times he speaks
of, was himself a soldier, and whose history is the most consistent and
the most judicious.

that

Y. of R. that situation. He was for drawing the enemy, if pos-
 sible, to some ground where horse would have little op-
 portunity to act. But the next day, it being *Varro's*
 215. Con- turn to command, he, in spite of all that his colleague
 236 Sulship. could say to dissuade him from it, decamped and drew
 nearer the enemy. *Hannibal* with his cavalry and light
 arm'd foot advanced to meet him, fell furiously upon
 the *Romans* in their march, and put them into great
 disorder. *Varro*, when he had sustained this first shock
 by means of some of the heavy armed foot, commanded
 his horse and dartmen to charge, and he had the pru-
 dence to mingle with these some of his legionaries ;
 this gave him the advantage in the combat, to which
 the night at length put an end.

The day following, *Æmilius*, who was against fighting, and yet could not safely retreat, encamped two thirds of his army along the *Aufidus* ^t, which lay to their left. The other third he led over the river, and made them intrench themselves at the distance of about 1300 paces eastward from his greater camp, and at somewhat more than that distance from the camp of the enemy, which lay to the south. By this disposition he could protect his own foragers and distress those of the *Carthaginian*.

Hannibal foreseeing that these movements of the *Romans* would infallibly bring on a general action, thought it adviseable before he came to that hazard, to animate his soldiers for the occasion ; lest their late repulse should have left some impression of fear upon their minds. Having called them together, he bid them cast their eyes over the country all around, and then tell him, ' Whether, being superior as they were to the enemy in horse, they could possibly, had the Gods consulted their wishes, have desired any thing more to their advantage than to come to a decisive battle on such a spot.' They all agreed that they could not have chosen better. He added, ' Thank the

^t The *Aufidus* runs through the *Apennines* into the *Adriatic*, and is the only river in *Italy* which takes that course.

‘ Gods

‘ Gods then who have brought your enemies hither, Y. of R.
‘ that you may triumph over them ; and remember 537.
‘ also your obligation to me for having reduced the Bel. J. C.
‘ Romans to the necessity of fighting ; for, advantageous 215. Con-
‘ as the ground is to us, here fight they must, there is fulship.
‘ no avoiding it. He concluded with reminding them
of their former exploits, and with assuring them that
one victory more would give a period to all their la-
bours, and put them in possession of all their hopes,
the wealth of *Rome*, and the dominion of *Italy*.

The *Carthaginian* after this intrenched his forces on the west side of the *Aufidus*, where lay the greater camp of the *Romans*, and the next day but one drew out his army and presented battle. *Æmilius* not liking the ground, and being persuaded that want of provisions would very soon oblige *Hannibal* to quit his post, declined the challenge, bot took great care to have his two camps well fortified and guarded. *Hannibal* after waiting a while in the field, returned to his intrenchments, and detached some of his *Numidians* to pass the *Aufidus*, and fall upon certain parties that from the *Roman* lesser camp were coming to the river for water. The *Numidians* having easily put these to flight, advanced so far as to brave the *Romans* in their very camp ; an insult so offensive to the soldiers in general as well as to *Varro*, that had it not been *Æmilius*'s turn to command, those of the greater camp would have instantly crossed the river to join their fellows, and offer battle to the enemy. ‘ Their impatience to fight, says *Polybius*, was extreme ; for when men have once resolved upon a difficult and dangerous enterprize, no time seems so tedious as the space between the determination and the execution.’

The same author tells us, that when the news came to *Rome* of the armies being near each other, and of their daily skirmishing and picqueering, the people, remembering their former defeats, were universally in the utmost anxiety and fear, well foreseeing the fatal consequences of a new overthrow ; that they talked of nothing but oracles, extraordinray appearances, prodigies

Y. of R. gies seen both in temples and in private houses; and
 537. Bef. J. C. that their whole time was spent in vows and supplications: he adds, ‘ for in all public calamities and dan-
 215. 236 Con- gers the *Romans* are extremely careful to pacify the
 sulship. ‘ anger of the Gods; nor of the many religious cere-
 monies prescribed for such occasions, is there one, of
 which, how frivolous and impertinent soever it may
 appear, they think the practice unbecoming.’

The bat-
tle of
Cannæ.

Polyb. B. 3.
c. 113.

* See
Vol. II.
B. 3. c.
10. §. 6.

At sun-rise in the morning after the insult by the *Numidians*, *Varro*, having the command, led his troops of the greater camp over the *Aufidus*, and joining them to those of the lesser, drew them up in the plain after the accustomed manner *, excepting that, in all the three lines, the battalions stood closer, and those in the first line were deeper than usual. The *Roman* knights, commanded by *Æmilius*, formed the right wing close to the river; the cavalry of the allies, under *Serentius Varro*, made the left. The Pro-Consuls *Servilius* and *Atilius* led the main body consisting of 70000 foot; for *Varro* had left 10000 men in the greater camp with orders to attack that of *Hannibal* when the armies should be engaged.

The *Carthaginian* ^u no sooner perceived the *Romans* in motion, but he sent over the *Aufidus* his slingers and the other light armed foot. The rest of the army followed, passing the river at two different places. He drew up his forces in one front. To face the *Roman* knights he posted his *Spanish* and *Gallic* cavalry in his

^u Plutarch reports that *Varro*'s confidence and his numerous army alarmed the *Carthaginians*; that *Hannibal* with a small company went out to take a view of the *Romans*, and that one of his followers, called *Gisco*, saying to him, *that the number of the enemy was very astonishing*: *Hannibal* with a serious countenance answered, *There is something yet more astonishing which you take no notice of. That in all that multitude there is not one man whose name is Gilco*. This jest made all the company laugh, who telling it to every one they met in their return, the laughter was continued till they reached the camp. The army seeing *Hannibal* and his Attendants come back laughing, imagined that without doubt this mirth proceeded from the good posture of their affairs, and their contempt of the enemy; which did not a little raise the spirits of the soldiers.

left

left wing ; next these were placed one half of his *African* Y. of R. ^{537.} infantry, then the *Spanish* and *Gallic* foot, then the other half of his *Africans* ; and the *Numidian* horse ^{Bef. J. C.} ^{215.} made his right wing. ^{236 Con-}
^{fulship.}

The *Africans* were armed after the *Roman* manner, out of the spoils taken from the enemy in former battles. The *Gauls*, naked from the waist upward, and the *Spaniards*, clothed in linen jackets trimmed with purple, were armed each after the manner of their country. They had shields alike ; but the *Gauls* used long broad swords fit only for cutting strokes, and at a certain distance ; the *Spaniards* short and well pointed blades proper both for striking and thrusting. The cohorts of these two nations being ranged alternately, this medley of troops of such different appearances, is said to have been terrible to behold. Strong of body, and furious in charging were the *Gauls*, but accustomed to spend their violence at the first brunt ; the *Spaniards* less eager and more wary, were neither ashamed to give ground when over-matched, nor afraid to return and rehew the fight whenever it was practicable. As the impetuosity of the one, and the patience of the other served mutually to reduce each of them to a good and firm temper, so the place which they held in this battle added confidence to them both : for they saw themselves well and strongly flanked by the *Africans*, whose name was grown terrible in *Spain* by their conquests, and in *Gaul* by this their present war. *Asdrubal* commanded the cavalry of the left wing, *Hanno* ^{** Livy} the right ; and *Hannibal* with his brother *Mago* took ^{says Ma-} *barbal.* the conduct of the main body ; this amounted to about 40000 foot ; the horse were 10000. The armies were neither of them incommoded by the rising sun, the *Romans* facing to the south, their enemies to the north.

The action began with the skirmishing of the velites or light armed troops, with little advantage to either side. During this skirmish the *Roman* knights came to an engagement with the *Spanish* and *Gallic* cavalry. Being shut in by the river on one side, and by their own infantry

Y. of R. infantry on the other, they could practise none of the
 537. evolutions and returns commonly used in fight by the
 Bef. J. C. horse in those days. There was no way but to bear
 215. forward in a right line ; and both parties rushing vi-
 236. Con- lently on, the men came at length to grapple with one
 another, and many of them, their horses running from
 under them, fell to the ground, whence starting up a-
 gain they fought on foot. In conclusion, the *Roman*
 cavalry were overborne and forced to recoil. This the
 Sir W. R. Consul *Aemilius* could by no means remedy, for *Aesdrubal* with his boisterous *Gauls* and *Spaniards* was not to be resisted by the *Roman* knights, unequal both in number and horsemanship. The greater part of them, after they had defended themselves with the utmost bravery were slain upon the spot, and most of the remainder, in their flight along the river ; for *Aesdrubal* gave no quarter.

Before this rout was quite finished, the heavy armed infantry on both sides joined battle. *Hannibal*, in advancing against the enemy had caused his *Gauls* and *Spaniards*, who held the middle of his line (and probably * made nine tenths of it) to march, some faster some slower, so as by degrees to form the figure of a crescent, the convex side towards the *Romans*, and the extreme points touching the *Africans* to the right and left. The middle or most prominent part of the curve being the thickest * (as its figure of a crescent implies) and the best strengthened against all impression, sustained the shock of the enemy for some time, with great bravery and steadiness, till the *Roman* center, reinforced by some battalions from the wings, compelled, by its

* The reason for this opinion will be given hereafter.

* *Polybius* (B. 3 c. 115) tells us that the *Gauls* were thinly ranged, and therefore easily broken. But if this be meant of the whole crescent, how will it accord with the stout fight which he himself says the *Gauls* maintained, or with the necessity which the *Roman* center, already deep, was under of being strengthened by draughts from the wings, in order to break that crescent. I imagine therefore, that *Polybius* speaks here of the *sides* only of the crescent, the parts towards the horns, and not of the middle part, which though thick and strong, was already broken by the superior weight of the *Roman* center.

very weight, the curve to yield ; but by the artful ma-^{Y. of R.} nagement of *Hannibal*, this curve so yielded and bent ^{537.} inward as at length to form a new curve, the *concave* ^{Bef. J. C.} side towards the enemy. The *Roman* legions following ²³⁶ Con- their supposed victory, and pressing still forward against fulship. the *Gauls* and *Spaniards*, who continued retiring before them, came insensibly between the two bodies of *Afri-* can infantry, which had not yet moved from their posts, and the depth ^y of whose files was, perhaps, at first concealed by the sides of the concave into which the *Romans* entered, and was but gradually discovered in proportion as the *Gauls* and *Spaniards* recoiled. The two bodies of *Africans*, as the conjuncture itself dictated, facing one to the right, the other to the left, attacked the *Romans* in flank, so that these could fight no longer in the order ^z of a *phalanx* (which form they had taken during the conflict) but were obliged to divide themselves into platoons or small bodies, to make head against those unexpected enemies.

The Consul *Æmilius*, after the defeat of his cavalry, seeing that all depended upon the foot, had by this

^y Neither *Livy* nor *Polybius* say any thing of the proportion which the number of the *Gauls* and *Spaniards* bore to that of the *Africans*; nor whether the *African* battalions were longer in rank or in file. Nor do they give us any light concerning those wonderful movements, by which *Hannibal* could, without confusion, form his center from a strait line into a crescent, the convex to the enemy; and afterwards, without confusion, invert its figure.

^z Chevalier *Folard* (tom. 4. p. 377.) from this expression of *Polybius*, triumphantly concludes that the *Romans* were originally drawn up by *Varro* in a *phalange coupée*, that is, says the Chevalier, in columns with small intervals between them. The inference is not well deduced. For, supposing the *Romans* to have been ranged at first in three lines as usual, yet *Polybius* might well speak of them as in the order of a phalanx at this time. It was the constant practice for all the three lines to form themselves into one phalanx, whenever it happened that neither the first alone, nor the first and second united could make any impression on the enemy. And that this was the present case with the center of the *Roman* army is plain from the necessity the Generals were under of bringing some battalions from the wings to strengthen it. If the *Hastati*, *Principes* and *Triarii* of the center, united in one phalanx, had not failed in the attempt to break *Hannibal's* crescent, what occasion could there be of adding strength to them from the wings?

Y. of R. time put himself among the legionaries, animating
 them both by words and example. *Hannibal* acted
 the like part among the *Gauls* and *Spaniards*, the con-
 duct of whom he had taken upon himself from the be-
 ginning.
 Bef. J. C. 537. 215. Con. 236.

Hitherto there had nothing of moment happened between the ^a *Numidian* horse and the cavalry of the *Roman* allies, commanded by *Varro*; for the former would neither give nor sustain any charge: yet by making frequent offers, they kept their enemies so employed as to hinder them from assisting the legions. But now the last and fatal blow, which completed the destruction of the *Roman* army, was given by the same hand that gave the first. For *Asdrubal*, having cut in pieces almost all the horse of the *Roman* right wing, hastened to the assistance of the *Numidians*. The cavalry of the *Roman* left wing, perceiving his approach, did not wait to be attacked. They immediately fled. Hereupon *Asdrubal* ordering the light *Numidians*, as fittest for that service, to pursue them, turned with his *Spanish* and *Gallic* horse upon the rear of the *Roman* main body, which by this means was entirely surrounded. Then was the slaughter dreadful, and then fell the Consul ^b

Æmilius

^a According to *Livy*, when the two armies were just ready to join battle, 500 of these *Numidians* came galloping away from their fellows, with their shields cast behind their backs (as was the manner of those that yielded) and throwing down their arms, surrendered themselves. *Varro* had not leisure to examine them, but thinking them really disarmed, ordered them behind the lines. In the heat of the battle, these pretended deserters, having short sword's under their jackets, flew upon the hindmost of the *Romans*, while all eyes and thoughts were bent another way, so that they did great mischief, and caused yet a greater terror. *Polybius* mentions nothing of this, which he would hardly have omitted had there been any foundation for it. Nor does he say any thing of a certain wind called *Vulturinus*, which, according to the *Latin* historian, proved very pernicious to the *Romans*, by blowing dust in their eyes.

^b *Livy* tells us that *Æmilius* had been wounded in the action between the cavalry, yet being assisted by those of the *Roman* knights who had escaped from *Asdrubal*, he made head against *Hannibal*, and restored the fight in several places. At length, unable through weakness to manage his horse, he was obliged to dismount; his attendants did

Æmilius quite covered with wounds, nobly discharging Y. of R. in this conclusion of his life, as in all the former parts 537. of it, the duties of a good citizen. The *Romans*, en- Bef. J. C. compassed on all sides, faced every way and held out 215. 236 Con- for some time: but the outermost ranks of their orb fulship. being still mowed down, they were gradually forced into a narrow compass, and becoming at length a mere throng, unable to wield their arms, were all put to the sword.

During

did the like, and it being told *Hannibal* that the Consul had ordered his cavalry to quit their horses, he is reported to have said jestingly, *I had rather be bad delivered them to me bound.* *Livy* adds, what is hard to be conceived, that some of the *Roman* knights, when they saw the battle irrecoverably lost, remounted their horses and escaped. One of them, *Cn. Lentulus*, a legionary tribune galloping along, found the Consul covered with blood, and sitting upon a stone. *Lentulus* entreated him to rise and save himself, offering him his horse; but *Æmilius* refused it, exhorting the tribune to shift for himself, and not to lose time, adding that it was not his purpose to be brought again into judgment by the people; be an accuser of his colleague, or be himself charged with that day's loss. He further desired *Lentulus* to give the Senate notice to fortify *Rome*, and to tell *Fabius* that he had been mindful of his counsel to the last. The Consul had no sooner uttered these words, but first a multitude of his own men in the rout, and then the enemy in the pursuit came upon him; the latter, not knowing who he was, dispatched him with their darts, *Lentulus* escaped by the swiftness of his horse.

* THE ACCOUNTS transmitted to us by *Polybius* and *Livy* of the battle of *Cannæ*, are not sufficiently full and clear to convey to those who read them at this distance of time, distinct and satisfactory Ideas of what passed in that memorable day; but have left much room for conjecture.

In the plans that are commonly given by the moderns of this battle, the *infantry* of the two armies are equal in front. *Hannibal's center* which he formed into a crescent, the *convex* side towards the enemy, makes but one third of his line of foot. How then came it to pass, that this crescent, when it yielded and retreated, so as gradually to invert its figure, and present a *concave* to the enemy, drew after it and within it, more of the *Roman* infantry than had stood opposite to it, when the armies first faced each other? This may be answered from *Polybius*, who tells us, that during the conflict between the centers of the two armies, the *Romans*, by draughts from their wings, thickened or deepened their center, which therefore broke, by its very weight, the *Carthaginian* center or crescent, consisting of the *Gauls* and *Spaniards*. He adds, that the *Romans* pressing unwarily

Y. of R. During this slaughter of the *Roman* foot, the *Numidians* were pursuing *Terentius* and the horse of the left wing.
 Bef. *J. C.* ^{537.}

^{215.}
²³⁶ *Con-*

fulship. rily after those *Gauls* and *Spaniards*, came at length between the two bodies of African *infantry*; which by a conversion, one to the right, the other to the left, instantly pressed the *Romans* on their flanks; and that *Asdrubal* soon after came thundering upon their backs with his victorious cavalry.

All this is conceivable and credible: and we here see how not only the cohorts that were originally in the *Roman* center, but those which were drawn from the wings to deepen it, became totally encompassed by the enemy; by the *Gauls* and *Spaniards* in front, by the *Africans* in flank, and by *Asdrubal* in the rear.

But the great difficulty still remains: for it is generally agreed (and indeed *Polybius's* words seem to import) that the *whole*, or almost the *whole* of the *Roman* infantry, in one deep phalanx, pressed after the retiring *Gauls* and *Spaniards*, and so became at length wedged between the two bodies of *Africans*. Now how could this happen, if the space between those two bodies was but one third of *Hannibal's* line of foot? For is it credible, that the *Roman* Generals could be so infatuated as, in the heat of the battle, to contract the front of their army to one third of its first extent, draw ALL the battalions of the wings to the center, and leave no troops to oppose the two wings (two thirds) of *Hannibal's* line, that were standing before them in battle array? And if those Generals, to deepen their center, only thinned their wings (as *Chevalier Folard* supposes) what advantage could *Hannibal* hope from drawing the *Roman* center within his two wings? Since these wings, while employed in attacking the flanks of that center, would themselves be exposed to be attacked both in flank and rear by the remainder of the *Roman* wings; which, if we suppose them diminished by one half, were still equal in number of men to the *Carthaginian* wings.

It would seem therefore that the plans which represent *Hannibal's* crescent, as making but one third of his line, must be extremely faulty.

Chevalier Folard, though he speaks as if he were a perfect master of the subject, is as unsatisfactory in his account of the battle as any writer before him. His plan of it (tom. 4. p. 391.) represents *Hannibal's* curve, as but one third of his line of foot: but being aware of the small number of *Africans* in the *Carthaginian* army, much too small to make the other two thirds of the line (as they do in the *Jesuits* plan) he represents the curve as consisting of only a part of the *Gauls* and *Spaniards*; the remainder of which troops stand extended to the right and left from the horns of the crescent, and between it and the *Africans*, who make only the extremities of the line, or the outer parts of the wings.

wing. Of all the *Roman* cavalry seventy only escaped Y. of R. with the Consul to *Venusia*, and about three hundred

^{537.}
Bef. J. C.
more

^{215.}
236 Con-

The employment, which the Chevalier finds for these wings, is fulship. not to give upon the flanks of the *Romans* that were advanced within the hollow of the inverted curve, but to wheel, extend themselves, and attack both in flank and rear the *Roman* wings, which he supposes, to be still subsisting, though much weakened by the imprudence of their leaders.

This account of the action has not the least foundation in *Polybius*, who does not say, that the *Romans* of the center, by rashly pursuing the *Gauls* and *Spaniards* of *Hannibal's* crescent, came between other *Gauls* and *Spaniards* of his wings (as they must do according to the Chevalier's plan) but between the two bodies of *Africans*. The *Africans* are the only troops the historian speaks of as coming upon the flanks of the *Romans*. Nor does he say any thing of the *Africans* wheeling and extending themselves to attack the *Roman* wings in flank and rear, but that turning or inclining (*adversus*) one part of them to the shield, the other to the spear, i. e. one facing or turning to the right, the other to the left, they pressed upon the flanks of those *Romans* that were pursuing the *Gauls* and *Spaniards* of *Hannibal's* crescent or center.

The *Roman* wings, says the Chevalier, still subsisted, though much weakened by the draughts made from them. I know not how much the Chevalier would allow them to be weakened. But if we suppose them to be diminished by one half, they were still equal (as I said before) in number of men to the *Carthaginian* wings; and it is hardly credible that the *Roman* wings having at this time no enemies to contend with but the *Carthaginian* wings, should stand still while these were wheeling and extending themselves, to come upon their flank and rear; or that the *Carthaginians* should find their account in such an attempt.

I shall observe, by the way, that *Polybius* never speaks of any part of the *Roman* army being attacked in rear by the *Carthaginian* foot. This was left for *Afdrubal* and his horse, who could hardly have performed this part without riding over the *Africans*, had these inclosed the *Romans* behind them.

What seems to have driven the Chevalier into all these deviations from his author, is his fundamental error of forming *Hannibal's* crescent out of but one third of his line.

Sir *Walter Raleigh* has gone into the other extreme. To account for the whole Roman army's being inclosed by the enemy, he supposes that *Hannibal's* crescent was of such extent, as to make his whole front; that the *Romans* saw nothing before them but that crescent; that the *Africans* (deep in file) were hid behind it's two corners, and not discovered by the *Romans* till they were attacked by them. 'For it is agreed, says he, that the *Romans* were encompassed unawares, and that they behaved themselves as men who thought upon no

Y. of R. more into other neighbouring towns, two thousand were
 537. taken prisoners, the rest were slain.
 Bef. J. C.

The

215.
236 Consulship.

other work than what was found them by the *Gauls*. Neither is it credible, that they would have been so mad, as to run headlong with the whole bulk of their army into the throat of slaughter, had they seen those weapons bent against them at the first, which when they did see, they had little hope to escape. Much might be imputed to their heat of fight, and rashness of inferior captains; but since the Consul *Paulus*, a man so expert in war, being vanquished in horse, had put himself among the legions, it cannot be supposed that he and they did wilfully thus engage themselves.

That *Hannibal's* crescent of *Gauls* and *Spaniards* made the *whole* of his front, cannot be reconciled with *Polybius* or *Livy*, who expressly relate, that the *Carthaginian* drew up all his infantry in one line, of which the *Africans* made the two points or wings; and *Polybius* more than once in describing the action, calls this crescent *τὸ μέσον* the middle or center of *Hannibal's* battalia, and the *Africans* are spoke of not as hid, but as *appearing* to the enemy armed after the *Roman* manner.

But it is not credible, says Sir *Walter*, that the *Romans* would have been so mad as to run with the whole bulk of their army between the *Africans*, had they seen them at first.

I will not pretend to remove this difficulty. All I can aim at, is, in some measure to lessen it.

Hannibal's infantry is said to have consisted of about 40000 men, extended at first in one strait line. Of this line the *Gauls* and *Spaniards* (who afterwards formed themselves into a crescent) made the middle or center, and the *Africans* the wings. Now if that middle part, instead of being but *one third*, was at least *nine tenth's* of the line, as there is good reason to believe, it will much lessen our wonder, that the *Romans*, when they had forced that middle part to give ground, should imagine themselves secure of the victory, and unwarily engage themselves between the *Africans*, who made so narrow a front, as only a *tenth* of the *Carthaginian* line, that is to say, at each extremity a *twentieth*.

That the *Africans* made but a *very narrow front* in respect of the rest of the line, may, I think, be fairly collected from the *small number* to which we are obliged to reduce them, and from the *manner in which* it is reasonable to believe they were drawn up.

It cannot be supposed that the *Africans* amounted to above 8000 men. *Hannibal* brought into *Italy* but 20000 foot, of which number

*Seep. 299 12000 only were *Africans**, and the other 8000 *Spaniards*. At the battle of the *Trebia*, his heavy armed infantry, *Spaniards*, *Africans* and *Gauls* were but 20000 in all. He lost some of his *Africans* in this battle, some at the lake *Thrasymenus*; and doubtless the *Africans* suffered with the rest of the troops in their march through the fens of *Hetruria*, and in their other fatigues. *Hannibal* had now been three years

The whole of the infantry that had been in the battle, was cut off except about 3000^d who fled, most of whom fled before J. C. of 215. 236 Con-

years in Italy, and had received no recruits from Africa; and from all fulship. these considerations we may well conclude, that his Africans were diminished by one third at least, before the battle of Cannæ.

Now supposing the Africans to be but 8000 of Hannibal's 40000 foot, and supposing his battalia to be every where of equal depth, it is plain that the Africans could make no more than one fifth part of the Carthaginian front, or one tenth of it at each extremity of the line. But if we consider, that Hannibal's intention, from the beginning of the day, was to draw the bulk of the Roman army between his Africans, it is reasonable to believe that he so disposed those Africans as to hide their strength as much as possible; and that he gave them no more extent in front, than was necessary to be their depth when they should face, one part of them to the right, and the other to the left, to attack the flanks of the Romans pressing after the retiring Gauls and Spaniards; and if so, it is probable that the front, which the Africans made, was not so much as a tenth part of the line, or, at each extremity a twentieth. And this being granted, it will not be so astonishing that the bulk of the Roman army should run precipitately between them. That the whole did, strictly speaking, engage themselves between the Africans, I do not conceive necessary to be supposed, in order to account for the event of the battle. For it seems from Polybius's relation, that none of those who did so engage themselves, escaped destruction. Yet we find according to the same author, that 3000 of the Roman foot escaped from the battle, and according to Livy, a much greater number. These might be of the troops that were in the points of the Roman battalia, and who probably took to their heels as soon as they saw Asdrubal with his horse coming upon the rear of the legions.

^d Dionysius of Halicarnassus agrees nearly with Polybius as to the number of men the Romans lost in this battle. Of 6000 horse (says he, Antiquit. B. 2. p. 37.) there remained only 370, and of 80000 foot there escaped somewhat more than 3000. But Livy differs from them, and is not very consistent with himself. According to the first account he gives, the sum total of those that were slain and taken prisoners amounts to about 59400, and of those that escaped to about 5670. In which reckonings (supposing, as he seems to do, that the whole Roman army at Cannæ consisted of 87200 men) there are above 18000 omitted. He afterwards tells us (B. 22 c. 54, 49.) that there were got together of the fugitives 10000 at Canusium, and 4070 at Venusia. In this case the number of the prisoners and the slain would be 73130. But (c. 56.) he makes Varro write to the Senate from Canusium (after he had brought to that place those that had fled to Venusia) that the whole remains of the Roman army were only 10000 men. And yet in the same book (c. 60) M. Torquatus tells the Senate, that if the captives who petitioned to be ransomed, and who (as one of themselves had said a little before) amounted to

Y. of R. of them to *Canusium*. Among the dead were, beside
 537. Bef. *J. C.* the Consul *Æmilius*, the two Pro-Consuls *Servilius* and
 215. *Atilius*. *M. Minucius*, late Master of the horse to *Fa-*
 236 *Con-bius*, two military Quæstors, twenty-nine legionary
 fulship. Tribunes, with eighty persons who had either been
Liv. B. 22. Senators, or had borne such offices as entitled them to
 c. 49. *Polyb. B. 3* be chosen into the Senate. Those of the infantry who
 c. 117. were taken prisoners had not been in the fight. *Varro*,
 by the advice of *Æmilius*, had left 10000 foot in his
 greater camp, with orders to attack the camp of *Hannibal* during the battle. The Consul's view in this
 was, to oblige the *Carthaginian* either to abandon his
 baggage, or to leave a greater part of his forces to guard
 it than he could well spare from the general action.
 The design so far succeeded, that *Hannibal* was just
 upon the point of losing his camp, when (after his vic-
 tory in the field) he came to the troops he had left to
 defend it. Upon his approach, the assailants fled to
 their own entrenchments; where being invested, they
 surrendered themselves prisoners, after they had lost
 2000 of their number.

Hannibal's

8000 men, were added to the forces at *Canusium*, the republic would
 have there an army of 20000 men. According to *Appian*, the whole
 In *Hanni-* Roman army at *Cannæ* consisted of 70000 foot and 6000 horse, of
 bal. c. 323. which 50000 were slain, a great number taken prisoners, and about
 10000 escaped to *Canusium*.

* *Livy* relates that 7000 *Romans* fled out of the battle to the lesser
 camp, 10000 to the greater and that 2000 took refuge in the village
 of *Cannæ*. These last were immediately surrounded by *Carthalo*,
 and taken prisoners. The soldiers in the greater camp, who were
 without leaders, and but half-armed, sent a messenger to those in
 the lesser, desiring they would come over to them in the night, that
 they might march together and take refuge in *Canusium*, a city not
 far distant. But the troops in the little camp could not be prevailed
 upon to hearken to this proposal, fearing to be intercepted by the
 enemy in their passage. Nevertheless 600 of them, encouraged by
Sempronius Tuditanus, a legionary tribune who commanded them, drew
 themselves up in the form of a wedge, and casting their shields upon
 their right arms, to defend themselves from the darts of the *Numidi-*
 ans, to which they were exposed upon that side, made their way
 through the enemy to the great camp, from whence, in conjunction
 with another large body, they escaped to *Canusium*. Next day *Han-*
nibal

Hannibal's loss of men on this important day amounted to no more than 4000 Gauls and Spaniards, 1500 Africans, and 200 horse^f. Y. of R. 537. Bef. J. C.

The consequence of this victory (says Polybius) was such as both parties had expected^g. Hannibal became master^{215.} 236 Com- fulship. Polyb. B. 3. c. 118.

nibal having invested the little camp, the Romans surrendered upon terms. They had leave to depart each with one garment, upon paying a certain ransom. In the mean time about 4000 foot and 200 horse escaped from the great camp in stragling parties to *Canusium*. The rest yielded upon the conditions granted to those of the little camp.

^f According to the Latin historian the loss of the Carthaginians amounted to 8000 men. Livy. B.

^g Livy thinks it might reasonably have been expected that Hannibal should have taken Rome immediately after the battle of *Cannæ*. When the Carthaginian officers (says that author) flocked round their General, congratulating him on his victory, and advising him to spend the rest of that day, and the following night, in refreshing himself and his wearied Troops, *Mahabal*, on the contrary, pressed him not to lose a moment's time. *That you may know* (said he) *the importance of this victory, follow me, I will instantly march away with the cavalry, and be at Rome before they have notice of my coming. In five days we shall sup in the capitol.* Hannibal commended his zeal, but told him that what he had proposed was of too great moment to be suddenly resolved upon, and that he would take time to consider of it. *Nay then* (said Mahabal) *I find that no one man is endued by the Gods with all talents. Hannibal knows how to conquer, but he knows not how to make advantage of his victories.* It is generally believed (adds Livy) that this day's delay was the preservation of the city and empire of Rome.

Several of the ancients have joined with Livy in blaming Hannibal for not laying siege to Rome without delay, but whether justly or not may very well be a question. If the advantages he had gained were, as Polybius says, chiefly owing to the superiority of his cavalry, those could be of little use in a siege, and the Roman infantry not inferior to his, would be invincible behind walls. Rome was provided with every thing necessary to sustain a siege. After the battle of *Thrasymen*, its fortifications had been repaired, (Livy. B. 22. c. 8.) and Polybius takes notice of the care of the Senate upon the present occasion to put the city in a posture of defence, (B. 3. c. 118.) Rome abounded with soldiers well trained to war. Livy speaks of four new legions and 1000 horse raised in the city by *Junius Pera*, who was made Dictator immediately after the battle of *Cannæ*. (Livy. B. 22. c. 57.) And exclusive of these the same Dictator led out an army of 25000 men (id. B. 23. c. 14) which he would not have done, had not he thought he had left troops enough in the town to defend it. *Marcellus* had also sent from *Ostia* 1500 men to strengthen the garrison of Rome. (Livy. B. 22. c. 57.)

Now

Y. of R. master of almost all *Great Greece*^b. Nay, the *Carthaginians* were not without hope, by some sudden stroke, Bef. J. C. to possess themselves of *Rome*. The *Romans*, on the other hand, despaired of being able to retain the dominion.

Now what forces had *Hannibal* to bring against so powerful a city? His army after the battle of *Cannæ* consisted of scarce 45000 men, 9800 of which were cavalry. He was moreover intirely unprovided of implements for carrying on a siege. And had he marched directly to *Rome*, it is not probable any of the nations of *Italy* would have gone over to him. At most they would have waited the issue of the siege, in which, if he had not succeeded, they would have been the less disposed to venture themselves under his protection. Nor perhaps would it have been prudent in him, when not one city in *Italy* had declared for him, to neglect the other towns (that were beginning to waver in their fidelity to the *Romans*) to go and besiege the capital; especially since his hopes of success in this undertaking must have depended more on the terror of his name, than the force of his arms. And that both these would have been insufficient, seems plain from the little effect they had upon *Nola* and *Naples*, which cities were twice in vain attempted by *Hannibal* soon after his victory at *Cannæ*, (*Liv. B. 23. c. 1, 14, 16.*) *Nuceria* also and *Caslinum*, two inconsiderable towns, gave him a great deal of trouble before he could reduce them. The latter held out more than a whole winter, though defended by only 960 men. (*Liv. B. 23. c. 15, 17, 18, 19.*)

Add to this, that had *Hannibal* laid siege to *Rome*, it is not likely that the *Latin* nations, and those other of the allies who always continued steady to her interest, would have quietly looked on till the city had been taken. And that these allies were not yet exhausted of soldiers, is plain from the great levies made among them in the course of this war. In the Dictatorship of *Junius Pera*, just after the defeat at *Cannæ*, the *Roman* armies in *Italy* reckoning the remains of *Cannæ* at 10000 amounted to above 84000 men, as appears from *Livy*, B. 22. c. 57. and B. 23. c. 14. The year after, the Republic had twelve legions on foot, and the year after that eighteen legions (*Liv. B. 24. c. 11.*) The third year after the battle they had twenty-one legions, and the fourth, viz. in the Consulship of *Q. Fulvius Flaccus* and *Appius Claudius Pulcher*, twenty-three Legions. (*Liv. B. 25. c. 3.*)

Upon the whole, *Livy's* censure of *Hannibal's* conduct seems not well founded, and the rather as we do not find that *Polybius* has anywhere blamed him upon this article.

^b The nations that revolted to the *Carthaginians* after the battle of *Cannæ* are thus reckoned up by *Livy* (B. 22. c. 61.) The *Atellani*, *Calatini* and *Hirpini*, part of *Apulia*, the *Samnites* except the *Pentri*, all the *Bruttians*, the *Lucanians*, the *Surrentini*, and almost all *Great Greece*, the *Terentines*, *Metapontines*, *Cratonenses*, *Locri*, and all the *Cisalpine Gauls*.

minion of *Italy*, and every moment expecting to hear of *Y. of R.*
Hannibal's approach, were in the utmost anxiety for ^{537.}
 themselves and for their country. The Senators never-Bef. *J. C.*
 theles preserved their fortitude and dignity; they all ^{215.}
^{236.} Con-zealously applied themselves to put the city in a posture fulship.
 of defence, and did every thing that could be done for
 the common safety. And though the *Romans* were now
 undoubtedly vanquished, and yielded, for the present,
 in military glory, to their enemies, yet by their courage,
 steadiness, and unwearied labours, the wisdom of their
 counsels, and the constitution of their government, they
 not only recovered the empire of *Italy*, but totally sub-
 dueed the *Carthaginians*, and in a few years after became
 lords of the world.

C H A P. XXII.

The extreme terror, with which the Romans were struck,
by their defeat at Cannæ. Their reception of Teren-
tius Varro at Rome. They refuse to redeem the pri-
soners. Hannibal gets possession of Capua, and winters
there. He sends to Carthage an account of his victo-
ries. The Romans create a Dictator for the sole affair
of filling the many vacant places in their Senate.

AMONG those *Romans*, who had fled from the late *Livy*, B.
 battle to *Canusium*, were four legionary Tribunes. ^{22. c. 35.} Of these the soldiers chose two, to be their chief
 commanders, *Appius Claudius Pulcher* and *P. Cornelius*
Scipio, the son of the Pro-Consul in *Spain*. Whilst *Scipio*
 (who was now about nineteen years of age) was deliberating with his colleague, and some others, what measures to take, notice was brought them, that certain young men of the best families of *Rome*, at the head of whom was *L. Cecilius Metellus*, giving all up for lost, had resolved to embark at the first port, and fly from *Italy*. So base a thought stirred up *Scipio's* indignation. Turning therefore to the company, he said, *Let those who value the preservation of Rome follow me.* They all went immediately to the house where the young *Pa-*
tricians

Y. of R. tricians were assembled. *Scipio*, as he entered their
 537. chamber, *I swear*, said he, drawing his sword, *that I*
 Bef. J. C. *will never abandon the Republic, nor consent that any of*
 215. *Con- her citizens forsake her; I call the great Jupiter to witness*
 fulship. *this my oath: And then addressing himself to Metellus,*
he added, Do you, Metellus, and all that are here pre-
sent take the same oath, or not a man of you shall escape
this sword. His look, his action, his menaces so ter-
 rified them all, that they readily came into the engage-
 ments he required.

The consternation and despondency of the people at *Rome* almost equalled those of *Metellus* and his compa-
 nions. For it was there currently reported that both the
 Consuls were killed, and their armies so entirely de-
 stroyed, that not an officer, nor hardly a single soldier
 remained alive; and that *Hannibal* was master of *Apulia,*
Samnum, and all Italy. The *Conscript Fathers*, the
 pilots of the state, did not, however, leave the helm
 because the storm blew high. For want of Consuls the
 two *Prætors* assembled them. As *Fabius's cunctation*,
 that *lingering war*, he had counselled and practised a-
 gainst *Hannibal*, was discovered, by the present cala-
 mity, to have been the dictate of wisdom, *he now was*
 principally listened to. He advised, that some horse-
 men well mounted should be sent out upon the *Appian*
 and *Latine* roads, to learn, if possible, of such as they
 met, the true state of affairs, what was become of the
 Consuls; to what place the remains of the army, if
 there were any, had retreated; where *Hannibal* was
 encamped; what he was doing, and what he designed
 to do: That the women should be forbid to appear in
 public, disturbing the city with their lamentations:
 That when any courier arrived, he should be brought
 privately and without noise to the *Prætors*; and that no
 person should be suffered to go out of the city.

Not long after, a messenger arrived from *Terentius* ;
 his letters importuned that the *Roman* army had been de-
 feated; that his colleague *Æmilius* was slain; that he
 himself was retired to *Canusium*, where he was assem-
 bling the remains of the troops; then about 10000 men
 of

of different corps, and for the most part without officers, had joined him ; and that *Hannibal* was still at ^{Y. of R.} ^{537.} *Cannæ*.
Bef. J. C.

At the same time a bark arrived from Sicily with advice from the Pro-Prætor *Otacilius*, that one Carthaginian squadron was ravaging the coast of Syracuse, while another appeared off the Ægates ready to make a descent at *Lilybæum*; and that it was necessary to send a fleet thither with all speed. The *Conscript Fathers*, not dejected at these additional cares, prepared for the defence both of *Italy* and *Sicily*. *Marcellus*, appointed Prætor for the last named province, and now at *Ostia* aboard the fleet, was ordered to resign the conduct of it to *P. Furius Philus*, the Prætor *Peregrinus*, and to go and take upon him the command of the army at *Canusium*. As for *Terenius Varro*, the Senate recalled him to *Rome*; and nothing has been more wondered at, than the respect with which he was received at his arrival. Multitudes of people of all ranks went out to ^{Livy, B. 22.} meet him, and the Senate returned him thanks for *that he had not despaired of the commonwealth*. How different this conduct, says *Livy*, from that of the *Carthaginians*, who were wont to put their unsuccessful Generals to the most cruel deaths ^{c. 61.} !

As

^c *Livy* says that *Hannibal*, after this famous battle, acted more like a man that had finished his conquests, than one that had a war to carry on, and that he was sitting at *Cannæ* bargaining about his plunder and the captives, in a manner very unbecoming a great General (*Liv. B. 22. c. 56, 58*). If this be not a calumny, at least the *Carthaginian* did not continue long thus employed; for the same author begins his 23d book by telling us, that *Hannibal*, after the battle of *Cannæ*, having taken and plundered the *Roman* camps, marched immediately (*confestim*) from *Apulia* into *Samnium*.

^d The Reception *Varro* met with at *Rome*, and his being afterwards intrusted with the command of an army, seem to have been the effects of just policy in the *Romans*. This General had done nothing irregular, nothing contrary to orders. The Senate and people had sent him to fight *Hannibal*, not to follow him at a distance like *Fabius*. *Æmilius*, it is true, was against fighting at that time; and he was an able General. But what then? *Varro* was not obliged to follow his advice. In a dispute they had a little before about marching, *Æmilius* had no officer of his opinion, except the late Consul *Servilius*,

as

Y. of R. As the present situation of things required an absolute magistrate to govern the state, *M. Junius Pera*
 537. Bef. *J. C.* was, by the authority of the Senate, named Dictator,
 215. and *Sempronius Gracchus* to be his General of the horse.
 236 Con- fulship. *Junius* made it his whole business to put the army in a
Liv. B. 22. condition to resist the enemy. Four legions and a thou-
 c. 57. sand horse were raised among the citizens of *Rome*.
 Faſt. The two *Latiums*, the *Municipia*, and the colonies fur-
 nished their contingents as usual ; and to all these were
 added 8000 slaves, whom the Republic bought of their
 masters, and who were called *Volones*, from the word
volo (I will) which every one returned in answer, when
 he was asked, whether he would serve in the troops.
 To recruit the treasury, which was greatly exhausted,
 and to put the public revenues under a good regula-
 tion, three men of eminent prudence and integrity
Liv. B. 23. were chosen for that trust. And then, the Senators
 c. 21. giving the example, and being followed by the knights,
Flor. B. 2. the whole people in general of the *Roman* tribes brought
 c. 6. all their gold to the public treasury ; the Senators only
 reserving their rings, and the *bulle* about their childrens
 necks. The silver coin was now, for the first time, al-
 loyed with copper.

Liv. B. 22. While they were thus employed at *Rome*, *Hannibal*,
 c. 56. 58. to get a supply of money, and with the further view of

as we are informed by *Livy*. And there is reason to think that it
 was not only the general inclination of the soldiers, but agreeable to
 the judgment of most of the officers, that *Varro* should fight, when
 he did. No objection is made to the order of his battle. If a fatal
 error was committed during the action, through the rashness of the
 infantry imagining themselves victorious, this was no more imputa-
 ble to *Varro* than to *Æmilius*. In short, as *Varro* does not appear to
 be chargeable with any thing worse, than the having such a depen-
 dence on the number and valour of his troops, as to venture a battle
 contrary to the advice of his colleague, it ought not perhaps to be so
 surprising that the Senate and people received him in the manner they
 did. They could not have treated him with rigour without discour-
 aging their Generals, which might have been of dangerous conse-
 quence at this juncture. Nor is it much to be wondered at that they
 employed him again. He was very humble after his defeat at *Cannæ*,
 and behaved himself to the general satisfaction of both Senate and
 people. However they never put him at the head of a great army ;
 he seldom had the command of above one legion.

abating

abating the obstinate resolution of the *Romans* in battle, Y. of R. by the hopes of being ransomed, in case they should 537. be defeated and taken, gave leave to his *Roman* prisо. Bef. J. C. ners, to redeem themselves. These chose out ten of ^{215.} _{236.} Con- their body, to send to *Rome*, to negotiate their redemp- fulship. tion; and *Hannibal* exacted no other security for their return than an oath. They were accompanied by a noble *Carthaginian*, named *Carthalo*, who, in case he found the *Romans* inclined to peace, was empowered to declare upon what terms *Hannibal* would grant it. Upon the first report of *Carthalo*'s arrival, the Dictator sent a lictor to order him out of the *Roman* territory. The ten deputies were admitted to an audience of the Senate. *M. Junius*, the chief of them, pleaded with great earnestness in behalf of the captives. He ^{Liv. B.22.} justified them from the charge of cowardice in having ^{c. 59.} yielded themselves prisoners to the enemy. He al- leged that they had been left in the camp to defend it, that they had done nothing cowardly or unworthy the *Roman* name, but by the adverse fortune of the day, the troops in the field being all cut off, they had been under a necessity of surrendering to the conqueror. He cited precedents of the regard had to prisoners in for- mer times, and urged the advantage it would be to the Republic, to have in her army 8000 *Romans*, re- deemed at a less ^f price than the purchase of so many slaves

* The ransom of each horseman he fixed at 500 denarii 16l. 2s. 11d.); that of each soldier at 300 (9l. 3s. 9d.); and that of each slave at 100 (3l. 4s. 7d.) *

* *Liv. B.*

^f This (says Sir *W. Raleigh*) is but a tale devised to countenance the *Roman* proceedings, as if they had been severe, when as indeed they were suitable to the present fortune, poor and somewhat beggarly. Hereof it is no little proof, that *Hannibal* valued those *Roman* slaves whom he had taken in the camp among their masters, at no more, than every one the third part of a common soldier's ransom; and likely it is, that he offered them at the price, whereat he thought them current. But if we should suppose, that by trading with *Hannibal*, a better bargain for slaves might have been made, than was by the state at home, in dealing with private men; yet must we withal consider, that these private men did only lend these slaves for a while unto the commonwealth, and were afterwards contented to forbear the price

Y. of R. slaves would amount to. His discourse was seconded by the multitude, whose concern for their relations in captivity had brought them together; and they implored the clemency of the Fathers in a suppliant manner.

The Senate debated the matter for some time, being much divided in opinion; but at length they concluded absolutely against the redemption of the captives: For having penetrated into *Hannibal's* views, they would convince their soldiers, that they must either conquer or be at the mercy of their enemies.

Livy, B.
23. c. 1.

Hannibal, after his victory at *Cannæ*, marched without delay from *Apulia* into *Samnium*. *Compsa*, a city of *Hirpini*, almost at the head of the *Aufidus*, surrendered to him, and was the first which fell off from the *Romans*. Having here placed a garrison, together with all his plunder and baggage, he divided his army. One part of it he gave to his brother *Mago* to reduce the towns and fortresses of this country and of all *Bruttium*; and with the other he himself marched towards *Naples*, to get possession, if practicable, of that maritime city, which would open to him an easy communication with *Africa*. But though he drew a part of the garrison into an ambuscade, and cut them off, yet the strength of the place deterred him from laying siege to it.

23. & seq. From thence he turned towards *Capua*. This city, which had been formerly governed by *Roman* laws, and a *Roman* præfect, was now a *Municipium*, and chose her own magistrates; and the *Capuans* had the uncommon privilege of intermarrying with the *Romans*. After the battle of the lake *Thrasymenus*, one *Pacuvius Calavius*, a man of the greatest interest among the people, and then governor of the town, had laid a design to assassinate the Senate, who were odious both to him-

price of them, until the war should be ended. [*Liv. B. 24. c. 18*] If *Hannibal* would have given such a long day of payment, it is likely that the *Romans* would have been his chapmen: but seeing he dealt only for ready money, they chose rather to say we will not give, than we cannot. *Hist. of the World*, part 1. B. 5. ch. 3. §. 9.

self

self and the people, and deliver up the place to *Hannibal*: but afterwards he thought that to assume a kind of sovereignty himself there, would be a better scheme, than that of introducing a stranger to usurp it. The only difficulty he had was to engage the Senators, who were universally for adhering to the *Romans*, to favour the project of his ambition. To this end, he told them that the people had sworn to cut their throats, and to surrender up *Capua* to the *Carthaginians*; but that if they would leave themselves to his conduct, he would preserve them. The Senators trusted him, upon his oath, and suffered him to shut them up in the temple, where they were then assembled, and to set a guard at the door. He then called the people together, and acquainted them, that the Senate were now entirely in his power, and that he would abandon those detestable slaves of *Rome* to their resentment, to be treated according to their demerits; but he insisted that (in order to preserve the old form of government, which ought not to be destroyed) as soon as any one of them had received sentence, and before he was executed, the people should name some man of probity, to succeed him, by which stratagem, *Pacuvius* saved the lives of all the Senators; for the multitude could not agree upon this man of probity. Some disqualification or other was still objected to whoever was named; so that in the end, the people finding that they could not rid themselves of their present Senate without choosing a worse, desired that all the prisoners might be released; and from this time the Senate courted the people by all manner of kindness and adulation, and (if we may credit *Livy*) *Pacuvius* acquired an absolute ascendant over both.

After the defeat of the *Romans* at *Cannæ*, the *Capuans* were again disposed to side with the *Carthaginians*. Two reasons restrained them; the intermarriages before-mentioned, and the consideration that the flower of their nobility were in the service of the *Romans*, in *Sicily*, and were therefore as so many hostages for their fidelity. And the relations of these young men pre-

Y. of R. vailed to have a deputation sent to the Consul *Terentius*,
537: then at *Venusia*, to offer him succours. These depu-
Bef. J. C. ties found the Consul so dejected and desponding, that,
215. 236 Con-weighing the circumstances of things, they thought the
fulship. time now come to shake off the *Roman* yoke, and re-
cover their ancient liberty. But to do this with the
more decency, they first sent ambassadors to *Rome*,
with such proposals as they knew would not be receiv-
ed. They demanded that for the future *Rome* and
Capua should be upon a perfect equality, and that every
year one of the Consuls should be chosen out of the
Capuans.

The *Conscript Fathers* having haughtily rejected the demand, it was carried by a majority of voices, both of the Senate and people of *Capua*, to send deputies to treat with *Hannibal*. They demanded entire liberty and independence, and that three hundred *Roman* knights should be put into their hands, to be exchanged against the same number of *Capuan* youths in the service of *Rome*. *Hannibal* readily granted all that was ask'd; and then the people contrived to have all the *Romans* in the city shut up in the public baths, and there suffocated. One *Decius Magius*, a man of a *Roman* spirit, and a friend to the *Romans*, loudly declared against these proceedings of his countrymen, warning them not to receive a *Carthaginian* garrison, and putting them in mind of *Pyrrhus*'s tyranny over the people of *Tarentum*; but his discourse was despised. When *Hannibal* was to make his entry, all the town crowded to meet him, except this *Magius*, and some few of the nobility, among whom was *Perolla*, the son of *Pacuvius*, who though not governor of *Capua* at this time, had been the soul of all the late proceedings. *Parolla* was afterwards obliged by his father to go and pay his homage to *Hannibal*, nevertheless having deeply imbibed the sentiments of *Magius*, he formed a resolution to stab the *Carthaginian* General, at a magnificent entertainment which *Pacuvius* and some other of the principal citizens were to give him: but the young man, having communicated the design to his father,

was

was by his tears and entreaties dissuaded from it. The X. of R. next day the Senate assembled, and *Hannibal* com- 537.
plaining to them of the disaffection of *Magius*, this Bef. J. C.
brave man was delivered up to him, loaded with irons, 215. Con-
and put on board a ship bound for *Carthage*. A tem- 236. Con-
pest drove the vessel into the port of *Cyrenne*, a city be- Liv. B. 23.
longing to the kings of *Egypt*; there the prisoner find- c. 10.
ing means to get to a statue of *Ptolemy Philopater*, and laying hold of it, the *Carthaginians* durst not drag him from that sanctuary. The *Cyrenians* conveyed him to *Alexandria*, where he chose to continue under the protection of *Ptolemy*.

About this time *Hannibal* dispatched his brother *Mago* to *Carthage* with an account of his success. *Mago*, reported to the Senate, ‘ That their General had defeated six Consular armies, slain above 200000 Romans, c. 13. and taken more than 50000 prisoners; that *Bruttium* and *Apulia*, with a part of *Samnium*, and a part of *Lucania*, had revolted to the *Carthaginians*; that *Capua*, the chief city, not of *Campania* only, but (in the present low estate of *Rome*) even of *Italy*, had surrendered to *Hannibal*: and he concluded with saying, ‘ That for so many and so great victories it was meet to return solemn thanks to the immortal Gods.’ To verify his report he spread abroad in the Senate-house, some say one, others three bushels of gold rings taken from the *Roman Knights* and *Senators*. Having thus prepossessed the Senate in favour of his brother, he proceeded to solicit for him supplies of men, corn, and money, that he might be enabled to carry on so successful a war. The request was universally applauded; and *Himilco*, a Senator of the *Barchine* faction, turning towards *Hanno*, as it were to insult him, ‘ Well, *Hanno*, are you still dissatisfied that we entered into a war against *Rome*? Are you still of opinion that we ought to deliver up *Hannibal*? Come, declare against our giving thanks to the Gods for our success; speak, *Hanno*, let us hear the language of a *Roman* in a *Carthaginian* Senate, *Hanno* rose up; ‘ To-day, Fa- c. 13. thers, if I had not been compelled to speak, I should

Y. of R. have held my peace, that, in this concert of your
 537. common gladness, no discordant word might drop,
 Bef. J. C. from me. But to be silent when thus interrogated by
 215. a Senator, would argue either pride or disaffection to
 236. Con- fulship. the state, a disregard of other mens liberty or of my
 own. To *Hamilco*, therefore, I answer, that I do
 still condemn the war, and that I never shall cease to
 blame our invincible General, till I see it ended by a
 peace upon some tolerable conditions. The exploits
 which *Mago* has boasted of, have caused much joy
 to *Hamilco* and his friends. To me too they may prove
 matter of joy, if a proper use be made of them for
 bringing about an honourable peace. But what is
 the ground of all this exultation? To what does it
 amount? *I have slain*, says *Hannibal*, whole armies of
 enemies: send me soldiers. What else could he have
 asked had he been vanquished? *I have taken two*
 camps, full, doubtless, of wealth and provisions:
 supply me with corn and money. What other demand
 could he have made, had he lost his own camp with
 every thing that was in it? And, that I alone may
 not wonder at all this, I would have *Hamilco* (for as
 I have answered him, I have now surely a right to
 interrogate) I say, I would have *Hamilco* or *Mago* an-
 swer me some questions. The *Roman* empire, it
 seems, was overturned at the battle of *Cannæ*, and
 all *Italy* is revolting: Is any one, I pray, of the *Latine*
 nations come over to us; Has any one man of the
 five and thirty tribes deserted to *Hannibal*? When
Mago had to both these answered in the negative:
 There remain then (replied *Hanno*) a huge number
 of enemies still to be subdued. And this multitude,
 what heart, what hope have they? *Mago* answered,
 That he knew not. And yet (returned *Hanno*) there
 is nothing easier to be known. Have the *Romans*
 sent any ambassadors to *Hannibal* to treat of peace?
 Has intelligence been brought you, that any mention
 of peace was made at *Rome*? No; said *Mago*. Why
 then (replied the other) the progres made in this
 war, is exactly the same, as when *Hannibal* first en-
 tered

tered *Italy*. The vicissitude of our fortune in the Y. of R. first *Roman War* many of us here present can well remember. Our affairs were never in a more prof. perous course both by land and sea, than just before our defeat at the *Aegates*. Should the like turn of fortune (the Gods avert the omen) happen to us again, can we hope to obtain, when vanquished, that peace, which when we are victorious, we disdain to think of? Were it now in debate to *offer* or to *accept* a peace, I know what I should say: if you ask my opinion concerning the supplies which *Mago* demands for the army, my answer is, That if they be truly conquerors, they little need them, and if they deceive us with vain hope, they less deserve them.' *Hannibal's* speech made no impression on the Senate. It was carried by a great majority to send to *Hannibal* from *Africa*, 4000 *Numidians*, 40 elephants, and 1000 talents of silver *. And one of the magistrates was immediately commissioned to go with *Mago* into *Spain*, and there hire 20000 foot and 4000 horse for recruiting the armies in that country and in *Italy*. These preparations however went on slowly, as is usual in times of prosperity. On the other side, neither the character, nor the present circumstances of the *Romans* would permit *them* to be dilatory in their proceedings. The Se-*Liv. B. 23.* nate neglected nothing, deferred nothing, that was necessary for supporting the war. The Consul *Varro* shewed himself extremely diligent in whatever belonged to his office; and the Dictator *Junius Pera*, after performing the usual ceremonies of religion, marched out of *Rome* at the head of 25000 men. This army was composed of two legions, which had been raised in the beginning of the year for the defence of the city, of some cohorts from *Picenum* and the *Gallic* territory, of the 8000 *Volones* before-mentioned, and of 6000 prisoners for crimes and debt, whom *Junius* had re-

* This was a tract of land between the *Rubicon* and the *Esis*, formerly taken from the *Galli Senones*, and divided amongst some *Roman*, citizens by virtue of a law lately enacted.

Y. of R. leased, upon the condition of their enlisting themselves
 537. in the troops, and whom he had armed out of the spoils
 Bef. J. C. *Flaminius* had formerly brought from *Gaul*.

²¹⁵ *236 Con-* As for *Hannibal*, having settled his affairs at *Capua*,
 fulship. he made a second attempt upon *Naples*, with as little
 success as in the first. From thence he marched to
Nola, in hopes that the populace, who were inclined
 to his party, would deliver up the town to him. But
 their Senate, alarmed at the Danger, had sent for assistance
 from *Marcellus*, who commanded the *Roman* army at
Canusium, and who came in all haste to the defence of
Liv. B. 23. the place. *Hannibal*, disappointed here, once more
 c. 15. attempted *Naples*. As this city had lately received a
Roman garrison, under the command of *M. Junius*
Silanus, the *Carthaginian* soon despaired of being able
 to reduce it by force; and he turned his arms against
Nuceria, a town not far from the other. The inhabi-
 tants, for want of provisions, were obliged to capitulate: Yet he could not prevail upon any of them to
 serve in his army. After he had plundered and burnt
Nuceria, he again sat down before *Nola*. *Marcellus*
 sallied out upon him at three several gates, and killed
 2300 of his men, with the loss only of 500 of his own.
 The *Carthaginian* being thus repulsed, laid siege to
Acerræ, a small town on the banks of the *Clanis*, near
Nola, and took it. Here he learnt that the Dictator
 was approaching to *Caslinum* with his army. Where-
 upon being afraid lest the neighbourhood of the enemy
 might occasion some sinister accident at *Capua*, he drew
 near to this city, and at the same time sent a part of
 his forces to attack *Caslinum*. These not succeeding,
 he himself marched thither with his army, and besieged
 the town in form. It was not garrisoned by *Campani-
 ans*. A body of *Prænestini*, to the number of 500
 men, happening to pass that way, had found the Inha-
 bitants wavering in their fidelity to *Rome*, and had
 therefore cut their throats in the night, and possessed
 themselves of the walls. Ths *Prænestini* were after-
 wards reinforced by about 400 *Perusini* from *Hætruria*,
 and some *Romans* and *Latines*. All these being men of
 bravery

bravery and resolution, made a vigorous resistance. Y. of R. Winter approaching, *Hannibal* discontinued the siege, ^{537.} intending to renew it in the spring. He left a small body of troops before the town, and retired to *Capua*, ^{215.} ₂₃₆ ^{c. 18.} _{Con-} _{fulship.}

Livy and some other historians tell us, that both *Liv. B. 23.* *Hannibal* and his soldiers were extremely softened by the effeminate life they gave themselves up to, this winter at *Capua*, and are very particular in their descriptions of the luxury of the *Carthaginians*, making *Capua* prove as fatal a place to them as *Cannæ* had been to the *Romans*. It does not however appear by their after behaviour, that they had lost much of their martial ardour. The principal cause of the decline of *Hannibal's* affairs in *Italy* after the battle of *Cannæ*, seems to have been his not receiving supplies from his own country. He had not men enough to oppose so many armies as the *Romans* sent against him, and at the same time to garrison the towns, and protect the countries, that had submitted to him. And that his residence at *Capua* had abated nothing of his wonted activity, seems plain from *Livy* himself, who informs us, that as soon as the rigour of the season began to soften, he renewed the siege of *Casilinum*, and this in sight of *c. 19.* an army, which, without reckoning the allies, amounted to 25000 men. This army was now under the conduct of *Sempronius*, General of the horse, the Dictator having been recalled to *Rome* on account of some religious affair. *Sempronius* continued quiet in his camp, for he had received orders not to fight. *Marcellus* (according to *Livy*) would have gone to the assistance of the besieged, if he had not been hindered by the swelling of the *Volturnus*, and by the people of *Nola*, who feared that the *Capuans* would attack them if the Roman garrison should withdraw. In the mean time *Casilinum* was reduced to great extremities for want of provisions, insomuch that many of the soldiers threw themselves from the walls, or exposed themselves without defence to the darts of the enemy. *Sempronius* attempted to relieve them, first by throwing barrels of

Y. of R. meal into the *Vulturnus*, that ran through the town,
 and afterwards by scattering in the stream great quantities of nuts, which the besieged stop'd with hurdles.
 These convoys of provisions being discovered and cut off, the garrison were reduced to live upon rats, and what other vermin they could find; nay, they pull'd off the leather that covered their shields, boiled it soft in water, and eat it. And when *Hannibal*, to hinder them from gathering any weeds or roots that grew close under the wall, had ploughed up the ground, they threw turnip seed out upon the mould; which when the *Carthaginian* heard of, he cry'd out, *What! am I then to sit here till their turnips are come to maturity?* And from this time he became more willing to grant them terms. They were at length allowed to march out of the town, provided each freeman among them paid seven ounces of gold. The condition was accepted; they remained prisoners till the money was paid, and the *Carthaginian* put a garrison of 700 men into the place.

LIV. B 23.

c. 20.

& 30. The inhabitants of *Petilia*, in *Bruttium*, gave likewise a signal proof of their attachment to the Republic, and shewed how agreeable her government was to her subjects. They resolutely stood a siege, though refused assistance from *Rome* on account of the distress she was in; and *Hamilco*, one of *Hannibal's* Lieutenants, found almost as much difficulty in subduing them, as the General had met with, in reducing the garrison of *Casilinum*.

c. 21.

About the same time couriers arrived from *Sicily* and *Sardinia*, with complaints from the Prætors of those two provinces, of the want both of provisions and pay for their armies and fleets. The answer was, that they must shift for themselves as well as they could; for that *Rome* was not in a condition to help them. King *Hiero* supplied the Prætor of *Sicily* with what money he wanted, and six months provisions; and the cities of *Sardinia* in alliance with the Republic, raised contributions among themselves for the Prætor of that island.

c. 22.

And now the Senate began to think of filling up the many vacant places in their assembly. When this matter was in debate, *Sp. Carvilius* proposed that the present

present opportunity might be taken to oblige the *Latines*, those ancient and faithful allies of *Rome*, by admitting two out of each nation of them to sit among the Fathers : but the motion was rejected with indignation ; and *Fabius* reproved *Carvilius* for his imprudence in exposing the Senate to a shameful innovation, or to the danger of affronting the *Latines*, at so critical a conjuncture. He added, that it was of the utmost consequence to observe a strict silence upon this head, that so the allies might never know such a proposal had been made. The matter was kept secret ; no mischief followed.

As there were no Censors in being, to fill up the vacancies in question, and the Dictator was now with the army, the Consul *Terentius*, by order of the Senate, nominated *M. Fabius Buteo*, the oldest of the former Censors, to be a second Dictator, whose office should be confined to this affair. And never did Dictator dis-*Liv. B. 23.* charge this trust with more modesty and prudence. *c. 23.* The first upon his list were all those who since the last Censors had obtained *curule magistracies*, but had not yet been ranked among the Fathers ; then all those, without exception, who had been Tribunes of the people, *Plebeian Aediles* or *Quæstors*, and lastly, such of the citizens as could shew the spoils of enemies by them vanquished, or had been rewarded by their Generals with a Civic Crown. By this impartial election the *Romans* had the happiness to see 177 new Senators created without jealousy or contention. *Fabius* was highly applauded for his conduct, and when he had finished his list, he immediately abdicated the Dictatorship, though he had been named to it for six months.

C H A P. XXIII. The FOURTH YEAR of the War.

A Roman army destroyed by the Gauls. King Philip of Macedon enters into league with Hannibal against Rome. Favourable accounts from Sardinia and from the Scipios in Spain. After the death of King Hiero, Syracuse takes part with the Carthaginians.

THE

Y. of R. **T**HE next affair, at *Rome*, was to appoint the great officers of the state for the new year. **T.**
 Bef. J. C. **S**empronius *Gracchus* (General of the horse to the Dictator *Junius*) and **L.** *Posthumius Albinus*, now at the head of an army in *Cisalpine Gaul*, were elected Consuls.
Liv. B. 23. Then the several Praetors were named, and *Marcellus* had the power and title given him of Pro-Consul; because, of all the *Roman Generals* in *Italy*, he was the only one who had gained any advantage over the enemy since the battle of *Cannæ*. The elections being over, *Junius* returned to his camp in *Apulia*, but *Sempronius* continued in the city, to consult with the Senate about the operations of the approaching campaign. While they were deliberating on these things, news came to *Rome* that *Posthumius Albinus* (one of the Consuls elect) with all his army, was destroyed by the *Gauls* ^{c. 24.} The fortitude of the *Romans* enabled them to surmount this last calamity of so unfortunate a year. *Sempronius* assembled the Senate, and endeavoured to c. 25. raise their dejected spirits. ‘The defeat of *Cannæ* ought to have hardened us against every adversity that can happen in war. Shall we be discouraged by moderate losses, after having supported the greatest calamities? The war with the *Gauls* may be deferred. Let us have no more armies in *Gaul*, but turn all our forces against *Hannibal*. When he is once driven out of *Italy*, the rebellious nations will soon be reduced again.’ This advice was followed, and all the *Roman* forces were ordered to the provinces near *Hannibal*.

^{c. 24.} According to *Livy* (B. 23. c. 24.) the *Gauls* made use of a very extraordinary stratagem upon this occasion. *Posthumius* being to pass through a wood, they, against his coming, had, on each side the road, sawed all the trees so far that a little force would serve to cast them down. When therefore the whole army had entered this dangerous passage, the *Gauls* that lay about the wood, began to throw down the trees, which falling one against another, those that were nearest the road came upon the heads of the *Romans*, so that scarce ten men of them escaped being crushed.

In the new disposition of employments, *Terentius V. of R. Varro*, notwithstanding his former ill success, was intrusted with the command of an army in *Apulia*, and *Bef. J. C.* had the character of Pro-Consul. His behaviour since ^{214.} his misfortune had soften'd every body to him. He ^{237.} *Con-*
fulship. had let his hair and beard grow, and had never taken *Val. Max.* a meal lying on a bed, as was the manner of the *Ro. B. 4. c. 5.* *mans.* Nay, it is said, he modestly declined the *Dic-* ^{f. 2.} *Frontin.* *tatorship*, to which the people, still well affected to him, *Stratag. I.* would have raised him. ^{4. c. 5. f.}

It now remained to choose a new Consul in the room ^{6.} of *Posthumius Albinus*; and *Marcellus* being sent upon a ^{Livy, B.} commission to the army, it was suspected, and complained of in the Senate, that he was kept out of the way on purpose that he might not be present at the *comitia*. *Sempronius* therefore deferred convening the centuries till the return of *Marcellus*, and then he was unanimously chosen Consul. But as it had happened to thunder during the assembly, the augurs laid hold of this accident to declare the election disagreeable to the will of the Gods. Their true reason for opposing it was his being a *Plebeian*, for *Sempronius* also being of that order, should *Marcellus*'s election be confirmed, *Rome* would have two *Plebeian* Consuls. Hereupon *Marcellus* abdicated, and *Fabius Cunctator* was chosen (the third time) in his stead.

And now the *Romans* began to be in motion. *Fabius* put himself at the head of those troops which the late Dictator had commanded. *Sempronius* was General of the *Volones*, and of 25000 auxiliaries. The troops that had escaped from *Cannæ*, and which after that battle had served under *Marcellus*, and all the weak soldiers in the army lately under the conduct of *Junius Pera*, had been sent into *Sicily*, there to serve as long as the war should last in *Italy*. In the room of these, *Marcellus* led to his camp near *Sueffula* (a city nine miles from *Nola*) two legions that had been raised for the defence of *Rome*. The *Prætor Lævinus* was ordered to cover *Apulia* with two legions, which arrived from *Sicily*,

Y. of R. Sicily, and to defend the coast from *Brunducium* to *Tarentum*, with a fleet of twenty five ships. A like number of vessels was sent under *Q. Fulvius Flaccus*, the other *Prætor*, to guard the coast near the capital. The legion under *Varro* being commanded into *Sicily*, he was ordered to make new levies in the country of *Picenum*, and to continue there to protect that and the neighbouring territories.

Livy, B. 23. c. 33. While the *Prætor Lævinus* lay encamped at *Luceria* in *Apulia*, a company of *Macedonians* were to his great surprise brought before him.

At the head of them was an *Athenian* named *Xenophanes*. These strangers had landed not far from the *Lacinian* promontory, and were making their way to *Hannibal's* camp near *Capua*, when *Lævinus's* scouts intercepted them. Being examined by the *Prætor*, the *Athenian* answer'd that he was commission'd by King *Philip* of *Macedon* to treat of an alliance with the *Roman Republic*. *Lævinus* overjoy'd at this, shew'd great respect to the ambassador, and furnished him with guides to conduct him to *Rome*. It is not known by what artifice he got to *Hannibal's* camp: but the league which, in his master's name, he made with the *Carthaginian*, is preserved to this day. Having finished his commission

* The form of the league as it is in *Polibius* B. 7. c. 2. runs thus.

The treaty confirmed by oath, which *Hannibal* the General, *Mago*, *Myrcan*, *Barmocar*, and all the Senators of *Carthage* that are with him [*Hannibal*] and all the *Carthaginians* that serve under him, have concluded with *Xenophanes* the *Athenian*, the son of *Cleomacus*, whom King *Philip*, the son of *Demetrius*, hath sent to us, in his own name, and in name of the *Macedonians*, and of his allies.

In the presence of *Jupiter*, and *Juno*, and *Apollo*; in the presence of the tutelary Divinity of the *Carthaginians*, and of *Hercules*, and of *Iolaus*; in the presence of *Mars*, of *Triton* and *Neptune*; in the presence of the Gods who accompany our expedition, and of the sun, the moon, and the earth; in the presence of the rivers, the fields, and the waters; in the presence of all the Gods who rule over *Carthage*; in the presence of all the Gods who rule over *Macedon* and the rest of *Greece*; in the presence of all the Gods who preside over war, and at the making this treaty; *Hannibal* the General hath said, and

commission he returned to his ship, and *Mago, Bostar, Y. of R.* and *Gisco*, three ambassadors from *Hannibal*, embarked ^{538.} with him. They were scarce out at sea when the vessel *Bef. J. C.*

^{214,}

and all the Senators of *Carthage* that are with him, and all the *Car-* ²³⁷ *Con-*
thaginians that are in his army. *fulship.*

If it seem good unto you and to us, this shall be a treaty of amity and good will between you and us, as friends allies, and brethren, upon condition that King *Philip*, and the *Macedonians*, and all the other *Greeks* that are his allies, shall preserve and defend the *Carthaginian* Lords, and *Hannibal* the General, and those that are with him, and the Governors of provinces dependent upon the *Carthaginians*, and those that use the same laws with them; and the inhabitants of *Utica*, and of all the cities and countries subject to the *Carthaginians*, and all the soldiers and allies, and all the cities and nations in confederacy with us in *Italy*, *Gaul*, and *Liguria*, and all those in this country who are in friendship and alliance with us. In like manner the *Carthaginian* armies, and the inhabitants of *Utica*, and all the cities and nations subject to *Carthage*, and the soldiers and allies, and all the nations and cities with which we have amity and alliance in *Italy*, in *Gaul*, in *Liguria*, and with which we may contract amity and alliance in this country, shall preserve and defend King *Philip*, and the *Macedonians*, and all their allies amongst the *Greeks*. We will not secretly devise evil against one another. We will not lay snares for one another. We [the *Macedonians*] with all affection and good will, without guile or fraud [declare that we] will be enemies to the enemies of the *Carthaginians*, except to those Kings, cities and ports with which we are in friendship and alliance. In like manner, we [the *Carthaginians*] will be enemies to the enemies of King *Philip*, except to those Kings, cities and nations with whom we are in alliance and friendship. You [the *Macedonians*] shall engage in the war we have with the *Romans* till it please the Gods to give success to our arms and yours. You shall assist us with what is necessary, according as shall be agreed upon between us. But if the Gods shall not grant to you and us a happy issue of the war against the *Romans* and their allies, and if we be reduced to make peace with the *Romans*, we shall treat in such a manner as that you shall be included in the treaty; and on condition that they shall not be allowed to declare war against you; that the *Romans* shall not be masters of the *Coryræi*, nor of the *Apolliniates*, nor of the *Dyrrachini*, nor of *Pbarus*, nor of *Dymallar*, nor of the *Parthini* nor of *Antintania*. They shall likewise restore to *Demetrius Pharius* all his friends and relations who are in the *Roman* dominions. If the *Romans* shall declare war against you or against us, we will assist each other as the occasion shall require. We will act in the same manner in case any other shall declare war against us, except the Kings, cities and nations with whom we are in alliance and friendship. If either of us shall judge proper to add any thing to this treaty, or retrench any thing from it, it shall not be done without the consent of both of us.

Y. of R. was despatched by *P. Valerius Flaccus*, whom *Lævinus* had
 538. appointed to command the fleet. She was soon obli-
 Bef. J. C. ged to strike to some ships sent after her. *Xenophanes*
 214. 237 Con-endeavoured to escape a second time, by the same sto-
 fulship. ry of his embassy from *Philip* to the Senate; adding
 only, that not having been able to reach the capital,
 because the enemy infested the roads, he had negotia-
 ted his business with the Praetor *Lævinus*. He would
 have imposed upon *Flaccus*, but for the habit and lan-
 guage of the three *Carthaginians*. The Roman having
 discovered the truth, detached five gallies under the
 command of *Valerius Antias*, to transport the *Athenian*
 and his companions to *Rome*.

Liv. B. 23. To return to *Hannibal*. *Campania* was now the chief
 c. 35. seat of the war; and the *Campanians* themselves, to
 assist him, raised an army of 14000 men. These hav-
 ing, in vain, solicited *Cumæ*, a city in the neighbour-
 hood, to join with them; endeavoured, with no better
 success, to surprise the *Cumans* by treachery. After
 c. 36. which *Hannibal* at the request of the *Campanians*, laid
 siege to the place. *Fabius* was then encamped at *Cales*
 but durst not cross the *Vulturnus*, to go to the assistance
 of the besieged, because of unlucky omens and prodi-
 gies. *Sempronius* had a little before entered the place,
 and he defended it. He is said to have slain in a sally
 1300 of the *Carthaginians*. *Hannibal* the next day
 presented battle, in hopes the Consul flush'd with his
 success, would venture to fight; but the *Romans* keep-
 ing close within the walls, he at length drew off his
 men, and returned to his camp, which was on mount
Tifata.

Whilst *Sempronius Gracchus* was thus defending
Cumæ, the *Roman* armies prospered in two other places.
 Another *Sempronius*, surnamed *Longus*, gained a victo-
 ry over *Hanno* in *Lucania*, and drove him from thence
 into *Bruttium*. And *Lævinus* retook three cities of the
Hirpini, which had revolted to *Hannibal*.

c. 38. About the same time the intercepted ambassador
 from King *Philip*, and his letters were brought to *Rome*.
 And the Senate finding that the treaty was actually
 concluded

concluded, came immediately to the wise and noble Y. of R. resolution of keeping the *Macedonian* out of *Italy*, by ^{538.} carrying the war into his country. ^{Bef. J. C.}

And now *Fabius*, having made expiation for the pro-²³⁷ Con- digies, at length passed the *Vulturnus*, and both the fulship. Consuls carried on the war in concert together. *Fa-*^{Liv. B. 23.} *biius* recovered some towns that had declared for *Hanni-*^{c. 39.} *bal*, and had received *Carthaginian* garrisons. At *Nola*, the people still disaffected to *Rome*, were secretly plotting to destroy their Senators, and betray the city to *Han-* *nibal*. To prevent this, *Fabius* sent *Marcellus* with his army into *Nola*, and he himself removed to the Pro-Consul's camp near *Sueffula*. There he continued quiet^{c. 40.} while *Marcellus* made frequent incursions into the lands of the *Hirpini* and the *Samnites* about *Caudium*. Deputies from these two nations came to *Hannibal* to inform him of the devastation of their country, and to desire relief. They even added reproaches to their complaints. ‘ We believed (said they) that so long asc. 42: ‘ you were safe and our friend, we might have banished ‘ all fear, not only of the *Romans*, but were it lawful ‘ so to speak) even of the angry Gods themselves : ‘ Yet certain it is, that whilst you are not only safe ‘ and victorious, but so near us too, that you can see ‘ the burning of our houses, and almost hear the cries ‘ of our wives and children, we have been miserably ‘ harassed this summer by *Marcellus*, as if he, and not ‘ you, had been conqueror at *Cannæ*. The *Romans* ‘ give out that you are like a bee that can sting but ‘ once.’ *Hannibal* returned a civil answer to the de- puties,

* The *Roman* historians frequently reproach *Hannibal* with inaction after the winter he spent in *Capua*, and *Livy* upon this occasion has put very severe reflections upon him into the mouths of the *Samnite* deputies. The truth of the matter seems to be this: The *Romans* had now learnt by their defeats that they were not a match for *Hannibal* in the open field. It was a long time before they would yield this point; but the battle of *Cannæ* seems to have convinced them. At first they sent one Consul to oppose him with the usual army of two legions (consisting of about 4000 men each) with a proportionable number of auxiliaries. The misfortune at the *Ticin*, and what im- mediately

Y. of R. puties, and encouraged them to hope for a happy issue
 538. of the war. ‘ Of the victories I have gained, said he,
 Bef. J. C. ‘ the last has always been the greatest. That of the
 214. lake *Thrasymenus*, was more considerable than that of
 237 Con-*Trebia*, and the victory of *Cannæ* surpassed them
Liv. B. 23. both. I shall soon gain a fourth victory superior to
 C. 43. ‘ all the past.’ With this answer, and rich presents,
 he dismissed the deputies.

Hannibal, being soon after joined by *Hanno* with
 some troops from *Bruttium*, invested, *Nola*, which was

mediately followed it, obliged them to send the other Consul with
 his army to join his colleague. These being defeated at the *Trebia*, the
 Republic encreased her armies the next year. *Flaminus* had alone
 the command of four legions, and his colleague of two. The former
 being vanquished at the lake *Thrasymen*, and *Fabius*’s dilatory arts not
 having any sensible good effect, the *Romans* seemed resolved to exert
 their whole strength, and ruin *Hannibal* at a blow. They doubled
 their legions, increased the number of men in each, and sent both
 their Consuls at the head of an army of near 90000 men to fight a
 decisive battle. The victory over these at *Cannæ* was so compleat,
 that the *Romans* saw plainly they could not hope to conquer the *Car-
 thaginian* in a general battle, and that they must change their manner
 of carrying on the war. Accordingly they divided their troops into
 many armies, never risked their whole strength in one action, but
 contented themselves with wasting *Hannibal*’s forces in small engage-
 ments, harassing his allies, and protecting their own. This very
 year they besieged him, as it were, with armies. *Fabius* commanded
 one at *Liternum*, *Sempronius* had another at *Cumæ*, and *Marcellus* a
 third at *Sueffula*, all in *Campania* where *Hannibal* was. *Lævinus* de-
 fended *Apulia*, and *Terentius Varro*, *Picenum*. Each of these Gene-
 rals had at least two legions under him, except *T. Varro*, who had but
 one. Beside these, *Livy* mentions a *Sempronius Longus*, who had an
 army in *Lucania* sufficient to defeat a considerable part of the *Car-
 thaginian* army under *Hanno*, of which 2000 were slain in the action.
 All these forces joined together would have made a greater army than
 the *Romans* had at *Cannæ*, but the Republic had now alter’d her mea-
 sures. Nay, so steady was she in pursuing this new method of car-
 ryng on the war, that though *Hannibal* was many years hemm’d in
 among the *Bruttians*, in a corner of *Italy*, without supplies from his
 own country, and in great want of men and money, she never ven-
 tured to unite her forces, in order to compel him to a general battle.
 Now considering the small number of his troops, his want of money,
 the many armies he had to deal with, the towns he had to garison,
 and the several allies he had to protect, it is more to be wondered at
 that he kept footing so long in *Italy*, than that he made no progress
 in conquest.

defended

defended by *Marcellus*, who (if we may credit the Latin historian) boldly marched his troops out of the town, and came to a pitched battle with the Carthaginian before the walls; victory declared for the Romans, and Hannibal lost 5000 men.^q

About this time, 1272 of his Spanish and Numidian horse went over to the enemy. These deserters continued faithful to Rome, and did her important services, for which they were recompensed with lands in their own countries at the end of the war. The Carthaginian General raised the siege of *Nola*, sent *Hanno* again into *Bruttium* with the forces he had brought from thence, marched himself into *Apulia*, and pitched his camp near *Arpi*, where he purposed to winter. As soon as he was gone, *Fabius* made two incursions, with the greatest part of his army, into the flat country of *Campania*, gathered in all the corn, and carried it to his camp at *Sueffula*, which he put in a condition to serve him for winter quarters. He then ordered *Marcellus* to keep no more soldiers at *Nola* than were necessary to de-

^q Livy, Plutarch, and others, relate several victories gained by *Marcellus* over *Hannibal*. But Corn. Nepos (in Vit. *Hannib.*) tells us, that the latter was always victorious in *Italy*, and that after the battle of *Cannæ* no one ever ventured to pitch a camp in the plain against him. *Quamdiu in Italia fuit, nemo ei in Acie restitit, nemo adversus eum, post Cannensem pugnam, in Campo Castra posuit.* Polybius's history of the Roman affairs after the battle of *Cannæ* is not entire; but we have several considerable fragments of it remaining, none of which mention any victory over *Hannibal* in *Italy*. From a passage in B. 9. c. 3. it is plain, that *Hannibal* was never defeated by any Roman General before the siege of *Capua*, and consequently not by *Marcellus* this year. Who (says the historian) ' can help admiring the Romans? That they who durst not draw out an army in battle against *Hannibal*, but used to lead their legions, and that with difficulty along the hills, should venture to lay siege to a strong city, while they themselves were harassed by an enemy whom they dared not to think of encountering in the field. But the Carthaginians, who had been conquerors in every battle, suffered no less than the vanquished, &c.' And in B. 15. c. 16. he expressly asserts, that *Hannibal* was never vanquish'd before the battle of *Zama*. And in chap. 11. he represents *Hannibal*, just before that battle, reminding his soldiers, that they had been victorious in every battle they had fought in *Italy*.

V. of R. send the town, and to send the rest to *Rome*, that they
 538. might neither be a burden to the allies nor an expence
 Ref. J. C. to the Republic. The Consul *Sempronius* marched his
 214. legions from *Cuma* to *Luceria* in *Apulia*; from thence
 237 Cor- he dispatched the Praetor *Lævinus* with the army under
 sulship. his command, to *Brundusium*, to guard the coast of
Salentum, and provide what was necessary for the *Ma-*
cedonian war.

Liv. B.23. While affairs in *Italy* were in the situation that has
 c. 34, 40. been described, good news came to *Rome* from *Sardinia*
 41. and *Spain*. The Praetor, *Manlius Torquatus*, had de-
 feated the rebel *Sardinians*, though assisted by an army
 sent from *Carthage* under the command of *Asdrubal the*
Bald. Twelve thousand of the enemy were killed upon
 the spot, *Asdrubal* himself with *Hanno* and *Mago*, his chief
 officers, taken prisoners, and the island entirely reduced.

c. 48. The *Scipios* had been equally fortunate in their wars
 in *Spain*. However, they wrote to the Senate, that the
 troops wanted their pay, cloaths to cover them, and
 provisions to subsist them. As to the first indeed, they
 added, that if the public treasury was exhausted, they
 would find means to get money from the *Spaniards* ;
 but that the other necessaries must be sent from *Rome*,
 otherwise they could neither keep the province in obe-
 dience, nor support the army. The Senators were all
 sensible of the reasonableness of the request ; but how
 to comply with it was the difficulty. They considered
 the numerous forces they already had to maintain both
 at land and sea, and what a large new fleet must pre-
 sently be equipped, if a war with *Macedon* should be
 commenced : that as to *Sicily* and *Sardinia*, which, be-
 fore the war, brought in considerable subsidies to the
 treasury, they were now scarce able to maintain the
 forces necessary for the defence of these provinces ;
 and that to tax the citizens at home for the supply de-
 manded, would quite oppress and ruin them. The
 result of all was ' that *Fulvius* the Praetor should af-
 semble the people, and lay before them the necessities
 of the state, and earnestly press all those who were
 grown rich by farming the public revenues, to lend
 ' the

‘ the public, for a while, a part of what they had gain-
ed by it, and furnish the army in *Spain* with neces-
saries, under a promise of being reimbursed the first
of any of the public creditors, when the treasury
should be in a condition to discharge debts.’ The

Y. of R. 538.

Bei J. C.

214.

237 Con-

Prætor accordingly represented the matter to the people, and also appointed a day when he would bargain for cloaths and corn, to be sent to the troops in *Spain*, and for other necessaries to equip the fleet.

When the day came, three companies of nineteen persons each, presented themselves as undertakers; but they insisted on two demands, ‘ That while thus employ’d, they should be exempted from serving in the war: And That, if what they shipped were taken by the enemy, or cast away by storm, the public should bear the loss; both which conditions being agreed to, they undertook this affair, so that now the Roman armies were subsisted by the purses of private subjects; nor was any thing wanting to carry on the war in *Spain* more than if the treasury had been full.

The *Scipios*, thus supply’d, immediately took the field, and (according to *Livy*) perform’d strange things, as shall hereafter be related.

The accounts from *Sicily* were not so satisfactory as *Livy*, B. those from *Spain* and *Sardinia*. King *Hiero* was dead, 24. c. 4. and had left his dominions, by will, to his grandson *Hieronymus* (whose father *Gelo* had rebelled against the old King the year before his death, and had come to an untimely end) under the tuition of fifteen guardians, whom he had entreated, a little before his decease, to keep up a good understanding with the *Roman* de-
mans, as he himself had done for fifty years past. *Hi-*
eronymus, being suffered by his guardians to take the
reigns of government into his own hands at fifteen Years
of age, ran into many excesses of vice and cruelty.
He affected an extravagant pomp, was difficult of ac-
cess, gave audience with an air of contempt, and of-
ten added insulting jests to refusals. Three lords of
distinction engrossed his favour, *Andranodus* and *Zo-
ippus* (his two uncles in law) and *Tbrafo*, surnamed

B. 23. c. 30.

Virt. &

Vit. Exc.

lib. 7.

Y. of R. *Charcarus*. This last was a friend to the *Romans*; the
 538. other two favoured *Carthage*. *Thraſo* being put to death,
 Bef. J. C. upon a false accusation of treason, the uncles easily
 214. persuaded their nephew to enter into a negotiation with
 237 Conſulſhip. *Claudius Pulcher*, the *Roman Praetor* in *Sicily*,
 Liv. B. 24. sent a deputation to the King, to renew the alliance
 c. 5, 6. formerly made by his grandfather with the *Romans*. *Hieronymus* insulted the deputies, asking them
 ‘ What fortune they had at the battle of *Cannæ*? be-
 cause, said he, *Hannibal*’s ambassadors have given most
 ‘ incredible accounts of it; and I would fain know the
 ‘ truth, that I may take my measures accordingly.’ The *Romans* only answered, that when he had learnt
 to give audience to ambassadors in a serious manner, they would come to him again; and then having rather
 admonish’d, than requested him, not rashly to violate
 the ancient league, they departed and returned to the
 Praetor. *Hieronymus*, without delay, sent ambassadors
 to *Carthage*, to ratify a treaty he had already made
 with *Hannibal*; the substance of which was, that he
 and the *Carthaginians* should divide *Sicily* between them,
 when they had jointly conquered the whole island.
 But being afterwards persuaded to think that he had
 himself a title of inheritance to all *Sicily*, by being de-
 scended from *Nereis*, the daughter of *Pyrrhus* (who
 had been declared King of it) he sent a new embassy,
 with instructions to lay before the Senate of *Carthage*
 his pretended rights, and to conclude only a treaty of
 mutual assistance with them. The *Carthaginians* were
 glad at any rate to draw off *Syracuse* from the *Roman*
 interest, and readily yielded to the proposals.

c. 7. Not long after, this foolish King being at *Leontini*, a town situate on the frontiers of his dominions, was there assassinated in the presence of his guards, by some conspirators among his own subjects; an event which promised no great benefit to the *Romans*: for though the *Syracusians*, fond of liberty, seemed much inclined to change the monarchy into a commonwealth, they seemed no less inclined to side with the *Carthagi- nian Republic*.

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C H A P. XXIV. FIFTH YEAR of the War.

The wise and public spirited conduct of the Romans in several instances. They gain some advantages over Hannibal in Italy, and over King Philip in Greece.

IN Italy, the campaign of this year being ended, ^{V. of R.} *Fabius* took the road to *Rome*, to hold the *comitia* ^{538.} ^{Bef. J. C.} by centuries for the new elections. The prudent Con-^{214.} ^{237. Con-} sul did not enter the city, but appeared at the assembly in the *Campus Martius*, on the day appointed, in his fulship. military habit, and attended by his Lictors with their axes as well as fasces. It fell by lot to the tribe of the *Anio*, to vote first, and of this tribe to a century which consisted of the younger men; and the majority of this prerogative century named to the Consulship, *T. Otacilius* (a relation of the president) and *M. Æmilius Regillus*, men, neither of them, of such abilities as the present exigency required. *Fabius* therefore thought fit ^{Liv. B.24.} ^{c. 8.} to interrupt the election, and harangue the assembly. He first excused the irregularity of his proceeding, by the present dangers which threatened the state. He then represented to them the importance of chusing Consuls qualified to enter the lists with *Hannibal*; that *Otacilius* had given no cause to think him equal to that enterprise, not having performed any one thing for which the command of the fleet had, this year, been intrusted to him, and that *Æmilius*, as high-priest of *Quirinus*, could not be absent from *Rome*. ‘Romans, (be added) do you name such Consuls as you would wish to be conducted by, if you were this moment to

After the thirty-five tribes were compleated, the Centuries, which form'd the *comitia centuriata*, were divided among the tribes, and became parts of them; and then in these assemblies it was decided by lot which of the tribes should vote first, and the tribe upon which the lot fell was called the *prerogative tribe*. Then lots were again cast among the *centuries* of this *prerogative tribe*, to determine which of those should vote before the rest; and the Century upon which the lot fell was called the *prerogative century*. *Rofin. p. 466.*

Y. of R. give *Hannibal* battle. I pronounce, That the prerogative century give their suffrages again. Heralds, Bef. J. C. proclaim my orders.' *Oscilius* at first made some opposition to this; but the Lictors with their axes surrounded him, and soon forced him to silence. Then the prerogative century returned to the voting place, and gave their suffrages for the president himself, *Q. Fabius Verrucosus* * (surnamed *Cunctator*, or the *Lingerer*) and *Claudius Marcellus* †, who was absent; and the other Centuries unanimously followed the example of this. *Rome* had never seen two greater men together at the head of her affairs. And though *Fabius*, by an irregular proceeding, had procured his own continuance in the Consular dignity, against law and custom, yet no one accused him of ambition or tyranny, or of being actuated by any motive but a zeal for his country. The *Romans* were convinced of the necessity of continuing the commanders of their armies more than one year in office; and they now therefore made little alteration in the disposition of military employments.

Liv. B. 24. c. 1. As a law had been made the last year (at the motion of *Oppius*, a tribune of the people) to restrain the luxury of women, forbidding them to wear above half an ounce of gold in toys, and to ride in a chariot within a mile of *Rome*, except to a public sacrifice; so now the Censors, *M. Atilius Regulus*, and *P. Furius Philus*, made a strict enquiry into the offences committed by the men, to the detriment of the public. *Cæcilius Metellus* and the other young nobles who with him would in despair have left *Italy* after the battle of *Cannæ*, those of the ten deputies, from the prisoners taken at that battle, who had not returned to *Hannibal* according to their oath, and about 2000 young men of military age who had neglected, without just cause, to enrol themselves for the service, were all degraded.

* *Liv. B. 24. c. 18.* also decreed that all who were stigmatized by the Censors, should be sent into *Sicily*, and there be obliged to serve on foot, among the runaways from the battle of *Cannæ*, till the war should be at an end. The *Romans* never

never exerted their virtue and disinterested zeal for Y. of R. their country in a greater degree than in this second 539. Punic war; private men voluntarily advanced money Bef. J. C. for the public works; the masters who had sold their 233. slaves to the Republic, would not accept of payment 238. Con- till the war was ended; scarce a centurion or trooper fulship. demanded his pay, and if any one had so little generosity as to receive it from the Quæstor, he became the jest of his legion. Nay, the money of the widow and the orphan was freely brought into the treasury, so great was the confidence in the public faith.

Such being the dispositions of the people, the new *Liv. B. 24.* levies were soon compleated. Six legions were added c. 11. to the twelve already on foot. The Sicilian expedition seemed to require the most dispatch: and *Otacilius* was therefore ordered to embark with all diligence for that island, with one legion. And in order to man and equip the fleet, the Consuls, by authority from the Senate, laid a tax upon the rich. Each head of a family, who by the Censors register was found worth from 50000 to 100000 asses, was obliged to maintain a rower or a sailor, at his own expence, for six months; and the more wealthy three, five, seven, in proportion to their riches. The Senators were obliged each to maintain eight sailors for a whole year.

What remained now, was to march the land forces, and begin the campaign in *Italy*. *Hannibal*, who had spent the winter in *Apulia*, returned to his camp on the *Tifata*, at the request of the *Capuans*, who thought their city threatened. He had ordered *Hanno*, with an army of 17000 foot, and 1200 Numidian horse, to come from the country of the *Bruttians*, and seize *Beneventum*; but *Sempronius*, with his army of *Volones*, prevented him, and possessed himself of that defenceless city. From thence he marched to give *Hanno* battle; and, to engage his *Volones* to exert themselves, he promised every man his liberty, who should bring off the head of an enemy. The Senate had given him power to enfranchise whom he pleased. But this pro- c. 15, 16. mise had like to have ruined his affairs. For though

Y. of R. his troops fought bravely at first, they lost much time
 539. in cutting off the heads of the enemies they had slain,
 Bef. J. C. and the ardour of those who had performed the condi-
 213. tion of obtaining their freedom, was immediately a-
 238 Con- bated : so that he was forced to publish a new declara-
 fulship, tion through all the ranks of his army, ‘ That none
 ‘ should obtain their liberty, unless the *Carthaginians*
 ‘ were routed.’ Hereupon the *Volones* renewed the
 fight with impetuosity, and gained so compleat a victo-
 ry, that scarce 2000 of the enemy escaped*. We are
 told however that 4000 of those legionary slaves did
 not behave themselves in the battle so well as the rest,
 and were afraid to pursue the enemy to their camp; and
 that apprehending punishment for their cowardice, they
 retired after the action to a hill. *Sempronius* had com-
 passion for their weakness, and sent a Tribune to invite
 them back: and then to perform his promise, he pro-
 nounced all, without exception, free. Nevertheless,
 that some distinction might be made between the brave
 and the cowards, he forbade the latter to eat sitting or
 lying down, all the time of their service, unless they
 were sick.

In the mean while, *Hannibal* endeavoured to surprise
Puteoli. Failing in this attempt, he went and pillaged
 the country about *Naples*. From thence he moved to-
 wards *Nola*, whither the populace (who were still in his
 interest, in opposition to their Senate) had invited him.
 Liv. B. 24. *Marcellus* being joined by the army from *Sueffula* (now
 c. 17. under *Q. Pomponius*) attack'd and kill'd 2000 of his
 men, with the loss only of 400; and would have en-
 tirely ruined him, had *Claudius Nero*, whom the Consul
 had ordered with some squadrons out of *Nola* to make
 a tour, and fall upon the *Carthaginians* in the rear during
 the action, come up in time. *Marcellus* offered *Han-
 nibal* battle again the next day; but the latter declined
 it, decamped the night following, and marched to-
 wards *Tarentum*.

* The reader has been already cautioned concerning *Livy's* tales
 of Roman victories in this war.

He had entertained strong hopes that this city would open her gates to him, upon his first appearance before it. Some *Tarentine* prisoners, whom he had formerly released without ransom, had engaged a great number of the young men of that place in his Interest, and these invited him thither. But *M. Livius*, who commanded in the place, took such effectual measures to prevent the designs of the factious, that *Hannibal* was again disappointed. He quitted the enterprize, and marched towards *Salapia* in *Apulia*, where he resolved to spend the winter. Thither he ordered corn to be brought from *Lucania*; and his foragers having found in *Apulia* about 4000 colts, *Hannibal* ordered them to be broke; and with them he remounted his *African* horsemen. These were all his exploits during the whole campaign.

But whilst the *Carthaginian* was on his march to *Tarentum*, *Fabius* besieged *Caslinum*, and sent to *Marcellus* to come with some legions and cover the siege, apprehending an attack from the *Capuans*. The garrison in the place consisted of 2000 *Campanians*, and 700 *Carthaginians*; and they made so vigorous a defence, that *Fabius*, by the daily slaughter of his men, was much discouraged. He would have raised the siege, if *Marcellus* had not represented to him, ‘ That a wise General should well consider all the difficulties of an enterprize before he undertakes it; but that, when it is once undertaken, he ought to go through with it: and that to desist now from the siege, would much lessen the credit of the Republic among her allies.’ Upon this *Fabius* renewed his attacks with more ardour than ever; and the *Campanians* were so intimidated by it, that they sent to him an offer to quit the place *Plut. life* if they might retire in safety to *Capua*. *Fabius* con-*of Fabius.* sented; but *Marcellus* taking his opportunity, before fifty of them were come out of the city, seized the gate, entered the place, and put all who opposed him to the sword, without distinction. The prisoners he

* This story ill agrees with the character given by the historians of *Marcellus*, but well with his after behaviour at the siege of *Syracuse*.

Y. of R. sent to *Rome*. After the taking of *Casilinum*, *Marcellus*
 539. returned to *Nola*, and *Fabius* marched into *Samnium*,
 Ref. J. C. laid waste the country, and took several towns.

213. 238. *Hannibal* still depended upon his alliance with the
 Con- fulship. king of *Macedon*, and indeed *Philip* began to draw to-
 Liv. B. 24. wards *Italy*. He first besieged *Apollonia*; but not suc-
 c. 40. ceeding in this enterprize, he turned his arms against
Oricum, and took it. The inhabitants sent notice of
 their misfortune to *Lævinus* at *Brundusium*, who in two
 days after the news, arrived before the place. The
 King had left a small garrison in it, and was returned to
 the siege of *Apollonia*. *Lævinus* easily took *Oricum*,
 and while he was there, deputies came to him from the
 people of *Apollonia*, begging assistance against the *Ma-*
cetodians. He sent thither 2000 foot under the com-
 mand of *Q. Nævius Crispa*, who got into the town with-
 out being perceived by the enemy. *Nævius* soon after
 understanding that the *Macedonian* camp was very ne-
 gligently guarded, broke into it in the night, and, if
 his soldiers had abstained from Slaughter, might have
 taken *Philip* prisoner; but the groans of the dying
 waked others, who carried off the King half naked to
 his ships. He returned into *Macedon*, and the *Roman*
 fleet wintered at *Oricum*.

C H A P. XXV.

Transactions in Sicily. The Carthaginian interest prevails in Syracuse. Marcellus besieges it, but soon turns the siege into a blockade.

HANNIBAL made himself some amends for his disappointment on the side of *Macedon*, by the troubles he found means to raise in *Sicily*. *Hippocrates* and *Epicydes* two brothers, of *Syracusan* extraction, whom he had sent to conclude the treaty with *Hiero-*
 nymus, had worked themselves into that Prince's favour,
 and, at the time of his death, commanded a body of
 c. 23. & 2000 *Syracusans*. Upon the news of the King's assassi-
 seq. nation, these Generals, being abandoned by their sol-
 diers,

diers, repaired to *Syracuse*, as thinking this the safest place for them in the present conjuncture. At their arrival they found that the heads of the conspiracy, who were favoured by the people, had come to an accommodation with *Andranodus*, the late King's uncle, in-law, and chief of the royalist party, and that he, *Tebemistus*, and those leaders, had been chosen Praetors to govern the state with the assistance of a Senate. The two *Hannibalists*, doubtless believing that this change of government had changed the dispositions of the *Syracusians* with respect to *Hannibal*, to prevent all suspicion of their designing to raise disturbances, applied themselves to the Praetors, and by their means obtained an audience of the Senate. They spoke to this effect, ‘ We came hither on the part of *Hannibal* to treat with his friend *Hieronymus*. We have only obeyed the commands of our General, and desire now to return to him ; but as our journey is not like to be with safety to our persons, the *Roman* forces so much infesting *Sicily*, we request that we may have a convoy as far as *Locri* in *Italy*.’ Their suit was easily obtained ; for the assembly had no unwillingness to be rid of these Generals of the late King, men extremely bold and enterprising, of great ability in war, and of narrow fortunes. The Senate however were too dilatory in executing their own desires ; and the brothers took advantage of the delay. Sometimes to the soldiers, with whom they were very intimate and familiar, sometimes to the deserters from the *Roman* fleet, and occasionally to the meanest of the populace, they whispered calumnies against the senators and other principal men of the city, accusing them, that under colour of renewing the league with *Rome*, they designed to betray *Syracuse* to her, in the view, that their own faction, having the sole merit of the pretended new alliance, might lord it over the rest.

These rumours being spread and believed, and drawing every day crowds of people to *Syracuse*, gave not only *Hippocrates* and *Epicydes*, but also *Andranodus*, who at the pressing instances of his ambitious wife,

Demarata,

Y. of R. *Demarata*, the daughter of *Hiero*, aimed at the royalty, good hopes of changing the government, and effecting Bef. J. C. their several designs. *Andranodorus* having concerted 539. his scheme with *Themistus*, the husband of *Harmonia*, 213. 238 Con- fulship. *Hieronymus*'s sister, unadvisedly imparted the secret to *Aristo*, a tragedian, who discovered it to the *Prætors*. *Aristo*'s profession was not dishonourable among the Greeks: He was a man well descended, and of a good estate, and the *Prætors* therefore had no reason to reject his testimony; and it being confirmed by several corroborating circumstances, they, in concert with some of the oldest senators, placed guards at the door of the senate-house, who slew *Andranodorus* and *Themistus* as soon as they entered. This extraordinary action, (most of the senators being ignorant of the cause of it,) raised a great commotion and terror in the assembly. *Aristo* put an end to their fears. Being introduced by the *Prætors*, he informed the Senate, ‘That a plot had been laid to cut off all the chiefs of the republic, and to seize * *Ortygia* in the name of *Andranodorus*, and that this was to have been executed by the help of the *Spanish* and *African* mercenaries, who had served under *Hieronymus*.’ He then entered into the particulars of the conspiracy, declaring the names of all the conspirators, and the several parts they were to have acted. His evidence obtained full belief, and the assembly passed a decree, pronouncing the death of *Andranodorus* and *Themistus* no less just than that of *Hieronymus*. In the mean time the people without doors had taken the alarm at this proceeding; and it was necessary to quiet them. The Senate therefore deputed *Sopater*, one of the *Prætors*, to harangue the multitude.

This orator began with invectives against *Andranodorus* and *Themistus*, as if he had been accusing them at the bar, charging them, as the tutors and counsellors of *Hieronymus*, with all the injustices, oppressions, and cruelties, committed by the order or authority of that

* A well fortified Island to the South of *Syracuse*, and joined to the town by a bridge.

King, and with many other atrocious crimes perpetrated since his death. In the conclusion of his speech he intimated that they had been spirited up by their wives, the ambitious daughter and grand-daughter of *Hiero*, to aspire to royalty by the destruction of the people's liberty. At this the whole multitude cried out, that neither of those women ought to live, nor any one of the royal race be suffered to remain on the earth. The Prætors, taking advantage of the people's present fury, immediately put it to the vote, and it was no sooner proposed than carried, ' that all who were of the royal family should be destroyed.' In pursuance of this decree certain officers, commissioned by the Prætors, quickly dispatched *Demarata* and *Harmonia*. There was another daughter of *Hiero*, named *Heraclea*, the wife of *Zoippus*, who had been sent ambassador by *Hieronymus* to King *Ptolemy*, and had chosen to continue at the Egyptian court in a voluntary exile from his country, rather than be a spectator of its miseries. This lady with her two daughters the same executioners inhumanly murthered, and with so much expedition, that an express from the magistrates (who on second thoughts relented) came too late to save them. But now the people began to repent of their own precipitation, and to pity the fate of the dead. Their pity soon turned into rage against the first authors of the cruelty. They furiously called out for an election of Prætors in the room of *Andranodorus* and *Themistus*; an election that was not like to be to the satisfaction of those already in power.

When, on the day appointed, the assembly was formed, it happened beyond all expectation, that somebody from the farther end of the crowd named *Epicydes*, and another a little after named *Hippocrates*, and strait almost the whole multitude joined their suffrages for these two agents of *Hannibal*. The Republic, being very young, no method was yet settled for voting; all were indifferently admitted into the voting place, citizens, strangers, and Roman deserters. The magistrates in vain opposed the people's choice. Fearing a sedition they

Y. of R.

539.

Bef. J. C.

213.

238 Con-

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ship.

V. of R. they gave way to numbers, and *Hippocrates* and *Epi-*
^{539.} *cydes* were declared *Prætors*.

Bef. J. C. ^{213.} The two *Hannibalists* did not immediately discover
^{238 Con-} their intentions. They were much dissatisfied, that de-
*sulship.*puties had been sent to *Appius Claudius* to renew the an-
*cident alliance between Rome and Syracuse; yet they
Appius was then at *Murgantia* with a fleet of a hundred
ships, waiting to see what the revolutions among the *Sy-*
racusians would produce.*

At *Rome* it had been resolved, from the apprehension
 that a dangerous war might arise in *Sicily*, to send the
Consul Marcellus to take upon him the direction of af-
*fairs in that island. He was just arrived in his province;
 and *Appius* referred the *Syracusan* deputies to him for a
final answer. The *Consul* approving the conditions,
 dispatched ambassadors to conclude the treaty with the
Prætors at *Syracuse*. But those ambassadors found the
 state of things very different from what they had ex-
 pected. A *Carthaginian* fleet had appeared off *Cape*
Pachynum, and *Hippocrates* and *Epydes* had laid hold
 of this advantage to attempt something in favour of
Carthage, by infusing anew into the minds of the people
 a jealousy of the *Partisans* of *Rome*, a suspicion of their
 intending to betray *Syracuse* to the *Romans*. This jea-
 lousy was the more readily entertained, as *Appius* to en-
 courage the *Roman* party in the town was come with
 his fleet to the mouth of the port. The populace ran
 tumultuously to hinder the *Romans* from landing in case
 they should attempt it.*

In the perplexity occasioned by these commotions,
 the magistrates thought it proper to call an assembly of
 the people. The multitude were for some time divided
 in opinion. At length *Apollonides*, one of the chief
 citizens, with great calmness, and as a man unbiassed
 by any private or party views, represented to them
 ‘ the necessity of unanimously adhering to the one or
 ‘ the other of the rival Republics. The choice, *he said*,
 ‘ was of much less importance than unanimity in choos-
 ing :

‘ ing : yet in his opinion, they had more encourage- Y. of R.
‘ ment to follow the example of *Hiero* than of *Hierony-* 539.
‘ *mus*, and to prefer a treaty with *Rome*, whose friend- Bef. J. C.
‘ ship they had happily experienced for 50 years, to the 213.
‘ uncertain advantages of an alliance with *Carthage*, fulship. 238 Con-
‘ who, in times past, had not proved very faithful to
‘ her engagements. Nor was it a consideration of small
‘ moment, that they must have immediate peace with
‘ the *Romans*, or immediate war with them ; whereas
‘ should they reject the friendship of the *Carthaginians*,
‘ a war with *them* might yet be at a great distance.’
The more dispassionate *Apollonides* appeared, the greater
weight his advice had with the people ; and as they
were in no condition to support a war with *Rome*, it was
in conclusion agreed, that the treaty with that Republic
should be renewed, and a deputation sent to *Marcellus*
for that purpose.

A few days after, the *Leontines* having demanded of
the *Syracusians* a body of troops to defend their frontiers,
the government thought this a favourable opportunity
to get rid of a multitude of soldiers and officers,
who were very turbulent in the city ; and it was deter-
mined that *Hippocrates* should march to the assistance of
the *Leontines* at the head of 4000 men, most of them de-
serters or mercenaries. This *Prætor*, glad of an op-
portunity to create disturbances, readily accepted the
commission, and soon after his arrival among the *Leontines*,
began to make stolen incursions into the *Roman* province,
laying waste the country. *Appius* informed of these hosti-
lities, sent a body of soldiers to protect his allies. Those
troops *Hippocrates* openly attack'd, and put most of them to
the sword. Hereupon *Marcellus* ordered deputies to *Syra-*
cuse to complain of the infraction of the treaty, and to re-
monstrate, that a firm and lasting peace between *Rome*
and *Syracuse*, was not to be hoped for so long as *Hippo-
crates* and *Epicydes* continued in *Sicily*. The latter, fearing
to be accused in the absence of his brother, and de-
sirous of having some share in exciting a war, repaired in
all haste to *Leontini*. There, in conjunction with *Hip-
pocrates*, here presented to the inhabitants ‘ that *Syracuse*,
‘ while

Y. of R. 539. while she provided for her own liberty, had expressly
 covenanted with the *Romans*, that she should have do-
 minion over all the cities formerly subject to *Hierony-*
 mus: But that the *Leontines* had as good a right to
 213. 238 Con- liberty as *Syracuse*; and that they ought therefore
 fulship. to refuse acceding to her treaty with *Rome*, unless that
 covenant were taken out of it.' The multitude was
 easily persuaded; so that when deputies from *Syracuse*
 complained of the slaughter made of the *Roman* troops,
 and desired the *Leontines* would concur with the *Syra-*
cusians, to banish *Hippocrates* and *Epicydes* out of the
 island, the citizens haughtily answered, 'that they had
 given no commission to the *Syracusians* to make a peace
 for them with *Rome*, nor were they bound by a treaty
 concluded without their participation.' The *Syracusians*
 acquainted *Marcellus* with this answer, and at the same
 time declared, that they would not only adhere steadily
 to their engagements with the *Romans*, but would join
 with them in besieging *Leontini*, on condition that this
 city after it's reduction, were restored to the dominion
 of *Syracuse*. *Marcellus* agreed to the proposal, assembled
 all his forces, sent for the *Prætor Appius* to come to his
 assistance, and prepared to attack *Leontini*.

Plut. life. About this time, a great company of those *Roman* sol-
 of *Marcel-* diers who had fled from the battle of *Cannæ*, and who
Ius. Liv. B. had been condemned, by a decree of the Senate, to
 25. c. 5, 6, serve in a separate corps in *Sicily* as long as the war
 7. should last in *Italy*, came, with the permission of their
 commander *Lentulus*, and earnestly begged of the *Con-*
sul to be incorporated in his legions. *Marcellus* wrote to
Rome in their favour: The *Conscript Fathers* returned
 answer, that it was their opinion, the Republic ought
 not to put any confidence in the courage of soldiers who
 had deserted their companions at the battle of *Cannæ*;
 yet if *Marcellus* thought otherwise, he might act in this
 matter as he pleased, provided none of them ever re-
 ceived any military rewards, or were suffered to return
 to *Italy* before the end of the war.

Livy, B. *Leontini* was taken upon the first assault, but *Hippo-*
 24. c. 30. *crates* and *Epicydes* made their escape to *Erbeffus*. A body
 of

of 8000 Men from *Syracuse*, under the command of *Sofis* Y. of R. and *Dinomenes*, two of the Prætors, marching to join ^{539.} *Bef. J. C.* *Marcellus*, were met at the river *Mylas*, by a man ^{213.} who told them, that *Leontini* had been sacked, ^{Plut.} *Con-* and all, without distinction, able to bear arms, put ^{life of} *fulship.* *Marcellus.* to the sword. This false story (occasioned by the execution of 2000 deserters, whom *Marcellus* had taken in the place) made such an impression on the soldiers, that their officers could not prevail with them to proceed to *Leontini*, but were forced to turn aside and lead them to *Megara*. From this place the Prætors marched them soon after towards *Erbeffus*, believing, that the seditious spirit among them would be easily quelled, if *Hippocrates* and *Epicydes*, the true authors of all the late disturbances, were destroyed, or driven out of the country.

The brothers found themselves now reduced to extremities; yet having some hope in the good-will of the soldiers, with whom they were well acquainted, and this hope being favoured by the recent report of the massacre at *Leontini*, they left *Erbeffus*, in the resolution to yield themselves up to the soldiers at discretion. It happened luckily for them, that a body of *Cretans*, which had formerly served the *Romans* as auxiliaries, and, being taken prisoners at the battle of *Thrasymen*, had been set at liberty by *Hannibal*, and had since served under *Hippocrates* and *Epicydes* in the reign of *Hieronymus*, was marching in the van of the army. To these they addressed themselves in a suppliant manner, presenting them olive branches, and imploring their protection, ‘that they might not be left to the mercy of the *Syracusians*, who would quickly deliver them up to be slain by the *Romans*.’ The *Cretans* immediately cried out to them, to take courage, and promised to defend them: So that when *Sofis* and *Dinomenes*, informed of what passed, came in haste and ordered the *Hannibalists* to be seized, they found no obedience from their troops, but rather a disposition to revolt. In this perplexity they gave orders for returning to *Megara*, and sent an account to *Syracuse* of what had happened. During the

Y: of R. march of the army, a letter forged by *Hippocrates*, but
 539. pretended to be written by the Prætors at Syracuse to
 Bef. J. C. *Marcellus*, and intercepted, was produced and read to the
 213. soldiers by the contriver of it. It was to this effect.
 238 Con-
 fulship. ‘The Prætors of Syracuse to the Consul *Marcellus*, health.
 ‘You have done justly and prudently in sparing none
 ‘at *Leontini*. All the mercenaries deserve the same fate.
 ‘Nor will Syracuse ever be in peace while any foreign
 ‘soldiers remain either in the city or the army.
 ‘Turn then your arms against those who are with our
 ‘Prætors at *Megara*, and by their destruction restore
 ‘us to perfect liberty.’ This letter kindled such a
 flame among the soldiers, and their sudden loud clamours so terrified *Sofis* and *Dinomenes*, that they galloped
 away in all haste to Syracuse. Their flight did not quiet
 the commotion: The mercenaries fell upon the Syracusan
 soldiers that were in the army, and would have put
 them all to the sword, if the *Hannibalists* had not inter-
 posed in their defence, desiring to make use of them as
 hostages, and also hoping by their means to gain friends
 in Syracuse. Thither they instantly sent a soldier, who
 had been in *Leontini* when it was taken, to spread the
 false story of the massacre of its inhabitants. The
 artifice had the desired effect, even upon the Senate and
 the chief men in the Republic. They thought it ne-
 cessary to shut the gates and guard the city against the
 Romans, as against an enemy whose avarice and cruelty
 would spare nothing. Scarce was this done, when *Hippo-*
crates and *Epicydes* appeared before the walls at the head
 of the mercenaries, and, by the assistance of the multi-
 tude within (who would not be restrained by their ma-
 gistrates) broke open one of the gates and entered the city.
 The Prætors retired with the Syracusan soldiery into that
 quarter of the town, which was called *Achradina*, hoping
 to defend themselves there; but the *Hannibalists* being
 joined by the mercenaries, the deserters and all the
 soldiers of the late king, took it at the first assault.
 Those of the Prætors who could not escape in the first
 confusion of the conflict were massacred, together with
 many of the citizens; and the next day, liberty being
 granted

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Chap. XXV. Second Punic War.

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granted to all slaves and prisoners, the mixed multitude Y. of R. declared *Hippocrates* and *Epicydes* their Praetors.

539.

Marcellus, upon the news of this revolution, advanced Bef. J. C. with his army to *Syracuse*. Before he began hostilities,^{213.} he sent deputies to the *Syracusians*, to assure them, he fulship.²³⁸ did not come to make war upon *them*, but assist those of their fellow-citizens, who having escaped the slaughter in *Achradina*, had taken refuge in his camp, and those who suffered yet greater wrongs in the city, from tyranny and oppression: That what he therefore insisted upon was, that the refugees under his protection should be restored to their possessions and privileges, the authors of the disturbances given up, and *Syracuse* put in a condition to enjoy peaceably her laws and liberty: And he threatened war against whoever should oppose these demands. The brothers, not thinking it safe to let the deputies enter the town, gave them audience without the walls; and when the latter had made their demands, *Epicydes* spoke to this effect: ‘ If you had brought any message to us, we would have returned an answer. You may now go back; and when the government of *Syracuse* is in the hands of those to whom you have orders to address yourselves, you may come back again. If *Marcellus* is for war, he will find the siege of *Syracuse*, an enterprise somewhat different from the siege of *Leontini*.’ The Consul, upon the return of his deputies, invested the place by sea and land.

Syracuse stood on the south-east side of *Sicily*, and was properly five cities in one; *Ortygia*, *Achradina*, *Tyche*, *Neapolis*, and *Epipole*. *Ortygia* was a small island, very near the continent, and might be called the citadel of *Syracuse*; it was joined to *Achradina* by a bridge. All the attempts of *Marcellus* to carry the town by assault were frustrated by the surprizing inventions of *Archimedes*. This great man is said to have once told King *Hiero*, that he could move the globe of the earth, provided he had another earth to stand upon. And he now contrived machines which cast stones of so prodigious a weight, as to break in pieces all the battering engines of the *Romans*. Nay, he invented a sort of iron crows

Y. of R. crows fastened to chains, which being let fall upon the
 539. *Roman gallies* (that were brought close to the wall of the
 Bef. J. C. town) stuck fast in the prows of them, drew them up,
 213. Con- by means of a counterpoise on that part of the machine
 238 fulship. which was within the rampart, and set them on one end, or overturned them: Insomuch that the *Romans* were utterly discouraged, and *Marcellus* obliged to remove to a further distance. It was resolved in a council of war, to attack the place no more, but shut up all the avenues of it, in order to reduce it by famine.

C H A P. XXVI. SIXTH YEAR of the war.

The Roman arms prosper in Italy. Syphax a Numidian King is gained by the Scipios to make war upon the Carthaginians in Africa. The blockade of Syracuse is continued, while Marcellus reduces some other towns in Sicily.

Y. of R. At Rome, *Q. Fabius Maximus*, the son of *Fabius*
 540. *Cunctator*, and *T. Sempronius Gracchus*, were chosen
 Bef. J. C. Consuls for the new year, and appointed, in concert
 212. Con- with the Praetorian armies in *Italy*, to conduct the war
 239 fulship. against *Hannibal*. *Marcellus* continued in *Sicily*, and had the government of the country formerly subject to *Hiero*. *Lentulus* with the title of Pro-Praetor, commanded the *Roman* province in that island, and *T. Otacilius Crassus* guarded the coast with his fleet. The two *Scipios*, *Laevinus* and *Scævola* managed the affairs of *Rome* in the respective countries of *Spain*, *Greece* and *Sardinia*. And the Republic employed this year in her several armies, twenty one *Roman* legions, besides the troops of her allies.

All the regulations necessary for beginning the campaign being dispatched, young *Fabius* set out from *Rome*, and took upon him the command of the army at *Sueffula*. His father served under him.

Liv. B. 24. c. 45. While the *Fabii* continued here, *Dafius Alinius*, one of the chief men of *Arpi*, who had engaged that city to revolt to *Hannibal*, came and offered, for a reward, to restore

restore it into the hands of its former masters. The Y. of R. affair being brought before a council, some were for ^{540.} treating the villain as *Camillus* had treated the school-
master of *Falerii*; but old *Fabius* represented to them, ^{Bef. J. C. 212.} Con-
that though such traitors ought never to be trusted as fulship.
friends, yet, in the present circumstances of the Repub-
lic, no discouragement should be given to those of the
rebels who were disposed to return to their former obe-
dience; and he advised, that *Altinius* should only be
kept in an easie confinement till the end of the war,
when it would be time enough to judge whether he had
made sufficient amends for his revolt. This advice was
followed, and the traitor sent to *Cales*, where in the day-
time he was suffered, to walk abroad with a guard, but
confined close prisoner at night. As soon as he was
missed at *Arpi*, the inhabitants sent notice of it to *Hanni-
bal*. The *Carthaginian* was in no manner of pain at the
news; he had long considered *Altinius* as a man in whom
he could place no confidence, and was glad of this pre-
text to seize his riches, which were very great. But that
he might appear to act rather from the motive of re-
venge than avarice, he sent for the wife and children of
Altinius, and having put them to the torture, partly to
discover the traitor's design, but chiefly to learn what
money he had left behind him, he ordered them to be
burnt alive.

The *Fabii* opened the campaign with an assault upon *Arpi*, in which was a garrison of 5000 men. The *Romans* in a dark rainy night surprised and entered the place on the strongest side, where it was least guarded. Nevertheless the garrison, assisted by 3000 of the townsmen, whom, through suspicion of them, they placed in the front, made a stout defence. At length the citizens, and, after their example, 1000 *Spaniards* went over to the *Romans*. The *Spaniards*, according to *Livy*, bargained that the rest of the garrison should have leave to depart in safety, which they accordingly did, and joined *Hannibal* at *Salapia*.

In the mean time 112 of the chief men of *Capua* having, under the pretext of pillaging the enemy's

Y. of R. lands, got permission to leave the town, went to the
 540. *Roman* camp above *Sueffula*, and yielded themselves to
 Bef. J. C. the Prætor *Fulvius*, upon a promise of being restored
 212. to their estates, when *Capua* should be reduced to the
 239 Con- to their estates, when *Capua* should be reduced to the
 fulship. obedience of the Republic.

Liv. B. 24. Nothing further of great moment happened in *Italy*
 c. 47. this campaign. The Prætor *Sempronius Tuditanus* took
Aeternum by assault, and in it 7000 prisoners, and a
Liv. B. 25. good deal of money. *Sempronius* the Consul had se-
 c. 1. veral slight skirmishes with the enemy in *Lucania*, and
 reduced a few towns, but none of any note. Two
 petty nations of *Brutium* returned to their former o-
 bedience. *Hanno* the *Carthaginian* defeated a Præfect
 of the *Roman* allies in that country, and cut off almost
 all his army, which consisted of raw undisciplined men.
Hannibal marched from *Salapia* to *Tarentum*, in hopes
 of having that city betray'd to him. He spent the
 summer near it to very little purpose, only some incon-
 siderable towns of the *Salentini* revolted to him.

In *Spain*, the two *Scipios* not only made considerable
Liv. B. 24. progress there, but extended their views even to *Africa*.
 c. 48. They engaged *Syphax* King of *Masælyia* (the western
 part of *Numidia*) to take arms against *Carthage*: And
Scatorius, one of the three officers, whom the *Scipios*
 had sent upon the negotiation, continued with the *Nu-*
midian King at his request, to discipline his troops.
 On the other hand, the *Carthaginians*, alarmed at the
 motions of the *Masælyian*, prevailed with *Gala* King
 of *Masylia* (the eastern part of *Numidia*, and the near-
 est to their territory) to join with them, to divert the
 threatened storm. *Gala* gave the command of his
 forces to his son *Masinissa*, a youth of about 17 years
 of age, who, in conjunction with the *Carthaginian* ar-
 my, defeated *Syphax* in a great battle, and slew 30000
 of his men. The vanquished King retired into *Mau-*
ritania, and made new levies there, intending to pass
 the freights, and join the *Scipios* in *Spain*: But *Masi-*
nissa followed him close, kept him so employed in *Afri-*
ca, that he had not leisure to cross the seas.

In the mean while the blockade of *Syracuse* continued. *Marcellus*, not thinking all his forces necessary for that purpose, left two thirds of the army before the place under the command of *Appius Claudius*, and marched with the remainder, to reduce some towns of *Sicily* which had gone over to the *Carthaginians*. *Pelorus* and *Erbeßus* surrendered to him, and *Megara* he took by force and plundered. About this time *Himilco* arrived from *Africa*, with an army of 25000 foot, 3000 horse, and 12 elephants, and soon made himself master of *Heraclea* and *Agrigentum*. Upon this news, *Hippocrates* left his brother *Epicydes* to command in *Syracuse*, and sallying out of the town with 10000 foot and 500 horse, broke through the *Roman* lines in the night, and marched to join *Himilco*. This detachment surprised, as they were pitching their camp near *Acriæ*, and he cut in pieces the infantry: But *Hippocrates* escaped with the cavalry, and, joining *Himilco*, turned against the Pro-Consul, in hopes of overtaking him before he could reach his camp at *Syracuse*. Disappointed in this expectation, and not daring to attack *Marcellus* in his entrenchments, the *Carthaginian* Generals employed their forces to reduce the Sicilian cities that were in the interest of *Rome*. *Murgantia* opened her gates to them, and betrayed the *Roman* garrison into their hands. *L. Pinarius*, the Governor of *Enna*, dreading the like fate, massacred all the inhabitants of that town, and pillaged it. *Marcellus* approved the fact, and granted the plunder of *Enna* to the soldiers of the garrison. The news of this barbarity, committed in a city held in great veneration all over the island, and sacred to *Proserpine* (whom *Pluto* was said to have carried off from that neighbourhood) alienated the minds of the *Sicilians* from *Rome*; and many of their towns embraced the party of the *Carthaginians*. Winter approaching, *Marcellus*, having dismissed *Appius Claudius*, who had a mind to stand for the Consulship, gave the command both of the fleet and the army before *Syracuse* to

Y. of R. *Quinctius Crispinus*, and took up his own quarters about
^{540.} five miles from the town.

Bef J. C. During these transactions in *Sicily*, all was peaceable
^{212.} *Con. at Rome*: Only religion suffered by the introduction of
 fulship. foreign Gods and foreign rites, which the superstition
Liv. B. 25. of a multitude of people from the country, driven by
^{c. i.} poverty and fear to shelter themselves in *Rome*, had,
 in this uncertain state of things, made them prone to
 receive. Foreign priests and diviners had dispersed a-
 mong them books, containing prophecies, forms of
 prayer, and particular methods of sacrificing. The
 ancient worship was almost forgot. It seemed, says
Livy, as if a new set of Gods were, on a sudden, come
 into being; or that a new species of men was risen.
 The evil became at leng^h so general, that the *Conscript*
Fathers were forced to interpose. The *Prætor* having
 assembled the people, read to them a decree of the Se-
 nate, and, in conformity thereto, his own edict; which
 ‘ commanded all persons, who had books of divination
 ‘ or prayers, or containing instructions about the rites
 ‘ of sacrifices, to bring them to him before the first of
 ‘ April; and forbade all persons to offer sacrifice in
 ‘ public, or in any sacred place whatsoever, according
 ‘ to any new or foreign ceremonies.’ Thus were the
 innovations suppressed, and religion settled again upon
 the ancient footing.

C H A P. XXVII. S E V E N T H and E I G H T H Y E A R S of the War.

*The city of Tarentum betrayed to Hannibal. He besieges
the citadel.—Capua besieged by the Romans.—Syracuse
taken by Marcellus. Hannibal marches into the neig-
bourhood of Rome; retires thence; defeats a Roman
army; and marches to Rhegium.—Capua surrenders
to the Romans.—They gain some advantages over King
Philip in Greece.*

TH E time for the elections drawing on, and the
 present *Consuls* being both engaged abroad in the
 war,

war, one of them nominated *C. Claudius Centho Dictator*, to hold the *Comitia*. And there *Q. Fulvius Flaccus*, and *Appius Claudius Pulcher*, were chosen Consuls for the new year. It was thought fit to add two legions to the twenty-one already on foot; a surprising multitude of soldiers, to be all raised out of the citizens of *Rome*, and exclusive of the troops of the allies, which were at least as numerous as the *Roman* legionaries! But the making these new levies was interrupted, and the departure of the Consuls delayed for some time, by an incident, which revived the hatred of the people to the publicans.

It has been observed before, that the publicans undertook to supply the *Roman* armies in *Spain* with provisions; and the Senate had agreed to indemnify them, in case of losses at sea. *Posthumius*, an avaricious wretch, took advantage of this condition to practise rogueries, and impose upon the public. He placed to their account many shipwrecks which had never happened; he also put small quantities of goods of little value on board old shattered vessels; which, after he had brought off the seamen in boats ready for that purpose, he sunk; and then pretended the cargoes had been extremely rich. By this means he made his losses run very high, and demanded great sums in consideration of them. But his knavery was at length discovered, and two Tribunes of the people threatened to have him fined 200000 asses of brass; in order to which they cited him to appear and take his trial before the *Comitia by Tribes*. Hereupon the friends of the accused applied themselves to *Servilius Casca*, a relation of *Posthumius*, and one of the Tribunes: But *Casca* not daring, through shame and fear of the people, to protest against the proceedings of his colleagues, the publicans, who were all interested in the affair, had recourse to violence, and insulted both the people and their magistrates. And they were just ready to come to blows, when the Consul *Fulvius* said to the Tribunes of the commons, ‘ You see how little respect is shewn to your persons. If you do not dissolve the assembly,

the

Y. of R.⁴ the affair will end in sedition.' The Tribunes followed his advice ; and, being afterwards authorised by the Senate, changed the nature of the process, and made the affair capital. *Postbumius*, and the other publicans who assisted him in the riot, were cited to appear as criminals before the *Comitia by Centuries*. Some were dragged to prison, for want of the sureties required of them ; others went into a voluntary banishment ; *Postbumius* left his bail and fled ; and *Rome* was delivered from a gang of bold and avaricious villains.

In the end of the winter *Hannibal* had surprized *Tarentum*. The inhabitants of this place had long been disaffected to the Republic, and lately provoked by the cruel execution of some hostages, they had sent to *Rome*, and who had attempted to make their escape. Thirteen of the principal citizens entered into a plot to deliver up the city to the *Carthaginian*. *Nico* and *Philomenus* were at the head of them. They made hunting their pretence for night-excursions. The game they brought home, and with which they furnished the table of *Livius*, the commander of the *Roman* garrison, pleased him so much, that, without the least suspicion, he allowed them the liberty of going out and coming in at pleasure. By this means the conspirators had frequent conferences with *Hannibal*, and having engaged him to promise,

' That when he should become master of *Tarentum*,
 ' the inhabitants should enjoy their laws, liberties,
 ' and estates, without infringement ; that they should
 ' not be subject to pay any tribute, or to receive a *Car-*
*t**baginian* garrison, without their own consent ; and
 ' that the effects of the *Romans* only should be given
 ' up as free booty to his troops,' they undertook to bring him into the town. *Hannibal* was at the distance of three days march from *Tarentum*, and feigned himself sick in his camp, that his long stay there might not occasion suspicion. At length *Philomenus* gave him notice, that a favourable opportunity offered to put their project in execution. The *Carthaginian* came away with a detachment of 1000 men, and concealed himself in a valley fifteen mile from the city.

Philomenus

Philomenus brought him word, that the next night the Y. of R. Roman Governor was to be at an entertainment, and would probably drink to excess; and that when he was fast asleep, it would be the proper time for the at-^{541.} ^{Bef. J. C.} ^{211.} ^{240.} Contumeliousness.

All preparations being made by the conspirators, both within and without the city, *Hannibal*, conducted by *Polyb. B.8.* *Philomenus*, approached the walls about midnight. Thec. 24. *Carthaginian* then giving a part of his forces to the *Tarentine*, silently drew near with the rest to the gate *Temenides*, and gave the appointed signal to *Nico*, who at the head of his party in the town, without much noise made himself master of the gate, slew the guard, and admitted the *Carthaginians*. The General, for the greater security in case of accidents, left 2000 horse without the gate, and advancing with the rest of his troops into the Forum, took possession of it. In the mean time, *Philomenus* had marched with 1000 *Africans* to another gate, at which he used to be admitted when he returned from hunting. He was followed by two young men carrying a wild boar of an enormous size, and when the wicket was opened, and the sentinel upon guard stood examining the beast, *Philomenus* ran him through with a hunting spear. Then thirty *Carthaginians* entered in an instant, broke down the gate, and let in their companions, who, as had been agreed upon, joined *Hannibal* in the Forum. After this the general seized the principal posts in the town, sent parties of men into the different quarters, and with each of them several of the conspirators. His view in this was, that the inhabitants might be distinguished and preserved, while all the *Romans* were put to the sword. To draw these out the more effectually, some men, prepared on purpose, sounded a charge in the theatre with *Roman* trumpets, and after the *Roman* manner. The slaughter continued all that night and part of the next day; but *Livius* with his domestics, in the beginning of the tumult, escaped in a bark to the citadel, which was strongly fortified, and where all that remained of the garrison took refuge.

In

Y. of R. In order to secure the *Tarentines* against all attacks
 541. from the *Romans*, *Hannibal* proposed to cast up a ram-
 Bef. J. C. part over-against the wall of the citadel, and, as he
 211. knew the enemy would endeavour to hinder the
 240 Con- fulship. work, he prepared to receive them. The rampart
 was no sooner begun, than the *Romans* made a vig-
 orous sally. *Hannibal*, defended himself but faintly,
 till he observed that the greatest part of the garrison
 was got over their ditch: then falling furiously upon
 them, he drove them with such slaughter within
 their walls that they did not think proper to attack
 him a second time; and he had leisure to carry on
 his works. Besides the rampart abovementioned he
 ordered a ditch to be drawn, and another rampart to
 be raised upon the brink of it, and within that a wall,
 so that the inhabitants might, without the assistance
 of the *Carthaginians*, easily defend their town against
 all attempts from the citadel. Having left a part
 of his troops to finish and guard the works, in con-
 junction with the *Tarentines*, he encamped with the
 rest of his army on the banks of the *Eurotas* (otherwise
 called *Galepus*) five miles from the city. When the
 fortifications were completed, he returned and besieged
 the citadel in form; but the garrison having received a
 reinforcement from *Metapontus*, a *Roman* city on the
 gulph of *Tarentum*, sallied out, burned his machines in
 the night, and made him lay aside the thoughts of re-
 ducing the place by assault.

However, it was necessary to secure the *Tarentines* a
 free passage to the sea, which was at present cut off
 by the citadel, that stood at the entrance of the port.
 No vessel could safely go out, or come in; and this
 made the *Tarentines* apprehend a scarcity of provisions.
Hannibal, who was not to be discouraged by difficulties,
 formed a scheme (which the ancients have much ad-
 mired) to remedy this evil. There were a good num-
 ber of ships in the haven of *Tarentum*; and he caused
 them to be transported to the sea by land, on carriages
 made for that purpose. These vessels anchored before
 the

the mouth of the haven ; so that the citadel, which before commanded the sea, could now receive no provisions that way ; and the city was supplied. After this, Hannibal returned to his winter quarters, leaving the citadel blocked up by sea and land.

The Consuls *Fulvius* and *Appius*, when their affairs at *Rome* were dispatched, took the field, and marched with their joint forces into *Samnium*. As the *Capuans* expected to be besieged by them, and began already to feel the miseries of famine (for the *Roman* armies had not permitted them to sow their lands) they sent a deputation to *Hannibal*, then near *Tarentum*, to beg he would order them a supply of corn from the towns in their neighbourhood, while the roads were yet open. The *Carthaginian* sent *Hanno* with an army from *Bruttium* to their relief. *Hanno* having pitched his camp near *Beneventum*, gave notice to the *Capuans*, to send their wagons to fetch the corn, which he had collected for them in vast quantities. So indolent and lazy were these effeminate wretches, that they sent but four hundred carts, and a few mules. The *Carthaginian* could not forbear expressing his indignation at such intolerable negligence, and fixed a day when a greater number of carriages should come to remove the rest of the corn. In the mean time the Consuls had notice of what was doing, from the people of *Beneventum*; and *Fulvius* with his troops marched thither with all expedition. He entered the town in the night, and the next morning appeared by break of day before the enemy's camp, while *Hanno* was absent foraging with a part of his army. Two thousand *Capuan* carts were arrived there, and the carters and peasants mixing with the soldiers caused a good deal of disorder. Nevertheless, as the camp was situated upon an ascent, it was very difficult to take it by assault : the *Roman* soldiers signalized their bravery on this occasion, beyond the expectation of their General, who was for quitting the enterprise, or at least suspending it, till his colleague should come to his assistance. One *Vibius*, who commanded a cohort of the *Peligni*, and, after his example, *Pedanius* a Centurion

Y. of R.

541.

Bef. J. C.

211.

240 Con-

fulship.

Liv. B. 25.

c. 13.

Y. of R. turion of the third *Roman* legion, threw each a stan-
 dard over the enemy's rampart, to excite the soldiers.
 Bef. J. C. 54¹. *The stratagem succeeded, the Car-*
^{211.} *Carthaginian entrenchments were forced, and the slaughter*
²⁴⁰ *was great. As for Hanno, having lost his camp,*
Liv. B. 25. *he was forced to return to Brutium with the remainder*
c. 12. *of his army ; and the Capuans sent a new deputation to*
Hannibal, to press him to come to their assistance, be-
ing now more than ever apprehensive of a siege. The
Carthaginian answered, that he would take care of Capua ;
and for the present sent them 2000 horse to defend their
territory from the enemy's incursions. He had still
hopes of reducing the citadel of Tarentum by famine ;
but a convoy of provisions having forced its way through
the Tarentine galleys, entered the place, and disappoint-
ed his expectations. His design upon Thurium succeed-
ed better. Hanno and Mago defeated the Prætor An-
nius, who sallied out of the place ; after which the inha-

Metapontines also, when left by the Roman garrison,
which went to the relief of the citadel of Tarentum, sub-
mitted to the Carthaginians.

During these things, the Consuls entered the ter-
 ritory of *Capua* with a design to besiege the city in form,
 and believing undoubtedly, that *Hannibal* would come
 to its relief, they ordered *Sempronius Gracchus* to leave
Lucania, and draw near to *Capua*, with his horse and
 light armed infantry, that they might be the better
 able to withstand the enemy's cavalry. *Sempronius*
Liv. B. 25. *c. 16.* having left his legions under the command of *Cn. Cor-*
nelius, his Quæstor, was preparing for his march, when
 one *Flavius*, a *Lucanian*, and hitherto zealous in the
Roman interest, changed his inclinations on a sudden,
 and in order to recommend himself to the *Carthagi-*
nians, betrayed the Pro-Consul to them. He pretend-
 ed to *Sempronius*, that the heads of the *Carthaginian*
 faction in *Lucania* were disposed to a reconciliation with
 the Republic, and only desired a private conference
 with him. The *Roman*, not suspecting any deceit,
 suffered

suffered himself, attended only by his lictors and a ^{A.Y.} of R. troop of horse, to be led by the traitor into an ambush, ^{541.} where *Mago* with a body of *Carthaginians* surrounded ^{Bef. J. C.} them; and then *Flavius* went over to the enemy. The ^{211.} ^{240 Con-} Pro-Consul, seeing himself betrayed, dismounted, and ^{fulship.} wrapping his left arm in his paludamentum, for want of a buckler, rushed sword in hand to the place where he saw *Flavius*, in hopes to kill the traitor before he fell himself; but he perished in the attempt, though the *Carthaginians* endeavoured to take him alive. The body of this brave Pro-Consul was carried to *Hannibal's* camp, who erected a funeral pile for him, and did honour to his memory.

While the Consuls were pillaging the country about *Livy*, B. *Capua*, *Mago* with his cavalry and some of the *Capuans* ^{c. 18.} fell upon the *Romans*, of whom he slew 1500. Upon this news *Hannibal* advanced towards the city and offered battle to the enemy. *Appius* and *Fulvius* accepted the challenge, and the engagement was begun, to the disadvantage of the *Romans*, when *Cn. Cornelius* appeared with the *Volones* which had been commanded by *Sempronius*. Each side apprehending, that assistance was coming to the other, immediately sounded a retreat. The Consuls, to draw *Hannibal* from *Capua*, decamped in the night, divided their armies, and marched the one into *Lucania* and the other towards *Cumæ*. The *Carthaginian* next day set out for *Lucania* in pursuit of *Appius*, who had taken the road, but the latter, fetching a compass, returned by another way to the neighbourhood of *Capua*. There happened to be at this time in *Lucania* one *M. Centenius Penula*, who by the credit of the *Prætor Cornelius Sylla*, and by promising great things, had obtained of the Senate the command of a body of 8000 men, which he had encreased to near double that number. *Hannibal*, missing the Consul *Appius*, turned his arms against *Centenius*, entirely defeated him, and cut off almost all his whole army. The *Carthaginian* then marched into *Apulia*, and attacked the *Prætor Fulvius*, who commanded 18000 men in that country. The victory was complete, 16000 of the *Romans*

Y. of R. Romans being slain, and their camp taken. And to
 541. add to the misfortunes of the present campaign, the
 Bef. J. C. *Volones* disbanded themselves. Notwithstanding these
 211. discouragements the Consuls were busy at *Casilinum*,
 240 Con- preparing all things necessary for the siege of *Capua*.
 fulship. They sent for the Praetor *Claudius Nero*, with the forces he commanded at *Sueffula*; and the three Generals with their united armies besieged *Capua* in form.

Liv. B. 25. During this siege, *Marcellus* made himself master of
 c. 23, & seq. *Syracuse*. He took the opportunity of a festival, when
 the soldiers and citizens had drunk plentifully, to make
 a detachment scale the walls of *Tyche*, in that part of it
 which was nearest to *Epipolæ*, and which was ill guarded.^b He presently after possessed himself of *Epipolæ*;
 whereupon the inhabitants of *Neapolis*, as well as
Tyche, sent deputies to him, and submitted. *Marcellus*
 granted life and liberty to all of free condition, but gave
 up those quarters of the city to be plundered.

Notwithstanding this, there was a great deal yet to do. *Achradina* and *Ortygia*, which were strongly fortified, still held out; *Hippocrates* and *Himilco* arrived with their troops to the relief of the besieged; and the *Romans* were forced to exert all their bravery and skill to maintain the advantages they had gained.

But now a plague made terrible havock in both armies. At the first breaking out of the pestilence, the *Sicilians*, who served under *Hippocrates* and *Himilco*, disbanded themselves, and returned to their respective homes; but all the *Carthaginian* soldiers perish'd, together with those two Generals. The *Romans* suffered less by the infection, because, having been a long time before *Syracuse*, they were seasoned to the air and water of the country.

About this time *Bomilcar* arrived on the coast of *Sicily* from *Carthage* with a fleet of 130 galleys and 700

^b Though this account be taken from *Livy*, yet he afterwards tells us, in two or three places, that *Sofis* a Brazier let *Marcellus* into *Syracuse* by night. *Liv. B. 26. c. 21, 30 and 31.*

ships of burthen, but was long hindered by contrary Y. of R. winds from doubling the cape of *Pachynum*. *Epicydes*, ^{541.} fearing the *Carthaginian* might sail back to *Africa*, left ^{Bef. J. C.} the command of *Achradina* to the Generals of the mer- ^{211.} ₂₄₀ Con- cenaries, and went to *Bomilcar*, in order to persuade *fulship*. him to fight the *Roman* fleet. The Admiral would not engage, but sailed away to *Tarentum* with all his galleys, ordering his ships of burthen to return to *Africa*. *Epycides*, thus frustrated of his hopes, and knowing himself unable to defend a city already half taken, retired to *Agrigentum*; whereupon the *Syracusians* massacred the commanders appointed by him, chose new *Prætors* to govern in the town, and sent deputies to *Marcellus* to treat of peace. In the mean time the deserters, fearing to be given up to the vengeance of the *Romans* persuaded the mercenaries that they also would have the same fate. Instantly the soldiers ran to arms, put to death the new *Prætors*, together with many of the *Syracusians*, and plundered part of the city. After this slaughter, they chose six Generals, three to command in *Achradina*, and three in *Ortygia*. Upon the return of the deputies from *Marcellus*, the mercenaries finding that their case was different from that of the deserters, and that there was no design against their lives, became perfectly satisfied, and the negotiation went on. During the course of the treaty, *Marcellus* found means to corrupt *Mericus*, a *Spaniard*, one of the six Generals chosen by the soldiers, and engaged him to admit the *Romans* into that part of the city where he commanded. *Mericus*, the better to accomplish this design, feigned an extraordinary zeal for the preservation of that place; pretended not to like, that deputies should have leave to go out and in at pleasure; and proposed that for the greater security of the town, each General should have a distinct quarter assigned him, and be responsible for any neglect of duty in it. The motion was agreed to, and, upon the division, that district of *Ortygia*, which extended from the fountain of *Arethusa* to the mouth of the great port, fell to his care. *Marcellus*, informed of what was done, took his measures accord-

Y. of R. 541. ingly. He sent a body of troops to that side where *Mericus* commanded, and the *Spaniard* admitted them
 Bef. J. C. at the gate of *Arethusa*. At the same time the Pro-Con-
 211. ful ordered a false attack to be made on *Achradina*,
 240 Con- which drawing almost all the soldiers of the garrison
 ship. thither, *Ortygia* was in a manner left defenceless.
 Foreseeing this, he had detached another party of sol-
 diers to take advantage of it. These entered *Ortygia*
 almost without fighting; upon which the deserters
 made their escape, the *Romans* giving them way; and
 the *Syracusians* in *Achradina*, thus delivered from the
 fear of the deserters, immediately opened their gates
 to *Marcellus*, who thereby became master of the whole
 city.

And now the conqueror, who is said to have wept,
 during the siege, with compassion for the inhabitants,
 gave up both *Ortygia*, and *Achradina*, to be plundered
 by his army, after he had secured the late King's trea-
 sures for the use of his Republic, and the statues,
 paintings, and principal ornaments of *Syracuse* to illus-
 trate his triumph. The soldiers had orders to spare the
 lives of the citizens; but they were cruel in their ava-
 rice, slew many of them, and, among the rest, the in-
 comparable *Archimedes*. He was very intent on a de-
 monstration in geometry, and calmly drawing his lines,
 when a soldier entered the room and clapped a sword to
 Plut. life of his throat. ‘ Hold! (said *Archimedes*) One moment,
 Marcellus. and my demonstration will be finished.’ But the sol-
 dier equally regardless of his prayer and his demon-
 stration, killed him instantly. There are different ac-
 counts of the manner of his death; but all agree, that
Marcellus regretted it extremely, and shewed a singular
 favour to his relations, for his sake.

The consular year being ready to expire, the Senate
 ordered, that one of the Consuls should come from
 Y. of R. *Capua* to hold the *Comitia* for the great elections. App.
 542. *Claudius* repaired to *Rome*, and presided in the assembly,
 Bef. J. C. which transferred the fasces to *P. Sulpicius Galba*, and
 210. *Cn. Fulvius Centumalus*. *Apulia* was to be their pro-
 241 Con- vince; while the late Consuls were in quality of Pro-
 ship. Consuls

Consuls to continue the siege of *Capua*. But as these Y. of R. proposed to reduce the place rather by famine than force they turned the siege into a blockade. ^{542.} Bef. *J. C.*

At *Rome*, *Cn. Fulvius*, the late Prætor, was called to account for the defeat he had suffered in *Apulia*. One fulship. One of the Tribunes of the people cited him to appear before the *Comitia*, purposing only to get him fined for his cowardice and ill-conduct. When the witnesses came to be examined, the charge appeared so heavy, that all the people cried out, *The process ought to be made capital*; and a day was appointed for the trial. *Fulvius* sent to his brother the Pro-Consul before *Capua*, urging him to come to *Rome* and employ all his credit to avert the impending storm. The Pro-Consul would willingly have complied; but the *Conscript Fathers* thinking it a case wherein the publick interest was greatly concerned, absolutely refused him leave to come: so that the accused, having no hopes, went into exile without waiting for his sentence; and the *Comitia*, after his departure, condemned him to banishment.

In the mean time the *Capuans*, greatly distressed for want of provisions, sent a messenger to acquaint *Hannibal* with their present situation. A *Numidian* horseman had the address to pass undiscovered through the *Romans* in the night, and carried the message to the *Carthaginian* General. Upon this advice, leaving the greatest part of the baggage behind him, he marched away with all expedition, arrived before *Capua*, and pitched his camp near the *Roman* entrenchments. At Polyb. I. 9. first he endeavoured by skirmishes to provoke the enemy to a battle, but this not succeeding, he almost besieged them in their camp, frequently assaulting it with bodies of infantry, which relieved one another, while some troops of horse covered them, and threw darts upon the enemy. All his attempts to draw the *Romans* to a battle or to break into the town, proved ineffectual: nor was it possible for him to stay long in the neighbourhood of *Capua* for want of forage, because the enemy, foreseeing his coming, had ruined the country all around. ^{c. 3. & seq.}

Y. of R. Add to this, that there being several armies in the
542. field against him, he feared lest they should join and
Bef. J. C. attack him, or cut off his provisions, and so reduce
210. him to extremities. Convinced that it was impracticable
241. Con- to raise the siege by force, he formed a design, much
fulship. Livy, B. extolled by the ancient writers. He resolved to leave
26. c. 7. his camp silently, march with all expedition, and appear
& seq. before the walls of *Rome*. By this means, he hoped the
affright of the citizens might produce some accident in
his favour, perhaps might give him an opportunity of
surprising the town: if that should not happen, the
Pro-Consuls, he thought, would either quit the block-
ade of *Capua*, or at least divide their army, and send a
part of it to the defence of the capital. In this last case
he did not doubt but he should have an easy victory,
both over those that staid before *Capua*, and those that
marched away. Before he put this scheme in execution,
he took care to acquaint the besieged with his inten-
tion, lest upon his departure they should in despair
surrender the town. Every thing being ready for his
expedition, he set out in the night, and, to deceive the
enemy, left fires burning in his camp. Having march-
ed through *Samnium*, he crossed the *Anio*, and pitched
his camp within five miles of *Rome*, designing to attack
the city next day, if practicable. The *Romans* terrified
at his approach, for he had never been so near their
walls before, at first imagined he had made his way
thither by the slaughter of their army at *Capua*. Their
fears however did not lessen their resolution; and it
happened luckily for them that the Consuls had already
raised one legion, which was to rendezvous at *Rome*
that very day, and had also called together the citizens
in order to select from amongst them another legion:
by which means there was very seasonably a great con-
course of men in the town. *Sulpicius* and *Fulvius* the
Consuls, marched out with an army, and encamped
before the walls. *Hannibal* seeing the *Romans* prepared
to make a stout defence, lost all hopes of being able

to

to take the town^a, and therefore fell to pillaging the ^{y.} of R. country. The Consuls boldly advanced, and encamped ^{542.} within ten furlongs of him. The *Carthaginian*, to se-Bef. *J. C.* cure his booty and execute the remaining part of his ^{210.} scheme, decamped in the night, and passed the *Anio* at ²⁴¹ Con-fulship. a ford, the bridges being all broken down. In his passage he was attacked by the *Romans*, and though the *Numidians*, and the rest of his cavalry, covered his retreat, so that he suffered no great loss, yet the enemy regained a part of the spoil, and took about three hundred prisoners. *Sulpicius* and *Fulvius*, thinking that *Hannibal* fled before them, followed him, but kept to the hills, for fear of a surprize. He, on the other hand, marched at first in great haste, to intercept any forces that, on occasion of his march to *Rome*, might have been sent from *Capua*, or in their absence to attack the *Roman* entrenchments before that city. Finding that none of the besiegers had stirred, he turned against the Consuls that were pursuing him, fell upon their camp in the night, and took it with great slaughter. Next morning he saw those that had escaped posted upon a hill, which was very difficult of access; and he would not lose time in attacking them, having formed a project of greater moment. Despairing to raise the siege of *Capua*, he hoped to surprize *Rhegium*. And though it was situated in the remotest corner of *Italy*, he marched with such rapidity through *Apulia*, *Lucania*, and *Bruttium*, and appeared so unexpectedly before the place, that he took prisoners many of the inhabitants who were walking securely without the walls; and was very near getting possession of the town.

Hannibal's departure left *Capua* without hope of relief. The *Pro-Consuls* signified to the inhabitants, that

^a *Livy* says that when *Hannibal* was before the walls of *Rome*, the ground on which his camp stood was sold at the full price; which so provoked the *Carthaginian* that he put up to sale the bankers shops that were round the *Roman* Forum. The account which the *Latin* historian gives of this expedition differs in many particulars from that of *Polybius*, which is followed in the text.

Y. of R they would spare the lives of all those of them who
 542. would repair to the *Roman* camp; but not one *Capuan*
 Bef. J. C. accepted the offer. The commanders of the *Cartha-*
 210. *ginian* garrison wrote letters to *Hannibal* full of re-
 241. Con-*sulship*, and pressing him not to abandon them to the
 Lit. B. 26. cruelty of the *Romans*. These letters were committed
 c. 12. to the care of some *Numidians*, who pretended to desert,
 and then sought an opportunity to escape to *Rhegium*.
 One of them being followed to the *Roman* camp by his
 mistress, to whom he had disclosed the secret, she be-
 trayed it; and above seventy of the *Numidians* were
 seized, whipped, had their hands cut off, and were
 driven back to *Capua*.

The sight of these maimed wretches threw the city
 into the utmost consternation. These people forced
 the chief of the Senators, who had for some time with-
 drawn themselves from public affairs, to assemble with
 the rest in the Senate house; where the greatest part
 were for sending a deputation to the *Pro-Consuls* to ca-
 pitulate: but *Vibius Virius*, one of the authors of the
 revolt, opposed this motion, and made a speech, the
 whole strain of which was rage and despair. Having
 represented the implacable hatred of the *Romans* to *Ca-*
pua, and exposed the folly of hoping for any favour
 from them, he thus concluded; ‘ Death is our only
 refuge. I have prepared an entertainment at my
 house. When we have finished our repast, a cup
 shall go round, that will end our days and our misfor-
 tunes together. Let all those who are weary of life,
 or despite it, or despair of preserving it, follow me.
 Funeral piles are already prepared to burn our bodies.
 A glorious death will gain us esteem from our ene-
 mies; and the perfidious *Hannibal* will lament the
 loss of allies, who did not deserve to be thus deserted
 and betray’d.’ Twenty seven of the assembly fol-
 lowed *Virius*, accepted the entertainment to which they
 were invited, and closed all with a cup of poison.
 As to the terms of the treaty, which the rest of the
Capuans made with the *Romans*, we can only guess at
 them by what followed. As soon as the latter were in
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possession of the place, they seized the soldiers of the y. of R. garrison and the *Capuan Senators*. These they conveyed to their camp to be tried by the *Pro-Consuls*. ^{542.} *Bef. J. C.* They were first made to discover all their treasures, ^{210.} *Con-* which amounted to seventy pounds weight of gold, ²⁴¹ *fulship.* and three thousand two hundred pounds weight of silver; and then fifty three of them were sent in custody to two *Roman cities* in separate companies; and it was resolved to determine their fate before any thing was decreed concerning the rest of the inhabitants. *Appius* inclined to clemency, *Fulvius* to severity; and the dispute grew warm between them. The former to put an end to it, wrote to the Senate, and referred the matter to them; but his colleague, without waiting for the Senate's decree, went with two thousand horse, first to *Teanum*, whither twenty eight of the *Capuan Senators* had been transported, and he caused them to be beaten with rods, and then beheaded by the *Lictors*. Thence he hasten'd to *Cales*, and treated with the same rigour the twenty five Senators who had been conveyed thither, though he might well have spared them, having just before the execution received letters from *Rome*, with orders to suspend it; but he put the letters in his bosom, and would not read them till all was over. Nor did the Republic ever blame him for this instance of severity, being doubtless pleased to have revenge, without incurring the odium of inhumanity among her allies. This charge fell only upon *Fulvius*.

And the impression of this Pro Consul's cruelty became yet stronger in the minds of the people, by the following incident. One *Jubellius Taurea*, a man, among his own party, reputed brave, had come from *Capua*, and had been present at the late massacre of the Senators. Pierced with compassion, and full of indignation, he thus addressed himself to the *Pro-Consul*, just as he was going to dismiss the assembly: 'Stay one moment, *Fulvius*, and command me to be murdered; and then thou mayest boast of having killed a braver man than thyself.' *Fulvius* (who had published the Senate's decree) replied, ' You come too

Y. of R. ‘ late to be punished, and are mad with rage.’ ‘ What!
 542. ‘ said Jubellius, have I lived to see my country redu-
 Bet. J. C. ‘ ced to slavery! Have I stabbed my wife and children,
 210. ‘ to preserve them from insults and dishonour; and
 241. Con- ‘ fulship. ‘ when I am come hither, to have my blood mixed with
 ‘ that of my friends and countrymen; do my enemies,
 ‘ after all, deny me death? My own arm shall put an
 ‘ end to this hated life: As he ended these words he
 stabbed himself with a dagger he had brought under
 his robe, and fell dead at the foot of the Tribunal.

In *Greece*, the Pro-Prætor *Lævinus* had, in order to keep *Philip* of *Macedon* employed at home, endeavoured (with the approbation of the Senate) to draw some of the *Greek States* into the interest of *Rome*. He began with the *Ætolians*, who were much discontented, because *Acarnania* had been by *Philip* dismembered from the body of their state, and he assured them that he would reduce it again under its ancient government *Livy*. B. and jurisdiction. These promises of the *Roman* Gen-
 26. c. 24. ral were confirmed to the people by *Scopas* their chief magistrate, and by *Dorimachus* a noble *Ætolian*, who with less modesty, and stronger asseverations, magnified the grandeur, power, and majesty of the people of *Rome*. The main motive however with the *Ætolians* was the hopes of recovering *Acarnania*. Articles were therefore drawn up, and agreed to, expressing the conditions on which these *Grecians* entered into an alliance with the *Romans*; and a clause was added, ‘ That the ‘ *Eleans*, the *Lacedæmonians*, *Attalus* King of *Pergamus* ‘ in *Asia Minor*, *Pleuratus*, a King of *Tbrace*, or per- ‘haps of a part of *Illyricum*, *Serdilædus*, King of the ‘ east part of the last mentioned country, should if they ‘ pleased be comprised and included in the treaty.’ *Polybius* tells us, that the *Ætolians* sent Ambassadors to these several States and Princes, to solicit them to join in a confederacy against *Philip*, and he has transmitted to us the speeches made in the Senate of *Lacedæmon*, *Polyb.* B. 9. by *Chlæneas* an *Ætolian*, and *Lyciscus* an *Acarnanian*, c. 22. two orators, the first an advocate for the *Ætolians*, the second for *Philip*. *Chlæneas*’s harangue consisted chiefly

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of invectives, displaying the tyranny, oppression, and u- Y. of R. usurpations exercised in Greece by the Kings of Macedon, §42. from the time of Philip the father of Alexander, to the Bef. J. C. present King ; and in the close of his speech he urged 210. Con- the safety the Lacedæmonians would find in joining them- fulship. selves with so powerful a confederacy as that formed against Philip. Lyciscus on the other hand endeavoured to clear the Macedonian Kings from the charge brought against them ; mentioned several of their laudable actions ; loaded the Ætolians with the guilt of many violences, outrages, and sacrilegious abominations ; and in conclusion represented the danger of making alliances with Barbarians ; that these defenders of the Ætolians would soon become their conquerors, and, in time, of all Greece. These apprehensions were not unreasonable ; but the Lacedæmonians did not at this time look so far forward ; it seemed safest for them, at present, to come into the alliance proposed by the Ætolians ; and they declared for that side.

The articles of confederacy between the Ætolians and Romans ran thus. ‘ The Ætolians shall forthwith enter into a war with King Philip by land, and the Romans shall assist them by sea with a fleet of twenty quinqueremes at least. All the cities that shall be conquered between the confines of Ætolia and Corcyra shall, as to the walls, houses, and lands belonging to them, be possessed by the Ætolians ; but the Romans shall have the moveable goods and plunder. The Romans shall use their endeavours that the Ætolians may again possess Acarnania. If at any time the Ætolians make a peace with Philip, they shall insert a clause, that the same shall be of no force until such time as Philip shall have withdrawn his forces employed against the Romans or any of their allies. And in the same manner, if the Romans treat with the Macedonian King, they shall make the like provision for the security of the Ætolians and their allies.’ Though these articles were not signed till two years after, the confederates immediately began hostilities against Philip. Lævinus took the island of Zacynthus, and

Y. of R. and also two cities of *Acarnania*, which he replaced under the dominion of the *Aetolians*, and having thus kindled a war in *Greece* against the King, and found him sufficient employment at home, to hinder his assisting the *Carthaginians*, he retired with his fleet to *Corcyra*, and there wintered.

The news, that the *Aetolians* were in motion, was brought to *Philip* as he lay in his winter quarters at *Pella*. Resolving to invade *Greece* in the spring, he first turned his arms against *Illyricum*, that by the desolation and destruction he should cause there, he might intimidate the rest of his neighbours from attacking *Macedon* in his absence. From thence he marched his troops into *Thrace* against the *Mædi*. In the mean time the *Aetolian* army entered *Acarnania*, where they found that the people of the country were come to the most desperate resolutions for their defence: for sending away their wives and children, and all who were above sixty years old, into *Epirus*, the rest engaged themselves by a solemn oath never to return from the field but with victory; and they laid the heaviest curses on those of their own nation, who should harbour or relieve any who were vanquished and fled. These desperate measures, together with the approach of *Philip*, whom the *Acarnanians* had earnestly pressed to come from *Thrace* to their assistance, so terrified the *Aetolians*, that they retired into their own territories, and there continued quiet, till *Lævinus*, coming in the spring with his fleet to *Naupactus*, put them again in motion. In conjunction with the *Pro-Prætor*, they besieged *Anticyra*, (a city of the *Locrenses*, in the neighbourhood of *Aetolia*) by sea and land, and reduced it. But *Lævinus*, after this, by reason of a dangerous sickness, was obliged to continue there a great while unactive.

Winter now approached, and *Marcellus* returned from *Sicily* to *Rome*, for the first time since the taking of *Syracuse*. He demanded a triumph at his arrival; but having, pursuant to orders, left his army in *Sicily*, and it not being the custom for Generals to triumph when their army was not present to give testimony to their

their exploits, he was granted only an ovation by the Y. of R. Senate. To do himself justice therefore in the best ^{542.} manner he could, he decreed himself a triumph on *The Bef. J. C. Hill of Alba*, for which there were some precedents in ^{210.} such cases. Next day he had a very magnificent ova- ^{241.} fulship. A plan of *Syracuse*, statues and paintings of an *Liv. B. 26.* exquisite taste, costly vases, and immense quantities of ^{c. 21.} gold, silver, and brass, were carried on biers before him. Eight elephants, and all sorts of military engines, used in sieges, made a part of the show. It was *Plut.* at this time that *Marcellus* introduced among the *Ro-*^{life of} *mans* a refined taste for paintings, and sculptures; which ^{Marcellus.} made some of the old *Romans* uneasy. They feared it ^{Author of} the lives would gradually destroy the people's love of husbandry of illustri- and war, and would be a means to soften and enervate ^{ous men.} them.

C H A P. XXVIII. The NINTH YEAR of the War.

Marcellus's conduct complained of before the Senate, by the Sicilians.—Fulvius accused of cruelty by the Capuans.—The fate of their city is determined.—The fortune of the campaign in Italy various.—The reduction of Sicily compleated.

TH E time for electing new magistrates drawing Y. of R. on, *Fulvius Centumalus* was recalled to *Rome*, to ^{543.} preside in the *Comitia*. The first Century that voted, ^{Bef. J. C.} named *T. Manlius Torquatus*, and *T. Otacilius*, for ^{209.} *Con-*^{242.} *Consuls*. It was not doubted but the rest of the Centuries ^{fulship.} would join in the nomination; and a multitude of peo- ^{Liv. B. 26.} ^{c. 22.} ple flocked round *Manlius* to congratulate him upon his election. But he, approaching the Consul's tribunal, begged that he would call back the Century that had just given their votes, and allow him to speak a few words. While all were in expectation of what he would ask, he excused himself, on account of a weakness in his eyes, from accepting the dignity offered him. ‘A man,’ said he, ‘must be very shameless to desire to be a pilot or a general, and to have the lives

‘and

Y. of R.^c and fortunes of multitudes committed to his care,
 543. ^{bef.} when he knows that in every thing he does, he must
 Bef. J. C.^c make use of other men's eyes.' He therefore en-
 209. treated the president of the assembly to order the pre-
 242 Con-rogative Century to give their votes anew, and desired
 fulship. of them, that in their choice they would have regard
 to the circumstances of the Republic, remember that
 the war was still in *Italy*, and that *Rome* was scarce re-
 covered from the terror caused by the late insult of the
 enemy at her gates. Notwithstanding this remon-
 strance, the Century, with repeated cries, insisted upon
 the choice they had made. ' No, said *Manlius*, nei-
 ther can I bear your manners, nor you my govern-
 ment. Return into the voting place, and consider
 that *Carthage* is making war in *Italy*, and that *Hanni-*
bal is her General.' The Century finding these
 words applauded by all who stood round *Manlius*, and
 having a real respect for him, made no longer any dif-
 ficulty to comply with his desire; and *Marcellus* the
 fourth time, and *Lævinus* the second time, were raised
 to the consular dignity.

Lævinus was still lying sick at *Anticyra* in *Greece*. *Marcellus* entered upon his office on the Ides of *March*, and according to custom assembled the Senate that day, but declared he would bring no matters relating to the Republic before the Fathers, till the arrival of his colleague. He complained that there were numbers of *Syracusians* in *Rome*, who spread reports about the city to his disadvantage; that *M. Cornelius Cetbegus*, the *Prætor* of *Sicily*, had not only sent over many of these to accuse him, but had also asserted in his letters, that the war was far from being finished in the island [no untruth, as will appear by and by] that he might have the greater glory, in putting an end to it. The Consul added, that he himself would immediately give his enemies an opportunity of laying their accusations before the Senate, were it not that he understood they affected to be afraid of accusing him in the absence of his Colleague; and that, as soon as *Lævinus* should arrive, he would take care they should be heard.

As *Lævinus* passed through *Campania*, in his return to Y. of R. *Rome*, the inhabitants of that country crowded about him, and implored his protection against the tyranny and cruelty of the Pro-Consul *Fulvius-Flaccus*. *Lævinus* ^{543. Bef. J. C.} _{209.} Con-ordered them to follow him to *Rome*; which when he ^{Liv. B. 26.} drew near, the company of *Sicilians*, who were to accuse ^{Liv. B. 26.} *Marcellus*, joined him likewise; and he suffered them to enter the city with him. However, before he procured them an audience from the Senate, he gave the Conscrip^{Faft. Cap.} Fathers an account of his own conduct, and the state of affairs in *Greece*. And the next thing to be done, was to assign the Consuls, and the rest of the ge-^{Liv. B. 26.} nerals of the *Roman* armies, their respective provinces, ^{c. 28.} for the ensuing campaign. *Italy* fell by lot to *Lævinus*, and *Sicily* to *Marcellus*. This was no sooner declared, than the *Sicilians*, who were present at the ceremony, made a horrible outcry, and exprest as much terror and consternation as they had done at *Syracuse* when *Marcellus* surprized it. They dressed themselves in mourning, ran to the houses of the Senators, and there declared, they would never return home, rather than be again subject to *Marcellus*: and that it would be better for *Sicily* to perish in the flames of *Ætna*, than to be given up as a prey to her implacable enemy. The affair was mentioned in the Senate, and the Consuls were asked to consult the Fathers about an exchange of provinces. *Marcellus* answered, that, had the *Sicilians* been already heard, perhaps he should not think that motion so equitable, but now lest it should be said, that fear restrained them from accusing a man who must shortly be their Governor, he was very willing to exchange provinces with his colleague, provided he agreed to it; but begged the Senate would not give him the mortification of interposing a judgment of theirs in the matter; for, said he, if it would have been unjust to give my colleague his option, without casting lots, how much more unjust, nay, what an indignity would it be to me, to transfer my lot to him? The Senate did not interpose their authority, and the exchange was made by the Consuls themselves. Then the *Sicilians* were admitted to

Y. of R. to bring their complaints against *Marcellus*. Their accusation turned upon his pretended cruelty at *Leontini*,
 543. Bef. *J. C.* his having sacked *Syracuse*, and his having stripped the
 209. 242 *Con-*^{ed} citizens of every thing, though (as the accusers protest-
 fulship. fided with the *Carthaginians*; and they prayed, that what had been taken from them, and could be recovered, might be restored.

Liv. B. 26. When the *Sicilians* had done speaking, *Marcellus* left the *Curule chair*, and went to the place where persons accused were wont to make their defence. He fairly laid before the house the matters of fact (as they have been related) and then withdrew, to give the Senators more freedom in their debates. A great many of the Fathers, and among the rest, *T. Manlius Torquatus*, were of opinion, that the war ought to be considered as having been carried on against the tyrants *Hippocrates* and *Epicydes*, equally the enemies of the *Romans* and *Syracusians*. After a long debate, the majority voted the proceedings of *Marcellus* to have been regular; but added to their decree, that the Senate would take care of the *Syracusians*, and recommended it to the Consul *Lævinus*, to consult their interest, as far as it was consistent with that of the Republic.

When the *Sicilians*, being called in, had heard the decree read, they threw themselves at the feet of *Marcellus*, and begged he would forgive whatever, with a view to set forth their miseries and move compassion, they had said against him; and would receive them into his protection. The Consul granted their request; and, in gratitude to him, the people of *Syracuse* ordered, that whenever he, or any of his family set foot in *Sicily*, the people should crown themselves with garlands, and celebrate the day with sacrifices; and *Syracuse* was, ever after, under the patronage of the *Marcelli*.

Livy, B. 26. c. 33. The cause of the *Campanians* came on next. Their pleading consisted wholly of a pathetic representation of their miseries. When they had finished their complaint, they were ordered to withdraw. And then *M. Attilius Regulus*, who had served in the army at the taking of *Capua*,

Capua, was examined as to the facts. This Senator Y. of R. could say little to the advantage of the *Capuans*; but he moved that the Senate might not determine the affair, till it had obtained the consent of the tribes; because the *Capuans*, being *Roman* citizens, could not legally be culpritship. 543. Bef. J. C. 209. 242. Con-
judged by the Senate, without the approbation of the people. Accordingly, a Tribune of the commons was desired to summon the comitia by tribes; and request them, to empower the Senate to pronounce sentence on the *Capuans*. He complied. The comitia answered in that authoritative stile which shewed their sovereignty: ‘What the majority of the Senate now sitting, after being sworn, shall determine, that we will and command.’ The Senate, thus authorized, pronounced judgment; and when the sentence came to be executed, *Campania* was stript of all the monuments of its grandeur; *Capua* was no longer à city; it had neither Senate, Comitia, nor Magistrates of its own; *Rome* sent a *Praefect* thither annually, to preserve order in the place, and to hear causes. Its former slothful and effeminate inhabitants were transplanted elsewhere, and succeeded by *Roman* colonies of laborious and industrious husband-men.

And now the Consuls applied themselves wholly to the preparations for the approaching campaign. *Liv. B. 26.* Asc. 35. the navy wanted great repairs, and the public treasury was exhausted, they published an edict, ordering every man, according to his census, to furnish pay and provisions for thirty days to a certain number of sailors and rowers, agreeable to a precedent on the like occasion. This falling heavy on the poorer citizens, already drained by taxes, since *Hannibal's* invasion, it had like to have caused an insurrection. The people threatened to do themselves justice, if the edict was not revoked in three days. In that time the Consuls, to make matters easy, proposed in the Senate a method which gained them c. 36. great applause. They moved, that all the dignified persons in the State, and the Senators, should give a good example of zeal for the Republic, by voluntarily carrying into the treasury their superfluous gold, silver, and brafs.

Y. of R. bras. All present approved the motion ; and the knights
 543. and common citizens so readily followed the example
 Bef. J. C. of the Consuls and Senators, that there was an emula-
 209. tion who should first enter their names in the register of
 242 Con- tributors. Thus were the *Roman* fleets recruit-
 fulship. ed ; and *Rome* put into a condition to support the war
 on all sides.

Liv. B.26. When *Marcellus* and *Lævinus* set out for their pro-
 c. 37. vinces, there were in the town of *Salapia* in *Apulia* two
 men of great authority. *Dafus* and *Blasius*, the latter
 was in the *Roman* interest, and had entered into a nego-
 ciation with the Consul to betray the town to him. As
 this could not be done without *Dafus's* consent, the traitor
 ventured to open his mind to him, and sollicit his
 assistance, though he knew him to be a zealous *Hanni-*
balist. *Dafus* immediately informed the *Carthaginian* of
 the affair, who thereupon cited both to appear before
 him. But the accuser not being able to bring any proof
 to support his charge, *Hannibal* imagined the accusation
 to have proceeded entirely from jealousy and hatred ;
 and would take no farther cognizance of it. After this,
Blasius gained over his colleague, and they took measures
 together for the surrendry of the place. *Marcellus* on
 a sudden appeared before it, and was admitted into the
 town ; and then the *Carthaginian* garrison, which con-
 sisted of 500 brave *Numidian* horse, finding themselves
 betrayed, resolved to sell their lives dear. They quit-
 ted their horses, which were of no use to them, and
 fought on foot, till they were all killed except fifty,
 who yielded themselves prisoners. This, if we may
 credit *Livy*, was so great a loss to *Hannibal*, that in all
 the battles he afterwards fought in *Italy*, his cavalry
 never gained the superiority over the enemy, as in for-
 mer engagements.

c. 39. The *Carthaginian* had still hopes of taking the citadel
 of *Tarentum*, which he kept blocked up. On the other
 hand the *Romans* sent a squadron of ships to supply the
 garrison with provisions : But this fleet, before it could
 enter the port, being obliged to come to an engagement
 with

with the *Tarentine* fleet, was utterly defeated, and the Y. of R.
admiral of it killed in the action.

Marcellus took two more cities in *Samnium*, and in
them about 3000 *Carthaginian* prisoners together with 209.
a great quantity of grain. *Fulvius Centumalus*, who fulship.
commanded as Pro-Consul in *Apulia*, being ambitious Plut. life
of imitating the Consul, without his abilities, drew near of *Marcel-*
to a city called *Herdonea*, in hopes to reduce it by force, *Liv. B.*
or by treaty, but was surprised by *Hannibal*; and though 27. c. 1.
the *Romans* behaved themselves bravely, they were to-
tally defeated, their camp taken, and the General, with
eleven Legionary Tribunes slain in the engagement.

So compleat a victory recovered the affairs and credit Plut. life
of *Hannibal* for some time, and greatly discouraged the of *Marcel-*
people at *Rome*, whose only hopes were now in *Marcellus*. *Liv. B.*
This Consul, knowing how much the people were terri- 27. c. 2.
fied, wrote to the Senate in these terms; ‘ I am the
‘ same man that I was after the battle of *Cannæ*. I am
‘ going to meet the same conqueror, and have reason
‘ to expect the same success. The joy that now swells
‘ the mind of the *Carthaginian* will not be of long durati-
‘ on.’ He then marched towards *Hannibal*, and came
up with him near *Numistro*, in *Bruttium*. The *Cartha-*
ginian did not decline a battle. The engagement was
bloody; and the night alone put an end to it. At sun-
rising *Marcellus* offered him battle again; but *Hannibal*
would not accept the challenge. He decamped; and
the Consul followed him from place to place. So that
these two Generals spent the rest of the campaign, the
one in seeking for an opportunity to come to a general
action, the other in endeavouring to avoid it, and to
draw his enemy into an ambush.

In the mean time *Fulvius Flaccus* was busy in manag- c. 3.
ing the affairs of the Republic in *Campania*; and the
Senate ordered a great quantity of corn to be bought up
in *Hetruria*, and carried to the citadel of *Tarentum*.
Two thousand men were likewise commanded to the
relief of the garrison; and this convoy had a happier
passage thither than the last.

From the Consul *Lævinus* the Senate received news
Vol. III. E e of

Y. of R. of the total reduction of *Sicily*. *Agrigentum* had long
 543. held out for the *Carthaginians*. *Hanno* had commanded
 Ref. *J. C.* there a numerous garrison; but having through jealousy
 209. 242. Con-disobliged, and even broke, a brave *Numidian* officer,
 fulship. named *Mutines*, much esteemed among his countrymen,
 and who having been sent by *Hannibal* into *Sicily*, to
 supply the place of *Hippocrates*, had done the *Cartha-*
ginians signal service in that island, the proud *African*
 could not brook the affront. To revenge himself, he
 entered into a correspondence with the *Consul*; and
 having engaged a body of the *Numidians* in the conspi-
 racy, they opened one of the gates to the *Roman* troops.
Hanno, with *Epicydes*, and a few more officers escaped
 in a small vessel; but the rest of the garrison were all
 cut in pieces. After this, twenty towns were betrayed
 into the hands of the *Romans*, six taken by force, and
 the rest to the number of forty, surrendered voluntarily.
Lævinus, having settled all affairs in the island, (which
 from this time became the granary of *Rome*) received
 an order from the Senate, to return home, to hold the
 Comitia by centuries: For though *Marcellus* was nearer,
 it was dangerous to interrupt his pursuit of *Hannibal*.

Livy, B. However, *Lævinus* was hardly arrived, when he found
 27. c. 4. himself obliged to go back again, to take care of his
 province, an express coming from *Valerius Messala* (who
 commanded a fleet in *Sicily*, and had been ravaging the
 coast of *Africa*) with an account that the *Carthaginians*
 were preparing a naval armament, to re-conquer *Si-*
city.

The Senate hastened the departure of *Lævinus*, and
 ordered him to name a dictator, to hold the Comitia for
 the new elections. The *Consul* did not refuse to obey;
 but that he might continue the longer in the supreme
 dignity, insisted upon deferring the nomination till he
 should arrive in *Sicily*; and he promised that he would
 then name *Messala*: But it being contrary to ancient
 custom, for a Dictator to be named elsewhere than in
Italy, the Conscript Fathers pass'd a decree, requiring
Lævinus before he left the city to petition the people to
 recommend a proper person for the Dictatorship, and
 enjoining

enjoining the Consul to name that person ; and the decree provided also, that in case the Consul refused to petition, as before mentioned, the Praetor of Rome should do it ; and if he likewise refused, the Tribunes of the Commons should bring the matter before the Comitia. ^{Y. of R. 543. Bef. J. C. 209. 242. Con-} *Lævinus* was obstinate, and forbade the Praetor to offer any petition to the people. Upon this the Tribunes assembled them ; and it was determined, that *Q. Fulvius Flaccus*, then at *Capua*, should be nominated Dictator. But *Lævinus*, the night before the holding of the Comitia, had set out for *Sicily* so that the Fathers were obliged to write to *Marcellus* to name the Dictator the people had recommended. *Q. Fulvius*, being thus raised to the Dictatorship, named *P. Licinus Crassus*, the Pontifex Maximus, to be his General of horse.

C H A P. XXIX. TENTH YEAR of the war.

Some of the Roman colonies refuse to contribute to the expences of the war. Marcellus is vanquished by Hannibal ; but the day following gains a victory over him. Fabius Cunctator gets possession of Tarentum.

THE Dictator *Fulvius*, having artfully carried on ^{c. 6.} his intrigues to promote his own election to the Consulship, called together the Comitia, and was there named Consul, with *Fabius Maximus Cunctator*, by the first Century which voted ; and the rest of the Centuries seemed inclined to the same choice. But two of the Tribunes interposed, alledging, ‘ That it was dangerous to the constitution to allow a continuation of magistracy in the same person ; and to suffer Presidents of the Comitia to pervert their authority to serve their private purposes ;’ and they declared, that they would dissolve the assembly if the Dictator did not desist from his pretension. *Fulvius* however justified the proceedings of the Comitia by a law just made after the battle of *Thrasymenus*, allowing the people to chuse the same men to the Consulship as often as they pleased, while the war should last in Italy ; and by the examples of *Postbu-*

Y. of R. *mus Metellus*, and *Fabius Maximus*, who at different times being presidents of the Comitia, had been elected Consuls by the assemblies in which they presided. After some time spent in these disputes, it was at length agreed, that the matter should be referred to the Senate.

^{544.} *Bef. J. C.* ^{208.} *Con-* The Conscript Fathers, pleased with the choice that had been made of two such able Generals, declared, that neither the Dictatorship nor Presidentship of *Fulvius* disqualified him from being chosen Consul.

Liv. B 27. It was necessary at this time to raise recruits, and to send some forces into *Sicily* in the place of two legions drawn from thence to serve in *Italy*; but this affair had like to have occasioned a rebellion.

The *Latines* and allies of *Rome* murmured at the continuation of a war, which drained their countries of their people and their wealth. Nay, twelve out of thirty *Roman* colonies that had been planted in the provinces conquered by the Republic, absolutely refused to furnish their contingents, either of men or money; alledging that they really were not in a condition to do it. But the other eighteen complied, and declared themselves ready to enlarge their quotas, if necessary. The agents of these faithful and affectionate colonies received the thanks of the Senate, and of the people in full *Comitia*. As for the twelve, it was thought proper, at this juncture, to shew a contempt of them, and to neglect their contributions, rather than extort them by violence, which would probably throw these colonies into the *Carthaginian* interest. To supply the deficiency occasioned by their refusal, recourse was had to a treasure which had been long hoarded up in the exchequer. From the year 396 the Republic had reserved to herself the twentieth part of the purchase money of every slave's freedom. The produce had been kept against a day of necessity, and was now first applied to the public use. It amounted to four thousand pounds weight of gold, which was all distributed among the Generals for the expences of the war. The *Censors* also requested of the Senate, that the territory of *Campania*, from which the old possessors had been driven, should be disposed of after the best manner,

manner, for the benefit of the public. Their petition being referred to the people, the latter decreed, that those vast plains, and fruitful hills, should be farmed out, and the rents paid into the public treasury.

Y. of R.
544.
Bef. J. C.
208.
243 Con-
flictship.

And now, the season of the year, and the motions of *Hannibal*, drew the *Consuls* from *Rome*. *Fabius* undertook to besiege *Tarentum*, whilst *Fulvius* and *Marcellus* were to oppose the enterprizes of the *Carthaginian*.

Marcellus thinking himself, of all the *Roman Generals*, *Plut. Life of Marcellus*. the fittest match for *Hannibal*, marched out of his winter quarters as soon as there was grass in the fields, *Liv. B. 27. c. 12, 13.* and came up with the enemy near *Canusium* in *Apulia*.

The *Carthaginian* retired, because the country was open and unfit for ambuscades. *Marcellus* followed him, pitched his camp near him, and offered battle. *Hannibal* would have avoided a general action, but was at length forced to it. The *Roman* attacked him as he was encamping; and the engagement lasted till night, without any advantage on either side. Next morning, as soon as it was light, *Marcellus* again drew out his forces; nor did *Hannibal* decline the challenge. He harangued his men, putting them in mind of *Thrasymenus* and *Cannæ*, and exhorting them to repress the audacious temerity of their enemies, who would not permit them either to march or to encamp in quiet, or give them time to breathe or look about them.

'The rising sun,' said he, 'and the *Roman* army daily appear to us at the same instant. Shall we bear this? One single victory will free us from an importunate enemy that is more rash than formidable.' The *Carthaginian* soldiers thus animated by their General, and vexed at being continually harassed by the *Romans*, behaved themselves with uncommon resolution in the battle. *Marcellus* was now vanquished, his whole army routed; he lost two thousand seven hundred men. Not being used to suffer these indignities, he shewed his resentment, by bitterly reproaching his troops with cowardice. They readily owned their fault, asked pardon, and protested that they would expose themselves to any danger he should think fit, with a resolution either

Y. of R.^t o die or conquer. ‘ Prepare then,’ replied the Gen-
544. ^{ral,} ‘ to perform your promises to-morrow, and to
Bef. J. C. ^{208.} merit the forgiveness you desire.’ Next morning
243. Con- the legionaries were ready to march by break of day;
fulship. *Marcellus* declared that he would place in the first line
those manipuli which had behaved themselves disho-
nourably; and he urged them all to exert themselves
in such a manner as to wipe off their shame; ‘ Let not
‘ *Rome*,’ said he, ‘ be informed of yesterday’s defeat
‘ before she hears of this day’s victory.’ He then or-
dered them to refresh themselves well with food, that
their strength might not fail; in case the battle should
prove long, which done, he marched them out of the
camp, and formed them as usual. *Hannibal* surprised
at this unexpected challenge from the *Roman General*,
‘ What!’ cried he, ‘ we have to do then with a man
‘ that can bear neither good nor bad fortune. When
‘ victorious he gives his enemy no repose, nor takes
‘ any himself when he is vanquished.’ Which said,
he gave orders for the trumpets to sound, and drew
his men out into the field. This battle was more sharp
than that of the day before. At length the *Romans*
prevailed by driving the elephants, which *Hannibal*
brought against them, back upon his own troops.

Plut. Life of Mar-
cellus. For by this means the *Carthaginians* were thrown into
the utmost confusion; and two of those great beasts
falling down just in the gate of their camp, stopped up
the entrance of it; so that the runaways were forced
to make their way with difficulty over the ditch
and rampart, which occasioned a great slaughter of
Livy. B 27. them. *Hannibal* lost eight thousand men. However,
c. 14, 15. *Marcellus* bought his victory dear. Three thousand of
his legionaries were killed upon the spot, and almost
all the rest wounded; he led his scattered forces to
Venafria, and could not take the field again that cam-
paign. *Hannibal* decamped the night after his de-
feat,

* These battles of *Marcellus*, as they are told by *Livy*, and nearly copied by *Plutarch*, have very much the air of a romance. Three general battles are fought in three days time. In the first, victory inclines

feat, retired into *Bruttium*, raised the siege of *Caulonia*, V. of R. and took the besiegers prisoners. They consisted of 544. 8000 men besides *Bruttian* deserters, and had been Bef. J. C. sent by *Fabius* upon that enterprize, under the conduct 208. 243. Con- of the governor of *Rhegium*. About this time the *Hir-sulship*, *pini*, and *Lucani*, and the *Volcenses* submitted to the Consul *Fulvius*. Some of the *Bruttians* also sent deputies to him, who were well received: But this negotiation had little success, probably because of the presence of *Hannibal*.

As for *Fabius*, who had undertaken the reduction of *Tarentum*, (in which *Hannibal* had placed a garrison, consisting partly of his old troops, and partly of new levies raised among the *Bruttians*) while he was with all prudence making his preparations for the siege, a young *Tarentine*, who served in his army, came and discovered to him a secret, which he thought might be of use in the present enterprize. He told the General, ‘ That he had a sister in *Tarentum*, whose beauty had captivated the commander of the *Bruttian* troops there; that he believed he could gain over his sister to the *Roman* interest; and that, if so, she could undoubtedly engage her lover in the same cause.’ *Fabius* thinking the project feasible, suffered the young man to return to his native city, as a deserter. The *Tarentine* conducted himself with so much art, that he soon gained his point. The sixth night after the attacks began, he returned to the Consul, and informed him of his success, and when and where the *Bruttian* officer, would be ready to let the *Romans* into

Plut. life
of *Fabius*.

inclines to neither side, in the second, *Hannibal* is conqueror, and, in the third, *Marcellus*. And, what is as strange, *Marcellus* when conqueror, was less able to keep the field than when he was vanquished. He lay idle all the summer, (for which he was afterwards impeached) at *Venusia*, while *Hannibal* master of the open country, continued his ravages in *Italy*. *Vagante per Italiam Annibale, media aestate, Venusiam, in tecta, milites abduxisset.* Liv. B. 27. c. 20. It is also to be observed, that *Polybius* knew nothing of these *Roman* victories, for he expressly tells us, that *Hannibal* was never vanquished in any battle or engagement till that of *Zama*. *Polyb.* B. 15. c. 11. and 16.

Y. of R, the place. The plot was happily executed ; and when
 544. the Romans had surprized the town, they spared nei-
 Bef. J. C. ther *Carthaginians*, *Tarentines* nor even *Bruttiens*. Some
 208. authors lay the blame of this odious maffacre on *Fabius*
 243. Con- himself, who, they say, gave these cruel orders, lest,
 fufhip. if he spared the *Bruttiens*, so important a conquest
 shouſd be imputed more to treachery, than to his pru-
 dence and bravery ; a conduct not suitable to his gene-
 ral character.

Liv. B. 27. The riches found in this maritime city were, ac-
 c. 16. cording to *Livy*, immense : The *Quæftors* received,
 * 581250l. weight of gold ; but *Plutarch* with more probability
 Arbuth. reckons the sum at only three thousand talents *. As
 to the pictures and statues, *Fabius* had not the taste
 of *Marcellus* ; and therefore, when he was asked what
 he would have done with those master-pieces of pain-
 ting and sculpture, he answered, *let us leave to the*
Tarentines their angry Gods ; alluding to the attitudes,
 Strabo, p. in which the Gods of *Tarentum* were represented : For
 278. after the *Lacedæmonian* manner, they had generally
 Pliny, B. swords in their hands, and were in fighting postures.
 34. c. 7. *Plut.* Life Nevertheless he carried to *Rome* a brazen colouſſus of
 of *Fabius Hercules*, which had been cast by the famous *Lyſippus* ;
 and it was placed in the *Capitol*, with an equeſtrian
 ſtature of *Fabius* near it.

The unexpected news of the ſiege of *Tarentum* drew
Hannibal from *Bruttium*. He marched night and day,
 and doubted not to come time enough to relieve it ;
 and it was with the greatest astonishment he received
 the account, when within five miles of the city, of its
 being taken : *Nay, then*, said he, *the Romans have*
their Hannibal too ; *We have lost Tarentum by the same*
art that we took it. However, that he might not ſeem
 to fly before the enemy, he did not immediately turn
 back, but encamped on the place where he heard the
 news. At length he marched to *Metapontus*, a city in
 his intereſt, and there invented a stratagem, which had
 like to have fatally deceived the cautious *Fabius*. He
 ſent two of the inhabitants with letters to the *Consul*,
 from

from the chief men of the city, offering to deliver up Y. of R. the place, and the *Carthaginian* garrison into his hands, if he would promise an oblivion for what was past. ^{544.} *Bef. J. C.*
Fabius, not suspecting the cheat, fixed the day for his ^{208.} *Con-*
march, and would have fallen into an ambush pre-*fulship*,
pared for him, if the *Augurs* and *Haruspices*, who had *Liv. B. 27.*
c. 16. probably better intelligence than the General, had not detained him in the camp, by declaring that the presages were all unfortunate. *Hannibal*, impatient of *Fabius*'s delays, sent new emissaries; but these being arrested, and terrified by threatenings of severe punishment, confessed the secret.

C H A P. XXX. ELEVENTH YEAR of the War.

The Consul Marcellus slain, and his Collegue at the same time mortally wounded.—Favourable accounts from Sicily and from Greece,

MARCELLUS had been accused, before the Y. of R. Comitia, for inaction the last campaign; nevertheless he was chosen Consul for the new year, with ^{545.} *Bef. J. C.* *T. Quinctius Crispinus*. When they had taken the field, ^{207.} *Con-* the latter, ambitious of signalizing himself by the con-*fulship*. quest of some important place, cast his eyes on *Locri*, a maritime city of that part of South *Italy*, now called *Farther Calabria*: But being afraid to engage with *Hannibal*, who advanced towards him, he postponed his expedition, and hastened to join his Collegue *Marcellus*. The two Consuls, having conferred together, determined not to drop the enterprize upon *Locri*. They commanded *Cincius*, Admiral of the fleet appointed to guard the coasts of *Italy* and *Sicily*, to invest the place by sea, and at the same time ordered a body of troops, then in garrison at *Tarentum*, to go and besiege it by land: But these latter were surprised by *Hannibal* in their march, two thousand of them killed, and twelve hundred taken prisoners. The *Carthaginian*, however, declined a battle with the united forces of

V. of R. of the Consuls ; and watched for an opportunity to deceive his enemies by artifice.

Bef. J. C. Between his entrenchments, and those of the *Romans*,

207. was a little hill, from which either camp might **244 Con-** be annoyed ; and the *Roman* soldiers were equally sur-
sulphur.

Plut. Life prised at *Hannibal's* neglect of it, and impatient to take
of *Mar-* possession of it themselves. They even murmured at
cellus.

Liv. B 27. their Generals not being so quick as they would have
them, to seize such an advantageous post : Hereupon

c. 27, 28. *Marcellus* and his Colleague, with a guard of two hun-
dred and twenty horse, went to view the eminence.

Hannibal had hid a detachment of *Numidians* in the
cavities of the hill, and under the bushes which covered
it. His design was to intercept those of the *Romans*
that should straggle from their camp. The *Numidi-
ans* coming out of their ambush, surprised and sur-
rounded the two Consuls and their guard ; and *Mar-
cellus*, in the attempt to retreat, was killed. His son,
and the other Consul were wounded.

Hannibal, informed of *Marcellus's* death, went im-
mediately to the place where the body lay, and, at
the sight of it, shewed no marks of joy, but seemed
rather to pity the misfortune of so great a man, who
had fallen in a manner unworthy of him. Yet his first
care was to take off the ring, which the dead Consul
had on his finger, and with which he used to seal his
dispatches. He then caused the body to be laid on
a funeral pile, and burnt ; and having gathered the
ashes into a silver urn, sent them to young *Marcellus*
the son.

Liv. B.27. The surviving Consul decamped the following night,
f. 28. retired to the nearest mountains, and posted himself

on a steep ascent. And fearing lest *Hannibal* should
make a mischievous use of the ring he had taken from
Marcellus, he dispatched couriers to all the neighbour-
ing cities, in the interest of *Rome*, to prevent their be-
ing deceived by letters, which might be sent to them
in *Marcellus's* name. By this prudent step, *Salapia* in
Apulia was preserved : Nay, the inhabitants turned
the artifice of the *Carthaginian* upon himself. He had
sent

sent a *Roman* deserter with letters, as from *Marcellus*, Y. of R. to give them notice that he would be there the next night, and that they should prepare to receive him. ^{545.} *Bef. J. C.* The *Salapians* seemed to suffer themselves to be cheated, and admitted into the town six hundred of *Hannibal's* men, ^{207.} *Con-* chosen out of the *Roman* deserters, that their language might not betray the design) but then on a sudden, the inhabitants letting fall the portcullis, surprised and slew those who had entered, and with a shower of darts from the ramparts drove back the rest.

This unsuccessful expedition did not so far dis courage *Hannibal*, as to hinder him from marching to the relief of *Locri*, now invested by sea and land. And upon the first appearance of his *Numidian* horse, the besiegers were so terrified, that *Cincius*, the Admiral of the *Roman* fleet embarked the land forces on board his galleys, left all his machines behind him, and sailed away for *Rome*.

In the mean time, *Quinctius*, whose wounds were mortal, and who, having left his post in the mountains, was now with his army at *Capua*, sent letters to the Senate, acquainting them with the death of his colleague, and that he himself was drawing near his end; and desiring that the Fathers would send some persons to him, of prudence and integrity, with whom he might intrust the affairs of the Republic. Accordingly three Senators were commissioned to receive his last advices; and, at their request, he nominated a dictator to hold the Comitia for the new elections. He named *T. Manlius Torquatus*.

The *Romans* during this unfortunate campaign, received the agreeable news from *Sicily* that *Valerius Lævinus*, who commanded an hundred sail of ships, had made a descent on *Africa*, brought thence much booty, and afterwards defeated a *Carthaginian* fleet off *Clypea*. And the advices from the Pro-Consul *Sulpicius* of the state of affairs in *Greece*, were not unfavourable. The *Ætolians* had received assistance from *Attalus* King of *Pergamus*, and being also joined by a thousand *Ro-*

mans,

*Liv. B. 27.
c. 29.*

Y. of R. mans, had ventured to march against *Philip*; and
 Ref. J. C. 545. though he defeated them in two battles, he could not
 207. prevail with them to desert the interest of *Rome*. He
 244. Con- had also attacked the *Roman* army, while they were
 sulship. pillaging the country about *Corinth*, and forced them a-
 board their ships with loss; but *Sulpicius* being joined
 by the *Aetolians* and *Elæans*, surprized the King near
Livy, B. *Elis*, and gained some advantage over him. Next day
c. 27. c. 30. *Philip* hearing that the country people were gathered
 together at a fortress called *Pyrgus*, (in order to de-
 fend their cattle, which they had driven thither as to a
 place of safety) he set upon them, took 4000 prisoners,
 c. 32. and 20000 cattle of all kinds. After this, he was ob-
 c. 33. liged to return into his own country, to put a stop to
 the irruptions of the *Dardans*, which a report of his
 death had occasioned; so that *Rome* had no reason to
 fear the *Macedonian's* coming suddenly to join *Han-*
nibal.

C H A P. XXXI,

The Romans are alarmed at the approach of Asdrubal,
 the brother of Hannibal, with an army from Spain.—
 A summary account of the Roman affairs in that coun-
 try, from the first landing of the Scipios there, to the
 time of Asdrubal's leaving it.

BUT now the chief care of the Senate, was to fill
 up the vacant Consulships, with two men who
 would be equal to that important charge, at a time
 when, beside the difficulties they had already to strug-
 gle with, a new and dreadful storm was driving to-
 wards *Rome* from the *Alps*. For Asdrubal, the brother
 of Hannibal, had left *Spain* with an army of 60000 men,
 and was crossing those mountains, in order to join him
 in the heart of *Italy*; a danger, than which none could
 have a more gloomy, a more threatening aspect to the
 Republic.

Vid. vol. 3. p. 340. The Roman affairs in *Spain* have been hitherto but
 341, 342. lightly touched. And indeed a credible and consistent
 account

account of what passed in that country, while the *Scipios* commanded there, to the departure of *Afdrubal*, is not easy to be formed out of the Historians and Geographers. Let the collection and observations, made by a judicious and able writer, supply the defect of the present work, in this particular.

The acts of these two brethren [*Publius* and *Cn. Sir Walter Scipio*]. in their province, were very great, and, as they are reported, somewhat marvellous. For they continually prevailed in *Spain* against the *Carthaginians*, whom they vanquished in so many battles, and withdrew from their alliance so many of the *Spaniards* their confederates, that we have cause to wonder, how the enemy could so often find means to repair his forces, and return strong into the field. But as the *Romans*, by pretending to deliver the country from the tyranny of *Carthage*, might easily win unto their confederacy as many as were galled with the *African* yoke, and durst adventure to break it; so the antient reputation of the first conquerors might serve to arm the natives against these invaders, and to reclaim those that had revolted unto the *Romans*, were it only by the memory of such ill success, as the like rebellions in former times had found. Here-to may be added, the *Carthaginian* treasure, which easily raised soldiers among those valiant, but (in that age) poor and gold-thirsty nations. Neither was it of small importance, that so many of the *Spaniards* had their children, kinsmen and friends abroad with *Hannibal* in his *Italian* wars, or serving the *Carthaginians* in *Afric*. And per-adventure, if we durst be bold to say it, the victories of the *Scipios* were neither so many nor so great as they are set out by *Livy*. This we may be bold to say, that the great captain *Fabius*, or *Livy* in his person, maketh an objection unto *Scipio*, which neither *Scipio* nor *Livy* for him, doth answer; that if *Afdrubal* were vanquished, as *Scipio* wold say, by him in *Spain*, strange it was, and as little to his honour, as it had been extremely dangerous to *Rome*, that the same vanquish-

ed

Raleigh's
Hist. of
the World,
B. 5. c. 3.
§. 14.

‘ ed man should invade *Italy*. And indeed it is an incredible narration, that *Asdrubal*, being inclosed on all sides, and not knowing how to escape out of battle, save only by the steep descent of rocks, over a great river, that lay at his back, ran away with all his money, elephants and broken troops, over *Tagus*, directly towards the *Pyrenees*, and so toward *Italy*; upon which he fell with more than threescore thousand armed soldiers. Neither do I see how it hangs well together, that he chose a piece of ground very defensible, but most incommodious for his retreat, if he should happen to be vanquished; and yet that he sent all his money and elephants away before him, as not intending to abide the enemy, or how it could be true, that these his elephants being so sent before, could hinder the *Romans* (for so are they said to have done in the last battle between him and *Scipio*) from breaking into his camp. Wherefore we can no more than be sorry, that all *Carthaginian* records of this war, and *Spanish* (if there were any) being utterly lost, we can know no more thereof, than what it hath pleased the *Romans* to tell us; unto whom it were no wisdom to give too much credit. In this regard, I will summarily run over the doings of the *Scipios* in *Spain*; not greatly insisting on particulars, whereof there is no great certainty.

Liv. B. 21.

c. 60.

Y. of R.

535.

* *Am-*

purias, a

town in

Catalonia.

‘ *Cn. Cornelius* landed at *Emporiae*, a haven town, not far within the *Pyrenees*, retaining still the name with little inflexion*. That by the fame of his clemency he allured many nations to become subject unto *Rome*, as the story begins of him, I could easily believe, if I understood by what occasion they had need to use his clemency, or he to give such famous example thereof, being a mere stranger, and having no jurisdiction in the country. Yet it is certain that he was a man very courteous, and one that could well insinuate himself into the love of the Barbarians; among whom his dexterity in practice had the better success, for that he seemed to have none other errand than setting them at liberty. This pretext availed with

with

with some ; others were to be hired with money ; and some he compelled to yield by force or fear ; especially when he had won a battle against *Hanno*. Into all treaties of accord made with these people, likely it is that he remembered to insert this article, which the *Romans* in their alliance never forgat unless in long times past, and when they dealt with the *Carthaginians*, or their superiors, *Majestatem Populi Romani* Orat. pro Corn. Balb. *comiter conservent*, which is, as *Tully* interprets it, *that they should gently (or kindly) uphold the majesty of the people of Rome*. This was in appearance nothing troublesome, yet implied in it indeed an obscure covenant of subjection. And in this respect it may be true that the *Spaniards* became *ditionis Romanae*, of the *Roman jurisdiction* ; though hereafter they will say, *Polyb. B.3.* c. 34. they had no such meaning. That part of the country wherein *Scipio* landed, was newly subdued by *Hannibal* in his passage towards *Italy*, and therefore the more easily shaken out of obedience : particularly the *Burgundians*. *Hannibal* had found, at his coming among them, such an apprehension of the *Roman* greatness, as made him suspect, that any light occasion would make them start from the *Carthaginians*. Wherefore he not only appointed *Hanno* Governor over them, as over the rest of the province between *Iberus* and the *Pyrenees*, but made him also their Lord ; that is (as I conceive it, for I don't think he gave the principality of their country to *Hanno* and his heirs) he made him not only Lieutenant General over them in matters of war, and things concerning the holding them in obedience to *Carthage* ; but took from them all inferior officers of their own, leaving them to be governed by *Hanno* at his discretion. These therefore had good cause to rejoice at the coming of *Scipio*, with whom others also, no doubt, found reasons to join ; it being the custom of all conquered nations, in hatred of their present Lords, to throw themselves indiscreetly into the protection of others, that many times prove worse than the former. This bad affection of this province would not suffer *Hanno* to temporize.

‘ temporize. Ten thousand foot and a thousand horse
 ‘ Hannibal had left unto him; besides which, it is like,
 ‘ that some forces he was able to raise out of his province.
 Therefore he adventured a battle with *Scipio*,
 Liv. B. 21. c. 60. Polyb. B. 3. c. 76. wherein he was overthrown and taken. Following
 this victory, *Scipio* besieged *Cissa*, a town hard by,
 and won it. But *Asdrubal*, having passed *Iberus*, and
 coming too late to the relief of *Hanno*, with 8000
 foot and 1000 horse, fell upon the *Roman* sea forces,
 that lay not far from *Tarragon*, whom he found care-
 less as after a victory, roving abroad in the country;
 and with great slaughter drove them aboard their
 ships. This done, he ran up into the country, where
 Liv. B. 21. c. 61. he withdrew the *Ilergetes* * from the *Roman* party,
 though they had given hostages to *Scipio*. *Scipio* in
 the mean season was gone to visit and aid his fleet:
 where having set things in order, he returned back,
 and made towards *Asdrubal*, who durst not abide his
 coming, but withdrew himself again over the *Iberus*.
 So the *Ilergetes* were compelled by force, having lost
Athanagia, their chief city, to pay a fine to the *Ro-*
 mans, and increase the number of their hostages.
 The *Ausetani* likewise, confederates of the *Carthaginians*, were besieged in their chief town, which they
 defended thirty days; hoping, in vain, that the sharp
 winter, and great abundance of snow that fell, would
 have made the *Romans* dislodge. But they were fain
 at length to yield, and for their obstinacy they
 were amerced twenty talents of silver. During the
 siege, the *Lacetani* came to help their distressed neigh-
 bours, and were beaten home by *Scipio*, leaving
 12000 of their company dead behind them. I can-
 not but wonder how these *Lacetani*, that are said to
 be the first which embraced the friendship of *Scipio*,
 should, without any cause remembered, become *Car-*
thaginian on the sudden, in the next news we hear of
 them. As also it is strange, that all the sea coast

* *Polybius* says nothing of the rebellion of the *Ilergetes*, *Ausetani*, or *Lacetani*. The Historian follows *Livy*.

‘ northward

‘ northward of *Iberus*, having lately become voluntarily *ditionis Romanæ, subject unto Rome*, should, in continuance of the story, after a few lines, hold war against *Scipio*, without any resistance of the *Carthaginians*. Neither can I believe, that *Asdrubal*, as it were by a charm, stirred up the *Ilergetes*, making them lay aside all care of their hostages, and take arms in his quarrel; whilst himself had not the daring to stand against *Scipio*, but ran away, and saved himself beyond the *Iberus*. *Philinus* perhaps, or some *Carthaginian* writer, would have told it thus: that *Scipio* adventuring too far into the country, was beaten by *Asdrubal* back to his ships, whence he durst not stir until winter came on: at what time the *Carthaginian* returned to the heart of his province, leaving some few garrisons to defend those places, that after *Scipio* won, by returning upon them, unlooked for, through a deep snow. As for the *Lacetani*, *Ilergetes* and the rest, we may reasonably think, that they sought their own benefit; helping themselves one while by the *Romans* against the *Carthaginians*, and contrariwise, upon sense of injuries received, or apprehension of more grievous tyranny, under which they feared to be brought by these new masters, hearkening again unto the comfortable promises of those that had ruled them before. For that it was their intent to live under their own country laws, and not under governors sent from *Rome* or *Carthage*, their demeanour in all ages following may testify; even from henceforth unto the days of *Augustus Cæsar*, till when they were never thoroughly conquered.

‘ The year following this, *Cn. Scipio* had a victory Y. of R. against the *Carthaginians* in fight at sea; or rather 536. came upon them unlook'd for, while they rode at anchor, most of their men being on shore. All their Polyb. B. ships that ran not too far on ground he took; and 3. c. 95. thereby grew master of the whole coast, landing at Liv. B. 22. pleasure, and doing great hurt in all places that were c. 20. not well defended: After this victory above a hundred and twenty nations, or petty estates in *Spain*,
VOL. III. F f ‘ are

are said to have submitted themselves unto the Romans, or given hostages: whereby *Asdrubal* was compelled to fly into the utmost corners of the land, and hide himself in *Lusitania*. Yet it follows, that the *Illergetes* did again rebel, that *Asdrubal* hereupon came over *Iberus*: and that *Scipio* (though having easily vanquished the *Illergetes*) went not forth to meet him, but stirred up against him, the *Celtiberians*, that lately were become his subjects, and had given him hostages. These took from the *Carthaginian* three towns, and vanquished him in two battles, wherein they slew 15000 of his men, and took 4000 prisoners. Then arrived *P. Scipio* with a supply [of 8000 men and a fleet of thirty galleys;] and henceforward the two brethren jointly administered the business in Spain.

The *Carthaginians* being occupied in the *Celtiberian* war; the two *Scipios* did *baud cunctanter*, without boith fear and doubt, pass over *Iberus*, and besieged *Saguntum*. Little cause of doubt had they, if *Cneius* had already subdued many nations beyond it, and among many others the same *Celtiberians*, who with their proper forces were able to vanquish *Asdrubal*. *Bostar*, the Governor of *Saguntum*, a simple man, suffered himself [as has been before related, p. 351.] to be persuaded by one *Abelox*, a *Spaniard*, that the only way to get the favour and hearty good will of the country, was by freely restoring unto them their hostages, as resting without any pledge assured of their faith: But the crafty *Spaniard*, being trusted with this message, and restitution of the hostages, carried them all to the *Roman* Generals; persuading them, as he had done *Bostar*, to make the liberality their

Neither *Livy* nor *Polybius* say that *Saguntum* was besieged. The Romans seem to have designed it, but winter coming on, hindered them. *Saguntum* *pergunt ire* :—*defectionem omnes [Hispani] spectare*, *armaque extemplo mota forent*, *ni hiems*—*intervenisset*. *Liv. B 22. c. 22.* *Saguntinorum urbi appropinquarent*, *5 millia ab oppido*—*castra faciunt*.—*Quia autem instabat hyems*, *utriusque [Rom. & Hispani] in hiberna*, *suos exercitus dimiserunt*. *Polyb. L. 3. c. 97, 99.* *Casaub. trad.*

own.

own. Hereby the *Romans* purchased much love if the tale were true; and if it were not rather true, as afterward, and ere this, we find, that all the *Spaniard* hostages were left in new *Carthage*. I am weary of rehearsing so many particularities, whereof I can believe so few. But since we find no better certainties, we must content ourselves with these.

The year following was like unto this: *Asdrubal* Y. of R. must be beaten again. The two *Scipios* divide their forces: *Cneius* makes war by land, *Publius* by sea. *Asdrubal* with much labour and entreaty hath gotten 4000 foot and 500 horse out of *Afric*. He repairs his fleet, and provides every way to make resistance. But all his chief seamen and masters of his ships revolt unto the *Romans*, because they had been chidden the last year for their negligence, which had betrayed the navy. The revolt of these ship-masters animates to rebellion the *Carpetians* or *Carpetani*, an in-land people, about *Toledo*, in the very center of *Spain*. These do much mischief, so that *Asdrubal* is fain to make a journey to them. His sudden coming cuts off some of them that were found scattered abroad in the fields. But they making head, so valiantly assail him, that they drive him, for very fear, to encamp himself strongly on a high piece of ground, whence he dares not come forth to give them battle. So they take a town by force, wherein he had laid up all his provisions, and shortly make themselves masters of the country round about. This good success breeds negligence, for which they dearly pay. *Asdrubal* comes upon them, takes them unprepared, beats them, kills the most of them, and disperseth the rest; so that the whole nation yieldeth to him the next day. Then come directions from *Carthage*, that *Asdrubal* should lead his army forth into *Italy*; which we may wonder why the *Carthaginians* would appoint him to do, if they had been informed by his letters in what hard case he was, and had so weakly supplied him, as is shewed before. But thus we find it reported, and that upon the very rumour of his journey, almost all *Spain* was

Y. of R.^c was ready to fall to the Romans. *Asdrubal* therefore
 537. sends word presently to *Carthage*, that this must not
 be so ; or if they will needs have it so, that then they
 must send him a successor, and well attended with a
 strong army, which to employ they should find work
 more than enough, such notable men were the *Roman*
 Generals. But the Senate of *Carthage* is not much
 moved with this excuse. *Asdrubal* must needs be
 gone : *Himilco* with such forces as are thought expe-
 dient for the service, both by land and sea, is sent to
 take the charge of *Spain*. Wherefore *Asdrubal* hath
 now no more to do than to furnish himself with
 store of money, that he might have wherewithal to
 win the friendship of the *Gauls*, through whose countries
 he must pass, as *Hannibal* had done before him. The
Carthaginians were greatly to blame for not remem-
 bering to ease him of his care. But since it can be no
 better, he lays great impositions upon all the *Spaniards*
 his subjects ; and having gotten together as much trea-
 sure as he could, onward he marched toward *Iberus*.
 The *Scipios*, hearing these news, are careful how to
 arrest him on the way. They besiege *Ibera* (so called
 of the river's name running by it) the richest town
 in all those quarters, that was confederate with *Asdru-*
bal, who thereupon steps aside to relieve it. The
Romans meet him, and fight a battle with him, which
 they win the more easily, for that the *Spaniards*, his
 followers, had rather be vanquished at home, than
 get the victory, and afterwards be haled into *Italy*.
 Great numbers are slain, and few should have escaped,
 but that the *Spaniards* run away ere the battles were
 fully joined. Their camp the *Romans* take and spoil,
 whereby (questionless) they are marvelously enriched ;
 all the money that could be raked together in *Spain*
 being carried along in this *Italian* expedition. This
 day's event joins all *Spain* to the *Romans*, if any part
 of the country stood in doubt before ; and puts *Asdru-*
bal so far from all thought of travelling into *Italy*, that
 it leaves him small hope of keeping himself safe in

Liv. B. 23. *Spain*. Of these exploits advertisement is sent to
 c. 48. *Rome*,

‘*Rome*, and letters to the Senate from *P.* and *Cn. Scipio*, Y. of R.
 whereof the contents are, that they have neither mo- 537.
 ney, apparel, nor bread, wherewith to sustain their See page
 army and fleet; that all is wanting; so as unless they 386.
 may be supplied from *Rome*, they can neither hold
 their forces together, nor tarry any longer in the pro-
 vince. These letters come to *Rome* in an evil season,
 the state being scarcely able after the loss at *Cannæ*,
 to help itself at home. Yet relief is sent. At the
 coming of this supply, the two *Scipios* pursue *Afdrubal*, See p. 387.
 and hunt him out of his lurking holes. What else Y. of R.
 can we think that remember the last news of him, and 538.
 how fearfully he mistrusted his own safety? They find
 him, and *Mago* and *Hamilcar*, the son of *Bomilcar*,
 with an army of threescore thousand men, besieging
*Illiturgi** (which the learned *Ortelius* and others pro-
 bably conjecture to have stood where *Carinnena* is now,
 in the kingdom of *Arragon*; for there was *Illiturgia**,
 afterwards called *Forum Julii*, quite another way) a
 town of the *Ilergetes*, their nearest neighbours, for
 having revolted to the *Romans*. The town is greatly
 distressed; but most of all for want of victuals. The
Romans therefore break through between the enemy’s
 camps, with terrible slaughter of all that resist them;
 and having victualed the place, encouraged the towns-
 men to defend their walls as stoutly as they should
 anon behold them fighting manfully with the besiegers
 in their behalf. So they issue forth, about sixteen
 thousand against threescore thousand, and killing more
 of the enemies than themselves were in number, drove
 all the three *Carthaginian* commanders every one out
 of his quarter, and took that day, besides prisoners
 and other booty, fifty and eight ensigns.
 The *Carthaginian* army, being thus beaten from
Illiturgi, fall upon *Incibili*, that stood a little southward

* Father *Rouillé* (B. 29. p. 208. Note 6.) and *Cellarius* (Vol. I. p. 69.) seem rightly to have placed *Illiturgi* on the river *Bætis*, near *Castulo*. But that the *Carthaginians* should after being beaten thence, go and lay siege to *Incibili*, which stood where Sir *W. Raleigh* places it, is not easy to be credited.

Y. of R. 538. from the mouth of *Iberus*. The *Spaniards* are blamed
 as too greedy of earning money by war, for thus re-
 inforging the broken *Carthaginians*. But it may be
 wondered whence the *Carthaginians* had money to
 pay them ; since *Asdrubal* was lately driven to poll
 the country, wanting money of his own ; and being
 beaten in his journey, had lost his wealthy carriages,
 when his camp was taken after the battle by *Ibera*.
 Howsoever it happens, the *Carthaginians* (according to
 their custom) are beaten again at *Incibili*, where there
 were of them above 13000 slain and above 3000 taken,
 besides two and forty ensigns, and nine elephants.
 After this (in a manner) all the people of *Spain* fell
 from them unto the *Romans*. Thus could *Fabius*,
Valerius Antias, or some other historian, to whom *Livy*
 gave credit, conquer all *Spain* twice in one year*,
 by winning famous victories, wherof these good Cap-
 tains *P.* and *Cn. Scipio* perhaps were not aware.

Liv. B. 24.
 C. 41.

Y. of R. 539. The *Romans* notwithstanding this large access of
 dominion, winter on their own side of *Iberus*. In the
 beginning of the next year, great armies of the *Spani-
 ards* rise against *Asdrubal*, and are overthrown by
 him. *P. Scipio*, to help these his friends, is forced to
 make great haste over the river. At † *Castrum Altum*,
 a place in the mid-way between new *Carthage* and
Saguntum, *Publius Scipio* encampeth ; and stores the
 place with victuals, being strong and defensible ; as
 intending to make it his seat for a while. But the
 country round about is too full of enemies : The
Carthaginian horse have charged the *Romans* in their
 march, and are gone off clear ; falling also upon some
 straglers, or such as lagged behind their fellows in
 march, they have cut off two thousand of them.
 Hereupon it is thought behoveful to retire unto some
 place more assured. So *Publius* withdraws himself

* Not twice in the same year according to *Livy*.

† *Rouillé* (not. 54. p. 238. B. 29.) says it is the same with *Kateria*,
 which he and *Cellarius*, V. 1. p. 103. place at the head of the *Sucro*.

unto * *Mons Victorie*, that rising somewhat eastward y. of R.
 from *Incibili*, overlooketh the southren outlet of *Iberus*. 539.
 Thither the *Carthaginians* pursue him. His
 brother *Cneius* repairs unto him; and *Asdrubal*, the
 son of *Gisco*, with a full army, arrives to help his
 companions. As they lie thus near encamped toge-
 ther, *P. Scipio*, with some light armed, going closely
 to view the places thereabouts, is discovered by the
 enemies, who are like to take him, but that he with-
 draws himself to a high piece of ground, where they
 besiege him, until his brother *Cneius* fetched him off.
 After this (but I know not why) + *Castulo*, a great
 city of *Spain*, whence *Hannibal* had taken him a
 wife, joineth with the *Romans*, though being far dis-
 tant from them, and seated on the head of the river
Bætis. Nevertheless the *Carthaginians* pass over *Ibe-*
rus, to besiege *Illiturgi* again, wherein lodgeth a *Ro-*
man garrison; hoping to take it by famine. We
 may justly wonder what should move them to ne-
 glect the rebellion of *Castulo*, yea and the *Roman*
 army lying so close by them, and to seek adventures
 farther off, in that very place, wherein they had been
 so grievously beaten the year before. But thither
 they go; and thither follows them *Cneius Scipio* with
 one legion; who enters the town by force, breaks
 out upon them the next day, and in two battles kills
 above twelve thousand, and takes more than a thousand
 of them prisoners, with six and thirty ensigns. This
 victory (doubtless) is remarkable, considering that the
 greatest *Roman* legion at this time consisted of no
 more than 5000 men. The vanquished *Carthaginians*
 besiege § *Bigerra*, but the siege is also raised by *Cn.*

* According to *Rouillé*, loc. cit. note 56. this hill was part of mount *Orospeda*, between the *Sucro* and the *Anas*. But then *Publius* instead of retiring was advancing farther into the country.

+ *Castulo* is upon the *Bætis*, not far from *Orospeda*.

§ *Bigerra*, according to *Rouillé* (who follows *Ptolemy*) and *Cellar*. V. 1. p. 108. stood in the country of the *Bastetani*, a people in the east part of *Bætica*.

Y. of R. Scipio. Thence the *Carthaginians* remove to + *Munda*, where the *Romans* are soon at their heels. There
 539. is a great battle fought, that lasteth four hours, wherein the *Romans* got a notable victory ; and a more notable would have gotten had not *Cn. Scipio* been wounded. Thirty nine elephants are killed, and twelve thousand men ; threethousand prisoners taken, and seven and fifty ensigns. The *Carthaginians* fly to *Auringes*||, and the *Romans* pursue them. *Cn. Scipio* in a litter is carried into the field, and vanquishes the *Carthaginians* again, but kills not half so many of them as before ; good cause why, for there are fewer of them left to fight. Notwithstanding all these overthrows, the *Spaniards*, a people framed even by nature to set war on foot, quickly fill up the broken troops of *Asdrubal*, who having also hired some of the *Gauls*, adventures once more to try his fortune with the *Romans*. But he is beaten again, and loseth eight thousand of his men, besides prisoners, elephants, ensigns, and other appurtenances. After so many victories, the *Romans* are even ashamed to leave *Saguntum* enthralled unto the *Carthaginians*, since, in behalf of that city, they had at first entered into this war. And well may we think it strange, that they had not recovered it long before, since we may remember, that, long before this, they had won all the country once and again. But it must not be forgotten, that they had ere now besieged *Saguntum* ; and were fain (as appears) to go their way without it : So as that they need not to blush for having so long borne to do that, which ere now they had attempted, but were unable to perform. At the present they win *Saguntum*, and restore the possession thereof unto such of the poor dispersed citizens as they can find out. They also waste and destroy the country of the

+ *Munda*, *Cellar.* p. 73. places near the sea, not far from the Straights of *Gibraltar*.

|| According to *Cellarius*, *Aurinx*, or *Oringi*, is not far from *Illiurgi* on the *Bætis*, but nearer the sea. *Cellar.* V. 1. p. 75.

Turdetani,

‘ Turdetani, that had ministred unto Hannibal matter Y. of R.
 ‘ of quarrel against the Saguntines. This last action 539.
 ‘ (questionless) was much to their honour ; and where-
 ‘ in we may be assured, that the Carthaginians would
 ‘ have disturbed them if they had been able.

‘ But overlooking now this long continuance of
 ‘ great victories, which the Romans have gotten in Spain,
 ‘ other print or token of all their brave exploits we can
 ‘ perceive none, than this recovery of Saguntum, except-
 ‘ ing the stopping of Asdrubal’s journey, which was in-
 ‘ deed of the greatest importance, but appertaining to
 ‘ their own defence. For they have landed at Emporiae,
 ‘ an haven town, built and peopled by a colony of the
 ‘ Phœceans, kin to the Massilians, friends to the Romans.
 ‘ They have easily won to their party, lost, recovered,
 ‘ and lost again some petty bordering nations of the
 ‘ Spaniards, that are carried one while by persuasion,
 ‘ other-whiles by force, and sometimes by their own
 ‘ unsettled passions ; and now finally they have won a
 ‘ town, whereof the Carthaginians held entire possession,
 ‘ who had routed out the old inhabitants. Wherefore
 ‘ we may easily believe, that when they took Saguntum
 ‘ (if they took it not by surprise; which is to be sus-
 ‘ pected, since in this action we find no particulars re-
 ‘ membered, as when the same place was taken by
 ‘ Hannibal) they had gotten the better of their enemies
 ‘ in some notable fight. In like sort also must we think
 ‘ that all those battles lately remembered, after every
 ‘ one of which Asdrubal sat down before some place that
 ‘ had rebelled, or seemed ready to rebel, were prospe-
 ‘ rous unto the Carthaginians. For it is not the
 ‘ custom of armies vanquished, to carry the war from
 ‘ town to town, and beleaguer cities of their enemies;
 ‘ but to fortify themselves within their own places
 ‘ of strength, and therein to attend the leyy and arri-
 ‘ val of new supplies. And surely if the Romans had been
 ‘ absolute masters of the field, when they won Saguntum,
 ‘ they would not have consumed a whole year follow-
 ‘ ing in practising only with the Celiberians, the next c. 49.
 ‘ adjoining people. Yet made they this little less than

Y. of R.
 540.
 Liv. B. 24.

‘ two

Y. of R. two years business. Of these *Celtiberians* we hear
 540: before, that they have yielded up themselves unto
 the *Romans*; for security of their faith given hostages
 to *Scipio*, and, at his appointment, made war against
 the *Carthaginians*, with their proper forces. Where-
 fore it is strange, that they are now thus hardly
 wrought, and not without express condition of a great
 sum, hired to serve in the *Roman* camp. How this
 may hold together I cannot perceive, unless perhaps
 in those days it were the *Roman* custom, or rather
 the custom of some bad author, whom *Livy* fol-
 lows, to call every messenger, or straggler, that en-
 tered their camp, an hostage of that people from
 whom he came.

Y. of R. The *Celtiberians* at length, hired with great re-
 wards, send an army of thirty thousand men to help
Liv. B. 25. the *Romans*, out of which three hundred^b, the
c. 32. & seq. fittest, are chosen and carried into *Italy*, there to deal
 with their countrymen, that follow *Hannibal* in his
 wars. But if any of these three hundred^c return
 back into *Spain*, it is to be feared that he brings with
 him such news of the riches and welfare of *Hannibal's*
 men, that all his fellows at home are the less un-
 willing to follow *Asdrubal*, when he shall next have a
 desire to lead them into *Italy*. Hereof we find more
 than probability when these mercenary *Celtiberians*
 meet the *Carthaginian* army in the field. The two
Scipios, presuming on this access of strength, divide
 their forces, and seek out the enemies, who lye not
 far off with three armies. *Asdrubal* the son of *Ha-*
niblcar is nearest at hand, even among the *Celtiberians*,
 at ^d *Anitorgis*. With him *Cn. Scipio* doubts not to
 take

^b *Livy* does not say these 300 were *Celtiberians, nobilissimos Hispanos* 300. l. 24. c. 49.

^c These 300 were sent into *Italy* the year before the siege of *Ca-*
pua, and three years after the battle of *Canna*. It may therefore
 be questioned, whether *Hannibal's* soldiers were so rich as Sir *Wal-*
ter represents.

^d It is not agreed where *Anitorgis* stood, *Rouillé* places it near the
Anas (n. 24. p. 286. B. 31.) *Cellar. V. 1. p. 77.* seems to think it the
 same

take good order : but the fear is, that this one part Y. of R.
 of the *Carthaginian* forces being destroyed, *Mago* 541.
 and the son of *Gisco*, hearing the news, will make
 use of their distance, which is five days march, and
 by running into the farthest parts of the country,
 save themselves from being overtaken. *Publius* there-
 fore must make the more haste, and take with him
 the better soldiers, that is two parts of the old *Ro-*
 man army ; leaving the third part, and all the *Celti-*
berians, to his brother. He that hath the longer
 journey to make, comes somewhat the sooner to his
 life's end. *Mago* and *Asdrubal* the son of *Gisco* are
 not studying how to run away : They find no such
 necessity. They join their forces together, meet
 with *Publius Scipio*, and lay at him so hardly, that
 he is driven to keep himself close within his trenches,
 wherein he thinks himself not well assured. Especi-
 ally he is vexed by *Masinissa*, Prince of the *Massylii*,
Numidians bordering upon *Mauritania*, in the region
 now called *Tremizen* ; to whom the chief honour of
 this service is ascribed, for that he becomes afterwards
 confederate with the *Romans*. In this dangerous case
Publius Scipio gets intelligence that *Indibilis*, a *Spanish*
 Prince, is coming with 7500 of the *Sueffetani* to join
 with his enemies. Fearing therefore to be strait shut
 up and besieged, he issues forth by night, to meet
 with *Indibilis* upon the way ; leaving *T. Fonteius* his
 lieutenant, with a small company to defend the camp.
 He meets with *Indibilis*, but is not able, according to
 his hope, to defeat him at the first encounter. The
 fight continues so long, that the *Numidian* horse ap-
 pear (whom he thought to have been ignorant of his
 departure) and fall upon the *Romans* on all sides :
 Neither are the *Carthaginians* far behind, but come

same with *Cunitorgis*, which *Strab* calls a town of the *Celticæ*, but
 which *Appian* places in *Lusitania*. The *Anitorgis* here mentioned
 by *Livy*, must have been near the *Iberus* ; for, according to him,
Publius Scipio's camp, which *Fonteius* and *Marcus* possessed after the
 General's death, was near that river.

The *Sueffetani* were a people on the north side of the *Iberus*.

‘ so

Y. of R. so fast upon him in rear, that *Publius Scipio*, uncertain
 541. which way to turn, yet fighting and animating
 his men, where need most requireth, is struck through
 with a lance, and slain; very few of his army escap-
 ing the same destiny, through benefit of the dark
 night. The like end hath *Cneius Scipio* within nine
 and twenty days after. At his meeting with *Asdrubal*,
 the *Celtiberian* mercenaries all forsake him, pre-
 tending that they had war in their own country. If
Anitorgis where *Asdrubal* then lay, were, as *Ortelius*
 following *Beuterus* takes it, a *Celtiberian* town, this
 was no vain pretence, but an apparent truth. But
 we may justly believe that they were won by *Asdrubal*,
 and easily persuaded to take as much money for not
 fighting, as they should have had for hazarding their
 lives. *Cneius Scipio* therefore being unable to stay
 them, and no less unable without their help either
 to resist the enemy, or to join with his brother,
 maketh a very violent retreat; herein only differing
 from plain flight, that he keeps his men together.
Asdrubal presseth hard upon him; and *Mago*, with
Asdrubal the son of *Gisto*, having made an end of
Publius, hasten to dispatch his brother after him.
Scipio steals from them all by night, but is overtaken
 the next day by their horse, and arrested in an open
 place, of hard stony ground, where grows not so
 much as a shrub, unfit for defence of his legions a-
 gainst such enemies. Yet a little hill he finds of easy
 ascent on every side, which he takes for want of a
 more commodious place, and fortifies it with pack-
 saddles, for default of a better pallisado. These weak
 defences the *Carthaginians* soon tear in sunder^f, and
 breaking in on all hands, leave very few of them a-
 live, that saving themselves, I know not how, within
 some woods adjoining, escape unto *T. Fonteius*, whom
Publius had left in his camp, as is before said. It is a
 terrible overthrow, they say, out of which no man
 escapes. Yet how they that were thus hemmed in on

^f *Livy* says it cost them a great deal of trouble, and they were a
long while about it. B. 25. c. 36.

‘ every

every side, in so bare a ground as afforded not a shrub Y. of R.
to cover them, could break out and shrowd them- 541.
selves within woods adjoining, I should much won-
der, did not a greater miracle following call away
mine attention. *T. Fonteius* is in *Publius Scipio's* camp
on the north side of *Iberus*, fearful (as may be sup-
posed) of his own life, since his General, with two
parts of the *Roman* army, had little hope to remain
long safe within it. Thither comes *L. Marcius*, a
young *Roman* gentleman of a notable spirit; who
having gathered together the scattered soldiers, and
drawn some companies out of their garrisons, makes
a pretty army. The soldiers being to choose a Ge-
neral by most voices, prefer this *L. Marcius* before
Fonteius the lieutenant, as well they may. For *Af-
drubal* the son of *Gisco* coming upon them, this *L.
Marcius* so encourageth his men (fondly weeping
when he led them forth, upon remembrance of their
more honourable Generals lately slain) and admonish-
eth them to their present necessity, that he beats the
Carthaginians into their trenches. A notable victory
perhaps he might have gotten, but that he wisely
sounds the retreat, reserving the fury of his soldiers
to a greater occasion. The *Carthaginians* are at first
amazed, and wonder whence this boldness grows, in
enemies lately vanquished, and now again little better
than taken. But when they see that the *Roman* dares
not follow his advantage, they return to their for-
mer security, and, utterly despising him, set neither
corps de garde nor centinel, but rest secure, as if no
enemy were near. *Marcius* therefore animates his
soldiers with lively words, and tells them that there is
no adventure more safe, than that which is furthest
from suspicion of being undertaken. They are soon
persuaded to follow him in any desperate piece of ser-
vice. So he leads them forth by night, and steals
upon the camp of *Afdrubal*; where finding no guard,
but the enemies fast asleep, or very drowsy, he enters
without resistance, fires their cabins, and gives a ter-
rible alarm; so that all affrighted the *Carthaginians*
run

Y. of R. 541. run head-long one upon another ; they know not
which way. All passages out of their camp *Marcius*
hath prepossessed, so that there is no way to escape,
save by leaping down the rampart ; which as many
do as can think upon it, and run away towards the
camp of *Asdrubal*, the son of *Hamilcar*, that lay six
miles off. But *Marcius* hath way-laid them. In a
valley between their two camps he hath bestowed a
Roman cohort, and I know not what number of
horse ; so that into this ambush they fall every one,
and are cut in pieces. But lest perchance any should
have escaped, and give the alarm before his coming,
Marcius hastens to be there as soon as they. By
which diligent speed he comes early in the morning
upon this furtlier camp, which with no great diffi-
culty he enters, and partly by apprehension of dan-
ger which the enemies conceived, when they beheld
the *Roman shields* foul, and bloodied with their for-
mer execution, he drives headlong into flight all that
can save themselves from the fury of the sword.
Thirty seven thousand of the enemies perish in this
night's work, besides a thousand eight hundred and
thirty taken prisoners. Hereunto *Valerius Antias* adds,
that the camp of *Mago* was also taken, and 7000
slain, and that in another battle with *Asdrubal*, there
were slain 10000 more, besides 4330 taken prisoners.
Such is the power of some historians. *Livy* there-
fore hath elsewhere well observed, that there is none
so intemperate as *Valerius Antias* in multiplying the
numbers that have fallen in battles. That whilst
Marcius was making an oration to his soldiers, a flame
of fire shone about his head, *Livy* reporteth as a
common tale, not giving thereto any credit ; and
temperately concludeth, that this Captain *Marcius*
got a great name ; which he might well do, if with
so small forces, and in such distress, he could clearly
get off from the enemies, and give them any parting
blow, though it were far less than that which is here
set down.

• Of

‘ Of these occurrents *L. Marcius* sent word to *Rome*, Y. of R.
 ‘ not forgetting his own good service, whatsoever it was,
 ‘ but setting it out in such wise as the Senate might
 ‘ judge him worthy to hold the place of their vicegerent
 ‘ in *Spain*, which the better to intimate unto them,
 ‘ he stiled himself Pro-*Prætor*. The Fathers were no
 ‘ less moved with the tidings than the case required,
 ‘ and therefore took such careful order for supplying
 ‘ their forces in *Spain*, that although *Hannibal* came
 ‘ to the gates of *Rome*, ere the companies levied to
 ‘ serve that province could be sent away, yet could they
 ‘ not stay a tide for defence of the city itself, but
 ‘ shipped them in all haste for *Spain*. As for the title B.26.c.11.
 ‘ of Pro-*Prætor* which *Marcius* had assumed, they
 ‘ thought it too great for him, and were offended
 ‘ at his presumption in usurping it; foreseeing well,
 ‘ that it was a matter of ill consequence, to have the
 ‘ soldiers abroad make choice, among themselves, of
 ‘ those that should command armies and provinces.
 ‘ Therefore *C. Claudius Nero* was dispatched away, Liv. B.26.
 ‘ with all convenient haste, into *Spain*, carrying with c. 17.
 ‘ him about 6000 of the *Roman* foot, and as many of
 ‘ the *Latines*, with 300 *Roman* horse, and of the *La-*
 ‘ *tines* eight hundred.

‘ It happened well that about these times the affairs
 ‘ of *Rome* began to prosper in *Italy*, and afforded
 ‘ means of sending abroad such a strong supply, other-
 ‘ wise the victories of *Marcius* would ill have served,
 ‘ either to keep footing in *Spain*, or to stop the *Car-*
 ‘ *thaginian* armies from marching towards the *Alps*.
 ‘ For when *Claudius*, landing with his new forces, took
 ‘ charge of that remainder of the army, which was
 ‘ under *Marcius* and *Fonteius*, he found surer tokens
 ‘ of the overthrows received, than of those miraculous
 ‘ victories, whereof *Marcius* had made his vaunts to
 ‘ the Senate. The *Roman* party was forsaken by most
 ‘ of the *Spaniard* friends, whom how to reclaim, it would
 ‘ not easily be devised. Yet *Claudius* advanced boldly
 ‘ towards *Afdrubal*, the brother of *Hannibal*, whom he
 ‘ found

Y. of R. 542. found among the *Ausetani*, near enough at hand, incamped in a place called *Lapides atri*, out of which there was no issue, but only through a strait, whereon the *Roman* seized at his first coming. What should have tempted any man of understanding to incamp in such a place, I do not find; and as little reason can I find in that which followed. For it is said that *Asdrubal*, seeing himself thus locked up, made offer to depart forthwith out of all *Spain*, and quit the province to the *Romans*, upon condition that he and his army might be thence dismissed; that he spent many days in entertaining parly with *Claudius* about this busines; that night by night he conveyed his footmen (a few at a time) through very difficult passages out of the danger, and that finally taking advantage of a misty day, he stole away with all his horse and elephants, leaving his camp empty. If we consider, that there were at the same time, besides this *Asdrubal*, two other *Carthaginian* Generals in *Spain*, we shall find no less cause to wonder at the simplicity of *Claudius*, who hoped to conclude a bargain for so great a country, with one of these three chieftains, than at the strange nature of those passages, through which the footmen could hardly creep out by night, the horse and elephants easily following them in a dark misty day. Wherefore in giving belief to such a tale, it is needful that we suppose both the danger wherein the *Carthaginians* were, and the conditions offered for their safe departure, to have been of far less value. Howsoever it was, neither this nor aught

^g The *Ausetani* were indeed near enough at hand. *Pliny* mentions a people of that name near *Emporiae*. *Livy*, as quoted by *Cellarius*, V. 1. p. 116. places them near the *Iberus*. But the *Lapides atri* (the black rocks) according to the same *Cellarius*, p. 99. were between *Illiturgi* and *Mentesa*, or *Mentissa* on the *Bætis*. *Livy* also says the *Lapides atri* were between *Illiturgi* and *Mentissa*; but then he places these towns in the country of the *Ausetani*, which agrees to the situation Sir *Walter Raleigh* gives to *Illiturgi*. *Asdrubal ad Lapides atros Castra habebat in Ausetanis, is locus est inter oppida Illiturgim & Mentissam.* Liv. L. 26. c. 17. *Rouillé*. N. 33, 34. p. 320. B. 32.) agrees with *Cellar*.

* else

else that the *Romans* could do, served to purchase any Y. of R.
new friends in *Spain*, or to recover the old which
they had lost. Like enough it is, that the old sol-
diers, which had chosen *Marcius* their Pro Prætor,
took it not well, that the Senate, regardless of their
good deserts, had repealed their election, and sent a
Pro-Prætor whom they fancied not so well. Some
such occasion may have moved them to desire a Pro-
Consul, and, perhaps, young *Scipio* by name, as if a
title of greater dignity were needful to work regard-
in the *Barbarians*, and the beloved memory of *Cneius*
and *Publius* likely to do good, were it revived in one
of the same family. Whether upon these or upon
other reasons, *C. Claudius* was recalled out of the pro-
vince, and *Publius* the son of *P. Scipio* sent Pro-Consul
into *Spain*;

This is that *Scipio*, who afterwards transferred the
war into *Afric*, where he happily ended it to the
great honour and benefit of his country. He was a
man of goodly presence, and singularly well conditi-
oned, especially he excelled in temperance, conti-
nency, bounty, and other virtues that purchase love;
of which qualities what great use he made shall appear
in the tenor of his actions following. As for those
things that are reported of him, favouring a little too
much of the great *Alexander's* vanity: How he used
to walk alone in the Capitol, as one that had some
secret conference with *Jupiter*: How a dragon
(which must have been one of the Gods, and in like-
lihood *Jupiter* himself) was thought to have conversed
with his mother, entering her chamber often, and
vanishing away at the coming in of any man; and
how of these matters he nourished the rumour by
doubtful answers; I hold them no better than fables,
devised by historians, who thought thereby to add
unto the glory of *Rome*; that this noble city might
seem not only to have surpassed other nations in vir-
ture of the generality, but also in great worth of
one single man. To this end nothing is left out that
might serve to adorn this *Roman* champion. For it is

Y. of R.^{542.} confidently written as matter of unquestionable truth,
 that when a Pro-Consul was to be chosen for *Spain*,
 there durst not any Captain of the principal citizens
 offer himself as petitioner for that honourable but dan-
 gerous charge ; that the people of *Rome* were much
 astonished thereat ; that when the day of election
 came, all the Princes of the city stood looking one
 another in the face, not one of them having the heart
 to adventure himself in such a desperate service ; and
 finally, that this *Publius Cornelius Scipio*, being then
 about four and twenty years of age^k, getting up up-
 on an high place, where he might be seen of all the
 multitude, requested and obtained, that the office
 might be conferred upon him. If this were true, then
 were all the victories of *L. Marcius* no better than
 dreams ; and either very reasonable was the fear of
 all the *Roman Captains*, who durst not follow *Claudius*
Nero, that not long before was gone into *Spain* Pro-
 Prætor, or very bad intelligence they had out of the
 province, which *Asdrubal the Carthaginian*, as we
 heard even now, was ready to abandon. But upon
 these incoherences, which I find in the too partial *Ro-*
man historians, I do not willingly insist.

Polyb. B. 10. c. 6. & seq. *P. Scipio* was sent Pro-Consul into *Spain*, and with
 him was joined *M. Junius Silanus* as Pro-Prætor and
 his Coadjutor. They carried with them 10000 foot
 26. c. 19. and 1000 horse in thirty quinquereme gallies. With
 these they landed at *Emporiae*, and marched from
 thence to *Tarragona* along the sea coast. At the same
 of *Scipio's arrival*, it is said, that embassages came to
 him apace from all quarters of the province, which
 he entertained with such a majesty, as bred a won-
Livy, B. 26. c. 20. derful opinion of him. As for the enemies, they
 were greatly afraid of him, and so much the greater
 was their fear, by how much the less they could give

^k *Polyb.* B. 10. c. 3. says upon the authority of *C. Laelius*, from
 whom he heard it, that *Scipio* was seventeen years of age at the bat-
 tle of the *Ticin*, and (c. 6.) twenty seven when he went into *Spain*.
 But if he was seventeen at the battle of the *Ticin*, and went to *Spain*
 this year (as *Livy* and *Pighius* say) he was now only twenty four.

^{any}

any reason of it. If we must believe this, then must Y. of R.
 we needs believe, that their fear was even as great as 542.
 could be; for very little cause there was to be terrified
 with the fame of so young a man, which had as yet *Liv. B. 27.*
 performed nothing. All the winter following (or, asc. 7.
 some think, all the next year) he did nothing, but Y. of R.
 spent the time perhaps, as his foregoers had done, in ^{544.} *Polyb. loc.*
 treating with the *Spaniards*. His first enterprize was cit. &—
 against new *Carthage*, upon which he came unex-*Liv.*
 pected, with 25000 foot and 2500 horse; his sea ^{B. 26. c. 42.} forces coasting him and moderating their course in & seq.
 such wise, that they arrived there together with him.
 He assailed the town by land and sea, and won it by
 assault the first day. The *Carthaginians* lost it by
 their too much confidence upon the strength of it,
 which caused them to man it more slenderly than was
 requisite. Yet it might have been well enough de-
 fended, if some fishermen of *Tarragon* had not disco-
 vered unto *Scipio* a secret passage unto the walls,
 whereof the townsmen themselves were either igno-
 rant, or thought, at least, that their enemies could
 have no notice. This city of new *Carthage* re-
 sembled the old and great *Carthage* in situation, stand-
 ing upon a demi-island, between a haven and a great
 lake. All the western side of the walls and some-
 what of the north was fenced with this lake, which
 the fishermen of *Tarragon* had sounded, and finding
 some part thereof a shelf, whereon at low water men
 might pass knee deep, or, at most, wading up to the
 middle, *Scipio* thrust thereinto some companies of
 men, who recovered the top of the walls without re-
 sistance, the place being left without guard, as able
 to defend itself by the natural strength. These fall-
 ing suddenly upon the backs of the *Carthaginians*
 within the city, easily forced a gate, and gave free
 entrance to the *Roman* army. What booty was
 found within the town¹, *Livy* himself cannot certain-

¹ *Polyb. B. 10. c. 19.* says, *Scipio* found in the town 600 talents of the public money; and that he had brought with him 400 talents from *Rome*, for the expence of the war.

V. of R. 544. ly affirm, but is fain to say, that some *Roman* histo-
rians told lies without measure, in way of amplifica-
tion. By that small proportion of riches, which was
afterwards carried by *Scipio* into the *Roman* treasury,
we may easily perceive how great a vanity it was to
say, that all the wealth of *Afric* and *Spain* was heaped
up in that one town. But therein were bestowed all
the *Spanish* hostages^m, or at least of the adjoining
provinces, whom *Scipio* intreated with singular cour-
tesy, restoring them unto their kindred and friends,
in such gracious manner as doubled the thanks due to
so great a benefit.'

Polyb. B. 10. c. 11. A procedure so generous encouraged a woman of a
Liv. majestick mein, to come and throw herself at his feet.
B. 26. c. 49. (She was the wife of *Mandonius*, brother to *Indibilis*,
King of the *Ilergetes*.) With tears in her eyes she
besought him, that he would order his *Romans* to be
more civil to their captives than the *Carthaginians* had
been. Her modesty hindered her from expressing her-
self more clearly; and *Scipio* misunderstood her mean-
ing. Imagining that she and her companions had been
hardly treated with respect to the necessaries of life, he
gave her an assurance that, for the future, they should
want nothing. *That*, returned the noble matron, *bas*
no part in my concern. Cares of another kind distract my
thoughts, when I consider the age of those about me. *Scipio*
casting his eyes upon her nieces (the daughters of *Indi-*
bilis) and other beautiful captives of like quality, who
were with her, and seemed to regard her as a mother,
understood the nature of her petition. Moved w i t
compassion for young Princesses, whose honour had
been exposed to so much danger, tears dropped from
his eyes; and, reaching out his hand to raise the sup-
pliant, he replied, ' For my own sake, and for the
' sake of the Roman people, I would suffer nothing, that
' is any where esteemed sacred, to be violated amongst
' us. But that virtue and dignity, which you have

^m *Scipio* promised to send home the hostages, provided their friends
would enter into an alliance with *Rome*. *Polyb. Lib. 10. c. 18.*

' preserved

' preserved under all your misfortunes, oblige me to be Y. of R.
' more particularly attentive to your protection.' He 544.
then appointed men of known probity to have the
charge of the fair captives and their conductress, and
commanded, that they should be respected as his sisters
and daughters.

A second adventure made it believed, that it was not mere policy, but virtue, which moved *Scipio* to such generous actions. His officers, knowing that he loved women, brought to him a young virgin of surprising beauty. Where-ever she appeared she charmed the eyes of all; and *Scipio* was struck at the sight of her. Nevertheless he gave this answer to the officers. ' Were I in a private station, you could not make me a more agreeable present; nor, in the post I now fill, a present less acceptable.' Then, having asked the Lady concerning her birth, country, and circumstances; and finding, that she was contracted to a Prince of the *Celtiberians* named *Allucius*, he sent for her father, and for the Prince. When they came into his presence, he thus addressed himself to the lover of the captive. ' *Allucius* we are both young, and may therefore speak freely to one another of our sentiments. My soldiers have brought me hither a virgin, who, I hear, is your mistress, and that you passionately love her. Her beauty makes me easily believe it; and would the business with which I am entrusted by our Republic allow me to think of such pleasures, I should be glad to be indulged in them, while they did not exceed the bounds of justice and honour. Your love I can favour, and am pleased with an opportunity to do it. Your mistress has been with us, as if she had been with her own parents, or yours, that I might make you a present worthy of me and of you. The only return I ask, is this; Be a friend to the Roman people. If you believe me to be an honest man, such as my father and uncle were esteemed in these countries, Know, that *Rome* has many citizens like us; and that there is not at this day, in the world, a nation, whom you and your countrymen would think a more ter-

V. of R. 'rible enemy, or a more desirable friend.' At these
 544. words he put the fair captive into the hands of the
Celteberian Prince ; and, as her parents had brought a
 rich present of money for the Pro-Consul, he gave that
 likewise to *Allucius*, as an addition to his wife's porti-
 on. This action did the *Roman* Republic great service
 in *Spain*. *Allucius* published in *Celtiberia*, ' That
 ' there was come among them a young hero, terrible
 ' and beneficent as the immortals, all conquering by
 ' his benignity as by his sword.'

Sir W. R. The grateful Prince soon after brought to *Scipio* a
 B. 5. c. 3. reinforcement of one thousand four hundred horse ;
 §. 11. ' and two petty Kings of the *Illergetes* and *Lacetani*,
 ' nearest neighbours to *Tarragona*, and dwelling on the
 ' north side of the *Iberus*, forsook the *Carthaginian*
 ' party and joined with the *Romans*. The speech of
 ' *Indibilis*, King of the *Illergetes*, is much commended
 ' for that he did not vaunt himself, as commonly fu-
 ' gitives use, of the pleasure which he did unto the
 ' *Romans*, in revolting from their enemies, but rather
 ' excused this his changing side, as being thereto com-
 ' pelled by the injuries of the *Carthaginians*, and in-
 ' vited by the honourable dealing of *Scipio*. This tem-
 ' perate estimation of his new professed friendship was
 ' indeed no unsure token that it should be long lasting.
 ' But if the *Illergetes* had long ere this (as we have heard
 ' before) forsaken the *Carthaginian* party, and stoutly
 ' held themselves as friends to *Cn. Scipio*, then could
 ' nothing have been devised more vain than this ora-
 ' tion of *Indibilis*, their King, excusing, as new, his
 ' taking part with the same, when he should have ra-
 ' ther craved pardon for his breach of alliance, for-
 ' merly contracted with the father and the uncle.
 ' Most likely therefore it is, that howsoever the two
 ' elder *Scipios* had gotten some few places among these
 ' their neighbours, and held them by strength ; yet
 ' were the *Romans* never masters of the country, till
 ' this worthy commander, by recovering their hosta-
 ' ges from the *Carthaginians*, and by his great muni-
 ' fiscence in sending them home, won unto himself the
 ' assured

Liv. B. 27.
c. 17. &
seq.

assured love and assistance of these Princes. The Y. of R.
Carthaginian Generals, when they heard of this loss, 544.
were very sorry, yet nevertheless they set a good face
on the matter, saying, that a young man, having
stolen a town by surprize, was too far transported
and overjoy'd, but that shortly they would meet with
him, and put him in mind of his father and uncle,
which would alter his mood, and bring him to a
more convenient temper.

Now if I should here interpose mine own con-
jecture, I should be bold to say, that the *Carthagini-
ans* were at this time busy in setting forth towards
Italy, and that *Scipio*, to divert them, undertook
new *Carthage*, as his father and uncle upon the like
occasion, sat down before *Ibera*. And in this respect
I would suppose, that it had not been much amiss, if
the passage over the lake had been undiscovered, and
the town held out some longer while. For howsover
that particular action was the more fortunate in com-
ing to such good issue upon the first day, yet in the
generality of the business between *Rome* and *Carthage*,
it was more to be wished, that *Azdrubal* should be
stayed from going into *Italy*, than that half of *Spain*
should be taken from him. Whereas therefore he
had nothing left to do that should hinder his journey,
Mago and *Azdrubal* the son of *Gisco*, were thought
sufficient to hold *Scipio* work, in that lingring war of
taking and retaking towns, whilst the main of the
Carthaginian forces under *Azdrubal*, the son of *Ha-
milcar*, went to a greater enterprise, even to fight in
trial of the empire.

But the *Roman* Historians tell this after another fa- Y. of R.
shion, and say, that *Azdrubal* was beaten into *Italy*, 545.
whither he ran for fear, as thinking himself ill as-
sured of the *Spaniards*, as long as they might but
hear the name of *Scipio*. *Scipio*, say they, coming
upon *Azdrubal*, his vant-curers charged so lustily the
Carthaginian horse, that they drove them into their
trenches, and made it apparent, even by that small
piece of service, how full of spirit the *Roman* army

V. of R. was, and how dejected the enemy. *Aſdrubal* there-
 545. fore by night retired out of that even ground, and
 occupied a hill, compassed on three sides with the
 river, very steep of ascent, and not easy of access on
 the foreside, by which himself got up, and was to be
 followed by the *Romans*. On the top of it there was
 a plain, whereon he strongly encamped himself, and
 in the midway, between the top and the root of the
 hill, was also another plain, into which he descended,
 more upon bravery, that he might not seem to hide
 himself within the trenches, than for that he durst
 adventure his army to the hazard of a battle, for
 which this was no equal ground. But such advan-
 tage of place could not save him from the *Romans*.
 They climbed up the hill to him, they recovered
 even footing with him, drove him out of this lower
 plain up into his camp on the hill top, whither al-
 though the ascent were very difficult, and his ele-
 phants bestowed in the smoothest places to hinder
 their approach, yet compassing about, and seeking
 passage where it was hardest to be found, but much
 more strongly breaking their way, where the *Cariba-*
ginians had got up before them, they drove both
 men and elephants headlong, I know not whither,
 for it is said, that there was no way to fly. Out of
 such a battle, wherein he had lost 8000 men, *Af-*
drubal is said to have escaped, and gathering toge-
 ther his dispersed troops, to have marched towards
 the *Pyrenees*, having sent away his elephants ere the
 fight began ^a. Nevertheless *Mago* and *Aſdrubal* the
 Liv. B. 27.
 c. 20. son of *Gisco*, are reported after this to have consulted
 with him about this war, and finally to have conclud-
 ed, that go he needs must, were it but to carry all
 the *Spaniards*, as far as might be, from the name of
Scipio. How likely this was to have been true, it
 shall appear at his coming into *Italy*, whence these
 incoherent relations of the *Spanish* affairs have too
 long detained us.

^a *Polybius*, B. 10. c. 35, 36, relates this battle somewhat diffe-
 rent from *Livy*, whom Sir *W. Raleigh* follows.

C H A P. XXXII. The TWELFTH and THIRTEENTH YEARS of the War.

Asdrubal vanquished in the battle of the Metaurus. Hannibal is forced to confine himself within Bruttium.

THE approach of *Asdrubal* (as was before observed) Y. of R. made it incumbent on the *Romans* to be very careful in their choice of Consuls to succeed *Marcellus* and *Quinctius*. The Conscript Fathers cast their eyes ^{Liv. B. 27. c. 33.} on *C. Claudius Nero*, who had formerly served in *Spain*; a man of approved courage and ability: But where to find him a proper colleague was the difficulty; for *Nero* being somewhat hasty, and extremely enterprising, it seem'd necessary to join with him, in the command, some person whose flegm might temper his vivacity. It happened about this time, that the reputation of one *M. Livius Macatus* was attacked in the Senate. His kinsman *M. Livius Salinator* spoke in his defence. *Salinator* had discharged the office of Consul with great prudence twelve years before; yet was afterwards unjustly censured by the people for a pretended unequal distribution of the spoils of *Illyricum*. Piqued at the affront, he retired from all public business to his country farm; and though *Marcellus* and *Lævinus* obliged him to return to the city, he lived there like a man in disgrace, his beard long, his hair neglected, and his dress slovenly, till the Censors forced him to shave himself and take his place in the Senate: and even then he continued to show his resentment of the affront he had received, giving his opinion only by an Aye or a No, or by moving from one side of the house to the other. The cause of his friend now engaged him to speak; this drew upon him the attention of the Fathers. They called to mind his merit and his past services, were surprized at themselves for having so long neglected a man of his worth and abilities, and judged him a proper person to be joined with *Nero* in the consulship. But, when the Comitia met, *Livius* himself

self opposed his own election : ‘ If I am worthy,’ said he, ‘ to be chosen Consul a second time, why was I condemned ? Or if my condemnation was just, why should I be placed again at the helm ?’ However, he was at length prevailed upon to accept of the dignity offered him. It fell to his lot to march against *Asdrubal*, and to *Nero’s* to oppose *Hannibal* in *Bruttium* : But the rest of the winter was spent in the celebration of games, processions, and other religious ceremonies, to render the Gods propitious.

Y. of R. When the spring came, the Consuls began to make
 546. new levies with extraordinary rigour. Five out of
 Ref. *J. C.* seven maritime colonies, which had been hitherto exempted
 206. from military service, were deprived of that immunity, which was
 245. confirmed only to *Ostia* and *Antium*. The *Volones* were
Liv. B. 27. enrolled in the legions, and *Scipio* sent from *Spain* to
 c. 38. *Livius* two thousand legionaries, eight thousand *Spaniards* and *Gauls*, and eighteen hundred horse, partly
Numidian, and partly *Spanish*.

C. 39. *Asdrubal* had come from *Spain* to *Italy* in a much shorter time than *Hannibal*. He had found means to gain the good will of the *Gauls*. A great number of the *Arverni* had listed themselves in his service ; and even the mountaineers of the *Alps*, being by this time sensible, that there was no design upon their cottages and possessions, and that their hills were only a road by which one powerful state marched its armies to attack another, at a great distance from them, had been so far from opposing his march, that many of them had joined his army. The *Carthaginian*, after passing the *Alps*, laid siege to *Placentia*. While he was before the town, the Consuls in great haste set out for their respective provinces. *Nero* found, as *Livy* would have us believe, that the *Prætor Hostilius* (who met him at *Venusia*, and there resigned the command of the troops to him) had, with some light armed cohorts, attacked all *Hannibal’s* army on a march, killed 4000 of his men, and taken nine standards. The same author adds, that *Nero* obtained a victory over *Hannibal*, by means of

an

an ambush he placed behind the *Carthaginian* army, Y. of R. flew 8000 of them and four elephants, and took 700 ^{546.} Ref. J. C. prisoners, with the loss only of 500 men; and in a second engagement cut in pieces 2000 of the enemy. ²⁴⁵ Con- Soon after this, four *Gallic* and two *Numidian* troopers, fulship. ^{206.} who had been dispatched with letters to the *Carthaginian* General from *Asdrubal*, missing their way, fell into the hands of some *Roman* soldiers, in the neighbourhood of *Tarentum*, who carried them before Q. *Claudius*, the Pro-*Prætor*; and when dread of torture had made these messengers confess their errand, *Claudius* sent them under a guard, with the letters unopened to the Consul *Nero* at *Canusium*. *Nero* having caused these letters to be interpreted, and finding the import of them to be, ‘That *Asdrubal* was repairing to *Umbria*,’ and desired his brother to join him there,’ he sent them strait to the Senate, signifying to them by the same express, that he was resolved to march with 6000 foot and 1000 horse of his choicest troops to reinforce his colleague, and give *Asdrubal* battle, before *Hannibal* could come to his assistance. This step was contrary to the laws, which forbade Generals to make war out of their own provinces, or to enter those of their colleagues: But the consul imagined, that the present perilous circumstances would justify his conduct.

The messenger dispatched, *Nero* sent orders to the people of the several provinces through which he was to march, to have provisions, horses, carts, and all other accommodations, in readiness. Then having caused a report to be spread, that he was going to force a *Carthaginian* garrison in a neighbouring city of *Lucania*, he left the command of the body of his army with one of his Lieutenants, and in the night took the road to *Picenum*. When he was got to a considerable distance from his camp, he discovered his intention to the detachment he had taken with him, and encouraged them to the enterprize by the prospect of the glory they would acquire by a victory over *Asdrubal*, in which, notwithstanding the smallness of their number,

Y. of R. number, they would be undoubtedly thought to have
 546. had the greatest share.

Bef. J. C. Nero's design, when known at *Rome*, threw the
 206. people into a consternation; some thought, that to leave
 245 Con- fulship. an army without its General, and deprived of its
 Liv. B. 27. bravest soldiers, in the neighbourhood of *Hannibal*,
 c. 44. was too bold a step; others approved the enterprize;
 and the least equitable suspended their judgment, till
 they should see the success.

c. 46. In the mean time the Consul drew near his colleague's camp, by whose advice he entered it in the night, to conceal his arrival from the enemy. A council of war was immediately held, in which many were for giving Nero's troops time to refresh themselves after so long a
 Zon. B. 9. march; but the General himself opposed this motion, being in hopes to defeat *Asdrubal* and return to his camp at *Canusium*, before *Hannibal* should discover his absence, or be able to take any advantage of it.

Liv. B. 27. Notwithstanding the precautions used by the *Romans*
 c. 47. to conceal from the enemy the arrival of Nero, *Asdrubal* the next morning perceived that *Livius* had got a reinforcement; and imagining that *Hannibal* had been defeated, and that the victorious army was come against him, he declined a battle, though he had already drawn out his men in order to engage; and the next night, under favour of the darkness, he decamped and took the road to *Insubria*, resolving to wait there for an answer from his brother, with certain intelligence of his situation. The two guides whom the *Carthaginian* chose to conduct him, proved unfaithful, and on a sudden disappeared: So that the army was bewildered, and knew not what rout to take. They marched all night along the banks of the *Metaurus*, a river in *Umbria*, *Asdrubal* designing to pass it as soon as it was light: And while he pursued his tedious march along the winding stream, the *Romans* had time

Polyb. B. to come up with him. He was forced to give battle
 11. c. 1. in a disadvantageous situation, and when his men were
 and faint with thirst, hunger, and want of rest. Nay, he
 Liv. B. 27. c. 48. had lost a great number of his soldiers in the night,
 especially

especially of the *Gauls*, who, not able, or not willing ^{Y. of R.} to endure the fatigue of so painful a march, had laid ^{546.} themselves down to sleep. He ranged his elephants, ^{Bef. J. C.} which, according to *Polybius*, were ten in number, in ^{206.} the front of his battle, before the center, which con-^{245.} sisted of his *Ligurians*. His *Gauls* he posted in the left, on an eminence near the river ; and, in the right, his *Africans* and *Spaniards*, which were the strength of his army ; and the whole was drawn up very deep in file. The main body of the *Romans* was led by *L. Porcius*, the *Prætor*, of *Gaul*, who with his forces had joined *Livius* before the arival of *Nero*. This last took upon him the command of the right wing, and *Livius* of the left. *Asdrubal*, knowing that his *Gauls* were secured by the advantage of their situation, made his greatest efforts against the left of the enemy. There the battle continued obstinate a long time. At length *Nero*, unable to mount the eminence to attack the *Gauls*, and impatient of inaction, chose out the stoutest of his soldiers, and, having led them round the rear of their own army, fell upon the *Africans* and *Spaniards* in flank and rear. Victory then declared for the *Romans* ; and *Asdrubal* (after having performed all the duties of a great General) seeing the entire rout of his troops, and unwilling to survive their defeat, threw himself into the midst of a *Roman* batalion, and was slain. There were more elephants killed by the *Carthaginians* than by the enemy : for when the beasts grew unruly, their riders drove a sharp iron into the joint, where the head is set on the neck. This (says *Livy*) was found to be the quickest method of dispatching those animals, a method invented by *Asdrubal*. According to the Latin Historian, the *Carthaginians* had 56000 men killed in the battle, and 5400 taken prisoners ; above 4000 *Roman* captives were found in the enemy's camp ; the *Romans* lost, in the action, 8000 men. But *Polybius* says, that of the *Carthaginians* there died only 10000 men, and of the *Romans* 2000. *Livy* reports that the conquerors were so fatigued with slaughtering their enemies, that the next ^{c. 50, 51.} day,

*Polyb. B.**11. c. 3.**Orof. B. 4.**Liv. B. 27.*

Y. of R. day, when advice was brought to *Livius*, that a large body of *Ligurians* and *Cisalpine Gauls* (who either had not been in the battle or had escaped from it) were going off in great disorder, without leaders and without ensigns, and that it would be very easy to put them all to the sword ; *No matter*, said he, *let some remain to carry the news of their own defeat, and of our bravery.* *Nero* set out from the camp of his colleague the night after the battle, and in six days time reached his own camp at *Canusium*.

The joy of the people at *Rome*, on the news of this success, was equal to the fears they had been in, on account of *Nero's* march. It quite changed the face of the city : from this time the citizens ventured to make contracts, to buy and sell, lend money, and pay debts, as securely as in a time of peace. *Nero*, at his return to his camp, ordered *Asdrubal's* head, which he had brought with him, to be thrown before the advanced guards of the enemy, and some *African* prisoners to be exposed in chains to their view. Two of these prisoners he set at liberty, and sent them to *Hannibal's* camp, to give him an account of the victory. The *Carthaginian*, struck with a blow so fatal to his Republic and his family, is said to have cried out, *It is like the fortune of Carthage.* He immediately decamped, and retired into *Bruttium* with all his forces. Thither he transplanted the *Metapontines* and all those of the *Lucanians* who still adhered to him ; preparing to defend this corner of *Italy*, since he was obliged to abandon the rest of it.

To add to the good fortune of the Republic this year, the Pro-Consul *Sulpicius*, in conjunction with *Attalus* King of *Pergamus* and the other allies, had kept *Philip* employed in *Greece*, and thereby secured *Italy* from an invasion from that quarter. And *Lævinus* had gained a victory over the *Carthaginians* at sea, and sent a large supply of corn from *Sicily* to *Rome*.

From some motive not known, the *Romans* were desirous of having a *Dictator* to preside at the approaching elections. *Nero* named his Colleague *Livius* to that

that dignity: *Q. Caecilius Metellus*, and *L. Veturius Philo*, who had both distinguished themselves by their valour in the last campaign under *Livius*, were chosen Consuls.

These new Generals had orders to carry on the war Y. of R. jointly in *Brutium* against *Hannibal*. And now, strange 547. as it may appear, the *Carthaginian* made himself fear- Bef. J. C. ed, even in the low condition to which the defeat and 205. death of his brother had reduced him: He gained 246. Con- fufship. some advantages over the Consuls, in the plain of *Con- sentia*; and they durst not attack him in his camp. *Hannibal* never appeared greater than in his adversity. Who, (says *Polybius*) that considers attentively *Hannibal's* Polyb. B. conduct, how many great battles he fought, how 11. c. 17. many lesser actions he was engaged in, the prodigious number of towns he took, the various turns of fortune he experienced, and the difficult situations in which he found himself, during the course of a sixteen years war, which he alone supported against the most powerful state in the world: Who that considers these things can help admiring his extraordinary talents as a General? And though, during all that time, he kept the field with his army, and that army was a mixture of *Africans*, *Spaniards*, *Gauls*, *Carthaginians*, *Italians* and *Greeks*, differing in their laws, customs and languages, and having no other bond of union but his command; and though they were often in want of necessities, [especially, adds *Livy*, when confined to *Liv. B.28.* *Brutium*, a country little able to sustain them in its^{c. 12.} prosperity, much less when exhausted by so long a war, and when its inhabitants were forced to leave tilling their lands, to enlist as soldiers] such was the excellence of *Hannibal's* discipline, that no sedition ever

^a According to *Appian* [in *Syr. c. 91.*] he took no less than 400 in *Italy*.

^b *Polyb. de Virt. & Vit. Excerp. ex Lib. 9.* tells us, that *Hannibal* was the sole spring and director of the second *Punic war*. "He carried it on in *Italy* by himself; in *Spain* by his brothers, first *Af- drubal*, then *Mago*; in *Sicily* by *Hippocrates*, and afterwards by *Myrto* [*Mutines*]; and in *Greece* by King *Philip*."

happened

Y. of R. happened amongst his troops, no mutiny against the
547. General.

Bef. J. C. Polybius adds, that had the *Carthaginian* invaded the
205. other parts of the world first, and reserved *Italy* for
246 Con- his last attempts, it is not to be doubted, but he would
fuslion. have succeeded in all his undertakings: But having
begun where he should have ended, his illustrious actions
found their period on the same theatre, where they
had their commencement.

C H A P. XXXIII.

*The continuation of the events of the war in Spain, after
the departure of Asdrubal, the brother of Hannibal,
from that country.*

Y. of R. **T**H E next day after the battle in which *Scipio* is
545. * See P. said * to have defeated *Asdrubal*, and driven
446. and him over the *Pyrenees*, he assembled the prisoners, a-
471. mounting to 10000 foot and 2000 horse: He ordered
the *Africans* to be sold, but the *Spaniards* he dismissed,
without ransom. This act of generosity had such an
effect upon the *Spaniards* in general, that they with one
voice saluted him King. The *Roman* answered, that
to him the greatest title was that of Imperator, which
his soldiers gave him; that the name of King, so
much respected in other places, was intolerable at
Rome: That, if to have a royal soul was in their
estimation the highest character among men, they
might silently think of him as they pleased, but he
desired they would forbear the appellation.'

There seems to have been no more action this year
in *Spain*. The *Carthaginians* had two Generals in that
country, *Mago*, the brother of *Hannibal*, and *Asdrubal*, the son of *Gisco*, each with an army. *Mago* re-
signed his troops to *Asdrubal*, and went into the *Baleares*
to make new levies there, while the latter posted him-
self in *Lusitania* near the Straights of *Gades*. *Scipio*
wintered at *Tarraco*.

The

The year following, *Silanus*, the Pro-Prætor under *Y. of R. Scipio*, with a detachment of 10000 foot and 500 horse, routed the united forces of *Mago* and *Hanno*, which latter had been sent from *Africa* with an army to supply the place of *Hannibal's* brother *Asdrubal*. *Hanno* was taken prisoner in the action, but *Mago* escaped with his broken troops to *Asdrubal* (the son of *Gisco*.) These, with their united strength, marched from *Gades* into *Bætica*, in order to protect their allies in that country, but at the approach of *Scipio*, were obliged to return to the place from whence they came. Upon their departure, the Pro-Consul sent his brother *Lucius* to besiege *Oringi*, a city of importance at the head of the *Bætis*, and after the reduction of that town, retired to *Tarraco* for the winter.

Mago, having employed himself for some time in making levies among the *Spaniards*, brought such recruits to *Asdrubal*, that the army consisted of 54000, some say 74000 men. With these forces the two Ge-*Y. of R. nerals*, in conjunction with *Masinissa*, marched the following spring in quest of the *Romans*, and encamped in a vast plain near a town called *Silpia*, on the confines of *Bætica*. *Scipio*, upon the news of the enemy's surprizing preparations, thought it necessary for him also to arm the *Spaniards*; but rememb'ring the misfortune that befel his father and uncle, by relying on them too much, he resolved to be cautious of employing them on critical occasions. Having swelled his army to 45000 foot and 3000 horse, he moved from *Tarraco*, marched towards the *Carthaginians*, and pitched his camp in the same plain with them.

The two armies were frequently drawn up before their entrenchments; and as *Scipio* observed, that *Asdrubal* always placed his best troops, which were his *Africans*, in the center, and his *Spaniards* in the two wings, he constantly posted his *Spaniards* in the wings, and his *Romans* in the center. But this he did to deceive the enemy. For when the day came, on which he resolved to give battle, he changed this disposition, and placed his legionaries in the two wings, and the

Y. of R. *Spaniards* in the middle. In this order he marched
 547. out of his camp very early in the morning, and sent
 Bef. J. C. his cavalry and the light armed foot to provoke the
 205. 246 Con-enemy; insomuch that *Azdrubal* was obliged to draw
 fulship. out his men before they had taken their usual refresh-
 Polyb. L. ment. In the mean time *Scipio* advanced with his in-
 11. c. 22. fantry. At his approach, his cavalry and *Velites*, pur-
 suant to orders, ceased the fight, and retired through
 the intervals of the foot. He then directed his center
 to move on slowly, but his wings to advance very fast,
 the cavalry and light armed men at the same time
 moving from the rear, and extending themselves to fall
 upon the enemy in flank. Thus the bravest of his
 troops came to an engagement with the weakest of the
 opposite army, and defeated them before the two cen-
 ters could join battle. And the great prudence of the
 Roman General, in this conduct, was visible, when af-
 ter he had routed the enemy's wings, he came to at-
 tack their center; for the *Africans* made so stout a re-
 sistance, as almost quite disheartened the *Romans*; in-
 Appian. in Iberic. somuch that *Scipio* (as one author relates) was forced to
 dismount and throw himself, sword in hand, into the
 midst of the enemy's battalions; before he could en-
 gage his men to make the necessary efforts to complete
 the victory. But then the *Africans* gave ground, and
 the slaughter was terrible. *Azdrubal*, with the run-
 aways, gained the camp, but the *Spaniards* deserted
 him so fast, that he laid aside the thought of fortifying
 himself there, and retired in the night towards the
 shore of the ocean. *Scipio* pursued, and came up with
 him; and, after a second slaughter, the three chiefs,
Azdrubal, *Mago*, and *Masinissa*, had no more than six
 thousand men left about them, and these for the most
 part disarmed. With all expedition they gained the
 summit of a steep hill, and there entrenched them-
 selves as well as they could. *Azdrubal* perceiving that
 these remains of his army continually lessened, aban-
 doned them in the night. The sea was near, he found
 ships ready to sail, and embarked for *Gades*. *Scipio*
 being informed of *Azdrubal*'s flight, left *Silanus* with
 ten

ten thousand foot and a thousand horse to besiege the ^{y.} of R. enemy's camp, and he himself with the rest of his forces marched back to *Tarraco*. After his departure, ^{547.} *Masinissa* had private conferences with *Silanus*, and entered into engagements to favour the *Roman* cause. ^{205.} ^{246.} *Mago* escaped to *Gades* with some ships which *Asdrubal* had sent him; and the soldiers abandoned by their Generals, either went over to the enemy, or dispersed themselves up and down the country.

The *Carthaginian* power in *Spain* was now almost totally reduced; but the Pro-Consul did not confine his views to *Spain* alone. He began to think of paving his way to *Africa*. *Syphax*, King of *Masælyia*, was ^{Livy, B.} now in alliance with the *Carthaginians*; and, as *Scipio* ^{28. c. 17.} knew that the *Numidian*'s friendship to them would not be more constant than their good fortune, he sent his friend *Lælius* to persuade him to break the treaty. *Lælius*'s arguments wrought conviction; but he being only a subaltern in *Scipio*'s army, the King insisted, for his greater security, upon having a personal conference with the Pro-Consul himself; and he protested, that if *Scipio* would come into *Numidia*, he should be received there with honour, and dismissed with satisfaction. The *Roman* considered the hazard of such an enterprise; but being above the fear of danger, when he had the interest of his Republic in view, (leaving *Marcius* at *Tarraco*, with a part of his troops, and ordering *Silanus* with the rest to *New Carthage*,) embarked with *Lælius* for *Africa*, and arrived at the capital of King *Syphax*. *Asdrubal* happened to arrive there the same day from *Spain*; and nothing could be more agreeable to the *Numidian* Prince, than to see two Generals of the two most powerful nations in the world, at his court, at the same time; and both come to seek his alliance. He first put on the person of a mediator, and would have had *Scipio* enter into a conference with the *Carthaginian*, in order to an amicable accommodation. But *Scipio* excused himself as not having received any commission from his Republic to treat of peace. However, he accepted of an invitation to dine at the King's

Y. of R. table with *Asdrubal*. And then not only *Syphax*, a
 547. stranger to the *Roman* manners, but even *Asdrubal* a
 Bef. J. C. *Carthaginian*, a mortal enemy, was charmed with his
 205. 246 Con- conversation. The latter is reported to have said,
 fulship. ‘That he did not question but *Syphax* and his king-
Liv. B. 28. dom would soon be at the devotion of the *Romans*,
 c. 11. ‘such an art had *Scipio* of conciliating to him the
 hearts of men: That the *Carthaginians* need not
 enquire how *Spain* was lost, but how *Africa* might be
 preserved: That *Scipio*’s voyages were not voyages of
 pleasure; that he would not have crossed the sea with
 only two vessels, nor put himself in the power of a
 King whose honour he had never tried, but with a
 view to gain all *Africa*.’ *Asdrubal* judged rightly.
Syphax entered into a treaty with *Scipio*; and, lest the
 Appian. in Ibericis. *Roman*, in his return to *Spain*, should be attacked at
 sea by *Asdrubal*’s galleys, kept the *Carthaginians* with
 him, and amused them till the Pro-Consul was safely
 arrived at *New Carthage*.

Liv. B. 28. His chief business now was to punish the nations and
 c. 19. cities which had signalized themselves against the *Romans*, and to keep the *Spaniards* in awe by examples of
 severity. He marched in person to besiege *Illiturgi*, and sent *Marcius* to invest *Castulo*. The former, which,
Livy says, had revolted to the enemy after the death of
 the two *Scipios*, was taken by assault, sacked and burnt;
 and men, women and children, put to the sword.
 The latter capitulated, and was more favourably treated.
 From *Castulo*, *Marcius* went and appeared before *Astapa*,
 a city obstinately devoted to the *Carthaginians*. The
 inhabitants, being desperate, brought all their move-
 ables, and threw them in a heap in the market-place;
 and then putting their wives and children on the top
 of the pile, and encompassing it with faggots, they
 chose out fifty of the most steady of the citizens to
 guard this dear depositum; and spoke to them in the
 following manner: ‘Be assured, we will either repulse
 the *Romans*, or all perish in the attempt. If we are
 overcome, do you, upon the first news of the enemy’s
 approach, save the honour and liberty of our wives
 and

and children. First make use of your swords, and then of fire, to preserve these remains of an unfortunate people from captivity and infamy.' After this they did not wait to be attacked, but marched out at one of the gates, in good order, to give battle; and all died fighting. And the news of this slaughter produced another in the heart of the city. The fifty *Astaps* discharged their trust, and then threw themselves into the flames.

Whilst *Marcius* was executing vengeance on these cities, *Scipio* returned to *New Carthage*, where he entertained his army with a fight of gladiators, in honour to the manes of his father and uncle, pursuant to a vow he had made. On this occasion two *Spanish* Princes are said to have fought a duel with each other for a principality. During these diversions, some deserters arrived from *Gades*, the only city of *Spain* in the *Carthaginian* interest; and upon their report of a conspiracy, among the *Gaditani*, to put the *Romans* into possession of the place, *Scipio* dispatched *Marcius*, with some troops by land, and *Lælius* by sea, with eight ships, to carry on the enterprize. But *Lælius*, in his passage, having met and defeated eight *Carthaginian* triremes, learnt from the prisoners, that the conspirators at *Gades* had been discovered, and sent in chains to *Carthage* to be tried there. Whereupon he gave *Marcius* notice of it, advising him to lead back his troops; and he himself likewise returned to *New Carthage*.

And now it appeared, how necessary *Scipio's* presence was, both to preserve his conquests in *Spain*, and to maintain discipline in the army. He happened to fall dangerously sick; and *Fame* made his case worse than it was; nay, a report prevailed that he was dead; and this had such an effect, that not only *Indibilis* (a petty King before mentioned) and his brother *Mandonius*, who had not been rewarded suitably to their expectations, immediately revolted from the *Romans*, and stirred up the *Celtiberians* against them; but eight thousand *Roman* legionaries, who were incamped on the banks of the *Sucro*, to keep that part of *Spain* in awe, mutinied,

Y. of R. cast off their leaders, (who would not enter into their
 547. measures) and chose two insolent common soldiers,
 Bef. J. C. *Atrius* and *Albius*, to conduct them. And the madness
 205, 246 Con. of these two fellows rose to such a height, that they
 fulship. usurped the consular dignity, and ordered Lictors to
 walk before them. The pretence for the mutiny was
 want of pay, which they had not received for six
 months. They also demanded to be led against the
 enemy, or if *Spain* was already reduced, to be per-
 mitted to return to *Italy*.

Livy, B. 28. c. 25. The Pro-Consul recovered his health; but was
Polyb, B. 11. c. 23. much embarrassed how to manage the mutineers, so as
 —25. not to push them to extremities, and yet to make such
 examples as should keep his troops in their duty. He
 at length decoyed them to *New Carthage*, by promising
 to pay them their arrears there, and by giving such
 orders as deceived them into a belief, that the troops
 with him were immediately to go, under the command
 of *Silanus*, upon an expedition against *Indibilis* and
Mandonius; which would leave the Pro-Consul abso-
 lutely at the mercy of the malecontents. Full of these
 hopes they entered the city. *Scipio* had before sent se-
 ven Tribunes to them, to supply the place of those
 whom they had driven away. And these, who had by
 an artful conduct gained the confidence of the rebels,
 were ordered each of them to invite five of the most
 guilty to his house, make them drink plentifully, then
 bind them, and give the General notice of the success.
 Thirty five of the mutineers were thus secured, without
 the knowledge of the rest. The next morning, by
 break of day, *Silanus*, who was to lead away the faith-
 ful troops, pretended to make preparation for his
 march, and drew up his manipuli near the gates: but
 he had secret orders to return into the heart of the city,
 upon a signal agreed on. *Scipio*, at a proper time, gave
 the usual notice for his soldiers to assemble in the mar-
 ket place; and upon the first sound of the trumpet,
 the seditious all ran thither without their arms, as the
 laws required. *Silanus*, at the same time brought back
 his armed troops, and surrounded the assembly. The
 Pro-Consul,

Pro-Consul, in a long harangue, expostulated with the Y. of R.
mutineers on the baseness and folly of their late proceeding,
when the sum of their grievances could amount to 547.
no more than this ; ‘ That their General, being sick, 246 Con-
‘ had neglected to pay them at the usual time.’ As fulship.
soon as he had ended his speech, the names of the Livy, B. 28
thirty five chiefs of the revolt who had been already
condemned by a council of war, were called over ; they
appeared before the Tribunal half naked, were whip-
ped, and afterwards beheaded by the Lictors. Then
the Herald called over the names of all the rest of the
mutineers ; the General took the military oath of them
anew ; and thus ended the sedition.

Scipio was yet at *New Carthage*, when he received Liv. B. 28.
an account that *Indibilis* and *Mandonius* had raised an c. 32.
army among their subjects and allies of twenty thousand
foot, and two thousand five hundred horse, and were
living upon free quarter, in the territories of the friends
of *Rome*. It was necessary to put a stop to the progress
of these faithless princes, and to employ the seditious
troops (who were now quiet and had received their pay)
jointly with the rest, in the expedition. Scipio therefore
having assembled all in the market-place, spoke to this
effect : ‘ The resolution I have taken to punish the per-
fidious *Spaniards*, gives me much less uneasiness than
the vengeance I was forced to execute on the late mu-
tineers. Among these, I found none but citizens of
Rome, or *Latines*, old soldiers who had been attached
to my father, and the companions of my victories.
I could not do justice upon *them* without tears. But
among those I am going to punish, I shall find none but
strangers and ingrates, robbers and their leaders who
lay waste the fields of our allies, and burn their houses.
Let us go then and clear the plains of these *Banditti* ;
nor let it be said, that in this province, so happily
subdued, we left in arms one single enemy of the
Roman name.’ Whilst the Pro-Consul was speaking Polyb. B.
he saw alacrity and joy painted on every face ; and 11. c. 29.
taking advantage of the present disposition of his sol-
diers, he immediately began his march. In fourteen
H h 4 . days

Y. of R. days he came up with the enemy in the country of the
 547: *Sedetani*, and there gained a complete victory. The
 Bef. J. C. ²⁰⁵ *Spaniards* lost about two thirds of their army, the rest
 246 Con- escaped with *Indibilis* and *Mandonius*. These brothers
 fulship. had now no resource but in the clemency of the con-
 queror. *Mandonius* came and fell at the Pro-Consul's
 feet, begging pardon for the King, and for himself. He laid the blame of their revolt on the misfortunes
 of the times, and the unaccountable effect which the
 report of *Scipio*'s death had caused in the minds of men,
 even of the *Romans* themselves. The Pro-Consul gave

Liv. B. 28. him the following answer: 'Both *Indibilis* and you have
 £. 34. deserved to die; live nevertheless, and owe your lives
 to my favour, and the favour of the *Roman* people.
 I shall not disarm you; that would look as if I feared
 you. Neither will I take vengeance upon your blame-
 less hostages, should you again rebel, but upon your-
 selves. Consider therefore whether you shall like
 better to feel the effects of our clemency in peace,
 or to experience the severity of our revenge.' *Scipio*
 carried his resentments no farther; only he obliged
 the two Princes to furnish him with a large sum of
 money. Then he divided his army into two parts;
 gave one to *Silanus*, to conduct it to *Tarraco*; and or-
 dered *Marcius* to lead the other to the shores of the
 ocean. He himself joined the latter soon after near
Gades.

£. 35. The Pro-Consul's chief design in this journey was to
 fix *Masinissa* in the interest of *Rome*: The *Numidian*,
 who was then at *Gades* with *Mago*, delayed concluding
 an alliance with the Republic, till he should confer with
Scipio in person, and have his sanction to the treaty.
 Upon the approach of the *Roman* General, *Masinissa*
 representing to *Mago*, that the cavalry were not only a
 burden to the island, but would be ruined by inaction
 and want of forage, obtained leave to transport them
 to the continent. He was no sooner landed, but he
 sent three *Numidian* chiefs to the Pro-Consul; who,
 with them, fixed the time and place for an interview.
Masinissa had already conceived a high opinion of *Scipio*,
 and

and was confirmed in that opinion by the first sight of Y. of R. him. The Pro-Consul had an equal mixture of majesty 547. and sweetness in his countenance ; he was in his full Bef. J. C. strength, and in the bloom of manly beauty. His hair 205. Con-flowed down his back to a great length. There was fulship. nothing affected, or too negligent about him ; his habit plain, but neat, and such as became a soldier, who despised the studied elegancies of dress. The *Numidian* began with a compliment of thanks for *Scipio*'s having formerly sent him back his nephew, taken prisoner in battle, assuring him, that ever since that time he had been seeking the opportunity which now presented itself, and desired nothing more earnestly than a strict union with *Scipio* and *Rome*. He added, that if the Republic would send the Pro-Consul into *Africa* at the head of an army, he did not doubt but the domination of *Carthage* would soon be at an end. *Scipio* returned these advances with dignity and politeness ; and was extremely pleased to engage in his interest a Prince, who, in every battle, had been the soul of the enemy's cavalry ; and whose very aspect promised a man of spirit. The treaty concluded, *Scipio* set out for *Tarraco*. The *Numidian* concealed the true design of his excursion, by pillaging some part of the continent, before he went back to *Gades* ; and *Mago* soon after abandoned the place, having received orders to go to the assistance of his brother *Hannibal* c. 36. 37. in *Italy*.

The *Carthaginian* signalized his departure from *Gades*, by cruel exactions and oppressions. He stripped the temples, plundered the public treasury, and forced private persons to give him their gold and silver. His view was, with this money to raise new levies among the *Ligurians* in *Cisalpine Gaul*. But as he coasted along *Spain* in his way thither, he formed a rash design of surprising *New Carthage*, and in the attempt lost eight hundred men. After this misfortune he returned to *Gades*, where finding the gates shut against him, he retired to *Cimbris*, a neighbouring city. From thence he sent deputies to the *Gaditani*, (who were themselves a colony of *Phænicians*, as well as the *Carthaginians*) to complain of their pro-

Y. of R. proceedings. The chief magistrate and the treasurer of
 547. the city went out to him, and assured him, that the re-
 Ref. J. C. fusal he had met with was owing wholly to the populace,
 205. whom the *Carthaginian* soldiers had plundered at their
 247. fulship. departure. This civility *Mago* returned with cruelty,
 causing the deputies to be inhumanly scourged, and afterwards crucified. He then steered his course towards the *Baleares*, landed at the island now called *Minorca*, forced two thousand of the inhabitants into the service of his Republic, and sent them to *Carthage*. Winter approaching he did not sail for *Italy* till the spring.

Zon. B. 9. As soon as *Mago* had left *Spain*, the *Gaditani* submit-

c. 11.

Liv. B. 28. ted to the *Romans*; and *Scipio*'s conquest was complete.

c. 38.

Before he got back to *Tarraco*, two new Pro-Consuls, *Cornelius Lentulus* and *Manlius Acidinus*, arrived in the port with commissions from the Senate one to govern *Hither Spain*, the other *Further Spain*. *Scipio* surrendered up the fasces; and attended by his brother *Lucius*, and his friend *Lælius*, immediately set sail, with ten ships for *Italy*.

Liv. B. 29. Scarce was *Scipio* gone, when *Indibilis* and *Mandonius*,

c. 1.

despising the new Pro-Consuls, revolted, and engaged several of the *Spaniæ* nations to take arms to recover their independence. They got together 30000 foot, and about 4000 horse. *Lentulus* and *Acidinus* endeavoured to bring them back to obedience by negotiations. These proving ineffectual, a battle ensued; *Indibilis* was slain, the confederate army totally routed, 13000 of them killed and 800 taken prisoners.

The *Spaniards*, to preserve their countries from the ravages of the enemy, seized *Mandonius* with the other heads of the revolt, and sent them in custody to the camp of the Pro-Consuls, who had insisted on this as a condition of their shewing mercy to the vanquished. Thus was the confederacy broken; and *Spain* continued for some years in tranquility.

C H A P. XXXIV. F O U R T E E N T H Y E A R
of the War.

Scipio chosen Consul, goes into Sicily to prepare for invading Africa. He surprizes Locri. The cruelties exercised by the Pro-Prætor Pleminius in that city.—The Romans send for the Goddess Cybele from Pessinus in Phrygia. A miracle wrought at her landing.

WHEN Scipio arrived from Spain, he did not immediately enter within the walls of Rome, but according to the established custom of Generals, continued in the suburbs, till the Senate assembled in the temple of Bellona, had heard the relation of his expeditions. He gave them a detail of his exploits, told them how many battles he had fought, how many towns he had taken, and what nations he had subdued, adding, that though he had found in Spain four Carthaginian Generals at the head of four flourishing armies, yet he had not left in the country one Carthaginian in arms. But though Scipio deserved a triumph, he demanded it but faintly, as knowing that the laws were against his having that honour: His appointment to the Pro-Consulship had been extraordinary, and out of rule: He had not passed to it from the Consulship, nor had he taken the command of an army under the sanction of the Greater Auspices, like the Consuls. However, he adorned his entry into Rome, by a great quantity of silver, which he had brought from Spain for the public treasury, and which was carried before him in the procession.

And now the Comitia being held for electing new Consuls, it is not to be expressed with what zeal the Centuries gave their suffrages in favour of Scipio, tho' he had not yet attained to the years customarily required for that dignity, being only between twenty eight and twenty nine years of age. The Collegue appointed him was P. Licinius Crassus, surnamed Dives, who being at this time Pontifex Maximus, an office which confined him to Italy, the province of Sicily was given to

Y. of R.

548

Bef. J. C.

204

Con-

fulship.

Liv. B. 28.

c. 38.

Y. of R. to *Scipio* without drawing lots. But *Scipio* could not be
 548. satisfied, unless he had also a commission to go imme-
 Bef. J. C. diately with an army into *Africa*. The matter was de-
 204. bated in the Senate. *Scipio* depending upon the favour
 247 Con- fulship. of the people, had not scrupled openly to give out, that
 Liv. B. 28. he had been appointed Consul, ‘ Not only to carry on
 c. 40. & ‘ the war, but to finish it ; that this could be done no
 seq. ‘ other way than by transporting an army into *Africa*,
 ‘ and that if the Senate should oppose this design, he
 ‘ would have recourse to the people, and put it in exe-
 ‘ cution by their authority.’ These unguarded words
 Plut. life of *Fabius*. had given great offence to the Fathers. Old *Fabius*,
 now president of the Senate, declared loudly against
 the pretensions of the young Consul, and employed all
 his eloquence to hinder his being sent into *Africa*. In
 a long and studied harangue he set forth the difficulties
 of such an enterprize, the fatal consequences which
 might attend it, and the necessity of driving *Hannibal*
 out of *Italy*, before the war could safely be carried into
 the neighbourhood of *Carthage*. He said it would be
 endless to enumerate all the instances of Kings and Ge-
 nerals, who, by rash invasions of foreign countries, had
 ruined themselves and their armies. He mentioned the
 irreparable mischief which had happened to the *Athenians*,
 by their descent upon *Sicily*, in pursuance of the
 advice of *Alcibiades*, a noble youth, and an expert Ge-
 neral. But he insisted especially on the more recent and
 interesting example of *Atilius Regulus*, the catastrophe
 of whose fortune, fair in its beginning, ought to be a use-
 ful lesson to them. And *Fabius* took great pains to
 guard against the suspicion of his being actuated by
 emulation or jealousy of another’s glory in this opposition
 to *Scipio*’s desires. ‘ I, said he, am grown old in the
 possession of honours. Two Dictatorships, five Con-
 sulships, the success of my counsels, many victories
 raise me above any rivalry with a young General,
 not yet come to the years of my son. When I was
 Dictator, and in the full career of glory, and when
 my General of the horse, a man incessantly declaim-
 ing against me, was put upon an equality with me

in the command, (an unprecedented hardship) no one Y. of R.
heard me, either in the Senate or in the assemblies of 548.
the people, refuse to acquiesce. And is it likely that Ref. J. C.
now, in my old age, when weary of public affairs, 204. Con-
weary of the world, and even of life itself, I should fulship.
enter into an emulation with a youth, a General in the
prime of life, full of vigour and activity; or that I
expect to have the province of *Africa* assigned to me,
if it should be denied to him? No, I am content
with the glory I have acquired. It is enough for me,
to have hindered *Hannibal* from compleating his con-
quest, that by younger Captains, you that are in the
flower of your age and strength, he might be after-
wards entirely overcome. But you will pardon me,
P. Cornelius, if I, who, for the sake of the common-
wealth, always neglected popular applause, and my
own private advantage, cannot now to the real wel-
fare of the Republic prefer the imaginary interests of
your glory. I say, imaginary interests. For no sooner
will you have a view of that coast, whither you are so
eager to sail, than you will be sensible that your ex-
ploits in *Spain* were but sport and play, in comparison
of what you will have to do in *Africa*. In *Spain* you
landed at *Emporia*, a confederate port; and, through
countries in alliance with *Rome*, or, guarded by *Roman*
troops, you marched safe and undisturbed to *New*
Carthage, which you had opportunity to besiege, with-
out fear of molestation from any one of the *Carthagi-*
nian Generals, who were then all at a great distance.
In *Africa*, no friendly port to receive your fleet, no
ally to add strength to your army—unless you trust to
Syphax and *Numidians*. You trusted them once; let
that suffice: Rashness is not always fortunate. The
fraudulent sometimes procure themselves credit by
fidelity in small things, that they may afterwards the
more easily deceive in matters of moment, and when
it can serve a weighty interest. *Syphax* and *Masinissa*, it
is not to be doubted, would gladly be more powerful
in *Africa* than the *Carthaginians*; but it is as little to
be questioned, they had rather *Carthage* should have
the

Y. of R. the superiority there than strangers. Emulation pre-
 548. vails amongst those powers, while the fear of foreign
 Bef. J. C. arms is yet remote: Let them but once see the Ro-
 204. man banners displayed in *Africa*, and they will all
 247. Con- run together as to extinguish a fire, that threatens the
 fulship. general destruction. What if *Carthage*, confiding in
 the strength of her walls, the fidelity of her allies, and
 the unanimity of all the States around her, should
 resolve, when she sees *Italy* no longer guarded by you
 and your troops, to pour in upon us a new army from
Africa? Or order *Mago*, who is even now with a fleet
 on the coast of *Liguria*, to join his brother *Hannibal*?
 We should then be in the same terror as when *Af-*
drubal invaded *Italy*, that *Afdrubal*, whom you, who,
 with your army, are to invest not only *Carthage*, but
 all *Africa*, suffered to slip through your hands into
 this country. You will say, *you vanquished him*. Be it
 so. But I could wish then for your own sake, as well
 as for the sake of the Republic, that you had not
 opened a passage for the same vanquished man to
 come into *Italy*. However, let us ascribe to your
 wise conduct every enterprize of yours that prospered,
 and all your ill success to fortune and the chance of
 war. The more brave and the more worthy you are,
 the more it concerns your country and all *Italy* to re-
 tain such a protector. That where ever *Hannibal* is,
 there is the principal seat of this war, you yourself al-
 low, since to draw him into *Africa* is your sole pretence
 for passing thither. With *Hannibal* therefore you pur-
 pose to contend, whether here or there. And will you
 be stronger in that country, and alone, than here,
 when joined by your Colleague and his army? Will
Hannibal be weaker in the neighbourhood of *Carthage*,
 and supported by all *Africa*; than now when he is
 confined to a corner of *Bruttium*, and in want of sup-
 plies, which he has long, but in vain, demanded from
 his country? Would a prudent man chuse to fight
 where the enemy is double his number, when he may
 with two armies attack one, and this one already
 fatigued and exhausted by many battles and a dis-
 tressful

tressful war. Consider how different your conduct is Y. of R.
 from your father's. He, though on his way to carry 548.
 the war into Spain, returned to meet Hannibal at the Bef. J. C.
 foot of the Alps: You, while Hannibal is in Italy,^{204.} are₂₄₇ Con-
 preparing to leave the country, not because it is advan-
 tageous to the Republic, but because you think it for
 your glory; as when, being General for the Roman
 people, you, against law, and without authority from
 the Senate, left your province and your army, and
 with only two ships sailed to Africa, hazarding in your
 person the interest of the public, and the majesty of
 the empire. My opinion, Conscrip^t Fathers, is, that
 P. Cornelius was created Consul, not for himself, but
 for us and for the Republic; and that the armies were
 raised for the defence of Rome and Italy, and not that
 the Consuls might, out of pride, like Kings, trans-
 port them into whatever countries they pleased.'

Notwithstanding what Fabius had said of his own integrity, and his unmixed zeal for his country's good on the present occasion, Scipio did not fail to observe, that, ' while the old man was proving himself free from all jealousy or emulation, he had taken particular care to extol his own actions, and to depreceate those of a young man, with whom, nevertheless, it was impossible he should have any competition for glory.' He then proceeded to justify his design of going into Africa. Fabius tells us, that it is an inaccessible coast, that there is no port open to receive us. He reminds us of Atilius Regulus, taken captive in Africa; as if Regulus had failed in attempting a descent on that country. He forgets, that this unfortunate Commander found the Carthaginian havens open, performed many noble actions the first year, and, to the last, remained unconquerable by any Carthaginian General. But, It seems we are to take warning from the example of the Athenians. If we have leisure, Conscrip^t Fathers, to hearken to Grecian tales, why does he not rather speak of Agathocles, King of Syracuse, who, when Sicily was distressed by the Carthaginians, transferred* the war from that island to the very gates of Carthage? See p. 127.

* He

Y. of R. He then asserted that no method could be so effectual
 548. to force *Hannibal* out of *Italy* as to carry the war into
 Ref. *J. C.* *Africa*, whither *Carthage* would undoubtedly recal him
 204. 247 Con- in so pressing a danger. He argued, that since the allies
 fulship. of *Rome* had deserted her after the battle of *Cannæ*, and
 this in greater numbers than *Hannibal* himself could
 have expected, certainly the *Carthaginian Republic*, imperious and oppressive to her subjects, and faithless to
 her allies, had little reason to depend on the constancy
 of the *Africans*. That as she had no inherent strength,
 and was obliged to trust absolutely to mercenaries, or
 to allies, whose very character was inconstancy, she
 would not be able to support the war like *Rome*, pot-
 tent by her own strength, and whose citizens were all
 soldiers. He concluded with these words, ‘ It would be
 ‘ tedious, and what no way concerns you, Conscription
 ‘ Fathers, if, as *Q. Fabius* has made light of my ac-
 ‘ tions in *Spain*, I should attempt to lessen his merit, and
 ‘ extol my own. I shall therefore do neither : In mo-
 ‘ deration at least, and in continence of speech, if in
 ‘ nothing else, young as I am, I will surpass this old
 ‘ General. Such has been the constant tenour of my
 ‘ life and actions, both in public and private, that I
 ‘ can be silent on this subject, and easily rest contented
 ‘ with the opinion which you have formed of me.’

Scipio's discourse was not favourably received by the
 Senate. The report that he intended to have recourse
 to the people, had prejudiced the assembly against him.
Fulvius who had been twice Consul and once Censor,
 desired him to declare frankly, whether he would refer
 the affair of the provinces to the deliberation of the
 Fathers, and acquiesce in their decree, or, in case he
 should not like it, appeal from it to the people. *Scipio*
 answered, that he would do what he thought most
 conducive to the public welfare. To which *Fulvius* re-
 plied ; ‘ When I asked you these questions, I was not
 ‘ ignorant either of what you would answer, or of what
 ‘ you would do ; for it is plain your design is rather to
 ‘ consult the Senate, and, unless we im-
 ‘ mediately decree you the province you desire, you
 ‘ are

are prepared to lay the matter before the people.' Y. of R.
 Then turning towards the Tribunes of the Commons, 548.
 ' I refuse, said he, to declare my opinion; because Bef. J. C.
 ' should it be approved by the Senate, the Consul would 204.
 ' not submit to their determination: And I desire you, 247 Con-
 ' Tribunes, to support me in this refusal.' *Scipio* con-
 tended, that it was not equitable for the Tribunes to
 obstruct a Consul in his demanding the opinion of any
 Senator. They nevertheless pronounced, That, if the
 Consul would refer the matter in question to the Senate,
 the Senate's decree should stand; nor would they suffer
 an appeal from it to the people; but if he would not
 refer the matter to the Senate, they would support all
 those who should refuse to declare their opinions.
Scipio desire done day's time to consult with his Colleague.
 To this they consented. The day following the assem-
 bly met again, and then, submitting the affair to the
 determination of the Conscript Fathers, without ap-
 peal, they decreed, That *Scipio*, should have *Sicily*, and
 the fleet of thirty ships of war, now commanded by
 the Praetor of that island; and that if he thought it for
 the advantage of the Republick, he might sail to *Africa*.
 As for *Licinius*, he was directed to carry on the war
 against *Hannibal* in *Bruttium*.

Though *Africa* was not assigned to *Scipio* as his pro-
 vince, nor any levies granted him for the enterprize *Livy*, B.
 which he had in view; nevertheless, he obtained leave 28. c. 45a
 to take with him into *Sicily*, as many volunteers as he
 could assemble; and also permission to ask of the
 allies all necessaries for building and equipping a new
 fleet. Many of the provinces and cities voluntarily

* From this decree, and the after conduct of the Senate, it is not improbable what *Livy* hints, [speaking of the transactions of the next year] that their design was to make preparations for carrying the war into *Africa*, without doing it by public authority; and to lull the *Carthaginians* into security, by making them believe, that these preparations were only the effect of *Scipio*'s ambition, which the Senate would not fail to oppose. *Quanquam nondum aperte Africa provincia decreta erat* (*occultantibus id, credo Patribus, ne præscirent Carthaginenses*) *tamen in eam spem erecta civitas erat, in Africa eo anno debellatum iri, finemque bello Punico adesse.* *Livy*, L. 29. c. 14.

Y. of R. taxed themselves, in order to furnish him, not only
 548. with materials for the ships, but with arms and pro-
 Bef. J. C. visions for the marines. So that in five and forty days
 204. time after bringing the timber from the forest, he was
 247 Con- in a condition to set sail with a fleet of thirty new gal-
 fulsip. leys, and about seven thousand volunteers ^g.

Liv. B. 28. c. 46 About this time *Mago* (the brother of *Hannibal*) with twelve thousand foot and near two thousand horse, landed at *Genoa* and took it : And finding two nations of *Liguria*, the *Ingaunians* and *Intemelians*, at war, he joined the former, his army increasing daily by the great number of *Gauls* that flocked to him from all parts. These advices from *Spurius Lucretius*, who commanded in *Cisalpine Gaul*, caused a general alarm in the Senate : they ordered *M. Livius* to march his army, of *Volones*, then in *Hetruria*, to *Ariminum*; and *Lævinus*, to lead the legions appointed for the defence of *Rome*, to *Aretium*. Other advices came, that *Octavius* the *Prætor* of *Sardinia* had taken fourscore ships of burden belonging to the *Carthaginians*. In *Bruttium* no remarkable action happened between the armies this campaign. The plague raged in *Licinius*'s camp ; and *Hannibal*'s troops were afflicted with pestilence and famine at the same time.

Scipio was busy in *Sicily*, forming an army for his *African* expedition. In his choice of men, he preferred, before all others, the veterans who had served under *Marcellus* at the siege of *Syracuse*. He refitted the old galleys he found in the island, gave the command of them to *Lælius*, and commissioned him to make a descent on *Africa*, and pillage the country.

Lælius landed near *Hippo*, and laid the territory about it waste ; which threw the people of *Carthage* into a great consternation : For they falsely imagined, that *Scipio* was come with a formidable army. When

Liv. B. 29.
c. 4.

^g According to *Plutarch*, *Fabius* would have engaged the Consul *Licinius*, to obstruct *Scipio*'s measures : Not succeeding herein, he dissuaded the *Roman* youth from following him into *Sicily*, as volunteers ; and he had before, by his influence in the Senate, hindered any funds being assigned to *Scipio*, for the expence of his armament. Their

their fright, upon better information, was over, they sent ambassadors to *Syphax*, and other princes of *Africa*, to renew their treaties with them; and also to King *Philip to Macedon*, offering him two hundred talents of silver, if he would invade either *Italy* or *Sicily*. *Mes-*
sengers were dispatched to Hannibal and Mago, with instructions to these two brothers, to hinder if possible, the departure of any troops which *Scipio* expected from *Italy*; and a reinforcement of six thousand foot and eight hundred horse was sent to *Mago* in *Liguria*, with large sums for hiring troops in *Cisalpine Gaul*.

Messinissa having learnt the arrival of *Lælius* in *Africa*, came to confer with him. He assured him, that there could not be a more favourable opportunity to attack *Carthage*; and expressed his surprize that *Scipio* had lingered so long in *Sicily*. The King added, that though he was by violence dispossessed of the throne of his ancestors, yet he could still bring some troops into the field, and would join the Consul at his landing. He also told *Lælius*, that he believed a *Carthaginian* fleet was already sailed out of the port to intercept him; and advised him to hasten his departure. *Lælius* took the Prince's counsel, weighed anchor the next day, and arrived safe in *Sicily* with his booty.

In the mean time, *Mago* received the reinforcement from *Carthage*, with orders to raise as numerous an army as possible, and hasten to join his brother: upon which he called a council of the chiefs of *Liguria* and *Cisalpine Gaul*, and endeavoured to persuade them to declare openly against *Rome*, and furnish him with troops. The *Ligurians* complied; but the *Gauls* durst not follow their example; because there were actually two *Roman* armies (under *Livius* and *Lucretius*) in their neighbourhood. However they consented to his levying men privately in their country; and supplied him with provisions and forage. *Livius* led his army from *Hetruria* into *Gaul*, intending, if *Mago* approached *Rome*, to march, in conjunction with *Lucretius*, and give him battle; but to post himself near *Ariminum*, in case the *Carthaginian* should continue in *Liguria*;

Y. of R. which it is probable he did, since we hear of no action
 548. in that part of *Italy* this campaign.
 Bef. J. C.

204. While *Scipio* was at *Messina*, he received information,
 247 Con- that a plot was formed by some *Locrians*, then in ex-
 fulship. ile at *Rhegium*, to surprize their native city (which stood
Livy, B. 29.c. 6. & on the sea coast in *Bruttium*) and put it again into the
 seq. hands of the *Romans*. He sent *Pleminius* with two Tri-
 bunes, and three thousand men, to assist in the enter-
 prize. There were two citadels belonging to the place ;
 and, when the *Romans* had made themselves masters of
 one, the *Carthaginians* retired into the other, leaving the
 inhabitants in sole possession of the city. These fa-
 voured the *Romans*; so that when *Hannibal* came to in-
 vest the place, they let in *Scipio* (who had hastened to
 their relief) privately in the night : the next morning he
 made a vigorous sally, and repulsed the assailants.
Hannibal having learnt, that *Scipio* was in person at the
 head of his troops, immediately retired to his camp
 near the *Alex*, sending orders to the *Carthaginians* in
 the citadel to provide for their safety as well as they
 could. Hereupon, setting fire to the houses, they es-
 caped amidst the confusion, and joined their General
 before night.

Scipio left the government of *Locri* to *Pleminius*, who
 treated the inhabitants more cruelly than if their city
 had been taken by assault : he rifled the temples of their
 Gods, and seized the treasure in the sanctuary of *Pro-
 serpine*. The two Tribunes were no less rapacious.
 Their soldiers, in a scuffle with those of the Pro-*Prætor*,
 about plunder, happened to wound some of them ; of
 which these having made their complaint to him, he
 ordered the Tribunes to be whipt. But the Tribunes
 were rescued by their followers, who not only mauled
 the Lictors, but pull'd *Pleminius* himself from off his
 tribunal, dragged him into a private place, beat him
 severely, cut off his nose and ears, and left him wel-
 tring in his blood. This accident made it necessary
 for *Scipio* to return to *Locri*. He took the part of the
 Pro-*Prætor*, put the Tribunes in chains, and ordered
 them to be carried to *Rome* to be judged. But this did
 not

not satisfy *Pleminius*: as soon as the Consul was gone, Y. of R. he of his own authority condemned the Tribunes to die by the most cruel torments, and their bodies to be left unburied; and, not yet content, he exercised the same cruelty towards those of the inhabitants who had fulship. 548. Bef. J. C. 204. 247 Complained to *Scipio* of his rapines and brutalities. The odium of these horrible actions fell in some measure upon the Consul; he had indeed been too indulgent to the guilty Governor; for which (as we shall see hereafter) his enemies, in the Senate, did not fail to inveigh against him, when occasion offered.

The time for the elections drew near: the Consul *Licinius* being sick of the plague in his camp, could not go to *Rome*, to preside in the Comitia. He therefore, with the approbation of the Senate, named a Dictator for that purpose; and his choice fell upon *Q. Cæcilius Metellus*, who, in the quality of Pro-Consul, was commanding a second army in *Bruttium*. In this army also the plague so raged, that *Licinius* pressed the Senate to recal the troops, assuring them, that otherwise there would not be a soldier left alive.

Many prodigies happening this year, and the Sybilline books being consulted for the proper expiations, the *Decemvirs* found it written in those oracles, That if *Liv. B. 29.* a foreign enemy invaded Italy, he might be vanquished, and ^{c. 10.} driven out of it, if the Goddess Cybele were brought to Rome from *Pessinus* in *Phrygia*. This same Cybele ^{App. in Annib.} was nothing more than a shapeless stone, which, as was pretended, had fallen ^{Ovid. Fast.} down from Heaven upon Mount *Ida*. The Conscript ^{Liv. B. 22.} Fathers sent five ambassadors, men of distinction, to obtain by negotiation this powerful protectress. And, because the *Romans* had little commerce with the *Asia-tics*, the ambassadors were to engage *Attalus* King of *Pergamus*, in their interest. They went by the way of *Delphi*, and there consulted the Oracle; from which they received this answer, That by the help of Attalus they should infallibly obtain what they desired; but that, when they had carried the Goddess to Rome, they should put her into no hands, but of the most virtuous man in the Republic.

Y. of R. Republic. King *Attalus* was so obliging as to conduct
 548. the ambassadors himself to *Pessinus*, where the inhabi-
 Bef. J. C. tants with equal complaisance, granted them the stone
 204. they so earnestly desired. One of them sailed away be-
 247 Con- fore the rest, to give notice at *Rome* that the Goddess
 fulship. was coming; and to report the answer of the *Delphic*
 Liv. B. 29. Oracle. And now the great difficulty was, to find out
 c. 14. that man of superior probity, who alone was worthy to
 receive the sacred and important stone, at its landing.
 History has not told us the remarkable virtues which
 gained *P. Cornelius Scipio* surnamed *Nasica*, the prefe-
 rence before all others: but this young man, cousin-
 german to the great *Scipio*, and son to *Cneius Scipio*,
 (who lost his life in *Spain*) was the person who obtained
 the honourable distinction. Attended by such of the
 ladies of *Rome*, as were in the highest veneration for
 their virtue, he went to meet the Goddess. Some of
 the Vestals likewise accompanied him, and particu-
 larly *Quinta Claudia*; of whom it is related, that when
 the vessel, on which the Goddess was imported, unfor-
 tunately stuck upon a bank of sand near the mouth of
 the *Tyber*, and neither the mariners, nor several yoke of
 oxen, were able to move it, she, pulling it only by her
 girdle tied to it, easily set it afloat. *Claudia* is said to
 have been suspected of incontinence; and it is added,
 that this miracle was wrought in answer of her prayer
 to the Goddess, to give a testimony of her innocence.
 There are not wanting Fathers of the church, who
 allow the fact, but they piously impute it to good an-
 gels, sent by God, to destroy the unjust aspersion cast
 upon the Vestal. The day on which *Cybele* arrived at
Rome became a solemn annual festival, distinguished by
 games, called *Megalenses*. She was deposited in the
 temple of VICTORY.

App. in
 Annib.
 345.

CHAP. XXXV. FIFTEENTH YEAR of the War.

Scipio is continued in his command in Sicily.—He is ac-
 cused in the Senate, by his Quæstor, Cato, of profuse-
 ness and idleness.—He is also accused of partiality to

the

the cruel Pleminius.—Commissioners are appointed to enquire into his conduct. Their report favourable to him.—Syphax declares for the Carthaginians.—Scipio makes a descent on Africa. Masinissa joins him.—A remarkable quarrel between the Censors at Rome.

BEFORE the arrival of the Goddess, the Dictator ^{V.} of R. Q. *Cæcilius Metellus* had held the Comitia by Centuries where *M. Cornelius Cetbegus*, and *P. Sempronius Tuditianus* were chosen Consuls. *Sempronius* was then Pro-Consul in *Greece*. The *Romans* having for two years past, (i. e. from the year 546,) neglected their affairs in *Greece*, *Philip* had forced the *Ætolians* to conclude a peace with him upon his own terms. Soon after this, *Sempronius* arrived at *Dyrrachium* with 10000 foot, 1000 horse and 35 ships of war. He was very angry with the *Ætolians*, for having, contrary to the league, made peace without consent of the *Romans*. Yet, not daring to venture a battle with *Philip*, he was easily prevailed upon to come to an agreement with him, by the mediation of the *Epirots*. The treaty was confirmed by the people of *Rome*. In this treaty were included, on *Philip's* side, *Prusias* King of *Bitbynia*, the *Achœans*, *Bœotians*, *Thessalians*, *Acarnanians* and *Epirots*; and, on the side of the *Romans*, the *Ilienses*, King *Attalus*, *Pleuratus*, *Nabis*, the tyrant of *Lacedæmon*, the *Eleans*, *Messenians*, and *Athenians*. *Sempronius* returned to *Rome*, after which the following distribution of offices was agreed upon. The Consul *Cornelius* had the command of the forces in *Hetruria*; his Colleague *Sempronius* was ordered into *Bruttium* with new levies, to act against *Hannibal*; and *Licinius* continued at the head of two legions, in that country, in quality of Pro-Consul. *Pomponius Matbo* had the Praetorship of *Sicily*; *Scipio*, the army and fleet he before commanded; and *M. Livius* and *Sp. Lucretius* remained in *Gaul* to oppose *Mago*. There were also two other armies in *Italy*, one at *Tarentum* under *T. Quintius Flamininus*, the other at *Capua*, under *Hostilius Tubulus*.

Y. of R. About this time, young *Marcellus* dedicated a tem-
 ple to Virtue. His father had formerly vowed one to
 Honour and Virtue, intending to place the statues of
 Con- both under one roof. But the Pontifices opposed this,
 fulship. declaring that it was not lawful to worship more than
Livy, B. one God in one temple; and they likewise urged, that
 29. c. 11. and B. 27. if lightning fell upon the building, or any prodigy
 c. 25. should happen in it, it would be impossible to discover
 to which of the two divinities expiatory duties should
 be paid. The temple therefore, which *Marcellus* had
 designed for both divinities, was dedicated only to Ho-
 NOUR, and another built in all haste to VIRTUE.

And now the Republic being to recruit her armies,
 she thought proper to call to account the twelve *Roman*
 colonies, who, about six years before, had with impu-
 nity refused their contingents of men and money. The
 Senate determined, that each colony should furnish
 double the number of foot it had done in any year of
 the war, and a hundred and twenty horse. If any of
 them could not raise the number of horse required,
 they were to send three foot soldiers in the room of
 each horseman wanting. The Fathers also imposed a
 new yearly tax upon each colony, and ordered its cen-
 sus to be taken according to the form used at *Rome*.

Liv. B. 29. This decree was put in execution with rigour. It was
 c. 16. followed by another in favour of those private persons,
 who, in the Consulship of *Lævinus* had lent the Re-
 public the sums requisite to supply her pressing wants.
 At the motion of *Lævinus*, the Senate ordered these
 debts to be discharged at three payments; the first
 to be made immediately, and the last within five
 years.

Such instances of equity in the Conscript Fathers em-
 boldened all, who were oppressed, to demand justice;
 and particularly the *Locrians*, who the last year had
 been so ill treated by *Pleminius*. From this people,
 ten deputies, in a neglected and sordid dress, (the
 mark of grief and distress among the ancients) and
 with olive branches in their hands, came to *Rome*, and
 laid before the Senate, in a long and pathetick harangue,

the

the grievances and miseries they had suffered under the Y. of R. tyranny of the Pro-Prætor. When the *Locrians* had done speaking, *Fabius* asked them, whether they had made their complaint to *Scipio*; to which they answered, that deputies had been sent to him for that purpose, but that he was then busy about his preparations for war, and that now he was either gone for *Africa*, or intended to sail in a few days; That they had seen, in the quarrel between the Tribunes and *Pleminius*, how much *Scipio* favoured the latter, whom, though equally criminal, if not more so, he had continued in his government, while he ordered the Tribunes to be laid in irons. After the deputies had withdrawn, some of the chief Senators not only inveighed against *Pleminius*, but began to take *Scipio's* character to pieces. Among these was *M. Porcius Cato*, the first of his family who distinguished himself at *Rome*. He had been Quæstor to *Scipio* in *Sicily*, and had reproved him for his profuseness to his soldiers, to which the General had answered, ‘that he did not want so exact a Quæstor; that he would make war at what expence he pleased, nor was he to give an account to the Roman people of the money he spent, but of his enterprises and the execution of them.’ *Cato*, provoked at this answer, had left *Sicily*, and returned to *Rome*. He now declaimed against *Scipio*, accusing him of making great and useless expences, of passing his time boyishly at the Theatre and the Gymnasia, as if he had been commissioned, not to make war, but to celebrate games. Others of the Senators added, that the Pro-Consul had laid aside the *Roman* habit, publicly appeared in the *Greek* cloak and sandals, and that the reading of *Greek* books, and the pleasures of *Syracuse*, had made him intirely forget *Hannibal* and *Carthage*, while his army, grown as effeminate as their General, was become more terrible to their allies, than their enemies. *Fabius* called *Scipio*, *a man born to be the corrupter of military discipline*. ‘He acted, said the old man, the like part in *Spain*, where we lost not much less by sedition than we did by the war. One while

*Plut. in
Cat. Maj.*

*Liv. B.29.
c. 19.*

Y. of R. ‘ while he indulges his soldiers in all licentiousness, and
 549. ^{Bef J. C.} then cruelly tyrannizes over them; as if he were a
^{203.} King and a ^b foreigner.’ *Fabius*’s sentence was as
^{248.} Con-harsh as his invective; ‘ That *Scipio* should be recalled
 fulship. ‘ home, for having quitted his province without orders
 from the Senate; and that the Tribunes should be
 desired to move the Comitia, to depose him from the
 Pro-Consulate. That *Pleminius* should be brought to
 Rome in chains, and, in case the crimes laid to his
 charge were proved, be executed in prison and his
 goods confiscated. And lastly, that the Senate should
 disavow the ill treatment of the *Locrians*, and give
 them all the satisfaction possible for the wrongs they
 had suffered.’

The debate was carried to such a length, that the opinions of all the Senators could not be taken that day. In the next assembly, the Fathers concurred in *Liv. B. 29.* opinion with *Q. Metellus*. ^{c. 20.} He approved the proposals of *Fabius*, with regard to *Pleminius* and the *Locrians*, but urged, that it was unreasonable, upon dubious accusations, to recall a general, whom *Rome* had chosen Consul, in the expectation of being by him delivered from *Hannibal*, and of becoming mistress of *Africa*: And he moved, that two Tribunes of the people, one *Ædile*, and ten other commissioners^c, out of the Senate, should be sent into *Sicily* with *Pomponius* the Praetor of that island, to take cognizance of *Scipio*’s conduct in the affair of *Pleminius*; and, if they found him an accomplice in that Pro-Praetors crimes, to send him to *Rome*; but in case *Scipio* had already sailed for *Africa*, the Tribunes, the *Ædile*, and two of the Com-

^b Extero & regio more, & indulgere licentiae militum, & sœvire in eos. *Liv. B. 29. c. 19.*

^c Perhaps this pompous embassy was rather designed to enquire into the state of *Scipio*’s army, and to see whether it was yet a proper time for the Senate to give him openly a commission to carry the war into *Africa*. This conjecture seems confirmed by the conduct of the Commissioners, who, even after the *Locrians* had cleared *Scipio*, or dropt the accusation, went nevertheless into *Sicily*; though the decree of the Senate, as it is in *Livy*, had confined their commission to the affair of *Pleminius*.

missioners should follow him thither, the last to assume ^{Y.} of ^{R.} the command of the army, if the Pro-Consul should be ordered home. The Commissioners, who were to embark at *Rhegium*, went first to *Locris*. There they ^{549. Bef. J. C.} ^{203.} ^{248.} Con-
seized the guilty Governor, and thirty two of his ac-
complices, put them in irons, and sent them to *Rome*. They also made reparation to the *Locrians* for their losses, and, having examined them concerning *Scipio*'s conduct, received answer, ‘ That though the Pro-Consul had not shewn great concern at the miseries of their city, yet he was a man they had much rather have for a friend than an enemy : That they persuaded themselves, so many heinous crimes had not been committed by his command, or with his approbation ; that he had only given too much credit to *Pleminius*, and too little to them ; and that such was the disposition of some men, they were more willing to believe people innocent, than disposed to punish them when guilty.’ This declaration pleased the Commissioners, as it freed them from the invidious office of beginning a criminal process against a man so much in favour with the people of *Rome*. And, when they ^{Liv. B. 29.} came into *Sicily*, they were thoroughly convinced, by ^{c. 22.} the vast preparations *Scipio* had made for his intended expedition, and the fine appearance both of his army and fleet, that the General had not spent his time wholly at the theatre, and in amusements. ‘ Go, said they, into *Africa*, and the gods give you that success which the *Roman* people promised themselves from your virtue and abilities, when they chose you Consul. Such a general and such an army will conquer the *Carthaginians*, or they are invincible.’

The report of the Commissioners at their return to *Rome*, raised the glory of *Scipio*. The Senate passed a decree, that he should immediately go into *Africa*, and take with him such of the *Roman* troops in *Sicily* as he thought fit for his enterprize. And, as for the people, the favour, in which he stood with them, made them tender even to the guilty *Pleminius*, for whom they imagined the Pro-Consul had some regard. Their com-

passion

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 opinions of all the Senators could not be taken that
 day. In the next assembly, the Fathers concurred in
^{Liv. B. 29.} opinion with *Q. Metellus*. He approved the proposals
^{c. 20.} of *Fabius*, with regard to *Pleminius* and the *Locrians*,
 but urged, that it was unreasonable, upon dubious ac-
 cusations, to recall a general, whom *Rome* had chosen
 Consul, in the expectation of being by him delivered
 from *Hannibal*, and of becoming mistress of *Africa*:
 And he moved, that two Tribunes of the people, one
Ædile, and ten other commissioners^c, out of the Se-
 nate, should be sent into *Sicily* with *Pomponius* the Præ-
 tor of that island, to take cognizance of *Scipio*’s con-
 duct in the affair of *Pleminius*; and, if they found him
 an accomplice in that Pro-Prætors crimes, to send him
 to *Rome*; but in case *Scipio* had already sailed for *Afri-
 ca*, the Tribunes, the *Ædile*, and two of the Com-

^b Extero & regio more, & indulgere licentiae militum, & saevire
 in eos. *Liv. B. 29. c. 19.*

^c Perhaps this pompous embassy was rather designed to enquire in-
 to the state of *Scipio*’s army, and to see whether it was yet a proper
 time for the Senate to give him openly a commission to carry the war
 into *Africa*. This conjecture seems confirmed by the conduct of the
 Commissioners, who, even after the *Locrians* had cleared *Scipio*, or
 dropt the accusation, went nevertheless into *Sicily*; though the de-
 crees of the Senate, as it is in *Livy*, had confined their commission to
 the affair of *Pleminius*.

missioners should follow him thither, the last to assume ^{Y. of R.} the command of the army, if the Pro-Consul should be ordered home. The Commissioners, who were to embark at *Rhegium*, went first to *Locri*. There they ^{Bef. J. C. 549.} ^{203.} ^{248.} Con-
seized the guilty Governor, and thirty two of his ac-
complices, put them in irons, and sent them to *Rome*. They also made reparation to the *Locrians* for their losses, and, having examined them concerning *Scipio*'s conduct, received answer, ‘ That though the Pro-Consul had not shewn great concern at the miseries of their city, yet he was a man they had much rather have for a friend than an enemy : That they persuaded themselves, so many heinous crimes had not been committed by his command, or with his approbation ; that he had only given too much credit to *Pleminius*, and too little to them ; and that such was the disposition of some men, they were more willing to believe people innocent, than disposed to punish them when guilty.’ This declaration pleased the Commissioners, as it freed them from the invidious office of beginning a criminal process against a man so much in favour with the people of *Rome*. And, when they ^{Liv. B. 29.} came into *Sicily*, they were thoroughly convinced, by ^{c. 22.} the vast preparations *Scipio* had made for his intended expedition, and the fine appearance both of his army and fleet, that the General had not spent his time wholly at the theatre, and in amusements. ‘ Go, said they, into *Africa*, and the gods give you that success which the *Roman* people promised themselves from your virtue and abilities, when they chose you Consul. Such a general and such an army will conquer the *Carthaginians*, or they are invincible.’

The report of the Commissioners at their return to *Rome*, raised the glory of *Scipio*. The Senate passed a decree, that he should immediately go into *Africa*, and take with him such of the *Roman* troops in *Sicily* as he thought fit for his enterprize. And, as for the people, the favour, in which he stood with them, made them tender even to the guilty *Pleminius*, for whom they imagined the Pro-Consul had some regard. Their com-
passion

Y. of R. passion for the criminal was likewise raised, by seeing
 549. the miserable figure he made, without his nose and
 Bef. J. C. ears; so that, though he was often produced before
 203. them, he was never condemned. He died in prison,
 248 Con-fulship. or, as some say, was, long after this, executed for at-
 tempting to set fire to *Rome*.

It has been before observed, that *Scipio*, in order to pave his way to *Carthage*, had gained over to the *Roman* interest the two *Numidian* Kings, *Syphax* and *Liv. B. 29. Masinissa*. The *African* Republic endeavoured to de-
 c. 23. stroy the engagements which those Princes had entered into with her enemy: And *Asdrubal*, the son of *Gisco*, by the means of his daughter *Sophonisba*, drew off *Syphax*^d. The Historians represent her as a woman of *Punic. 6. Appian. in Punic.* excellent beauty, accompanied with graces and a manner irresistibly winning; love for her country, the ruling passion of her soul, with a courage to execute whatever that love could dictate. This lady being given in marriage to *Syphax*, his passion for her made him forget his engagements with *Rome*; and he readily entered into an alliance offensive and defensive with *Carthage*. Prompted by *Asdrubal*, he wrote a letter to *Scipio*, to dissuade him from making a descent upon *Africa*, acquainting him at the same time with his marriage, the new alliance he had made with the *Carthaginians*, and the necessity he should be un-

^d According to *Appian* (*in Punic. c. 6.*) *Asdrubal* had promised his daughter in marriage to *Masinissa*: But *Syphax* being in love with her, the *Carthaginians*, to bring him off from the alliance of *Rome*, gave him *Sophonisba*, without the knowledge of her father, who was then in *Spain*. *Masinissa*, in revenge, privately entered into a league with *Scipio*. Upon hearing this, *Asdrubal* (says the same Historian) was indeed sorry for the injury done to the young Prince, but resolved to have him murdered because it was for the interest of *Carthage*. Accordingly he sent guards with him under pretence of convoying him into his dominions, but gave them secret instructions to kill him. *Masinissa* having discovered the design, found means to escape. *Zonaras* tells us, that *Asdrubal* promised his daughter to *Masinissa*, but afterwards broke his word, and gave her to *Syphax*; thinking it of greater consequence to gain this Prince to the interest of *Carthage* than the other.

der of taking part with them, in case they were at-
tacked.

The Pro-Consul received this letter at *Syracuse* with some surprize; and, to conceal the contents of it from his army, sent back the messenger immediately, with a short answer to the *Numidian* Prince, advising him to beware how he offended both Gods and men, by a violation of public faith: After which, assembling his troops, he bid them prepare for a voyage to *Africa*: ‘Formerly,’ said he, ‘*Masinissa* complained to *Lælius* of my dilatoriness; and now *Syphax* presses me to hasten my departure; and desires, that if I have changed my resolution, I will let him know it, that he may provide for his own safety.’ He then ordered his ships of war and transports to *Lilybaeum*; and thither he, in person, marched the land forces, purposing to set sail with the first favourable wind. All the troops shewed an incredible ardour to follow him in this expedition, especially those legionaries, who had run away at the battle of *Cannæ*, and had therefore been condemned to stay in *Sicily*, for the whole time, that *Hannibal* should continue in *Italy*. As they were old soldiers, and had been in many battles and sieges, the Pro-Consul, notwithstanding their disgrace, took with him as many of them, as were fit for service.

Lælius commanded the fleet. It is uncertain what c. 29 number of men were embarked; but never was embarkation made with more order and solemnity; and the concourse of people, who came from all parts to see it, and to wish the Pro-Consul a prosperous voyage, was incredibly great. Just before he weighed anchor, c. 27 he appeared on the poop of his galley, and, after a herald had proclaimed silence, addressed this prayer to Heaven? ‘O all ye Gods and Goddesses of earth and sea, I intreat and implore you to make whatever I have done, am doing, or shall do, in my command, prosperous to me, to the people and commons of *Rome*, to the allies and the *Latine* name, to all those who espouse the cause of the people of *Rome* and mine.

Y. of R.
549.
Bef. J. C.

203.
248 Con-
fulship.

Liv. B. 29.
c. 24.

V. of R. mine, and follow my command and auspices by
 549. land, by sea, and on rivers: to favour all these en-
 Beſt. J. C. terprizes, and encrease them with good encrease:
 203. 248 Con- Bring us all home safe and unhurt, victorious over
 fulship. our enemies, adorned with spoils, loaded with booty,
 and triumphant: And enable us to execute upon
 Carthage all that she designed against Rome.' When he
 had ended this prayer, he caused a victim to be slain,
 and the entrails to be thrown into the sea; and then the
 trumpets sounding, he weighed anchor, and with fifty
 galleys and four hundred ships of burden, set sail, with
 a favourable wind, for Africa. As he drew towards
 the coast, he asked the name of the nearest land then
 in view, and being told it was called the Fair Pro-
 montory, he liked the omen, ordered his pilots to di-
 rect their course thither, and safely landed his army.

Liv. B. 29. Soon after *Masinissa*, the only African Prince in the in-
 tereſt of Rome, came and joined him. The Historians
 & 29. have left us the following relation of the adventures
 of this young King.

Gala, King of *Massylia**, and father of *Masinissa*,
 had, according to the laws of *Numidia* been succee-
 ded by his younger brother *Oesalces*. And when the
 latter died, his son, *Capusa*, had mounted the throne.
Capusa was slain in a battle against his rebellious sub-
 jects, headed by one *Mezetulus*, a factious man of the
 blood royal, and a constant rival and competitor of
 the Kings of *Numidia*. The Conqueror, though he
 durſt not assume the title of King, made himself tutor
 to *Lacumaces* the younger brother of *Capusa*, and
 seized the government as in right of his ward. And,
 to secure himself in his usurped authority, he not only
 entered into an alliance with King *Syphax*, but married
 his pupil's mother who was niece to *Hannibal*; hoping
 thereby to gain the *Carthaginians* to his interest.

c. 30, 31. *Masinissa* was then in Spain; where hearing of *Ca-*
 32, 33. *pusa*'s death, he passed into Africa, and asked assistance
 of *Bocbar*, King of *Mauritania*. *Bocbar* lent him

* A part of *Numidia*.

4000 men to convoy him to the frontiers of *Massylia*, Y. of R. There, being joined by a small body of *Numidians*, ^{549.} and having advice, that *Lacumaces* was marching into ^{Bef. J. C.} *Massæsylyia* †, to ask succours of King *Syphax*, he surprised the young Prince near *Thapsus*, ^{203.} routed his forces, ^{248 Cons.} fulship. and took the town; but *Lacumaces* escaped to *Syphax*. This success engaged many of the *Numidians* to side with *Masinissa*; and particularly the soldiers who had served under his father *Gala*. Encouraged by these veterans, he ventured, though inferior in number, to attack *Mezetulus*, who was now in the field with a great army, *Lacumaces* having brought him a reinforcement of 15000 foot from *Syphax*. *Masinissa*'s superior skill in war, and the bravery of his troops gave him the victory. *Lacumaces*, with his tutor, and the small remains of their forces, fled for refuge into the territories of *Carthage*; and the conqueror took possession of the vacant throne. But now apprehending he should have a much more difficult war to sustain against *Syphax*, he thought it adviseable to come to an accommodation with his kinsman. He offered to place him in the same rank *Oesalces* had held at *Gala*'s court, pardon *Mezetulus*, and restore to him all his effects. The Princes preferring a moderate, but certain fortune, in their own country, to uncertain hopes, in exile, accepted the proposals, notwithstanding all the industry of the *Carthaginians* to hinder it.

At this time *Asdrubal*, happening to be at *Syphax*'s court, insinuated to him, that *Masinissa* was an ambitious enterprizing youth, who would not be contented, like his father *Gala*, or his uncle *Oesalces*, with the dominion of *Massylia*, and if not crushed in the beginning, might one day prove a dangerous neighbour, both to him and the *Carthaginians*. *Syphax*, instigated by these suggestions, marched an army against *Masinissa*: A pitched battle was fought, in which the *Massylians* were totally vanquished; the King himself

† A part of *Numidia*.

narrowly

Y. of R. narrowly escaped, with only a small guard of horse, to
 549. *Mount Balbus.* Thither some families of his own
 Bef. J. C. subjects followed him, with all their cattle, (wherein
 203. the riches of the *Numidians* chiefly consisted,) and
 248 Con-
 sulship. there being plenty of pasture and water round the
 mountain, he lived on the milk and flesh of their
 flocks. The rest of the *Massilians* submitted to the
 conqueror.

Masinissa having, in this retreat, got some troops together, began to make nocturnal incursions upon the frontiers of the *Carthaginians*; and, in a short time, his forces augmenting, he ventured in open day to penetrate farther into their country, destroyed the inhabitants, and brought thence a considerable booty. *Carthage*, to put a stop to his devastations, had recourse to *Syphax*. The King disdaining to go in person to reduce a band of robbers, dispatched away *Bocchar*, one of his officers, with four thousand foot and two thousand horse. These surrounded the mountain, where *Masinissa* was lodged, hindered the return of the detachments he had sent out, and forced him to the top of the hill.

Bocchar, thinking that he had his enemy secure, sent him back all his troops, except five hundred foot, and two hundred horse. Soon after, he surprized *Masinissa* in a narrow pass, attempting to get away by stealth. The Prince, with only fifty horse, escaped by flight. *Bocchar*, and his two hundred horse, pursued him, came up with him near *Clypea*, and cut in pieces all his guard, except four. With these *Masinissa* though wounded, fled full speed; and finding a river in their way, they leaped horse and man into it. Two of them were drowned in crossing the stream; but the Prince, and the other two, gained the opposite bank, and hid themselves among some bushes. *Bocchar*, who pursued them to the river, imagined they had all perished, and went no farther; and from that time it was reported at *Carthage*, and the court of *Syphax*, that *Masinissa* was dead. In the mean while, he hid himself in a cave, dressed his wound.

wound with herbs, and lived upon the prey which his ^{V.} of R. two companions brought him.

Dethroned Princes, who have any spirit, do not easily relinquish the hopes of a restoration. *Masinissa*, ^{549. Bef. J. C.} ^{203.} Con- as soon as his wound would suffer him to mount on sulship. horseback, left his cave, and took the road to his own country. In a few days after his appearance there, some of his people, to the number of six thousand foot and four thousand horse, gathering about him, he not only possessed himself of *Massylia*, but made dreadful ravages in the territories of the *Carthaginian* allies, and King *Syphax*. The latter thinking the affair serious, came in person with an army to stop the enemy's progress. During the battle which followed, *Vermina*, the son of *Syphax*, having with a large detachment fetched a compass, fell upon the *Massylians* in the rear. By this means *Masinissa* was again defeated. With only sixty horse he fled to the sea coast near the lesser *Syrtis*; and there he continued, for the most part, till the arrival of *Scipio*; by which time he had augmented his troop; for he joined the Pro-Consul with two hundred, some say, two thousand horse.

The alarm and terror which *Scipio*'s descent caused ^{Liv. B. 29.} among the *Carthaginians*, made them think it necessary c. 28. to strengthen the fortifications of their capital. They had no General in any degree qualified to oppose him in the field. *Ashdrubal* (the son of *Gisco*) the best they had, is spoken of by *Livy*, as a man of great quality and wealth, but as excelling in no military

* Appian makes no mention of this second battle. According to him, after *Masinissa* was once driven from his kingdom, he continued dispossessed of it, till *Scipio*'s arrival in *Africa*; at which time *Syphax* and the *Carthaginians*, to draw him off from the *Romans*, pretended to be reconciled to him, and restored him to his kingdom. Though *Masinissa* was sensible, that they were not sincere, yet he pretended to come into their measures, and joined *Ashdrubal* with his cavalry. However he held secret intelligence with *Scipio*, and only waited a favourable opportunity to go over to him, which he did soon after, betraying, at the same time, a party of *Carthaginian* horse into the hands of the *Romans*. In Punic. §. 7. & seq.

Y. of R. talent, except that of saving himself by a swift re-
 549. Bef. J. C. treat*; nor were they provided with disciplined and
 203. experienced soldiers.

248 Con-. Scipio, having ordered his fleet towards Utica, en-
 fulship. camped on certain eminences, not far from the sea
 Livy, B. coast. Next day a body of five hundred Carthaginian
 29 c. 34. horse, commanded by Hanno, a young warrior, who
 had been sent to watch the motions of the enemy, fell in with the advanced guards of the Roman camp,
 who routed them, and slew their commander.

Appian. in Punic. 9. This first success was a good Augury; and Scipio drew near to Locba, a city which seemed to promise his soldiers a rich booty. He had no sooner planted his ladders for the assault, than the inhabitants being terrified, sent a herald to ask their lives, with liberty to retire. Hereupon the General sounded a retreat; but the soldiers, greedy of plunder, would not obey: They forced the town, and put all, even women and children, to the sword. It was necessary to punish so signal a disobedience; and the centurions being the most guilty, as having encouraged the soldiers to it, the Pro-Consul decreed that three of them should die as lots should determine. The soldiers were deprived of the booty they had taken. After some few expeditions of small moment, Scipio undertook the siege of Utica with all his army. But Asdrubal, who commanded 30000 foot, and 3000 horse, being joined by Syphax with 50000 foot, and 10000 horse, obliged the Roman to dislodge, after he had been before the place forty days. He retreated to a promontory, under which his fleet rode at anchor, entrenched himself there, and waited the return of the spring to renew the war. Asdrubal lay encamped near him, and Syphax at a little distance from the Carthaginian. We shall leave them here a while, and return to the affairs of Italy.

Liv. B. 29. c. 36. THE Consul Sempronius, who marched into Brutium against Hannibal, was worsted in his first engage-

* — Asdrubale, fugacissimo Duce. *Liv. B. 30. c. 28.*

ment

ment with him, and lost 1200 men: But, in a second, Y. of R. being assisted by the forces of the Pro-Consul *Licinius*, ^{549.} it is said, he defeated the enemy, left four thousand of them dead upon the spot, and retook several towns ^{203.} after the victory. ^{248 Consulship.}

On the other hand, the Consul *Cetbegus*, who was to act against *Mago*, kept *Hetruria* in awe. By commencing legal processes against those who had entered into a correspondence with the enemy, he prevented the insurrections which the *Carthaginian* endeavoured to raise in that country. The guilty would not appear upon the summons, but went into a voluntary banishment; and their estates were confiscated.

While the Consuls were thus employed abroad, the *Liv. B.29.* two Censors at *Rome*, *Livius Salinator*, and *Claudius c. 37.* *Nero*, drew a contempt on themselves by a most ridiculous behaviour. Though their quarrels with each other had formerly been very great, yet the distress of the Republic, during their Consulship, had reconciled them in appearance for some time; but now their mutual hatred broke out afresh. It was customary for the Censors, just before leaving their office, to draw up a list of the Senators, review the *Roman Knights*, assemble the Tribes, and set a mark of Infamy on such persons as deserved it. As to the first, *Livius* and *Nero* were equitable in their proceedings; but when they came to review the Knights, of which body they both were, *Nero* ordered his Colleague's name to be struck out of the list, on pretence, that he had been formerly condemned by the people for a misdemeanor. And *Livius*, when *Nero*'s name was called over, passed the like sentence against him: 'My reasons,' said he, 'are, that he has borne false witness against me; and that his reconciliation with me was not sincere.' Their passion and folly appeared yet more extravagant, when they came to take an account of the Tribes. *Nero* ranked his Colleague among those whom he declared *AERARII*, i. e. Persons deprived of the rights of *Roman Citizenship*, but still obliged to pay the public taxes. And *Livius* not only did as much for *Nero*, but

Y. of R. but disfranchised all the thirty five Tribes, except the
 549. *Mæcian*, (which was the only one that had formerly
 Bef. J. C. voted for him upon his trial) ‘for,’ said he, ‘it must
 203. 248 Con- be owned they acted unjustly either *once* when they
 fulship. ‘condemned me, or *twice* when they conferred upon
 ‘me the Consulship and Censorship.’ Among the ef-
 fects of *Livius*’s anger against the people, may be reckoned a tax he laid, during his Censorship, upon salt; ordering that it should be sold dearer in some places than others. It was hence that he got the name of *Salinator*. These Censors however were very exact in taking an account of the number of *Roman* Citizens, and sent to the most distant of the camps abroad, for that purpose. The number appeared to be two hundred and fourteen thousand fit to bear arms.



The END of the THIRD VOLUME.